I don’t see a 200 ton shackle fitting any type of socket on 3" wire; I could be wrong.
[QUOTE=“c.captain;111039”]
You know, I think I asked the same question when the KULLUK grounded. I have never towed using two wires to a common fishplate but in all honesty see no reason why not to. The bridles would prevent the fishplate from spinning and the two wires fouling eachother.[/QUOTE]
The dual wire setups I have seen are completely redundant. Crowley has one go to a bridle and the other go to a separate chain in the center of the barge. (I have never used one and only seen the setups on their giant ro-ro barges.)
Only one tow drum on the Aiviq.
GL Noble Denton gets a spanking today but why would they ever be qualified to sign off on towing arrangements anyway?
[B]Shell contractor’s role in checking tow setup under scrutiny[/B]
Published: May 30, 2013
By LISA DEMER — ldemer@adn.com
The first hint of blame over the Dec. 31 grounding of Shell’s oil rig, the Kulluk, on Thursday creeped into the Coast Guard hearing investigating the incident.
Royal Dutch Shell’s offshore marine manager, Jonathan Wilson, testified by phone from London mainly about the later, more substantial tow of the Kulluk after it grounded. In February, it was pulled from Kiliuda Bay, off Kodiak Island, back to Dutch Harbor by three tug boats using heavy gear compared to the single vessel that towed it in December.
Shell lawyer Gregory Linsin asked Wilson his reaction to earlier sworn testimony by a Shell contractor, warranty surveyor Anthony Flynn of GL Noble Denton, an oil and gas technical consultant that was hired to verify the tow setup for insurance purposes.
Shell was surprised by how Flynn described the scope of his work, said Wilson.
Ben Aderholt, a lawyer for Noble Denton, was also listening to the hearing and asked Wilson what surprised him about that. His voice was muffled when he answered. Coast Guard Cmdr. Joshua McTaggart, who is leading the investigation, later repeated the question.
“I was surprised to hear the scope of work didn’t include the evaluation of operations and planning against Noble Denton guidelines,” Wilson said.
That would have checked Shell’s towing setup against marine industry standards, he said.
Flynn testified on Saturday that he evaluated the tow operation to make sure it conformed with Shell’s tow plan and checked that the equipment was in good shape.
Susan Dwarnick, an official with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement who is part of the Coast Guard investigation panel, pressed him to explain on Saturday.
“Are you actually assessing adequacy by some scientific method or engineering calculations or are you just confirming that what you are seeing is consistent with what has been included in some document provided to you by the vessel,” Dwarnick asked.
“The latter,” Flynn answered.
Surprised Shell even used Noble Denton. They are already dropped as far as most inspection work.
here’s Crosby’s page showing spelter socket dimensions…I believe a 200ton shackle will fit a 3" wire socket.
Not by much, but it will!
some better sources than ADN being unearthed this evening. Here’s a transcript of the brilliant highly informed testimony of AIVIQ’s chief engineer last week:
[B]Kulluk Hearing Sheds Light on Fuel Problem[/B]
By Ellen Lockyer, KSKA - Anchorage | May 23, 2013 - 5:24 pmUnder questioning by US Coast Guard officials, chief tug engineer Carl Broekhuis told a chilling story of engine failure that shut down the Aiviq’s four main engines within hours of each other.
The Aiviq was about six days out from Dutch Harbor, where it had taken on fuel under the eye of inspectors. Although three samples of the fuel were taken – at the start, middle and end of the fuel load, there was no suspicion of anything amiss, until the late hours of Dec. 27, when one of the tug’s engines inexplicably went out.
Broekhuis told the Coast Guard panel that the fuel injectors on the engines quit, due to some kind of residue on the filters, eventually shutting down all four engines.
“Like I said I did find some of this jelly – like stuff, I guess you could say, and that was something new. I hadn’t seen it before. I’ve been doing this a long time. I’ve actually seen injectors fail by water. You might lose one, I’ve never lost twenty.”
[USCG] “And are you certain as to what about the fuel caused the engines to shut down?”
” I’m not a scientist, but I’m telling you, that I believe that it was something that was introduced to the fuel, and additive of some sort or something. I truly believe that, because I’ve eliminated everything else. ”
Broekhuis said that at the time of the engine failures every effort was taken to inspect and investigate the various components of the tug’s engine system. Water in the fuel tanks or injectors was ruled out, as were faulty vents. Broekhuis said something appeared to be gumming up the fuel filters, and, in retrospect, a jelly like substance was found in the fuel tanks after the Aiviq reached Kodiak. Broekhuis testified that he didn’t learn about the gel until after the incident, and that he has not seen a report of what it could have been, although he suspects it was some kind of fuel additive. Coast Guard Commander Joshua McTaggart questioned Broekhuis further about the additive:
[USCG] “So any additives that would have been added to the fuel would have been from your supplier, correct?”
[Broekhuis] “That is correct.”
[USCG] “Perhaps you knew there was an additive added? Can you explain that?”
[Broekhuis ] “I found out after the fact. After the fact is when I found out that there was an additive in it.”
[USCG] “OK. Would you share that with us what information you might have?”
[Broekhuis] “Ah, I’m not sure what it was. I do know you know, it’s been discussed with a couple of different things, but, I mean I do know that there was some form of an additive in there. ”
[USCG] “Is there any further information you can give us regarding the name of the additive, the type of additive and anything along that line?”
[Broekhuis] “Not off the top of my head, no. I can’t give you exactly what was in it. No one’s ever told me what was in it.”
Attorneys for the Aiviq’s shipbuilders Edison Chouest, also questioned Broekhuis. One of them told reporters later that the origin of the tug’s fuel is not known, nor is the component of the alleged additive.
I mean the man must be a sheer genius with such detailed highly technical knowledge in his head. Just the perfect kind of chief for a $200M ECO flagship! At least he is very good at regurgitating what his handlers told him to say anyway.
It will its a 4" diameter with a 4 1/2" pin usually at least a waterman shackle.
I was there for over 17 years, and do not know that person. Must have hired him.
I’m starting to get deja vu all over again… Sailing off into heavy weather due to financial concerns, an engineer unclear regarding fuel, shortcuts taken for convenience…
Guess there’s a little Bounty everywhere… Thank you all for you insights, I got to piss off the boss today by telling him to call Waterman and order a 3 1/2" connector link, I wasn’t even gonna try a 500+/- ton lift with a 2" Chinese shackle anywhere near… They’ll probably tell me to tie a knot and stop it off with a bungee cord…NOT
[QUOTE=anchorman;111058]Only one tow drum on the Aiviq.[/QUOTE]
I’d call that a very significant design flaw.
[QUOTE=anchorman;111015]Please. You can have as much experience as you Want and Mother Nature could give a rats ass. If you’ve towed for any amount of time on a hauser and call yourself experienced, you certainly have lost a tow once or twice.
Just for shits and giggles, I googled an operators name with “lost tow”…and it took less than a second to prove no boat or towing company, no matter who they are is immune to losing a tow, and ECO belongs on that list as well as everyone else. Anyone professing themselves as “perfect” is stupid, unheard of, and certainly does make sense to make that self conceived comment.
Another case in point…
I use to tow a customers barge that had three shots of 3-1/2" chain surge gear permanently rigged to the barge.
My company required that we haul all the chain surge gear aboard and check the shackles and keeper bolts every so many miles. Maybe it was every 1000 miles? Since we mostly towed the barge between Hawaii and the coast, we had to haul all three shots aboard in just about every port. This was with an old 130’ single screw tug with a single drum winch. We had to haul the chain aboard over the stern with a capstan, and the main tow wire. It took about four hours of strapping and stopping off and made a hell of a pile on deck.
So I cannot see why a drill rig with a crane and AIVIQ could possible have had any trouble handling one shot of of the same chain.
In my opinion, a tow like the KULLUK crossing the Gulf of Alaska in the winter should have had more than one shot of heavy chain.
[QUOTE=c.captain;111065]some better sources than ADN being unearthed this evening. Here’s a transcript of the brilliant highly informed testimony of AIVIQ’s chief engineer last week:
I mean the man must be a sheer genius with such detailed highly technical knowledge in his head. Just the perfect kind of chief for a $200M ECO flagship! At least he is very good at regurgitating what his handlers told him to say anyway.[/QUOTE]
Oh, my. That testimony is embarrassing. I don’t think he has any handlers. A ‘handler’ could come up with coherent testimony for someone to regurgitate. Why would someone with an interest in shaping testimony come up with such incompetent BS?
That is a reverse waterfall (3) drum winch rated for 500 tons.
On a ship tow job with a 5000 hp. tug we used 5 shots 3" chain 100 ton shackles and 2600’ of 2 1/4" wire. All towing gear was new. The ship SS Petersburg was over 600’ and quite wide. The tow was from Alameda CA to Portland OR in predicted good weather. We had an Orville hook on board with a crew experienced in its use.
The tow was uneventful. This was a simple straight forward job…my point is it appears they were using less surge gear than we use in a every day tow in the west coast petroleum barge trade…relative to the size of the Kulluk. There is nothing wrong with being chain happy…
[QUOTE=c.captain;110913]All agreed but there is so much we are not getting from the Anchorage Daily News that little of these reports make for a clear picture yet you are correct that failure #1 was to track right to the south of Kodiak in that kind of weather. Should have been go 300miles SE from Unimak Pass and then rhumbline to Cape Flattery. The worst of the systems would have tracked to the north of them on the AIVIQ and would have made it just fine to Everett but this is where lack of experience in those waters shows. If the master wanted to go that direct route (as I have been told privately) and was countermanded, then the system is rotten. He must have the final say or he is no master at all but just a boat driver. The route the AIVIQ/KULLUK took in the end was the most dangerous one possible with the greatest risks of exactly this kind of circumstance occurring. If Shell demanded they go that route, then they are at fault for lack of knowledge and unnecessary risk taking and ECO is at fault for not standing up to Shell and saying BULLSHIT ON THIS!
Also on top of the route taken, an 85ton tow shackle is too small and no surge gear is plain foolish as was not using dynamic braking (which I do not have experience with but understand the value of provided it works per the manufacturer’s design). A hard brake is asking for the wire to tightline and the tow gear to fail!
.[/QUOTE]
You are right that the best route would have been to sail south from Unimak Pass for at least 200 or 300 miles and then run straight for Seattle. That’s the tried and true offshore route. The idea is to stay out of the Gulf of Alaska and avoid the endless series of lows that track across it.
Don’t they call this “local knowledge”?
Yup but somebody had to make sure their helicopters were in range, bet they wish they changed their minds now…btw what kind of winch was it that could pull 3 shots of 3" chain that’s some serious weight!
The U.S. Coast Guard inquiry into the grounding of the Shell drillship Kulluk continued Friday, with questions on the overall management of the drillship and events that led up to the accident last Dec. 31.
On Thursday, the chief engineer of the Edison Chouest heavy tug Aiviq told the hearing panel that he believes fuel problems caused all four engines on the Aiviq to quit in the midst of the late December storm off Kodiak as the 365-foot Aiviq struggled to regain control of the Kulluk, which was adrift after towlines had broken.
The Kulluk, a conical drillship, eventually grounded Dec. 31 on a small island. It was refloated after several days and has since been transported to South Korea for repairs. Shell had been using the Kulluk in its Arctic offshore exploration.
The panel asked detailed questions Thursday to chief engineer Carl Broekhuis and Capt. Bobby Newill, the Aiviq’s third mate, who was in charge of the tow system in addition to other duties.
With Broekhuis, the panel asked detailed questions about possible water entering the fuel from tank vents on the vessel being submerged by waves, particularly in rough seas Dec. 27 when the Aiviq took severe rolls while maneuvering to reestablish tow lines on the drillship.
Broekhuis told the panel he had conducted extensive tests on the fuel after the accident to eliminate the possibility, in his mind, that it had been contaminated with water.
He was later informed there was an additive in the fuel when it was loaded at Dutch Harbor, the Aleutians port from which the Aiviq had left towing the Kulluk.
Broekhuis said he narrowed the questions down to the quality of the fuel by replacing the fuel injectors but “staying on same fuel tank, and the same thing happened” with the fuel injectors failing.
“It ruled out everything else–I believe it was the additive. I should have known it (the additive) was there,” he said.
Broekhuis said he had not been informed of the additive and he still does not know its identity. He also reported seeing a “green gunk” on the fuel injectors as they were being replaced.
“The additive could have been incompatible with the fuel, or not added right,” he said.
Edison Chouest is still investigating the issue internally, Broekhuis said.
“After the accident I received numerous emails from captains of fishing vessels operating out of Dutch Harbor complaining about problems with fuel,” Broekhuis told the inquiry.
Sources familiar with marine fuel distribution in Alaska, asking not to be identified, said the “green gunk” (there were other reports of its appearing as a “slime”) pointed to some sort of bacterial action in the fuel.
The panel did not ask the identity of the fuel supplier in Dutch Harbor, and Shell officials did not volunteer it. Major fuel suppliers in Diutch Harbor include Delta Western, Inc.; North Pacific Services, a subsidiary of Petro Star Inc., an Arctic Slope Regional Corp. company, and Aleutians Fuel Service, an affiliate of Offshore Systems Inc.
If even a small amount of water was present it could encourage bacterial growth. In very rough seas any accumulation of organic matter, or sludge, in the fuel tanks could be broken loose and mixed in the fuel, the sources said.
“Think of it like a big martini shaker,” one source said.
However, this might not fully explain how all of the Aiviq’s fuel injectors failed, and all four engines shut down, over a space of three to four hours late Dec. 27 and early Dec 28, so other factors were likely at work, the source said.
The hearing panel also focused questions to Newill on whether running the engines at 80 percent power was a risk. On Monday, Capt. Marc Dial, a towmaster on the Kulluk’s northbound voyage in mid-2012, told the panel he did not like to exceed 60 percent power on the engines.
Newill said the 80 percent power levels were to be the top speed and that frequently the speed was below that. In fact, the Aiviq had slowed down due to large swells when the first towline broke, he said.
There are also questions on levels of training the officers and crews had received for received for the Aiviq, which was new and in its first year of operations, and with new-technology operating systems.
“The Ailviq is very sophisticated and complex, and it’s the first of its kind,” said Susan Dwarnick, with the U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, a member of the hearing panel.
Newill told the panel Thursday he had been given no formal training on the new systems but there were orientations and “on the job training,” on new equipment.
Broekhuis, the chief engineer, said the engine systems were new and with no operating protocols as yet, but that he could apply “best engineering practices,” in troubleshooting problems.
However, as with any brand new piece of equipment, operating glitches were expected, and the vessel owner, Edison Chouest, was quick to take note of recommendations, he said.
Newill said the first break of the towline to the Kulluk was a complete surprise to the Aiviq crew because weather conditions were moderate, though there were large swells and the speed of the Aiviq had been slowed to about 2 knots.
The large seas did cause sudden peaks of tension on the tow array, however, to as much as 220 tons of stress, or twice as much as the normal average load, Newell said. However, that was well below the calculated breaking point of the shackle that failed, he said.
“I still don’t now why it failed. Everything we were doing that morning was well within normal ranges,” Newill said.
The Coast Guard hearings will continue through the week of May 27, concluding June 31.
It seems to me that there is some really strange hubris involved here. Some of these guys answers are just sad. It is like for some reason or other they suddenly found themselves with a vessel on which they had little actual training and protocols were not established. Meanwhile they proceeded with towing something unlike anything they had ever towed before and ‘poof’ shit just happened but no one can fathom how such a thing happened. This was the best and brightest available for the job? All the while the chief engineer is talking some gobbley-dee-gook about mysterious slime which was something caused by some mystery person adding mystery additive to the fuel which caused all the engines to shut down. No analysis of the fuel seems to be available even though it has been months since the incident. A competent engineer would have never used the fuel out of his storage tanks until the analysis was returned. My lord this is worse than I thought.
220 tons “normal” !!! No shit they lost it. If you’re making 2 knots and banjo stringing you got the wrong gear or are pulling too damn hard, what a broken record sob story though.
According to that mate then if it was only half the rated strength then they were towing with 450 Ton shackles? Lolz!!!
[QUOTE=rshrew;111092]Yup but somebody had to make sure their helicopters were in range, bet they wish they changed their minds now…btw what kind of winch was it that could pull 3 shots of 3" chain that’s some serious weight![/QUOTE]
I don’t remember the brand of the winch. We only pulled the chain up on deck in shallow water with the barge alongside the dock. I’m not sure but I seem to recall that each link weighed something like 60 or 80 pounds.