I hope he is, was hoping they didn’t use him as a scapegoat is all.
[QUOTE=rshrew;110963]I hope he is, was hoping they didn’t use him as a scapegoat is all.[/QUOTE]
Anyone that removes the only surge gear, and then tows up short with a hard brake set in well forecast heavy weather over an inappropriate route resulting in an ultra high profile grounding is obviously unqualified for towing.
True at this point it’s speculation and I doubt the REAL facts will ever be made public, one can only hope.
[QUOTE=rshrew;110969]True at this point it’s speculation and I doubt the REAL facts will ever be made public, one can only hope.[/QUOTE]
The most egregious truth is that the reason we will probably never find out what happened and why is because the criminal system whereby a CG O-whatever gets bought out by the industry he took the taxpayer’s money to oversee. The system that allows this to happen is broken, it has to stop. Those who participate on either side are criminals, in my opinion.
When a private individual who lacks the cash or connections to support a former USCG O-(pick a number) in the style he figures his influence is worth on the market, we very quickly learn the most minute and irrelevant personal detail. The times we never learn “the REAL facts” are when the “former CG” O- (don’t worry, I have friends in high places) overseer intervenes to bury what he knows will be evidence or events or actions that might cost his handlers more than his salary for the next few years.
from yesterday’s testimony
[B]Exhaustive efforts failed to prevent Kulluk grounding[/B]
Published: May 29, 2013
By LISA DEMER — ldemer@adn.com
Capt. Paul Mehler III, left, commander of Coast Guard Sector Anchorage, testifies on Wednesday, May 29, 2013, during the formal marine casualty investigation hearing into Shell’s conical drilling rig Kulluk grounding on Sitkalidak Island, Alaska, during severe weather on Dec. 31, 2012. Coast Guard lawyer Cmdr. William Dwyer listens at right.
Bill Roth — Anchorage Daily NewsBuy Photo
Anchorage — The Coast Guard commander who oversaw the massive but ultimately failed attempt to stop Shell’s drilling rig, the Kulluk, from grounding last year near Kodiak Island revealed new moments of danger and despair about the event on Wednesday.
Cmdr. Paul Mehler, the Anchorage-based officer for Western Alaska, was the federal on-scene coordinator during the effort to save the Kulluk and keep crews safe. In the unified command structure that included Shell, a state environmental official, a Kodiak Island Borough official and Shell contractors, the Coast Guard held ultimate authority, Mehler explained to the Coast Guard panel investigating the grounding.
“It’s a team, and we do decisions jointly,” said Mehler, the only Coast Guard representative called to testify in the 10-day hearing, which wraps up Friday. But as the top federal official, he said, “I have 51 percent of the vote.”
The Kulluk was being towed by a single vessel built to be a powerhouse, the Aiviq, from Dutch Harbor to the Seattle area in December. But a shackle somehow came loose and was lost at sea, breaking the tow connection. All four of the Aiviq’s engines failed. Other vessels came to help but none could hold the round, bobbing Kulluk in a winter storm. The Coast Guard eventually evacuated the Kulluk’s 18-person crew with helicopters, abandoning it to come aground on rocks and gravel.
Cmdr. Joshua McTaggart, the lead investigator, asked Mehler about a decision to drop off a four-person salvage crew on the Kulluk when it was adrift and unmanned in the stormy Gulf of Alaska.
Mehler said the command team knew from photos and videos that multiple broken tow lines were hanging loose, but didn’t know which one would work best. Then there was a reprieve in weather.
“If we can get, even for a short period of time, folks on board to assess, see where we are, and maybe adjust a line, so we have one good line to grab onto,” maybe the Kulluk could be controlled and saved, Mehler said.
It’s hazardous enough for boats to get close enough, he said.
The four-person crew included two men from Smit Salvage and two from Global Diving & Salvage. They talked to some of the last crew members evacuated to get the Kulluk layout. They looked at diagrams. They watched Coast Guard aerial footage of the rig.
A Coast Guard helicopter lowered them onto the Kulluk, then took off to deliver parts to the Aiviq, Mehler said.
But the Kulluk was no place for even tough salvage guys.
As Mehler told it, the men couldn’t even walk around. “Let’s get out of here,” they said.
The Coast Guard helicopter, meanwhile, was having its own troubles. “Its cable snagged and tangled,” Mehler said. It had to return to base. Another helicopter got the crew off. The foray didn’t provide any useful information, Mehler said.
Mehler said the Coast Guard never signed off on Shell’s tow plan, nor did it have to. But some on his staff were briefed on it.
Another member of the investigation panel, Lt. Cmdr. Brian McNamara, asked Mehler about Coast Guard oversight when the Kulluk and the Aiviq left Dutch Harbor on Dec. 21 for the weeks-long trip to Seattle.
“Were you comfortable, sir, that they were fit to head to sea?”
“Yes,” Mehler answered.
The Aiviq had previously towed the Kulluk north from Seattle all the way to the drilling site in the Beaufort Sea and then back south to the Aleutians.
“Were you aware, sir, that on Nov. 10, 2012, the Aiviq during the transit from the Beaufort to Dutch Harbor had suffered a complete electrical failure that had put the No. 4 main diesel engine out of commission?” McNamara asked.
No, Mehler said. That failure, revealed earlier in the hearing by an Alaska manager for Aiviq owner Edison Chouest Offshore of Louisiana, occurred more than a month before all four engines went down during the Kulluk crisis.
With the benefit of hindsight, McNamara asked, what would he have done differently?
The Coast Guard inspected the Kulluk, but not the Aiviq, before they left and should have checked both, Mehler said. He later clarified that both vessels had valid Coast Guard certificates.
Mehler also described the mood in the emergency command center in the Anchorage Marriott Downtown just before the grounding.
He said he gave the order on Dec. 31 to cut the Kulluk free from the last vessel that held it, the Alert, a Crowley Marine Services tug boat. The Alert captain didn’t want to give up, but a vessel tracking system showed his boat was being pulled by the heavy Kulluk toward shore.
“People felt as they had failed,” Mehler said. “After a tremendous fight to try to keep Kulluk afloat and not go aground … we made the decision based on safety of people.”
The hearing at Loussac Library continues Thursday with a Shell witness and the Aiviq captain.
So it appears that the AIVIQ’s master never filed a CG2692 for the Nov. engine failure? Shame on them if they didn’t. This is too much of the oilfield way to operate.
.
The USCG will never figure out the real facts. They don’t have an Alaska towing expert telling them what questions to ask. They just have Buddy Custard telling them what questions not to ask.
[QUOTE=“Steamer;110976”]
The most egregious truth is that the reason we will probably never find out what happened and why is because the criminal system whereby a CG O-whatever gets bought out by the industry he took the taxpayer’s money to oversee. The system that allows this to happen is broken, it has to stop. Those who participate on either side are criminals, in my opinion.
When a private individual who lacks the cash or connections to support a former USCG O-(pick a number) in the style he figures his influence is worth on the market, we very quickly learn the most minute and irrelevant personal detail. The times we never learn “the REAL facts” are when the “former CG” O- (don’t worry, I have friends in high places) overseer intervenes to bury what he knows will be evidence or events or actions that might cost his handlers more than his salary for the next few years.[/QUOTE]
I am sure this is the first time a government agency has gone with what a commercial entity has told them. I am shocked and dismayed I tell you.
Come on, this business as usual. First everybody says they want less government and their guns and the next second they want the government to be an expert on everything and hold people accountable. YOU CAN’T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS!
Either give up on our government or make a conscious effort to serve our country and save it. Just stop the incessant whining! This was a done deal when Shell started waving money and the government lackeys were there to lap it up. When it goes to hell, the only person responsible is the Master. That’s the way it is set up. He took the job, be could have said no but he did not. Everybody else has plausible deniability and will not be culpable.
Chances are G&D-money will keep him on salary until this whole episode becomes a memory. That is how they roll. They are very loyal to their employees and expect the same. CHOUEST did not get to where they r by being a bunch if boobs. I have nothing but respect for them and the company. Some of the other players, not so much.
[QUOTE=BMCSRetired;110994]Chances are G&D-money will keep him on salary until this whole episode becomes a memory. That is how they roll. They are very loyal to their employees and expect the same. CHOUEST did not get to where they r by being a bunch if boobs. I have nothing but respect for them and the company. Some of the other players, not so much.[/QUOTE]
I think is must be stated that no matter how big or successful does not make Chouest perfect or the most expert at everything they do. For this case in point, they are not an experienced Alaskan towing company. Foss, Crowley, Western, Boyer & Dunlap all are but not Chouest and unless they decide to hire Alaskan towing masters, they will not have that experience for a very long time. You do not get it in one short season and that we have already witnessed! These other companies have been working in the North for decades!
Please. You can have as much experience as you Want and Mother Nature could give a rats ass. If you’ve towed for any amount of time on a hauser and call yourself experienced, you certainly have lost a tow once or twice.
Just for shits and giggles, I googled an operators name with “lost tow”…and it took less than a second to prove no boat or towing company, no matter who they are is immune to losing a tow, and ECO belongs on that list as well as everyone else. Anyone professing themselves as “perfect” is stupid, unheard of, and certainly does make sense to make that self conceived comment.
Another case in point…
[QUOTE=anchorman;111015]Please. You can have as much experience as you Want and Mother Nature could give a rats ass. If you’ve towed for any amount of time on a hauser and call yourself experienced, you certainly have lost a tow once or twice.
Just for shits and giggles, I googled an operators name with “lost tow”…and it took less than a second to prove no boat or towing company, no matter who they are is immune to losing a tow, and ECO belongs on that list as well as everyone else. Anyone professing themselves as “perfect” is stupid, unheard of, and certainly does make sense to make that self conceived comment. [/QUOTE]
one would think with such a high valued and high profile tow as the KULLUK that Chouest would have done everything possible and more to ensure no single point failures in the rigging of the gear and would have triple sized the shackle used! Were they completely relying on Delmar to do this for them and what experience do they have in Alaska? NONE is the answer! An 85ton tow shackle is puny and none of the other companies would ever consider using one for such a tow in mid winter. I personally have never seen less than a 150ton tow shackle used for such a heavy rig tow as the KULLUK and those tows were in the summer with tandem tugs! Somebody here didn’t know what they were going to face even if they were going to even take a sheltered route let alone going outside where there would be not one single refuge or shelter available to them. LACK OF EXPERIENCE IS WRITTEN ALL OVER THIS FIASCO!
Plus we have heard not one word about any emergency recovery system carried aboard AIVIQ such as an Orville Hook! What about that?
I know full well that this forum is filled with ECO apologists, but I let the facts speak for themselves and they do not write a pretty story. ECO, Noble Drilling, HGIM are Gulf of Mexico operators without specific Alaskan experience and I know all the other Alaskan vets her will back me up when I say that the GoM way of working is NOT the way to work in the North…especially in the winter!
They had no surge gear and inadequate cotterpins to keep the shackle together. It would not have mattered if they had used a 200 ton shackle. If they don’t know how to install cotterpins or keeper bolts (with the ends peaned over), the pin will fall out of any size shackle. They botched this tow before they even let the lines go in Dutch Harbor.
In spite of the best efforts of good people, shit happens. Yes, it happens to all of us. But it happens to Shell and Noble all the time. I have no doubt that ECO is an excellent company (and that AIVIQ will eventually prove to be a very good vessel), but in this instance they were in way over their heads. The results speak for themselves.
Please give an example of wire/chain/connecting link sizes, and weights that would allow accommodating a safe (appropriate) hook up. Just what they “should” have had, that works, and that you are accustom to use in Alaska. I am just curious, seriously.
If that is the case, I agree with that 100%
[QUOTE=anchorman;111023]Please give an example of wire/chain/connecting link sizes, and weights that would allow accommodating a safe (appropriate) hook up. Just what they “should” have had, that works, and that you are accustom to use in Alaska. I am just curious, seriously.[/QUOTE]
for the time of year and shape and displacement of the rig, the legs of the bridle should have been 120’ of 3-3.5" chain made to a fishplate with minimum 150ton shackles with double nuts and bolt keepers with the ends peened over (no cotter pins), the fishplate would be 3’ per side and 2.5" thick plate with doublers at each hole. A 120-150’ piece of 3-3.5" surge chain would be shackled to the fishplate with a 200ton shackle and a 3" tow wire with a new poured socket would be connected to the end of the surge gear with another 200ton shackle. Of course, for maximum redundancy and best maritime practice a second tug would be shackled to a second piece of surge chain to a fishplate made for the tandem tow! Heavy as HELL and awkward to handle? YES, but that’s how you move a KULLUK in the winter across the Gulf of Alaska and keep the tow intact all the way across!
.
And isn’t that why the Aiviq had chain lockers and cranes and winches and hydraulic pins and every other accessory known to man? You know, to handle awkward towing gear maybe? If there was a vessel setup to easily handle that crap it sure beats a 120’ conventional tug with no crane and minimal deck space.
[QUOTE=z-drive;111027]And isn’t that why the Aiviq had chain lockers and cranes and winches and hydraulic pins and every other accessory known to man? You know, to handle awkward towing gear maybe? If there was a vessel setup to easily handle that crap it sure beats a 120’ conventional tug with no crane and minimal deck space.[/QUOTE]
Yeah…No Shit!
[QUOTE=“c.captain;111026”]
for the time of year and displacement of the rig, the legs of the bridle should have been 120’ of 3-3.5" chain made to a fishplate with minimum 150ton shackles with double nuts and bolt keepers with the ends peened over (no cotter pins), the fishplate would be 3’ per side and 2.5" think plate with doublers at each hole. A 120-150’ piece of 3-3.5" surge chain would be shackled to the fishplate with a 200ton shackle and a 3" tow wire with a new poured socket would be shackled to the end of the surge gear Of course, for maximum redundancy and best maritime practice a second tug would be shackled to a second piece of surge chain to a fishplate made for the tandem tow! Heavy as HELL and awkward to handle? YES, but that’s how you move a KULLUK in the winter across the Gulf of Alaska and keep the tow intact all the way across!
.[/QUOTE]
Hell, when I towed in the Bering Sea it was only a ~240ft container barge and we used 2.5 inch chain for a bridle with a 45ft pigtail of the same attached via a heart-shackle (no fish plate). Attached to that was another half shot of 2.5 inch chain surge gear before the 1.75 inch wire.
I believe Crowley tows the Puerto Rican aircraft carriers with two 2.5 inch wires and 3 inch chain or bigger. I can’t imagine using less than 3 inch chain for the Kulluk and at least one whole shot of chain surge gear after the pigtail.
Did the Aiviq have a double wire drum. If so, why weren’t they using it?
[QUOTE=Capt. Phoenix;111037]Did the Aiviq have a double wire drum. If so, why weren’t they using it?[/QUOTE]
You know, I think I asked the same question when the KULLUK grounded. I have never towed using two wires to a common fishplate but in all honesty see no reason why not to. The bridles would prevent the fishplate from spinning and the two wires fouling eachother.
We tow 420x100’ across the gulf weekly year round on 3" chain. 90’ pigtail and 90’ shot on the tug 3" with 2 1/2" wire.
The aircraft carriers mentioned have two separate bridles and gear, must be two separate systems for a reason.