KULLUK grounding hearings as reported in the Achorage Daily News

Maritime News
101

from today

[B]Contractor says tow line OK before Shell grounding[/B]

Published: May 28, 2013

By DAN JOLING — Associated Press

ANCHORAGE, Alaska — An employee of a Royal Dutch Shell PLC contractor says towing equipment appeared to be in order before a Shell drilling barge left an Aleutians Island port last December.

William Hebert (AY’-bayr) of Delmar Systems, Inc. testified Tuesday before a Coast Guard investigation panel investigating the grounding of the 266-foot diameter Kulluk (KUL’-uk).

The floating rig broke free from towing lines and ran aground Dec. 31 off an island near Kodiak.

A key piece of the tow system, a metal shackle, was not recovered.

Hebert says he was in Seattle last summer when the shackle was installed before the Kulluk’s trip north.

He says he saw it again in December in Dutch Harbor after the Kulluk’s return from the Beaufort Sea and the shackle showed no sign of deformity.

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more from Tuesday…confirmation that there was no surge gear in the rigging of the tow…in the Gulf of Alaska…in the WINTER!

[B]Shell contractor testifies tow setup for Kulluk was modified[/B]

Published: May 28, 2013
By LISA DEMER — ldemer@adn.com

An employee for a Shell contractor testified Tuesday that a heavy chain – which investigators indicated can be used to absorb the force of rough weather – was eliminated from the towing setup for Shell’s drilling rig, the Kulluk, because of concerns about handling the gear.

William Hebert works for Delmar, a Louisiana offshore oil field services company, and was sent to Alaska to serve as “rig move coordinator” for the Kulluk. He testified on Day 7 of a Coast Guard hearing investigating the Kulluk’s Dec. 31 grounding in a fierce Gulf of Alaska storm.

The same tow setup was planned for the multiple legs of the Kulluk’s transit, Hebert said, testifying by telephone from the company headquarters in Broussard. On Dec. 21, the Kulluk left Dutch Harbor under tow by a single vessel, the Aiviq.

Hebert said he oversaw the mooring system at the drilling site. He was not responsible for the tow plan, but helped Shell and its drilling contractor, Noble Drilling Corp., acquire the tow gear. A Delmar crew rode aboard the Aiviq and connected the tow gear, he said.

Unlike towing a car on land with a taut connection, at sea the line is mostly underwater and is curved to absorb movement. Often in Alaska, the tow gear includes heavy chain, called surge chain, which is pulled along to act like an undersea spring between the tow line and the bridle system that connects to the vessel under tow.

The Kulluk tow plan called for a 90-foot length of chain, Coast Guard investigator Keith Fawcett said in questioning Hebert.

“Was there any conversation about lengthening that surge chain to accommodate shock loading?” Fawcett asked.

“Not that I recall, sir,” Hebert answered.

Then what, the investigator asked, was changed?

Hebert said the tow master for the trip north, Marc Dial, originally designed the system so that chain would be attached to the Kulluk, then connected to a wire, then to surge chain. To anchor for drilling, all that chain would have go up on the rig. The tow planning team talked about how the crew on the Kulluk would recover and deploy the tow gear.

“Noble personnel made mention that it just would just be kinda hard to handle, trying to be able to work, the way that was that designed,” Hebert said.

So the surge chain was eliminated from the set up, he testified.

The Aiviq lost its tow connection to the Kulluk on Dec. 27 as the seas were picking up. As various boats came to help, they couldn’t hold the Kulluk under tow either.

The Coast Guard appears to zeroing in on a shackle that came off and was lost at sea as the initial failure point. Fawcett also asked Hebert about the bending of a cotter pin intended to secure a bolt and keep the shackle intact.

In a photograph that is part of the evidence, the tips of the cotter pin are bent at 90-degree angles and extend beyond the edge of the bolt, Fawcett said, describing it for Hebert. The Coast Guard has not released any of the evidence. Could that protrusion have damaged the pin?

It could have, Hebert said.

“We’ve talked about the strain on the towing system that the equipment was subjected to at sea. Is it a possibility that the cotter pin might have failed, the bolt migrated or rotated off the shaft and the shackle simply fell apart at sea?” Fawcett asked.

“Yes, it’s a possibility,” Hebert said.

The hearing at Loussac Library continues Wednesday afternoon with testimony from the lone Coast Guard official testifying, Capt. Paul Mehler, commander of the Anchorage Coast Guard office. He led the federal response to the Kulluk situation.

The panel was supposed to hear this week from John Becker, the tow master on the trip south, but he’s unable to testify because of a family emergency, the panel was told.

The hearing is set to wrap up Friday.

Clearly, the stoopid leading the idiots being followed by the morons!

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[QUOTE=c.captain;110880]more from Tuesday…confirmation that there was no surge gear in the rigging of the tow…in the Gulf of Alaska…in the WINTER!

Clearly, the stoopid leading the idiots being followed by the morons![/QUOTE]

There has to be more to it than that. I am curious of the set-up, as far as the bridle on the Kulluk, if the chain was already there. I can understand not adding chain, if it was already part of the set-up. I do not believe 90 extra feet will be difficult handling as he testified, that vessel can hold some chain - thousands of feet, and not that difficult to add sections at any point. Even though Willie has 30 years experience, he does not dictate anything in the tow. That is done by Shell and the under writers, then signed off by ECO and the Captain at the very end, going through a 3rd party consultant as well. Willie makes sure the rigging is as per plan - that’s it.

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It will be interesting who will be the one left holding the blame. From what has been posted it sure sounds like the tow was not rigged correctly for the weather. Now it might have been fine in “Normal” Weather but we all know that you plan for the worse case when it comes to rigging tow gear.

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[QUOTE=Tugs;110887]It will be interesting who will be the one left holding the blame. From what has been posted it sure sounds like the tow was not rigged correctly for the weather. Now it might have been fine in “Normal” Weather but we all know that you plan for the worse case when it comes to rigging tow gear.[/QUOTE]

There is no “right” tow for that weather. You should not have been there to begin with. The Master of the vessel is always at fault. That is a very easy one to answer.

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I may catch hell for this, but surge chain can only do so much given the size of the tow and the tug. All things being equal, I wouldn’t have a problem without it, but you need to make up for it with more wire out, and slower speeds. Anyone who has towed rigs in any kind of weather (like 25% of what they had) has spent time heading North, but moving south at a knot or 2. Anchorman, does Delmar use shackles with 2 cotter pins; one right through the nut, and another one outside it? I’ve used them on tugs, but don’t know if they are approved.

[QUOTE=c.captain;110880]more from Tuesday…confirmation that there was no surge gear in the rigging of the tow…in the Gulf of Alaska…in the WINTER!

Clearly, the stoopid leading the idiots being followed by the morons![/QUOTE]

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[QUOTE=c.captain;110268]It wasn’t the GODDAMNED fuel! Literally hundreds of vessels took that same diesel from the jobber and if it was bad then there would have been dozens of boats going DIW out in the Bering Sea and elsewhere.

All four mains were pulling from the same day tank I believe and there was a shitload of water in it from seas washing on the decks! ECO is throwing up a smokescreen here to pass the blame to something that can easily be proved negatively with simple tests of the samples.[/QUOTE]

Being on board the Aiviq most of the season, I can tell you that you nailed it. Going North in the Chukchi Sea we hit a severe storm, at least as bad as the last fateful voyage. With water washing up on the back deck for hours, we developed a loll of 20-25 degrees. This lasted 12 hours. I was told by some of the crew that they had deckhands diving into the sea water to “open” hatches. That was confusing to me since we were obviously taking on water somewhere. Shouldn’t they be diving to “close” hatches. Another confusing point to me was why did we take on water at all. Shouldn’t the water have simply washed off our back deck? I read one sentence on the investigation where the fuel intake vent was questioned to the Chief Engineer; “The Kulluk last year drilled in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska’s north coast and seawater on the return trip had reached fuel tank vents. However, Broekhuis, said they functioned properly and no water was detected in tanks or lines” (see http://www.adn.com/2013/05/22/2912310/rig-manager-testifies-in-shell.html ).
Read more here: http://www.adn.com/2013/05/22/2912310/rig-manager-testifies-in-shell.html#storylink=cpy

The USCG has also missed the fact that we never reached our normal cruising tow speed of 4.7 knots after leaving Dutch, even though we were in good weather/waves for 3-4 days. Leading me to assume that the Aiviq still had a an engine problem after much maintenance and 1 engine replacement. The captain of the Aiviq must’ve known that he had a propulsion problem.

Also of note; the Aiviq went to Seward, AK as soon as the rig was secure to raise the fuel vents.

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[QUOTE=c.captain;110343]he was likely one of the “chosen ones” by Gary Chouest…a golden boy awarded a plum command if you will![/QUOTE]

Probbaly…but it’s much simpler then that. Look at the date. We left Dutch 12/22/2012. The master mariner was home for Christmas

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[QUOTE=mhnydn;110893]I may catch hell for this, but surge chain can only do so much given the size of the tow and the tug. All things being equal, I wouldn’t have a problem without it, but you need to make up for it with more wire out, and slower speeds. Anyone who has towed rigs in any kind of weather (like 25% of what they had) has spent time heading North, but moving south at a knot or 2. Anchorman, does Delmar use shackles with 2 cotter pins; one right through the nut, and another one outside it? I’ve used them on tugs, but don’t know if they are approved.[/QUOTE]

I am wondering myself as far as how much wire they had out. I would guess around 3,000’. The shackle would have had 2 cotter keys, but usually, they do not use shackles at all. They’ll use a #8 pear link, pigtail, and moorlink swivel. So, someone probably required a shackle, since you do not have to NDT them; the certificate is good on it’s own.

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[QUOTE=mhnydn;110893]I may catch hell for this, but surge chain can only do so much given the size of the tow and the tug. All things being equal, I wouldn’t have a problem without it, but you need to make up for it with more wire out, and slower speeds. Anyone who has towed rigs in any kind of weather (like 25% of what they had) has spent time heading North, but moving south at a knot or 2. Anchorman, does Delmar use shackles with 2 cotter pins; one right through the nut, and another one outside it? I’ve used them on tugs, but don’t know if they are approved.[/QUOTE]

All I know is that there is a tow wire in the video looking very suspiciously like it is tight lining and then recoiling back after something parts. Failures in tows happen when the gear is badly overloaded and surge gear is specifically there to prevent that from occurring. It is a huge shock absorber if you will and even if the tow bridles were both all chain, they might not have had enough weight to keep that fishplate down deep where it needs to be. FUCK, THIS IS PRIMER OF TOWING SHIT!

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[QUOTE=Shaqnup;110901]Probbaly…but it’s much simpler then that. Look at the date. We left Dutch 12/22/2012. The master mariner was home for Christmas[/QUOTE]

The boat is not legal without a Master Mariner, and there was one, that even had more towing experience.

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[QUOTE=c.captain;110906]All I know is that there is a tow wire in the video looking very suspiciously like it is tight lining and then recoiling back after something parts. Failures in tows happen when the gear is badly overloaded and surge gear is specifically there to prevent that from occurring. It is a huge shock absorber if you will and even if the tow bridles were both all chain, they might not have had enough weight to keep that fishplate down deep where it needs to be. FUCK, THIS IS PRIMER OF TOWING SHIT![/QUOTE]

Past that obvious fact, the option is always there to put out additional wire and use the dynamic breaking on the winch, which will automatically take stress off the tow at a certain set-point. There are some additional capabilities, that I think were not used as they could have been. The Rolls Royce manual does say to take the drum out of clutch and tow on the brake, which has a load cell on its own. You can however tow engaged, off the brake, use dynamic settings - the system will monitor the pressure transducers in the motors and slip if there is a surge.

There are still many factors to consider, but the show stopper for me has nothing to do with the rigging - it’s the voyage plan and leaving when they did. All being considered, even without a tow, there is no good reason to take that route with those weather forecast - period. PRIMER OF TOWING? More like, BOWDITCH 101.

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All agreed but there is so much we are not getting from the Anchorage Daily News that little of these reports make for a clear picture yet you are correct that failure #1 was to track right to the south of Kodiak in that kind of weather. Should have been go 300miles SE from Unimak Pass and then rhumbline to Cape Flattery. The worst of the systems would have tracked to the north of them on the AIVIQ and would have made it just fine to Everett but this is where lack of experience in those waters shows. If the master wanted to go that direct route (as I have been told privately) and was countermanded, then the system is rotten. He must have the final say or he is no master at all but just a boat driver. The route the AIVIQ/KULLUK took in the end was the most dangerous one possible with the greatest risks of exactly this kind of circumstance occurring. If Shell demanded they go that route, then they are at fault for lack of knowledge and unnecessary risk taking and ECO is at fault for not standing up to Shell and saying BULLSHIT ON THIS!

Also on top of the route taken, an 85ton tow shackle is too small and no surge gear is plain foolish as was not using dynamic braking (which I do not have experience with but understand the value of provided it works per the manufacturer’s design). A hard brake is asking for the wire to tightline and the tow gear to fail!

.

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Our smaller RR winch just says “if towing on the brake” to de-clutch the drum. I’ve never been able to get anyone to tell me why, other than so the load cell on the band brake will read accurately. Any ideas? Can you think of any reason not to use auto tension?

[QUOTE=anchorman;110910]Past that obvious fact, the option is always there to put out additional wire and use the dynamic breaking on the winch, which will automatically take stress off the tow at a certain set-point. There are some additional capabilities, that I think were not used as they could have been. The Rolls Royce manual does say to take the drum out of clutch and tow on the brake, which has a load cell on its own. You can however tow engaged, off the brake, use dynamic settings - the system will monitor the pressure transducers in the motors and slip if there is a surge.

There are still many factors to consider, but the show stopper for me has nothing to do with the rigging - it’s the voyage plan and leaving when they did. All being considered, even without a tow, there is no good reason to take that route with those weather forecast - period. PRIMER OF TOWING? More like, BOWDITCH 101.[/QUOTE]

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[QUOTE=mhnydn;110914]Our smaller RR winch just says “if towing on the brake” to de-clutch the drum. I’ve never been able to get anyone to tell me why, other than so the load cell on the band brake will read accurately. Any ideas? Can you think of any reason not to use auto tension?[/QUOTE]

The only reason is for tripping the line, that’s it. I have been to both the IP Huse and Rolls Royce factory talking to the engineers when I was doing ECO’s policies. There is still pressure transducers on the motors that provide the same information as far as tonnage off the brake. It’s usually the load cell that is the least accurate over time.

There is even an over speed function that actuates the brake, to keep the motor RPM below 100 - if you did trip, depending on the winch.

The Dino and Laney Chouest have the 600 ton winches, with motors directly mounted to the ring gear. No clutch at all; all winches should be built like those.

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[QUOTE=Shaqnup;110898]Being on board the Aiviq most of the season, I can tell you that you nailed it. Going North in the Chukchi Sea we hit a severe storm, at least as bad as the last fateful voyage. With water washing up on the back deck for hours, we developed a loll of 20-25 degrees. This lasted 12 hours. I was told by some of the crew that they had deckhands diving into the sea water to “open” hatches. That was confusing to me since we were obviously taking on water somewhere. Shouldn’t they be diving to “close” hatches. Another confusing point to me was why did we take on water at all. Shouldn’t the water have simply washed off our back deck? I read one sentence on the investigation where the fuel intake vent was questioned to the Chief Engineer; “The Kulluk last year drilled in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska’s north coast and seawater on the return trip had reached fuel tank vents. However, Broekhuis, said they functioned properly and no water was detected in tanks or lines” (see http://www.adn.com/2013/05/22/2912310/rig-manager-testifies-in-shell.html ).
Read more here: http://www.adn.com/2013/05/22/2912310/rig-manager-testifies-in-shell.html#storylink=cpy

The USCG has also missed the fact that we never reached our normal cruising tow speed of 4.7 knots after leaving Dutch, even though we were in good weather/waves for 3-4 days. Leading me to assume that the Aiviq still had a an engine problem after much maintenance and 1 engine replacement. The captain of the Aiviq must’ve known that he had a propulsion problem.

Also of note; the Aiviq went to Seward, AK as soon as the rig was secure to raise the fuel vents.[/QUOTE]

I can guess what they meant by “deckhands diving into the sea water to “open” hatches” that had you confused. I would suppose they are talking about the door for the FRC. There is a stainless door that rolls up/down that protects the FRC from the weather, but being that door is on the main deck, I can certainly see that getting blown off the tracks with a big wave allowing water to come in, and acting like a check valve, not allowing water to drain back out. They were more than likely trying to open that door all the way - to allow water to drain. I never thought that was a good design. I only helped with back deck arrangement and bridge design. The initial design also had that for the lifeboats until they identified the containerized type which was certainly the better choice. A one piece steel door would have been better, but maybe available space was the determining factor.

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[QUOTE=c.captain;110913] If the master wanted to go that route and was countermanded, then the system is rotten. He must have the final say or he is no master at all but just a driver.[/QUOTE]

The system is half-way rotten. I can tell you that from experience. The Deepwater Nautilus broke loose during Katrina. It was recovered, but several of the mooring winches were totally screwed. The DWN was eventually moored in one of the Grand Isle blocks, not with an optimum configuration, but it was on location. Then, here comes Hurricane Rita. Shell insisted to pick the rig back up and tow it to the EAST, worried about it breaking its moorings!!?, north of the storm track now. Luckily, I was due off anyway, and I crew changed, but could not even think of doing that - dumbest thing I’ve ever heard from Shell. Anyway, when I got home and was packing to head north, I learned that the tow was lost and the Deepwater Nautilus ran aground, hitting bottom for several miles and snapping off thrusters in the process, damaged a few export oil lines as well, before it finally stopped. The DWN to this day still does not have thrusters; they are still in the gulf (somewhere), and the Kongsberg panel looks more like a place to put coffee cups.

This certainly isn’t Shell/ECO’s first rodeo.

I will say this, every Captain can at any time call Mr.Gary or Dino and raise safety concerns, and that will be a show stopper. They will back you 100%; if you have the balls to pull that card. Most don’t.

It’s my belief that if the Senior Captain would have been on the Aiviq, it would have never departed…only because his relationship with Mr.Gary and not afraid to use that card, if Shell is asking for something stoopid.

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[QUOTE=anchorman;110941]The system is half-way rotten. I can tell you that from experience. The Deepwater Nautilus broke loose during Katrina. It was recovered, but several of the mooring winches were totally screwed. The DWN was eventually moored in one of the Grand Isle blocks, not with an optimum configuration, but it was on location. Then, here comes Hurricane Rita. Shell insisted to pick the rig back up and tow it to the EAST, worried about it breaking its moorings!!?, north of the storm track now. Luckily, I was due off anyway, and I crew changed, but could not even think of doing that - dumbest thing I’ve ever heard from Shell. Anyway, when I got home and was packing to head north, I learned that the tow was lost and the Deepwater Nautilus ran aground, hitting bottom for several miles and snapping off thrusters in the process, damaged a few export oil lines as well, before it finally stopped. The DWN to this day still does not have thrusters; they are still in the gulf (somewhere), and the Kongsberg panel looks more like a place to put coffee cups.

This certainly isn’t Shell/ECO’s first rodeo.

I will say this, every Captain can at any time call Mr.Gary or Dino and raise safety concerns, and that will be a show stopper. They will back you 100%; if you have the balls to pull that card. Most don’t.

It’s my belief that if the Senior Captain would have been on the Aiviq, it would have never departed…only because his relationship with Mr.Gary and not afraid to use that card, if Shell is asking for something stoopid.[/QUOTE]

I agree with Anchorman about one thing for sure. If you have got enough faith in your own judgement to call Gary or Dino Choeust they will back you up and respect you for it. If you don’t have enough to do that you should not call yourself master. By the same token I would not want to lead Chouest or any other company into harms way by being a dumbass or having no cojones, it won’t look good on a resume at the very least.

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So does the master of the Aiviq when they lost the Kulluk still work at ECO?

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[QUOTE=rshrew;110960]So does the master of the Aiviq when they lost the Kulluk still work at ECO?[/QUOTE]

I’m sure he does; why wouldn’t he? I stated my belief if the shoe was on the other foot, but it wasn’t, which simply means speculation.