Air gapped systems are still vulnerable to insider threats, whether they are intentional or unintentional.
yes sure, playing videos on those huge DP screens off CD’s and memory sticks
No class requirements to secure DP systems and last I checked no vendor does.
I get shrugged shoulders when asking simple questions, its a ship so 10 years behind the office.
Perhaps that changed now that operators are looking at their SMS documentation as post jan 2021 any review must now include it
“ENCOURAGES Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately
addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the
company’s Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021”
Shall, must, maybe?
“Encourages”, that’s pretty weak. Maybe after enough operating DP systems get ransomed, that will change. With an unpatched network, it wouldn’t take much. Maybe a gateway bastion system to the network might fall vulnerable, or if the network was accidently attached directly to another network with Internet access.
The system vendors really need to get their act together. Even when patches are released, some are so narrowly targeted, that the bad guys only need to make a small change in their attack to work around the patch. The vendors also need to do a better job of maintaining system availability during the patching process.
In the mean time, protecting air gapped networks will have to rely on solid administrative and technical controls to protect those networks. Once the bad guys get in, they’ll likely have free reign.
you need to add thruster systems to that now as they have marched down the Ethernet path and put PC based control systems in.
I’ll bet many vessels with airgaps in their design no longer have them…
There must be some in the internet as well…