Former Employee: Transocean Nearly Caused Oil Rig Catastrophe - Zeta - Deepwater Asgard

Maritime News
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I addressed this in the other more current thread on this topic, that the more details that come out the more it appears like a legitimate claim for negligence. The initial press releases from the plaintiffs lawyers didn’t provide much in the way of facts or details, whereas the recent lawsuit documentation, investigative reporting, and regulatory alerts add a lot of important info about the true timeline and possible office interference. I am certainly guilty of brushing off the initial claims; I now think differently.

That being said, I don’t agree with your examples. Your vehicle is rated to safely operate at posted speed limits even though it is capable of operating faster. Ships like this are rated and built to classification standards to operate in severe weather because it is fully expected they will encounter it, even though they can actually likely survive worse. And yes, the USCG 47’ MLBs that are self-righting are intentionally, purposefully, capsized by the USCG for practice training so their sailors know exactly what to expect.

In this case, the rigs need to be rated for severe weather so that they have a time window to safely abandon a well in the case of problems/delays that arise in doing so. The office pushing you not to run from a storm when there is time should not have been one of those problems. That could be considered negligence.

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Won’t happen. After the Horizon incident they were offered a token if they didn’t sue. The ones that participated in the suit were much more highly compensated.
Here’s why I don’t believe anyone will get a large settlement in this case. 1. They like the Horizon survivors believe they will be black balled and not allowed to work again so there is a minimal number of participants in the suit. 2. This appears to be a suit by someone who was on the Horizon so he/she must have known the nature of the management. TO has gotten much smarter with hiding evidence and the regulatory folks have no expertise or interest in investigating the matter. Hope I am wrong but I doubt it.

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"Seamen" Sue Over Rough Weather
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The Department of Justice should intervene in this case as a plaintiff to protect the public interest, and make sure that the case cannot be quietly settled with the facts about Transocean’s extreme risk taking swept under the rug, but that is unlikely to happen.

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I tried to get the Department of Justice to intervene with Noble…especially where Noble had just entered into a plea agreement for 8 felony charges related to safety, oil pollution and major non-conformities with their SMS. Noble was violating it two months later. The DOJ did nothing…and the U.S. Attorney involved was a USCG Academy graduate who spent 24 years in the USCG. I had multiple conversations and provided evidence to the Coast Guard Investigative Service and even met with two DOJ prosecutors. However, after all is said and done, it is up to the U.S. Attorney and he did nothing. One would think they would want to protect the public interest as you indicate but, unfortunately, that is not the case…at least from my personal experience.

Jeff Hagopian
Cell: 978-764-3908
Email: jbhagop@yahoo.com

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As stated directly from the lawsuit, page 3, Section V, bullet point #10: “The Captain aboard the “Deepwater Asgard” ordered the crew to pull the lower marine riser package so the vessel could unlatch and get out of the path of the hurricane.” Obviously, the Captain was concerned enough that this course of action was ordered.

The lawsuit then further states on page 3, Section V, bullet point #11: “……calls started coming in from the shoreside offices of Transocean and Beacon stating that the Deepwater Asgard needed to stay latched and continue operations.” It further states the following: “At the 4:00 p.m. phone call, Transocean and Beacon ordered the vessel to stay latched despite Hurricane Zeta headed directly toward them. Plaintiff, along with other crew members on board, strongly disagreed with the decision to stay latched but had not other options but to obey orders.”

The Captain, however, did have options. Since when does shore-based management give “orders” to the Captain; especially, when it pertains to the safety of the crew and vessel? That is the Captain’s primary job and responsibility. A real Captain puts the safety and well being of his crew and vessel above all else including himself. That is what leaders do. The reality is that companies such as Transocean, Noble Drilling, etc. don’t want strong, competent leaders in the position of Captain. They want “yes men” and “puppets” who will fall in line and do as they are told. It is very disappointing that there are a number of “Captains,” who will compromise the safety and well-being of their crew and vessel all for their own self-serving interests and the hopes of looking favorable in the eyes of shore-based management. As I stated in a post in a different thread, any “Captain” who will compromise the safety and well-being of their crew and vessel is not worthy of possessing a USCG License.

Section 5.2 of the ISM Code: Master’s Responsibility & Authority

The Company should ensure that the SMS (safety management system) operating on board the ship contains a clear statement emphasizing the master’s authority. The Company should establish in the SMS that the master has the overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to request the Company’s assistance as may be necessary.

It’s painfully clear that the Captain of the “Deepwater Asgard” does not understand his responsibility and authority. Based on the language of the lawsuit, it is also clear that Transocean and Beacon “management” have no comprehension (or simply don’t care) of the ISM Code and, specifically, as it pertains to the Master’s Responsibility & Authority. Perhaps, during Transocean’s next ISM Audit this will be addressed. I would hope (but seriously doubt) the USCG will investigate this situation as this is a glaring example of a blatant collapse and breakdown of the safety management system (SMS). One would think in the decade after the tragic loss of the “Deepwater Horizon” that Transocean management might have learned a thing or two but it’s very apparent they didn’t.

Jeff Hagopian
Cell: 978-764-3908
Email: jbhagop@yahoo.com

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I doubt very seriously they consider the red circle at equipment limits. But, they more than likely did not adjust the radius of the red circle down for the pending weather - just educated speculation on my part to make sense of it all. All WSOG(s) are based on the riser analysis w/ metaoean data. The metaocean data for the GOM is typically @ 0.6 m/sec. This is your assumed baseline drift speed; the disconnect sequence EDS (estimated at 55 seconds) is time dependent to this drift speed. With this data, you calculate where the red circle needs to be considering the point of disconnecting with ~33% safety factor from equipment limits. However, in cyclone-type conditions, 1.5 m/sec is not out of the realm. If you kept the original red circle with these real-time environmental conditions, you would have a big problem - you would not have the time for a disconnect even with the safety factor. Although, this assumes no thrusters. The alert mentioned the LMRP contacting the seafloor. This means the vessel was heaving ~35 at the well center. That’s pretty unbelievable, but it’s not that unusual for the water-depth to be shallower than at the well head in close proximity. I know with the SHI ships, @ 100 knots wind speed, you will not make any ground @100% power, you will lose ground.

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I agree, the Master has the ultimate responsibility. Like with the Oil Record Book, it is the Master’s responsibility to verify entries and report any issues, right? If you were Master, would you report a false entry in the ORB to the USCG? Or the DPA?

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The Master has the ultimate responsibility and his signature on an Oil Record Book or a Deck Logbook entry is a legal testament that what is stated is truthful and accurate. I did, in fact, report a false logbook entry in the Deck Logbook to the ADPA. The false logbook entry pertained to the quarterly SOLAS requirement for the vessel four lifeboats to be “launched and maneuvered.” The logbook stated that the lifeboats were “launched and maneuvered” but that event never happened. Under oath, the ADPA testified that the false entry I reported was, in fact, a false entry.
In my opinion, I think that a false logbook entry of this nature should be reported to the DPA/ADPA first so as to give the Company an opportunity to correct the situation. Not reporting it is tantamount to consent and approval. I believe something of this nature being reported to the USCG, without giving the Company the opportunity to correct the situation, is a bit extreme; however, reporting it to the Company as is required by Company policy is what got me terminated…

Jeff Hagopian
Cell: 978-764-3908
Email: jbhagop@yahoo.com

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The company stated the cause of your termination was reporting a noncompliance?

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I was told by my direct supervisor, the shore-based manger, that “we have lost confidence in your ability to manage the vessel.” My termination was done over the phone. I asked for a written letter of termination but they would not provide one. My termination was 11 days after my report to the ADPA. My direct supervisor was involved with and knew of the false logbook entires and of the lying to the USCG Inspectors. He was also the manager of the “Noble Discoverer” when they committed their multiple felony offenses for safety and oil pollution violations. This shore-based manager is also a graduate of Mass. Maritime Academy so it isn’t as though he didn’t have a maritime background.

Jeff Hagopian
Cell: 978-764-3908
Email: jbhagop@yahoo.com

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I am aware of the violation in the ORB of the Disco. The CE suffered no repercussions and went on to another company…in retrospect Noble is no better or worse than most drilling companies. They consider paying a fine simply a business expense.

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That Chief was a short Napoleon complex asshole onboard, but apparently a good family man at home. My first day on the vessel, right out of Bayou Black, he told me my company directed 30min fire watch after welding was only 15mins and i needed to go find something else to do. As a new guy I was struggling to come up with a response without saying “you’re wrong”, but luckily the 1st stepped in and saved me. He was not well liked by any of the engineers, I can promise you that.

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Ok, this train jumped square off the tracks. Please keep animosities and 2nd hand allegations elsewhere. There are places to seek remedies, but not in a thread started by a moderator to engage on a particular subject.

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It’s a little late for that.

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Apparently so. How childish. Unbelievable.

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Back to the original subject. It would be beneficial for the community if a timeline was released by TOI (copy of the IADC reports). I’m curious at what point the shoe track was drilled. I presume if a cement squeeze job was performed, there was a bad FIT (formation integrity test), and that may have occurred around the 22nd. Or, losses could not be cured with normal LCM. It’s hard to tell and that’s the issue. A case study would help decision-making for Captains that hold UWA positions on MODUs in the GOM. Not many clients want to stop their drilling program to take a wait-and-see approach for a “possible” storm, and not many Captains are drilling experts and may not interject at the earliest point for that reason. But, if you have a storm forming in the Caribbean and decide to drill out the shoe, you are rolling the dice if you go into well control.

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giphy

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These are the kinds of posts we need on this site, and are the kind that made this once great forum what it was.

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This is from the lawsuit:

However, calls started coming in from the shoreside offices of the Transocean
and Beacon stating that the Deepwater Asgard needed to stay latched and continue operations.
The Captain ordered the crew to stop the unlatch process until a planned 4:00 p.m. phone call
with officials back in Houston. At the 4:00 p.m. phone call, Transocean and Beacon ordered
the vessel to stay latched despite Hurricane Zeta headed directly toward them. Plaintiff, along
> with other crewmembers on board, strongly disagreed with the decision to stay latched but had
no other options but to obey orders.

It says that the plaintiff along with other crew members had no option but to obey orders. It doesn’t say anything about the captain.

It said somewhere that the company was using private forecasts and that they didn’t expect the wind speeds to be as high as they were. TC intensity forecasts have not improved as much as the track forecasts have.

It’s possible that the captain agreed with the forecast supplied by the company and decided not to move. In hindsight apparently the wrong move.

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Having no option but to obey orders is a little bit of a red herring. That’s pretty much the case for anyone with a supervisor. They did set an RTTS packer and obviously got as far as displacing the riser with seawater, since I didn’t hear anything about a discharge of drilling fluid during the EDS. All of this takes time. This does beg the question about the comment from Transocean and Beacon stating “staying latched and continue operations”. The lawsuit needs to define the generic term “operations”. All indications tell me that operations were defined as well suspension activities which you will not stop. So, that doesn’t make much sense to me with the drilling knowledge, but it may sound damning to a novice. Zeta was a fast-moving storm. More than likely, as the storm approached, there was a realization that they could not pull the LMRP on the riser all the way to the surface before the weather got too rough and decided to stay latched up; that alone would take ~12 hours. With a storm moving at 15 knots, that’s 180 nm of track-line. I can actually see that scenario, and there is no good choice at that point. You’re screwed either way. The point is, they started too late no matter how you cut it due to well control issues. That’s pretty much why I advocated earlier about having a case study just to understand the timeline, and if that can be improved upon with better decisions or processes.

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