I think like most things - lots of things all had to go wrong for this to happen.
I have issues with the folks in the office allowing Bob Kagen to sail as an AB, Also the 2nd mate had some significant issues as well, and Greg not all that experienced as a mate. The office could have done a better job of crewing that ship.
I have issues with the resistance to 4 mate ships the office had in those days. An extra mate on a tanker is money well spent. Chief Mate is a full time job.
I had an issue with the machiso we all had in those days of how many hours we could work. It was a badge of honor not to sleep. That was stupid.
I have a big issue on why Moe was on the wing, and Kagen was steering. We all knew he was not capable of much of anything. Greg should not of let that happen.
And, if you are going to let Kagen steer, you had better be monitoring him with an eagle eye.
I have an issue with Joe going to town. On the run from Valdez to PTP there are about 30 total hours when your skills as Captain are really needed. The biggest part of that is getting out of Prince William Sound. While all those other mates were busy loading the ship, he should be resting for the ride out.
But as Kennebec has said, ultimately Joe left the bridge with the ship standing into danger, if you are going to do that, you, as Captain, and you alone, had better make darn sure the world is turning outside your window when it is supposed to.
He left instructions to turn at a certain point within minutes which were understood as âPrudent and Practicalâ for the mate by his own testimony. I personally would not have left the bridge at that point, but mate for some reason gained his confidence in saying I got this and understand your orders. That , as I said were a few minutes Hazlewood would like to have back. Many things in the error chain, we can all analyze after the fact, Cousins put that rig on the reef after confirming the watch exchange⌠JMHO Quite alright for other opinions for an accident that affected our industry that happened 30 years ago, Sadly,many careers and businesses were affected, not just at Exxon. Some in a good way. So glad I am retired, and donât have to deal with all that anymore.
From the NTSB report wrt to the helm, the helmsman may have used counter rudder to slow the turn.
Third mate initially ordered right 10 rudder. Helmsman reduced on his own without orders.
On way of looking at the incident is the quality of the plan and errors in executing the plan.
The NTSB plan found that the third mateâs workload was too high. A far safer plan would have been to have two officers in the bridge. One on the center line conning the ship visually and a second watching the radar and plotting fixes.
Splitting the conning and navigation duties would have made it much more likely one of the officers would have caught the helmsmanâs error.
Only about another 20 minutes or 1/3 of a man-hour was required to man the bridge with two officers through the turn. It wouldnât have required calling anyone out, the master was already up and about.
As far as fatigue on the part of the captain, he spent 10 hours ashore (from 10:30 hrs to 20:30 hrs). When the captain got back to the ship both the agent and pilot were waiting for him.
1030 Hazelwood, Glowacki, and Roberson went ashore
2020 Pilot Murphy arrived at the ship for the outbound trip
2030 Hazelwood, Glowacki, and Roberson returned to the ship
2040 Hazelwood arrived on the bridge to find the pilot waiting
2112 Last line
2121 Vessel clear of Dock
2130 Hazelwood left the bridge - Captain leaves bridge 10 minutes after letting go.
The third mate had to call the captain to come back to the bridge when it was time to drop the pilot off. The captain remained on the bridge for 30 minutes then left again with the ship headed for Blight Reef.
Bob Kagen was completely and utterly useless. He was incapable of performing even minor tasks without total supervision. This fact was well known and I am sure his personal file was full of reports of it. When they did away with messmen, he was made an OS. Then they did away with OS, and my guess is this is when he was promoted to AB. This was all done in the days of reducing manning. Continuing to allow him to sail as AB after continued reports that he was unfit for the job is a failure.
The way this was managed on most ships was to just not allow him to touch anything. Those ships sailed with 5 ABâs and him.
The shoulda, coulda, woulda, analysis (third mate should have caught the helmsman error, been able to make the turn etc) is not an objective measure.
But the bridge manning levels can be looked at objectively. The transit through Valdez Narrows required a pilot and a watch officer by law (and presumably the master by company procedures). The Narrows requires a turn and line-up but then itâs a straight shot.
That gap between blight reef and the edge of ice, when the other ships passed it was between 2 and 4.5 ship lengths and requires more or less a constant gradual turn. It stands to reason manning by a single officer (and the third mate at that) isnât sufficient.
I of course agree about manning. My point was not a âcouda, wouldaâ my point was there was an error chain, not a single event. There were many errors made - starting with ESC management, the office, and the folks on board. If almost any of those errors where omitted there is very very good chance this does not happen.
My post was not in response to yours but a general statement wrt an objective measures of manning in specific circumstances. The statement that the third mate shoulda been able to manage the turn is belied by the fact that in similar navigation circumstances more manning is used.
Valdez Narrows for example and also by the fact that the other two ships that transited in similar situations between Bligh Reef and the ice with the captain and mate on the bridge
Agree. Iâve made over 75 trips to Valdez as a mate (150 passages of PW Sound) and, without having pilotage, was left alone at some point for almost all of those passages. But never when maneuvering for ice or even when ice is or is reported to be present. And as 3rd Mate, never for more than short periods where no maneuvering (even within the lanes) is needed.
I never bothered to get pilotage as Mobil was top heavy on licenses, and all the Masters had the endorsement. So if I got the pilotage, I would still not get to âactâ as the pilot (i.e. get paid for it) but if I was alone ont he bridge and something happened, I would likely incur greater liability for having the endorsement. So I decided to only get it when sailing Master was becoming a possibility.
This sounds a bit like the disproved theory that holding a license makes you more liable for an incident aboard even if you arenât employed under that license.
Itâs not the same. Your âdisproved theoryâ relates to holding an endorsement but not serving in that capacity. If I hold pilotage, and am the only one on the bridge, I am the pilot, even if I am not being paid to be one. I am the only officer on the bridge, the only one with pilotage, and I am directing the navigation of the vessel, i.e. doing the things a pilot does. Could the vessel be cited for violating the requirement for a pilot to be present on the bridge? If not, who was the pilot?
What if I did have the piloltage, was alone on the bridge, and the passage was uneventful⌠Could the Coast Guard prevail in citing the owner for violating the requirement to have a pilot by saying the Master wasnât on the bridge?
Note to Sea Lawyers and/or anyone looking to argue about minutiae - I did say âdirecting the navigation of the vesselâ and a pilot is an advisor. So I took some liberties to keep it relatively simple.
Based on the link you provided, which in true gCaptain fashion devolved into a discussion about an unrelated matter, i.e., the Jones Act and what constitutes a passenger. The issue is not addressed in the CFRs so unless someone has a better answer, Iâll answer my own question this way: unless I hear differently, it would depend on the circumstances of a case and the tactics chosen by the lawyers involved.
The lawyering changes everything, especially what really happened in any particular case. Get a good one if you are at fault and know it⌠My bride was hit almost head on in broad daylight, somehow the other attorney tried to make it look like was her fault. Cousins had a decent lawyer, and his snivelling character traits tried to take all his shipmates down with him. The helmsman deserved that treatment, but not the rest of the crew.
Obviously. The outcome is going to vary if you are just engaging in the same decadence that other guests on a private yacht participate in as compared to going up to the bridge and âSaying Iâm a professional, I got this.â
Of course it is. Any credible respondent (e.g. a lawyer) is not going to give specific legal advice based on a vague and general question from someone who isnât their client (both in terms of who pays the bill, and who meets the legal standard of being a client).
