I don’t know. I read the transcripts and have followed along as circumstances allow. Having spent thousands of days at sea, what I read was regular people going about their job. That is their legacy, and they acted just as decent men and women do.
It all seems, simply put, that circumstances got ahead of them. I saw a mention of cargo securing methods. Was it insufficient or rushed? Not sure …
As rshrew mentions, maybe the list was mistaken for wind induced heel. I just get the feeling that as the flooding and mechanical shutdowns progressed, each problem was one step ahead of any ability to counteract it, especially in a bad storm - albeit one with perhaps similar conditions often seen and weathered easily by the ship during her service life. The circumstances cascaded, perhaps faster than first recognized by those aboard, even as they became aware of the danger at hand. Once the list passed 15 degrees and was increasing, few minutes wasn’t much time to get off a big ship.
Not much news in any of that I suppose - and the result is clear. John, the holes in the Swiss cheese or the puzzle lined up for a lot of reasons. I could posit a dozen theories, as some of the biggest of blowhards have before, but anything I might add from here, would be at best, uninformed speculative bull. It seems some of the earliest and rankest speculation here in the Forum was sadly, just proven true in the transcript, so any criticism on my side, is well, tempered into a gentle silence.
I hope the truest of reasons are learned and publicized for the benefit of all mariners, and their families. The evidence is there to be examined, and it’s right that the NTSB, and then the USCG and then the Courts see every bit of it, and that they all ask the hardest of questions of those that deserve scrutiny.
For the families of the lost, you remain in our thoughts and prayers. Without judgements. Godspeed.