Does Your Safety Management System Make Your Operation Safer?

My recollection is that:

Hazelwood’s blood test was ruled inadmissible at trial (there were chain of custody and timing of the test problems) and the jury found him not guilty on the “operating-a-tanker-while-under-the-influence” charge. He was only convicted of misdemeanor “negligent discharge of oil.”

The defense presented a number of Masters in the Valdez tanker trader who all testified at trial that once beyond Valdez Narrows, it was permissible for a Master to leave the bridge to the Mate on watch. However, on cross examination they all admitted that none of them had ever done it.

Hazelwood knew, or should have known, that Cousins was debilitated by fatigue after many hours on duty loading the ship, and not fit to stand his watch. Cousins was not drunk, and had not engaged in any misconduct, but he was apparently just too tired to do it properly.

When Hazelwood left the bridge, the ship was intentionally headed off course toward the inbound traffic lane (and toward Bligh Reef) to avoid ice coming off the Columbia Glacier that was in the outbound lane. Hazelwood left Cousins with instructions to turn back to the original course once the ice was cleared and proceed outbound in the inbound lane. For whatever reason, Cousins failed to make the turn and steamed right up onto Bligh Reef. The rest is history. The only thing we are missing is another song from Gordon Lightfoot.

If we ignore for a moment whether or not Hazelwood was drunk (which was never proven), it was obviously a huge blunder on Hazelwood’s part to leave an exhausted Cousins in control on the bridge to dodge ice and make a critical turn back to the proper course once he cleared the ice — without supervision and assistance.

With in a couple of years Cousins was sailing as a Mate again, and for all I know he is probably sailing as Master somewhere by now. I have never heard any evidence to suggest that Cousins was not a competent mate. To the contrary, I heard that he was quite competent. I have never heard any logical explanation for Cousins failure to change course after clearing the ice, except fatigue or that he nodded off on his feet.

With the benefit of hindsight it seems to me that Hazelwood was clearly at fault for failing to be well rested and alert himself on the bridge to supervise Cousins ice avoidance and a timely critical course change.

The jury found that Exxon was reckless because they knew of Hazelwood’s drinking problems and failed to properly supervise him. I cannot recall what the jury might have said about Exxon routinely requiring their mates to work unreasonably long hours before sailing. But in my view, Exxon was also at fault for failing to provide enough tankermen to at least allow the mate going on the first sea watch to be properly rested.

I don’t believe the topic of whether the Master is ultimately responsible is being debated.

The issue is vetting crew in (what should be considered) the ordinary requirements of doing the job.

As Tugsailor pointed out, the ‘causes’ for Cousins to not turn away from Bligh Reef are multiple. But it boils down to one issue. Gross Negligence.

This topic is a perfect example of the differences between ‘deep sea’ and ‘tugs.’. When I at work my mate must be almost in all respects my equal. When on a two watch system, If I had to stay awake when I am off watch because I couldn’t trust my mate two things would happen. The first is I would be in direct violation of the 12 hour work rule. The second, the vessel would not be able to legally move when it was time for me to be on watch. So there would appear to be a second set of standards when operating deep draft vessels. It may be possible that allowing a Navigation watch to assume command of a watch with less than competent personnel may be ordinary practice in some cases.
Does the phtase: “Maintain a X mile CPA, if you have to alter course wake the Captain, if you must alter from the rhumb line wake the Captain, do NOT slow down the engine” ring a bell? Exactly what is the message here? Are these ‘watch standers’ that incapable of even doing the ordinary practices of seamanship? And who exactly promotes this innane behavior?

If these are the type of mariner that YOU work with, I feel sorry for you and that would explain your frustration with what you have grown accustomed to!

BTW. Cousins had his name legally changed. Any thoughts on Why? Nothing like running and hiding. Yes, he is still working in the industry.

On to the real issue here. When an individual assumes the watch it is with a certain expectation of ability to fulfill the job at hand. If someone accepts the watch but is (fill in the blank as tugsailors post does) then that person is NOT qualified to assume the watch in the first place. This issue has almost never been dealt with satisfactorily in any CG hearing I have heard or read about. This also applies to reliefs sent aboard who have been hired by the office but are not competent. But the vessel has to sail over the masters objections. Be real. You have never held a vessel up over manning because the office said… GO ? Business is business after all!

Then we have ISO / ISM thrown in to ensure as few accidents as possible to keep the insurers happy. But what is really needed is competent crew. And management who both understands and backs up the Master.

Lots of good points are made in the above post.

What young mariner in Cousins’ shoes would not have legally changed his name? That’s an absolute no brainer.

Two different vessels have struck Bligh Reef, the tug Pathfinder and the Exxon Valdez. The EV incident was a much bigger deal then the Pathfinder.

The consequences of an incident are much more severe on the supertanker then the (light) tug so the precautions taken to avoid an incident have to be greater on the supertanker. As a result the precautions taken on the supertanker seem less “real” then do the precautions taken on the tug.

On the tug the feedback loop for the precautions taken is much stronger then on the tanker. If you tell someone to stay out of the bight of a line and they get knocked on their ass by a line they will have learned the lesson. On the other hand you can spend a career on the tanker with the 2 mile CPA and the passage plan with course marked well clear of all hazards etc etc and have far fewer close calls. The feedback loop is much weaker.

On the tug risk assessment can be, to some extent, based on the level of fear, how close you pass other vessels or navigation hazards sometimes is based on the operators comfort level and is more intuitive. On the other hand the tanker risk assessment has to more formal and based on experience over a longer time period and is less intuitive.

Another factor is that the supertanker is more complex then the smaller vessel as are operations, regs, number of ports etc.

As a result of this the apprenticeship period for a supertanker captain is longer. It is not at all reasonable to expect a new third mate to be anywhere near the level of the captain in skill, knowledge, judgement or experience. There is a reason why the 3rd is on the 8x12 watch, also called the “captain’s watch”.

I want the third mate to be as capable as possible.This is for a couple of reasons, one is to increase safety generally, the other is to reduce my workload. The quicker the third mate becomes an asset and not a liability the better and the more skilled the 3rd is the more robust, flexible and capable the crew is overall

My approach is to make the third understand that their contribution is an important factor in the success of the voyage and that I expect them to be constantly taking on more responsibly.

I know that this is not the case on all deep-sea vessels. Some captains seem to feel the need to treat the junior officers poorly. This is why I say that it is possible to sail third on a container ship and remain brain-dead. Some captains prefer it that way but I don’t like to have any dead weight on the vessel, I want everyone pulling their weight.

I’ve said it elsewhere, the new third mate that successfully make a voyage around the world is not the same person the day they sign off as they were the day the signed on.

K.C.

the best thing a young, inexperienced Third Mate can do when in doubt is to call the Captain. I wouldn’t want a young inexperienced kid making maneuvers without adult supervision. Call the Captain and wake him up. Let him, with his far superior experience level, assess the situation and give you guidance. That is, after all, what a big ship Captain gets paid for. I understand its different on a tug or other vesel with a two watch system.

I always tell my mates don’t call me to witness an accident!

The notion that the custom in the tanker industry, certainly Exxon’s SOP, was to require the watchstanding mates to load the ship and then sail dead tired, just to save a few pennies by not hiring an extra cargo mate or tankerman is still hard for me to understand. Why would they have ever taken such a risk time after time? That a bad incident would eventually happen was not only foreseeable, it was inevitable.

This certainly happened on tugs too. In those days, it was routine for tug crews to pump barges and handle deck cargo and sail from port with everyone dead tired. Some places it is still routine.

Jobs use to be hard to come by and a job had to be really bad to walk away from it. You had to take risks that you knew you shouldn’t, if you wanted to work. Some places its still that way.

I certainly understand Cappy’s point about the office sending an unqualified mate that had little seagoing and no towing experience at all (typically recent academy grads). You just have to hope that you have a good AB or engineer to help you keep an eye on them. And you have to put in a lot of hours in confined waters with traffic. Then again. I’ve had mates that were better than I was.

I understand that in some places the custom is that the mate is a “2nd Captain” who is expected to run his own watch as he sees fit and not bother the master while he is off watch. Obviously that works for companies who have been doing it forever, but it requires a mate who is fully qualified as a captain.

If anyone is in doubt, I want them to call me. Even if they don’t have any doubts, if anything with a pucker factor is about to happen, I still want them to call me. Better call to me to soon and too often, than too late or not often enough. I’d rather be at fault for working over the allowed hours, than at fault for failing to keep the mate out of trouble.

[QUOTE=tugsailor;71190]If anyone is in doubt, I want them to call me. Even if they don’t have any doubts, if anything with a pucker factor is about to happen, I still want them to call me. Better call to me to soon and too often, than too late or not often enough. I’d rather be at fault for working over the allowed hours, than at fault for failing to keep the mate out of trouble.[/QUOTE]

I always tell any mate that I have with me that I want to be called by hearing the engines slow way down before the telephone even rings. If a mate calls me and the engines are still hooked up I will kick that sorry guy’s butt from one end of the ship to the other and back again. Keeping speed on in any dangerous or even pucker inducing situation is inviting an accident and even if there is one, with lower speed means likely less damage.

[QUOTE=tugsailor;71190]
I certainly understand Cappy’s point about the office sending an unqualified mate that had little seagoing and no towing experience at all (typically recent academy grads). You just have to hope that you have a good AB or engineer to help you keep an eye on them. And you have to put in a lot of hours in confined waters with traffic. Then again. I’ve had mates that were better than I was.

I understand that in some places the custom is that the mate is a “2nd Captain” who is expected to run his own watch as he sees fit and not bother the master while he is off watch. Obviously that works for companies who have been doing it forever, but it requires a mate who is fully qualified as a captain.
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I agree that Cappy is making valid points also, I worked the port/stbd 6 hr watch system as well. Eventually I reached a point where the captain and I could operate the vessel 24 hrs. I ran it for 12 hrs and he ran it for 12 but the ship was simple to operate and the run was Seattle to Alaska. Same operation each time more or less.

Towing of course is another matter as more proficiency is required dealing with the barge in confined waters.

K.C.

The original post is about the new paperwork/ safety regimen and whether it has made us safer.

I keep harping upon the EV because that is indicative of the mentality in the industry. As ‘Tater’ says: “You can’t fix stupid.” No matter what the beancounters say.

Even after Exxon shipping took their names off the ships, and renamed them S/R; the (joking) phrase used by employees was that stood for Spill and Run. So theirs is a hard act to follow. Even now there is a disconnect between what IS required and what is actually needed. My company safety manual, operations manuals, VRP, and maintenance manuals all total around 2500 pages. Who actually knows ALL content. Even guys in the office are regularly baffled when one of us asea gets into an argument with them because what They THINK the manual means isn’t what it says. Then there is the cat fight about “well what we meant it to say…”

Before I flame out on this post…

It is my belief (being cynical and all) that the true purpose of these ISO/ISM implementations is solely to limit companies liabilities and at least TRY to limit criminal negligence.

Now for the best part. Guess who they will try to leave holding the bag? Yup. The Master.

Of course. Since I must have known all 2500 pages of company policy verbatim, and knowingly didn’t follow it to the letter.

This has taken the ‘ordinary practice of seamen’ and is morphing it into a crazy unrealistic expectation of what the ‘ideal’ mariner must be.

Oil companies recently (20 years or so ago) decided that they couldn’t profitably transport their own oil. It was too big a liability. And their demands upon the crews were unrealistic. So they outsourced. Now charterers and customers want to hold the private transporters to the same criteria that the oil companies realized 20 + years ago that they couldn’t meet!