Dive Vessel Conception - NTSB Release Preliminary Report

Maritime News Marine Incidents
124

Since the LA Times article may be behind a paywall, here’s the main takeaway:

The charging stations were behind the cushions in the galley seating area. This seating area was between the stairwell from the deck below and the aft exit to the deck behind the galley. If the fire started at the charging stations (as opposed to the cooking area), even if the passengers woke up and went up the stairwell exit, they would have had to pass through the fire to get outside.

Significant quotes:

“People have rechargeable everything these days,” said veteran diver Ben Wolfe, a retired Los Angeles County Fire Department captain who dived off the Conception two weeks before its fiery demise. “I had a battery like a TV camera battery that powered my underwater scooter plugged in each night.”

and

Wolfe, the retired fire captain who had traveled aboard the Conception a handful of times, said the bench on the boat with the outlets was not only a place to charge batteries and electronics.

“The space down behind the cushion often had T-shirts, towels and bottles of wine because it was a place to store them and stop them from rolling around,” said Wolfe, who wondered whether the cushions could have provided fuel for the blaze.

This is disturbing on so many levels that I am unable to comment.

Earl

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125

I agree training is important but the point I’m trying to make has to do with the visibility of the requirements.

For example deep-sea everything used to be driven by the CFRs. But there was no need to look in the CFRs to learn the requirements as a record of compliance was kept in the deck log with the relevant CFR number (IAW CFR…) For example pre-departure gears test and the like. We also keep a poster size paper hanging in the wheelhouse with a spreadsheet like grid for tracking the drills.

Anyone that wanted to learn the routine could look in the log or the safety sheet. Also someone that wanted to check that the requirements were being carried out could likewise check.

I don’t know what would be suitable on a dive boat with regards to the requirements listed on the COI.

126

Wow,
a fire prevention expert and he didn’t say shit.

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127

Is there any legal responsibility for captain to train crew, they are just an employee like any other?
( less standing night orders)
Gov body gives the person a license not the captain or company.

128

It’s the master’s responsibility to ensure that each crew member is fit for the duty he is assigned. Obviously.

129

vague term, does that mean has the right skills or is just sober?
can speak same language as rest of crew can speak well enough or what?
I worked out he is totally colour blind but office sent him as he clearly has fake medical…now what?

130

46 CFR 15.405.

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131

ok, just each crew member must be able to do their job like every where
I was looking to find where the captain was responsible for credentialed crew to be capable other than the lack of sleep and sober stuff

132

There is tons of case law. Google seaworthiness and you’ll find more than enough to make your eyes glaze over (seaworthiness is way broader than the name would suggest to a lay person. It’s been used for almost everything, including fish slime on a hand rail)

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133

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California boat fire investigators rebuilding Conception to find cause of deadly blaze

Authorities are painstakingly rebuilding the charred remains of the Conception and scouring the ocean floor for more evidence of the cause of the fire that killed 34.

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Sources said that much like after a commercial jet crash, investigators are piecing together the remains of the vessel.

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The Dutch passengers airplane MH17 was hit by a Russian BUK missile killing all 298 passengers and crew. To this day the Russians deny any involvement in this brutal atrocity. For the reconstruction 1600 pieces were attached to a metal frame. The wreckage pieces were spread over a large area and most were not burned. This contrary to the wreckage of the Conception which will make it much harder to reconstruct the unlucky ship.

135

Your post was criticized by one member. I found it to be quite excellent. I have postulated, to the NTSB, FBI, and LA Times, that the fire may have originated in the engine room, where the CO2 suppression system discharged, and asphyxiated all the passengers.The engine room bulkhead was adjacent to the bunk room. The CO2 could have leaked past the bulkhead, or have been sucked into the bunk room by the ventalation system. This could be a plausible explanation, why NONE of the passengers attempted to flee the fire. There were reportedly TWO smoke alarms in the bunk room. The Aft emergency egress was a total joke, and I sent the NTSB investigator an email, asking them to stop calling it an emergency egress at all. I have slept in that emergency egress bunk on the Truth, a sister boat to the Conception.

The fire monitoring equipment was absolutely dismal, and a criminal joke. My 1975 Skipjack 28 ft boat, had a Fyre Watch system with Halon extinguisher system in the engine room. LED monitoring and audible alarm at the helm. For God’s sake, why did a 75 ft Charter vessel have zero fire monitoring in the Wheelhouse.
Why was no on on Roving night watch?

Why was there no Fire Axe in or near the Pilothouse?

Why did not a single crew member even use a fire extinguisher? There must have been one in the Wheelhouse.

Why did the crew jump overboard, then access the stern, and look inside the engine room, when all the 30 passengers were being burned alive in their bunks? Makes me wonder what was in the engine room, more important than 30 human lives. Some illegal substance that might cause embarrassment?

No fire extinguishers on the Aft deck either? I know there was storage of Gasoline for the Skiff, on the back deck, as it is shown in the Safety video, made exclusively for the Conception.

I am sad, that there is no emerging details about the investigation. This story has been forgotten by the news media.

I would like to see the drug test results of the crew. It has only been said that Alcohol testing was negative.!

Open the CO2 chart, the link below, to see how deadly dangerous CO2, can be.

CO2|618x499

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This was brought up earlier in this thread. It wasn’t listed on the required fire fighting equipment on the COI.

137

My question is: why didn’t the COI require enough crew, and a better fire detection system?

138

Anything may have happened but I disagree that this scenario is probable. Here are my reasons:

  1. Marine fixed systems must be deployed manually. They don’t go off automatically. Therefore there would have been a notice of fire aboard the boat–crew milling about excited, yelling, calling the captain-- and the passengers would almost inevitably have been awakened in the excitement. Of course, none of this happened.

  2. When a fixed system is discharged there is a 30-second alarm that goes off before the gas is released. From personal experience, I can tell you it is ear-splitting. It would have awakened everyone on the boat.

  3. The gas release itself is quite noisy. On a small boat like this, not as deafening as the similar system on a ship. But when the gas is released you’re going to hear it throughout the boat. People are going to get up. But as mentioned in 1) people would need to be up already to activate the system.

  4. RE: Asphyxiation by gas leaking through the bulkhead: Many people overestimate the gas capacity of a CO2 system. The CO2 gas volume of a marine system is calculated to reduce the oxygen level in the protected compartment to 15%. This is one percent below the oxygen level needed to support open flame. Also one percent below the level needed to render any person unconscious.

But just one percent. When released, a certain volume of CO2 will fill the engine room. A certain volume will escape through unsecured ventilators to the outer air. While a theory can be made that a certain amount leaked through the common bulkhead to the cabin, we would need to explain how enough volume of gas did so to drop the oxygen level in the cabin from 20.9% to below 16%, when there would be barely enough CO2 to do so in the engineroom itself.

Like I said, most anything could have happened, but I would not list this scenario near the top of possible causes.

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139

Ironically, they had more crew on board than the COI requires. As has been mentioned before, poor utilization of the crew by the master is the issue. With two deck officers on board and the other 4 crew, even if one was the cook, should be enough to have a watch at all times. I use the word watch loosely too. Someone half asleep binge watching something on netflix in the galley could have saved lives.
In addition to that, being a customer focused business, the crew catering to the passengers in and out of the water added a bad fatigue element to the whole scenario most likely. In the charter boat industry thats what is paramount.

As far as fire detection goes, they were apparently in compliance with subchapter T as of their last annual inspection.

140

I’m not familiar with the new environmentaly friendly agents but fixed halon systems were set to go off automatically when the ER temperature exceeded 175 degrees or so. Has that changed?

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141

You are correct. The Fireboy systems common on Subchapter T goes off automatically at 175 degrees. But it is also breathable. At least long enough for you to supposedly escape the ER.

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142

The fire detection and suppression systems I’ve seen on Subchapter T or M boats are , how shall I say this, not very impressive. Cheap halfass systems are permitted.

143

I think that fiberglass is ok for smaller day boats, but I do not think fiberglass should be allowed for larger overnight boats.

1 Like