Dive Vessel Conception - NTSB Release Preliminary Report

46 CFR 15.405.

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ok, just each crew member must be able to do their job like every where
I was looking to find where the captain was responsible for credentialed crew to be capable other than the lack of sleep and sober stuff

There is tons of case law. Google seaworthiness and you’ll find more than enough to make your eyes glaze over (seaworthiness is way broader than the name would suggest to a lay person. It’s been used for almost everything, including fish slime on a hand rail)

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California boat fire investigators rebuilding Conception to find cause of deadly blaze

Authorities are painstakingly rebuilding the charred remains of the Conception and scouring the ocean floor for more evidence of the cause of the fire that killed 34.

Sources said that much like after a commercial jet crash, investigators are piecing together the remains of the vessel.

The Dutch passengers airplane MH17 was hit by a Russian BUK missile killing all 298 passengers and crew. To this day the Russians deny any involvement in this brutal atrocity. For the reconstruction 1600 pieces were attached to a metal frame. The wreckage pieces were spread over a large area and most were not burned. This contrary to the wreckage of the Conception which will make it much harder to reconstruct the unlucky ship.

Your post was criticized by one member. I found it to be quite excellent. I have postulated, to the NTSB, FBI, and LA Times, that the fire may have originated in the engine room, where the CO2 suppression system discharged, and asphyxiated all the passengers.The engine room bulkhead was adjacent to the bunk room. The CO2 could have leaked past the bulkhead, or have been sucked into the bunk room by the ventalation system. This could be a plausible explanation, why NONE of the passengers attempted to flee the fire. There were reportedly TWO smoke alarms in the bunk room. The Aft emergency egress was a total joke, and I sent the NTSB investigator an email, asking them to stop calling it an emergency egress at all. I have slept in that emergency egress bunk on the Truth, a sister boat to the Conception.

The fire monitoring equipment was absolutely dismal, and a criminal joke. My 1975 Skipjack 28 ft boat, had a Fyre Watch system with Halon extinguisher system in the engine room. LED monitoring and audible alarm at the helm. For God’s sake, why did a 75 ft Charter vessel have zero fire monitoring in the Wheelhouse.
Why was no on on Roving night watch?

Why was there no Fire Axe in or near the Pilothouse?

Why did not a single crew member even use a fire extinguisher? There must have been one in the Wheelhouse.

Why did the crew jump overboard, then access the stern, and look inside the engine room, when all the 30 passengers were being burned alive in their bunks? Makes me wonder what was in the engine room, more important than 30 human lives. Some illegal substance that might cause embarrassment?

No fire extinguishers on the Aft deck either? I know there was storage of Gasoline for the Skiff, on the back deck, as it is shown in the Safety video, made exclusively for the Conception.

I am sad, that there is no emerging details about the investigation. This story has been forgotten by the news media.

I would like to see the drug test results of the crew. It has only been said that Alcohol testing was negative.!

Open the CO2 chart, the link below, to see how deadly dangerous CO2, can be.

CO2|618x499

This was brought up earlier in this thread. It wasn’t listed on the required fire fighting equipment on the COI.

My question is: why didn’t the COI require enough crew, and a better fire detection system?

Anything may have happened but I disagree that this scenario is probable. Here are my reasons:

  1. Marine fixed systems must be deployed manually. They don’t go off automatically. Therefore there would have been a notice of fire aboard the boat–crew milling about excited, yelling, calling the captain-- and the passengers would almost inevitably have been awakened in the excitement. Of course, none of this happened.

  2. When a fixed system is discharged there is a 30-second alarm that goes off before the gas is released. From personal experience, I can tell you it is ear-splitting. It would have awakened everyone on the boat.

  3. The gas release itself is quite noisy. On a small boat like this, not as deafening as the similar system on a ship. But when the gas is released you’re going to hear it throughout the boat. People are going to get up. But as mentioned in 1) people would need to be up already to activate the system.

  4. RE: Asphyxiation by gas leaking through the bulkhead: Many people overestimate the gas capacity of a CO2 system. The CO2 gas volume of a marine system is calculated to reduce the oxygen level in the protected compartment to 15%. This is one percent below the oxygen level needed to support open flame. Also one percent below the level needed to render any person unconscious.

But just one percent. When released, a certain volume of CO2 will fill the engine room. A certain volume will escape through unsecured ventilators to the outer air. While a theory can be made that a certain amount leaked through the common bulkhead to the cabin, we would need to explain how enough volume of gas did so to drop the oxygen level in the cabin from 20.9% to below 16%, when there would be barely enough CO2 to do so in the engineroom itself.

Like I said, most anything could have happened, but I would not list this scenario near the top of possible causes.

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Ironically, they had more crew on board than the COI requires. As has been mentioned before, poor utilization of the crew by the master is the issue. With two deck officers on board and the other 4 crew, even if one was the cook, should be enough to have a watch at all times. I use the word watch loosely too. Someone half asleep binge watching something on netflix in the galley could have saved lives.
In addition to that, being a customer focused business, the crew catering to the passengers in and out of the water added a bad fatigue element to the whole scenario most likely. In the charter boat industry thats what is paramount.

As far as fire detection goes, they were apparently in compliance with subchapter T as of their last annual inspection.

I’m not familiar with the new environmentaly friendly agents but fixed halon systems were set to go off automatically when the ER temperature exceeded 175 degrees or so. Has that changed?

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You are correct. The Fireboy systems common on Subchapter T goes off automatically at 175 degrees. But it is also breathable. At least long enough for you to supposedly escape the ER.

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The fire detection and suppression systems I’ve seen on Subchapter T or M boats are , how shall I say this, not very impressive. Cheap halfass systems are permitted.

I think that fiberglass is ok for smaller day boats, but I do not think fiberglass should be allowed for larger overnight boats.

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once glass starts to burn you are not putting it out and the smoke is toxic
I know 99% of powerboat race classes dont ask for extinguisher as they know its useless, jump out and let it burn

I personally like the case where the night watchman took mercury from the tank level indicators and put it in potatoes and baked them to turn it into gold.

Overcome with the fumes, he later claimed the vessel was “unseaworthy”. The claim would have gone thru, but unfortunately he was cheated.

You see the bottom of the boat was cut out and it was incapable of navigation. Other than that, he would have got paid ….

807 F. Supp. 1266 (1992) Donald R. McCLENDON
v.
OMI OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE. No. 1:91-CV-0809.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

November 25, 1992.

*1267 Thomas J. Swearingen, Warren G. Clark, Swearingen & Clark, Port Arthur, TX, for plaintiff.

G. Michael Jamail, Bernsen, Jamail & Goodon, Beaumont, TX, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COBB, District Judge.

Donald R. McClendon was cooking a potato in the oven in the galley of the GALVESTON on August 15, 1990. The potato was laced with mercury instead of the more traditional condiments. While plaintiff, McClendon, was cooking his unusual choice in the galley, the tow-boat GALVESTON was in drydock for numerous repairs, and in dire need of a new bottom, since it was bottomless.

Not surprisingly, McClendon sustained injuries while breathing mercury vapors escaping from the very hot oven containing the mercury-laden Idaho potato. McClendon, again unsurprisingly, reasons that because his injuries occurred on a tow-boat in drydock, he asserts he is a seaman and seeks refuge under that rock of protection, the Jones Act, and under general maritime law. This court must deny him safe harbor.

On July 20, 1990, the OMS GALVESTON entered Texas Bayou in Sabine Pass, Texas, on its way to dry dock for an extensive repair of its bottom. At that time the plaintiff met with Kenneth Baker, friend, port captain, and fellow amateur alchemist; he received from him one ounce of mercury, which the plaintiff offered to “cook” for him in an effort to retrieve gold.

The GALVESTON resumed its journey and arrived at Bolinger Shipyards, Larose, Louisiana, on August 8. It was put in dry dock on the thirteenth. Its engines were cut, its bottom was ripped away, and the captain and crew dispersed, with only the plaintiff remaining on board during the repairs. On August 15, he retired to the ship’s galley and, in an effort reminiscent if not worthy of Paracelsus, attempted to produce gold through a combination of fire, mercury, and one half of an Idaho potato. The attempt failed. He was overcome by the fumes and seeks damages for his resultant injuries.

The plaintiff now comes before the court with a motion for summary judgment on his suit against the ship’s owner, OMI Offshore Marine Services, for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 App.U.S.C.A. § 688, and general maritime law. The defendant also moved for summary judgment. Both motions are now pending before the court.

A plaintiff claiming seaman status under the Jones Act must first establish that he or she was employed upon a “vessel in navigation.” Wixom v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 956, 957 (5th Cir. 1980). The issue of Jones Act seaman status is not susceptible to summary judgment except in the rare circumstance where the underlying facts are undisputed and the record reveals no facts from which reasonable persons could draw conflicting inferences. Williams v. Weber Management Services, Inc., 839 F.2d 1039, 1040 (5th Cir.1987) (summary judgment affirmed); see, Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.1970) (summary judgment denied). Operative criteria include whether or not the vessel was in dry dock, the nature and extent of repair operations and who controls them. See, Wixom at 957; Hill v. Diamond, 311 F.2d 789, 791-192 (4th Cir.1962); 1B Benedict on Admiralty § 11a (7th Revised Ed.) (collecting cases).

*In this instance, McClendon was acting as a caretaker when injured aboard the GALVESTON at a time when it was in dry dock, minus captain and crew, without any power of her own, and undergoing extensive repairs by contract workers which would eventually take 77 days to complete and over $25 million to pay for. Its bottom had been substantially removed. She was utterly incapable of navigation. Plaintiff admitted at oral argument that, had the 1268 chocks been pulled out from under her at the time he was injured, she would have slid from her berth into the water and down to the bottom of the river. In light of these undisputed facts, the court finds that reasonable persons could not conclude that the plaintiff was employed on a “vessel in navigation”; consequently, McClendon was not a Jones Act seaman and so cannot bring a Jones Act suit.

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A post was merged into an existing topic: Conception dive boat captain indicted on 34 counts

A post was merged into an existing topic: Conception dive boat captain indicted on 34 counts

That’s why I love mankind

  • Randy Newman
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