Junior ship’s deck officers typically do not trust direct visual perception and instead rely almost entirely on representations (paper charts, ECDIS, etc.).
It’s been my observation that when potentially useful visual cues are available the typical junior OOW does not trust them and will not use them.
The consensus here on this forum is that these deck officers are correct and becoming proficient using instruments is sufficient and teaching junior officers to use visual cues (in addition, not instead) could in fact be unsafe.
One exception here is the third mate on the Exxon Valdez.
This is from another thread is with regard to the EV
Here’s a thread of mariners saying the 3/M of the EV should have been able to use visual cues:Exxon Valdez Grounding #2
I’d put it more like this: The instruments should cause the mate to check the visual cues, as opposed to the visual cues causing the mate to check the instruments.
Tech has a come an extremely long way since the Valdez grounding, but had the mate been confident in his radar skill it never would have happened back then either.
Yes, I agree. The use of the radar in that way is closer to direct perception than is to representation (paper charts, ECDIS, etc.) there’s no conscious interpretation. What’s lacking is confidence, which improves with (deliberate) practice.
Becoming confident in out-the-window visual perception works the same way. Just need practice while cross-checking with other means.
The instruments should cause the mate to check the visual cues, as opposed to the visual cues causing the mate to check the instruments.
That’s not the way ship pilots do it. - although sometimes more precision is required which means checking the instruments.
Well, it’s not the way they used to do it, but they’re doing it more and more with the kits they bring with them now.
But I would never train someone to do things the way a ships pilot operates, for obvious reasons. There are also numerous instances of ships pilots fucking that up.
It’s a question of misplaced confidence. The amount of instances of misplaced confidence in visual navigation causing an incident far, far outpaces the amount of times there was an instrument failure or incorrect use of such. This is data, not vibes.
In the age of paper charts, (Exxon Valdez) the representation method required that bearing and ranges be taken, a fix plotted on chart and course to steer determined. Also DRs were laid down, time to turn was computed etc. The clock and compass were key tools.
When using direct perception none of that need be done. The direction to steer is determined by direct observations out the window and/or from the radar screen and the vessel is simply steered in that direction.
Before GPS and ENCs mariners in different sectors had split perspectives. For a junior deep-sea deck officer the idea of using direct perception makes no sense. On the other hand, for ex-fisherman I sailed with on an Aleutian freighter the idea that a fix must be plotted on a chart likewise made no sense.
The captain of the Exxon Valdez and the third mate likewise did not share a common perspective. For the captain the task was a simple matter of conning the loaded tanker back to the traffic lanes. For the third mate the same task required plotting a fix etc. The third mate faced a far higher workload to safely perform the same task.
It’s about world building. You want to teach people to world build the way you did because you know the benefits.
I did too, but that’s wrong. You cannot force a world to be built that no longer exists. You can adapt the lessons from your world building into the new one, or become irrelevant.
The paper chart is a representation (the map is not the territory), the pencil marks represent position (fix), expected position (DRs, time to turn) and courses to be steered (track lines).
The paper chart along with the pencil marks is an abstraction of some relevant aspects of the environment, a model. It’s not the real world any more than is a photograph.
The radar is not a representation, it’s a real-time display of sensor information directly coupled to the environment (other examples are the fathometer and anemometer).
Direct perception is a real-time connection to the environment using one senses
The point of the OP is the Exxon Valdez grounding was an example of the captain’s miscalabration of the third mate’s skills and an error as to what methods he would almost certainly use.
As a rule, most third mates have no confidence in direct perception and if required to navigate in pilotage water they will instead use representational (plotting on a chart then, ECDIS now) methods.
This is the disconnect. The ECDIS outside of some extremely rare occurrences that are easily detected is perception, not representation. Just the same as radar.
There are disadvantages to that, but there are also benefits.
I recently had a situation where a captain informed me that a deck officer new to the company was spending their watch with eyes glued to the plotter. Plainly, they had little piloting experience prior to this job. On the Inside Passage piloting skill is paramount.
The captain suggested we send the officer out on our training boat with a captain from our Training Group.
For us, organization is the key to solving the issue. We have an organization with highly experienced captains who can spot the deficiency in a new officer right away. The captain knows he can bring the issue up with the port captain. The port captain puts the word out to all captains that this officer needs instruction in this particular skill.
At the same time, the port captain can turn to the leadership of the Training Group with the issue, who then schedule themselves and the officer for a training trip on the Salish Sea. A week of piloting with no electronics by day and only radar at night.
But the key here is the organization. The organization can spot the deficiency and has the wherewithal and expertise to correct it.
The captain knows what to expect from a watch officer. The watch officer knows the expectation from the Navigation section of the Vessel Operation Manual, which has been vetted by the Training Group. The Training Group are all working company officers who have dealt with this sort of thing before.
They also maintain the training boat so it is ready to go for these trips.
For us, nowadays, the remedy is an organizational one.
Focusing on archaic navigation methods as a means of instilling and maintaining a culture of good seamanship is a good thing, but the important thing is the culture of good seamanship, not the archaic navigation methods.
That’s where organization comes into play. The captains know the mix of navigation methods which work best for the job. Since they form the Training Group they know the best remedies for the issues which need to be addressed. They have everything from bridge simulator programs which they themselves have developed at Seattle Maritime Academy. They have the Curlew at their disposal. They can also just let the other captains know what added training a new person needs as they move from boat to boat.
But the captains know best about what remedy to use because they do the work and have to live with the results.
It’s no different than running a baseball team. If you have a great pitcher who has batting problems you don’t giving them pitching lessons. You assign them a batting trainer to focus on just that one aspect.
Moreover, the batting trainer is not likely to have the pitcher work on all aspects of batting. It’s not that he doesn’t know how to bat, it’s just that there is one aspect of batting that needs to be identified and worked on: form, or strength, or tactics.
A good organization has people who can identify the problem, and other people who can work on it.
The captain is nothing if not punctual, so we arrived at five o’clock, exactly on schedule, and waited a few minutes while the simulator’s operator booted up its Valdez program
"The ship begins to swing. Hazelwood does not look to the radar screen for proof: he waits to see it, as he later says “to feel the turn”
What’s being implied here is maneuvering a loaded tanker at night back to the traffic lanes, which were blocked with ice, can be done by visual means and 'feel" alone. No need to look at the radar or to plot fixes.
These direct perception skills however can only be developed with practice. The third mate is going to judge it’s far more prudent to plot fixes on the chart. Representational methods, the only ones he had confidence using.
Now old and retired. First thought “young folks today, ect”
If some “new deck officers” are using tech to much and not visual means. It’s cause the “Older deck officers” who they worked with. Didn’t train them very well.
30 years ago I noticed some newly certified deck officers. Were over reliant on radar ect. Most had worked thier own way up without a lot of help. I put a lot of it down to lack of actual on the job experience. Their first introduction to watch keeping, often being, attending the radar classes. This was easily fixed in most instances by encouraging good practice and giving them the opportunity and encouragement to learn.
I found graduates of cadet programs to be generally very good. Some exception to every rule though. One of the advantages of the cadet programs. Bridge Experience hopefully with good learning opportunities.
Some of deck crew working their way up were fortunate to work with seniors who encouraged and helped them to learn. A lookout or QM encouraged to take part in the watch would learn well. Others weren’t so lucky.
Anyway I don’t believe it’s a new problem or irreparable.
Often found new hires with big certifications coming from other parts of the industry were lacking in basic good practices. Like old dogs, much harder to teach them New Tricks.
That one. The entire training / education / testing system and most of the industry has got it wrong, Deck officers new to the industry can in fact quickly learn to use direct perception methods (alongside other methods).
It’s difficult to convince anyone however. Only way is to show them, to have them do it, at sea, on the bridge, in traffic or restricted water..
