Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Offshore
1881

[QUOTE=bnhpr;34777]Again, hangoff is what you do during an EDS due to loss of position, not a well control issue. There should be no reason to EDS for a kick or well control issue. It’s a last resort. No win scenarion, to the point where its rarely even discussed (this will change)

To shear, it doesn’t really matter if your hung off or not (unless you hit a tooljoint…oops) The hangoff just helps you retrieve the fish.

On the last 3 rigs I’ve worked on, the eds sequence includes automatic pickup of the drawworks after shearing. This is so you do not drag the fish out of the hole, and damage profiles, stack etc.

The standing joke is, how will the drawworks pull up if you lose power? In the days of compensators, you had hydraulic lift. With AHD’s blackout means there is no heave compensator!

Closing the annular is a good idea if you have time (slow), so you do not lose the oil based mud in the riser…as an environmental issue.[/QUOTE]
I was on a rig one time when the driller accidentally engaged the shears instead of closing the annular. We had just set a packer & were going to test the annulus. Anyway, he got it open before it completley cut the pipe. From what I’ve seen, it wouldn’t be easy to fish after shearing because it doesn’t make a claen cut. It mashed the pipe & cut it half into before he got it opened. The other issue I would have with hanging off before shearing is with the weight stacked onto a set of slips or hanging rams, I believe it doesn’t give the pipe anywhere to be displced. i have cut a lot of pipe & casing & the best way to cut it is with weight hanging off, because you get assistance from the weight hanging. I liken it to trying to cut a rope & only holding one end of the rope. I have some other questions for you & didn’t mean to irritate you yesterday. I was just giving my opinion on this operation.
On the rams is the hanging ram expected to hold pressure? because I would not like to trust my life on a ram expecting it to hold say 9000 PSI & 300k hanging weight. I also have heard a lot made about the annular. I would not want to stake my life on an annular holding 9000PSI.
I have read your posts on the BOP on DWH. I agree with you that there is no way every part of it malfunctioned. I am wondering if you think it is possible/probable that it may not have malfunctioned at all. I have believed this to be a possibility all along. that is why I have not come down on TO nearly as hard as BP.
I still say those ROV operators are some bad boys. So far they’re the only ones that can seem to get anything done since this mess happened.

1882

The plume is huge now.

1883

[I still say those ROV operators are some bad boys. So far they’re the only ones that can seem to get anything done since this mess happened.[/QUOTE]

The pressure at 5,000ft. is nothing compared to what those guys “flying” those ROVs are going through. The whole world is watching their every move. I’ll bet that the conversations (exclamations!!!) in those ROV “shacks” would burn the ears off of sailors. Hats off to them.

1884

[QUOTE=Anchor Guy;34780][I still say those ROV operators are some bad boys. So far they’re the only ones that can seem to get anything done since this mess happened.[/QUOTE]

The pressure at 5,000ft. is nothing compared to what those guys “flying” those ROVs are going through. The whole world is watching their every move. I’ll bet that the conversations (exclamations!!!) in those ROV “shacks” would burn the ears off of sailors. Hats off to them.[/QUOTE]

I totally agree. I bet they have the best pilots in the market flying those ROVs… hats off to them.

1885

[QUOTE=company man 1;34778]I was on a rig one time when the driller accidentally engaged the shears instead of closing the annular. We had just set a packer & were going to test the annulus. Anyway, he got it open before it completley cut the pipe. From what I’ve seen, it wouldn’t be easy to fish after shearing because it doesn’t make a claen cut. It mashed the pipe & cut it half into before he got it opened. The other issue I would have with hanging off before shearing is with the weight stacked onto a set of slips or hanging rams, I believe it doesn’t give the pipe anywhere to be displced. i have cut a lot of pipe & casing & the best way to cut it is with weight hanging off, because you get assistance from the weight hanging. I liken it to trying to cut a rope & only holding one end of the rope. I have some other questions for you & didn’t mean to irritate you yesterday. I was just giving my opinion on this operation.
On the rams is the hanging ram expected to hold pressure? because I would not like to trust my life on a ram expecting it to hold say 9000 PSI & 300k hanging weight. I also have heard a lot made about the annular. I would not want to stake my life on an annular holding 9000PSI.
I have read your posts on the BOP on DWH. I agree with you that there is no way every part of it malfunctioned. I am wondering if you think it is possible/probable that it may not have malfunctioned at all. I have believed this to be a possibility all along. that is why I have not come down on TO nearly as hard as BP.
I still say those ROV operators are some bad boys. So far they’re the only ones that can seem to get anything done since this mess happened.[/QUOTE]

I do not believe the BOP malfunctioned significantly. I think the well rendered it inoperable, and/or the rig was in a no-win scenario, since the well came at them so fast, with so much pressure, there was not time.

I know many of the crew of the DWH and I think they were doomed as soon as they lined up saltwater to the mud pumps.

It’s likely the explosion/fire took out the surface controls and the EDS function from the bridge, and/or by the time it was initiated, it was too late. The timeline is not clear. Or, possibly, the button/activation circuit failed during the blackout. Maybe UPS, all possible theories.

Latent failures…due to lack of testing. Noone ever wants to test ups (especially dp and well control stuff), your on normal power, then bang, you have nothing. Also, how were electronic circuits protected from high voltage/frequency when the engines ran away. (why didn’t the rig savers prevent this?) How about the engine room dampers (notorious for seizing)…these are my equipment questions…not the BOP.

The BOP panel is used daily, tested weekly/biweekly etc. I have never seen full functionality lost. Maybe a pod has a fault, or sim, or node etc, but never the entire control panel. Very unlikely that it would fail, at the same moment there is a well control problem.
Maybe I’m wrong, maybe nobody is coming clean about losing comms with the BOP, but I doubt it.
The only major failure I can see is failure to stop the job, when the well indicated repeatedly that there was a problem.

Sadly, people tried, but they were ignored.

1886

[QUOTE=CaptVal;34781]The pressure at 5,000ft. is nothing compared to what those guys “flying” those ROVs are going through. The whole world is watching their every move. I’ll bet that the conversations (exclamations!!!) in those ROV “shacks” would burn the ears off of sailors. Hats off to them.[/QUOTE]

I totally agree. I bet they have the best pilots in the market flying those ROVs… hats off to them.[/QUOTE]

Divers…a different breed. Good at what they do though.

Be warned about going drinking with them.

Ever been to the Rat in Morgan City?

1887

A New Kent Wells update is available on the BP site:

http://bp.concerts.com/gom/kentwellstechupdatelong053110.htm

1888

[QUOTE=bnhpr;34783]I do not believe the BOP malfunctioned significantly. I think the well rendered it inoperable, and/or the rig was in a no-win scenario, since the well came at them so fast, with so much pressure, there was not time.

I know many of the crew of the DWH and I think they were doomed as soon as they lined up saltwater to the mud pumps.

It’s likely the explosion/fire took out the surface controls and the EDS function from the bridge, and/or by the time it was initiated, it was too late. The timeline is not clear. Or, possibly, the button/activation circuit failed during the blackout. Maybe UPS, all possible theories.

Latent failures…due to lack of testing. Noone ever wants to test ups (especially dp and well control stuff), your on normal power, then bang, you have nothing. Also, how were electronic circuits protected from high voltage/frequency when the engines ran away. (why didn’t the rig savers prevent this?) How about the engine room dampers (notorious for seizing)…these are my equipment questions…not the BOP.

The BOP panel is used daily, tested weekly/biweekly etc. I have never seen full functionality lost. Maybe a pod has a fault, or sim, or node etc, but never the entire control panel. Very unlikely that it would fail, at the same moment there is a well control problem.
Maybe I’m wrong, maybe nobody is coming clean about losing comms with the BOP, but I doubt it.
The only major failure I can see is failure to stop the job, when the well indicated repeatedly that there was a problem.

Sadly, people tried, but they were ignored.[/QUOTE]

My gut feeling is along similar lines. Recall that the shear rams had been used earlier that day and the Upper? annular was being used for the negative testing. This doesn’t jive with the BOP “totally failed” as coming from bp.

It’s probably more a case of avoiding blame and immediate criminal prosecutions if they continue finger pointing elsewhere.

On a previous note…
“Luddite” is a term describing those opposed to industrialization, automation, computerization or new technologies in general.

The guy that designed the spreadsheet I mentioned earlier was a Driller. He wasn’t a Luddite,
neither was he called “Bubba Wyoming-Tampax Junior III”.

1889

7:50 AM eastern time currently. Have been watching undersea video for an hour. Riser cutting in progress. Also still see the pipe shear for the riser hanging on a cable. The oil plume at the kink looks larger. Perhaps someone watched during my sleep time the operations? … did they shear the riser yet? I cannot tell from the video so far.

PS: Here is a link for us learning on diamond wire cutting systems: http://www.cut-group.com/overview.asp

Note to pribus THANK YOU for the document references. To me, this one was outstanding: http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/TRO-Deepwater.Horizon.BOP.Assurance.Analysis.March.2001.pdf

It contained the hazard analysis, FMECA and the details of valving and component layouts on the BOP and the LMRP. This is a must read, particularly the drawings on pages 55 through 63!

Update 8:20 AM… looking like the pipe shear is being positioned now for the cut.

Update 9:44 AM… looks like the riser has been cut. Shear being repositioned to take additional length(s?) off the riser.

1890

Check:
http://www.loe.org/images/100528/Increased-Safety-Measures-Report-2.pdf
Changes are coming

1891

[QUOTE=Alf;34787]…
On a previous note…
“Luddite” is a term describing those opposed to industrialization, automation, computerization or new technologies in general.

The guy that designed the spreadsheet I mentioned earlier was a Driller. He wasn’t a Luddite,
neither was he called “Bubba Wyoming-Tampax Junior III”.[/QUOTE]

The tool pusher should have time to do the schematics, walk over and discuss it with the driller for critical stopping points. If not, until we get the automation that should be hand in with the bop, if they were getting $533,000/day for that rig they should charge $534,000/day and hire a statistician.

It’s obvious the ability to drill a well in deepwater has outpaced the ability to handle the worst case scenario. But that just means handling the worst case scenario will have to catch up so we can proceed: http://www.aoghs.org/pdf/conroe.pdf

I grew up in a town where they build very large submarines and they designed a submarine oil transport 50 years ago to pass under the Arctic but no one bought it. I believe the underwater tech is doable but it will just take some time. In Long Beach 80 years ago they were lucky to get within 500’ of their deviated target but now we can drill several miles horizontally within a few feet using the exact same mechanics but advanced design. Someday we’ll be auto-drilling in the deep trenches.

“ He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, [I]Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 146[/I]
[I]German philosopher (1844 - 1900)[/I]

1892

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;34790]The tool pusher should have time to do the schematics, walk over and discuss it with the driller for critical stopping points. If not, until we get the automation that should be hand in with the bop, if they were getting $533,000/day for that rig they should charge $534,000/day and hire a statistician.

It’s obvious the ability to drill a well in deepwater has outpaced the ability to handle the worst case scenario. But that just means handling the worst case scenario will have to catch up so we can proceed: http://www.aoghs.org/pdf/conroe.pdf

I grew up in a town where they build very large submarines and they designed a submarine oil transport 50 years ago to pass under the Arctic but no one bought it. I believe the underwater tech is doable but it will just take some time. In Long Beach 80 years ago they were lucky to get within 500’ of their deviated target but now we can drill several miles horizontally within a few feet using the exact same mechanics but advanced design. Someday we’ll be auto-drilling in the deep trenches.

“ He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, [I]Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 146[/I]
[I]German philosopher (1844 - 1900)[/I][/QUOTE]

“What does not kill us makes us stronger” Nietzsche

My father told me this when I was a boy…working on his fishing boat.

Unfortunately, it did kill some of us…

We may never know all of what caused this…that is, until the sea gives up her dead.

1893

[QUOTE=bnhpr;34783]I do not believe the BOP malfunctioned significantly. I think the well rendered it inoperable, and/or the rig was in a no-win scenario, since the well came at them so fast, with so much pressure, there was not time.

I know many of the crew of the DWH and I think they were doomed as soon as they lined up saltwater to the mud pumps.

It’s likely the explosion/fire took out the surface controls and the EDS function from the bridge, and/or by the time it was initiated, it was too late. The timeline is not clear. Or, possibly, the button/activation circuit failed during the blackout. Maybe UPS, all possible theories.

Latent failures…due to lack of testing. Noone ever wants to test ups (especially dp and well control stuff), your on normal power, then bang, you have nothing. Also, how were electronic circuits protected from high voltage/frequency when the engines ran away. (why didn’t the rig savers prevent this?) How about the engine room dampers (notorious for seizing)…these are my equipment questions…not the BOP.

The BOP panel is used daily, tested weekly/biweekly etc. I have never seen full functionality lost. Maybe a pod has a fault, or sim, or node etc, but never the entire control panel. Very unlikely that it would fail, at the same moment there is a well control problem.
Maybe I’m wrong, maybe nobody is coming clean about losing comms with the BOP, but I doubt it.
The only major failure I can see is failure to stop the job, when the well indicated repeatedly that there was a problem.

Sadly, people tried, but they were ignored.[/QUOTE]
It sounds to me like you are saying that the truth about what could have hapened with the BOPs & disoconnect will most likely never be known unless the whole rig is pulled from the sea & that is highly unlikely. So you are telling us that everything could have gone back to something as simple as one of the generators having had it’s ESD bypassed or just plain old malfunction at the wrong time ? Therefore allowing the intricate circuitry that the EDS/ emergency shut in system uses. This I can absolutely buy into. I don’t profess to know doodley squat about the exact make up of the electronic over hydrauic system this rig used in it’s shut down system, but I could learn it, GIVEN ENOUGH YEARS, & do understand there just aren’t that many malfunctions which occur at one time to system like that other than malfeasence without a very good reason.
I realize the guys on that rig knew that system was on there for a reason & with the dummies they had calling shots they better make sure it was working properly or this could happen to them in the middle of the night. This all leads us back full circle. If BP had done the right things, it would never have come down to a possible malfunction of an ESD on a generator, or bad battery, or whatever other thing BP is trying to point the finger at to protect themselves form public scrutiny as welll as criminal litigation.
Edit: In short it sounds as if the smartest guys in this room, based on their individual sutdy of the evidence & good common sense are all starting to come to the same conclusion.

1894

[QUOTE=bnhpr;34773]“ROV identified hydraulic system errors such that test rams were being activated
instead of lower variable rams”

This one was dirty, no shame here…The SSTV was installed per client request, since, as the customer, they tell us how they want the stack configured. Maybe it was mislabeled, but what does this have to do with the alleged stack failure?[/QUOTE]
Could the dead man switch have been wired to the SSTV?

1895

I’ve got a question regarding the EDS procedure. I recall hearing or reading that the EDS “button” can be used to “get off” the well in case of an emergency. Am I correct in understanding that this would/could mean a physical disconnect between the drilling vessel and the wellhead/bop? If so, is the connection broken up top, at the vessel, or down below at the wellhead? If the connection was broken up top, seems like you’d have the problem of the riser being unsupported. Is it true that the riser is supported by buoyancy devices along it length? Thanks!

1896

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;34790]The tool pusher should have time to do the schematics, walk over and discuss it with the driller for critical stopping points. If not, until we get the automation that should be hand in with the bop, if they were getting $533,000/day for that rig they should charge $534,000/day and hire a statistician.

It’s obvious the ability to drill a well in deepwater has outpaced the ability to handle the worst case scenario. But that just means handling the worst case scenario will have to catch up so we can proceed: http://www.aoghs.org/pdf/conroe.pdf

I grew up in a town where they build very large submarines and they designed a submarine oil transport 50 years ago to pass under the Arctic but no one bought it. I believe the underwater tech is doable but it will just take some time. In Long Beach 80 years ago they were lucky to get within 500’ of their deviated target but now we can drill several miles horizontally within a few feet using the exact same mechanics but advanced design. Someday we’ll be auto-drilling in the deep trenches.

“ He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, [I]Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 146[/I]
[I]German philosopher (1844 - 1900)[/I][/QUOTE]

Pumping Jack, what is worst case scenario in this case, other than the operator being unsafe due to greed & incompetence ? This leads us to a fundamental decision. Will we as a nation isolate & punish the guilty harshly ? Or will we pumish ourselves & our way of life, because after all any one of us could have done what they did? Because America has now had time to think about this & they are staring to wonder is it worth the damage to ourselves that a disaster like this can cause. Therefore I will say again as I have said before, it is my belief, hope, & fervent desire that we pumish those whose disregard for the rules causes this kind of catastrophe, because Quite frankly there will never be a guaranteed way to get Pandora’s box closed once it has been opened.

1897

The disconnect acts at the interface between BOP and LMRP. This allows the annulars, as well as the control pods and their interfaces to be removed independently.

The riser is left “hanging” with the riser tensioners and slip joint connected.

The riser is fitted with bouyancy along xx% of its length (top part) this will depend on currents / drag / water depth and riser analysis which is carried out, as well as tension requirements. The riser you see in the ROV pictures does not have the bouyancy attached - just the Kill / Choke / hydraulic and control lines ranged around the outside.

The BOP is then left with the top rams (bind/ shear) closed, and under “normal” disconnect (e.g. when you have time to plan it) procedure a hanger or drillpipe suspended in the rams below.

1898

The cut is happeing right now !!

1899

[QUOTE=charles_oil;34811]The cut is happeing right now !![/QUOTE]

is it just me or did the giant shears just jam up while cutting the riser? I haven’t been able to watch very much…did they already cut the riser off of the stack or are they cutting out here on the end first?

1900

It looked like they went for the cut, possibly wasn’t able to make the cut, backed off, then attempted closure again, and now are backing off one more time.

Edit: now I’m getting a bad feeling… wonder if they can cut one half at a time. Maybe they need to cut a section out of the auxiliary lines so it’s only cutting riser?

Edit 2: time to break out the shaped charges. (said factiously)