Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

On land, they can use RFID tags for things like pallets and use them for inventory and shipping. Some can store information on them. I don’t know anything about if they could survive in the environment on the inside of a drill pipe somewhere. But if they could, you could store a unique id for that pipe for tracking, length information, number of hours used (if that’s useful), repair info, etc. And as you hang pipe, it could automatically query the RFID tag and do all the calculations and visualizations. If they could survive in that environment…

Maybe place something like an RFID reader somewhere in the BOP so that as the tag passes that location, it would update a display so you would know exactly what portion of the drill string is at that location.

[QUOTE=bnhpr;34625]It wasn’t told to.[/QUOTE]

I disagree with this. If you listen to the witnesses that have already come forward, you will see that they did hit the EDS button on the BOP panel in the Bridge. The Subsea Engineer did it, even before the Captain authorized him to do so, as it was his responsibility. The main reason why the BOP did not close is that the hydraulic system in the BOP did not have pressure its hydraulic accumulators to make it work.

See this in the - Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Transocean, subsea supervisor:

The amount of energy required to perform the EDS is very large, and is one of the dimensioning criteria for the accumulators in the BOP Stack.[I][/I]

See also the initial findings from BP that were presented in US House of Representatives – Committee on Energy and Commerce.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100527/BP.Presentation.pdf
See page 37 of this BP presentation.
[I][I]"Post the explosion, numerous ROV hot stab interventions were conducted in an attempt to activate

  • Blind Shear rams
  • Variable Pipe rams
  • LMRP Disconnect (Auto shear cut in attempt to activate blind shear rams)
    ROV survey found a number of hydraulic leaks on the system
    ROV identified hydraulic system errors such that test rams were being activated
    instead of lower variable rams
    ROV identified undocumented modifications to the hydraulic control system; the extent of these modifications is unknown at this time"

If you guys go and look at the DWH documents that were provided to the US House of Representatives – Committee on Energy and Commerce,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100525/Memo.BP.Internal.Investigation.pdf
"…
The information from BP identifies several new warning signs of problems. According to BP there were three flow indicators from the well before the explosion. One was 51 minutes before the explosion when more fluid began flowing out of the well than was being pumped in. Another flow indicator was 41 minutes before the explosion when the pump was shut down for a “sheen” test, yet the well continued to flow instead of stopping and drill pipe pressure also unexpectedly increased. Then, 18 minutes before the explosion, abnormal pressures and mud returns were observed and the pump was abruptly shut down. The data suggests that the crew may have attempted mechanical interventions at that point to control the pressure, but soon after, the flow out and pressure increased dramatically and the explosion took place.

Further, BP’s preliminary findings indicate that there were other events in the 24 hours before the explosion that require further inquiry. As early as 5:05 p.m., almost 5 hours before the explosion, an unexpected loss of fluid was observed in the riser pipe, suggesting that there were leaks in the annular preventer in the BOP. Four hours before the explosion, during efforts to begin negative pressure testing, the system gained 15 barrels of liquid instead of the 5 barrels that were expected, leading to the possibility that there was an “influx from the well.” A cementer witness stated that the “well continued to flow and spurted.” Having received an unacceptable result from conducting the negative pressure test through the drill pipe, the pressure test was then moved to the kill line where a volume of fluid came out when the line was opened. The kill line was then closed and the procedure was discussed; during this time, pressure began to build in the system to 1400 psi. At this point, the line was opened and pressure on the kill line was bled to 0 psi, while pressure on the drill pipe remained at 1400 psi. BP’s investigator indicated that a “fundamental mistake” may have been made here because this was an “indicator of a very large abnormality.” The kill line then was monitored and by 7:55 p.m. the rig team was “satisfied that [the] test [was] successful.” At that time, the rig started displacing the remaining fluids with seawater, leading to the three flow indicators described above.

…….
In addition, the method of displacing the drilling mud with seawater may have interfered with the monitoring of the flow levels from the well because the mud was transferred to another boat instead of measured in the mud pits. Moreover, mudloggers were not informed when the offloading of drilling mud to the other boat was stopped."

Looking at the DWH BOP Assurance Analysis that was made in March 2001, also available in the US House of Representatives – Committee on Energy and Commerce

http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/TRO-Deepwater.Horizon.BOP.Assurance.Analysis.March.2001.pdf

If we look at page 58/147 of this report we see that there is no means to fill-up the BOP hydraulic accumulators (8x80Gal accumulators) with an ROV. This explains why right after the sinking they could not make the shear rams or the Casing shear rams close with the ROV.
There are ROV functions to dump the accumulators (8x80Gal) but not to fill them.
This would be due to the fact that they have to be dumped prior to retrieval to the surface due to the fact that they are designed to be dumped before the stack is retrieved, as retrieving them without dumping would mean they would be subject the accumulators to a pressure higher than there designed (5,000 psi).

http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.We.Know.pdf

this is also an interesting document that states the different fronts that the investigation is following.

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;34739]Sometimes I’m on the floor, sometimes I’m on the brake handle, sometimes I’m in the derrick, sometimes I’m in the library, sometimes I’m in the office, sometimes I’m in the welding shop, sometimes in the mechanic shop, sometimes I operate the winch, sometimes I’m on the design table, sometimes I need to be in more than one of those places at the same time, but I broke in on a standard triple on the floor at $5.40 an hour when they were already at 18,000’ drilling to 24,000’, and my point to you was, if a man is too distracted to do his job safely, shouldn’t we stop, look, and listen like we learned in 1st grade. Ain’t it 'bout time we got back to the basics…[/QUOTE]

Based on what I’ve gleaned from a few of you guys out here in the GoM with me, you are on semi-subs. As everyone is now understanding, there are a lot of variables to consider when the driller determines the length of drill string and the resultant relative locations of the tool joints. Nobody has mentioned another variable which I (and other persons in my position) are tasked with controlling and maintaining. What was the actual draft of the Horizon at the time of the incident? RKB to Well Head is based on what is supposed to be a “constant” but that distance normally varies by a few inches due to load changes onboard. It is the Ballast Control Operator’s job to keep this as constant as feasible because this is not something that the driller should have to worry about. This was not a “normal” day-to-day operation because they were preparing for a rig move. Most semi-subs discharge a lot of their deck cargo (drilling equipment, tools, fluids, etc.) so as to be able to maintain a good stabilty margin while deballasting to get up to “transit” draft. Just a thought, but you guys that need to know that your RKB to Well Head has not changed should maybe verify that with the “Control Room”.

[QUOTE=SEDCO445;34703]Here is what I read Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000149 EndHTML:0000005822 StartFragment:0000000199 EndFragment:0000005788 StartSelection:0000000199 EndSelection:0000005788
Here is the latest story which sounds pretty feasible!!!

[B][I]The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.
The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8”, 11 7/8” and 9 7/8”) with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8” X 7” tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.
The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.
The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.
It is likely that pressure built up between the 9 7/8” and 16" casing under the casing hanger, due to gas migration from the pay zone. Based on reported mud weight, the reservoir formation pressure is in excess of 13,000 psi. The pressure building in the cross sectional area below the casing hanger would have increased casing tension and caused casing to collapse and part (rapidly separate) at a connection, probably a joint or two (50’ or 90’) below wellhead. The collapse pressure for 62.8 ppf 9-7/8” casing is +/- 10,300 psi. However, the collapse resistance of casing is considerably reduced in presence of axial stress (i.e. tension). Engineers - see formula from API bulletin 5C3, section 2.1.5 and run the math. The well then came in violently through parted casing and caused the blowout. Without lockdown ring on hanger, the casing hanger and joint(s) were slingshot up into BOP. That would explain why all components of the BOP are unable to seal or shear. The parted casing section remains across all BOP ram cavities and probably all the way up into the riser.

Shortcut #1: Running a tapered long string rather than a liner with 9-7/8” liner top packer, followed by tieback string and pumping heavy cement all the way to seabed. Perhaps the original permits for this casing program were based on a planned appraisal well, and changed midstream to a producer well, then hastily approved by the complacent or under-staffed MMS. This tragic shortcut may have saved about 1.5 rig days.

Shortcut #2: Insufficient time was used to cure the mud losses prior to cementing the open hole reservoir section, depending instead on using lightweight cement to prevent losses to the formation.

Shortcut #3: The nitrified primary cement job. This is difficult to pull off, even under ideal conditions.

Shortcut #4: Hanger without lock ring may have used due to the previously unplanned long string, and to avoid waiting for hanger with lock ring to be fabricated or prepared.

Shortcut #5: No cement evaluation logs were performed after a job with known high calculated risk (mud losses to formation). This shortcut may have saved 8 hours of rig time.

Shortcut #6: Pressure testing casing less than 24 hours after cement in place can expand the casing before the cement is fully set. This shortcut can “crack” the cement and create a micro annulus which will allow gas migration.

Shortcut #7: Displacing 14 ppg mud from 8000 ft MDRT with 8.7 ppg seawater, less than 20 hours after primary cement is in place. How many tested and proven barriers can you count? I count zero satisfactory barriers. Industry standards dictate that at least two tested (to maximum anticipated pressure) barriers are in place prior to removing the primary source of well control (weighted mud or brine).
[/I][/B]
[/QUOTE]

That is the most plausible explanation I’ve heard yet. Where are the cement logs? And nitrogen cement is more difficult to log because of it physical properties to boot.

1.5 to 3 days rig time saved vs. untold billions, 11 lives, and wetlands that will take how long to recuperate? The whole BP company isn’t worth that. Not Transocean fault - BP made the decisions and Halliburton.

[QUOTE=SEDCO445;34703]Here is what I read Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000149 EndHTML:0000005822 StartFragment:0000000199 EndFragment:0000005788 StartSelection:0000000199 EndSelection:0000005788
Here is the latest story which sounds pretty feasible!!!

[B][I]The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.[/I][/B]
[I][B]The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8”, 11 7/8” and 9 7/8”) with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8” X 7” tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.[/B][/I]
[I][B]The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.[/B][/I]
[I][B]The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.[/B][/I]
[I][B]It is likely that pressure built up between the 9 7/8” and 16" casing under the casing hanger, due to gas migration from the pay zone. Based on reported mud weight, the reservoir formation pressure is in excess of 13,000 psi. The pressure building in the cross sectional area below the casing hanger would have increased casing tension and caused casing to collapse and part (rapidly separate) at a connection, probably a joint or two (50’ or 90’) below wellhead. The collapse pressure for 62.8 ppf 9-7/8” casing is +/- 10,300 psi. However, the collapse resistance of casing is considerably reduced in presence of axial stress (i.e. tension). Engineers - see formula from API bulletin 5C3, section 2.1.5 and run the math. The well then came in violently through parted casing and caused the blowout. Without lockdown ring on hanger, the casing hanger and joint(s) were slingshot up into BOP. That would explain why all components of the BOP are unable to seal or shear. The parted casing section remains across all BOP ram cavities and probably all the way up into the riser.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #1: Running a tapered long string rather than a liner with 9-7/8” liner top packer, followed by tieback string and pumping heavy cement all the way to seabed. Perhaps the original permits for this casing program were based on a planned appraisal well, and changed midstream to a producer well, then hastily approved by the complacent or under-staffed MMS. This tragic shortcut may have saved about 1.5 rig days.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #2: Insufficient time was used to cure the mud losses prior to cementing the open hole reservoir section, depending instead on using lightweight cement to prevent losses to the formation.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #3: The nitrified primary cement job. This is difficult to pull off, even under ideal conditions.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #4: Hanger without lock ring may have used due to the previously unplanned long string, and to avoid waiting for hanger with lock ring to be fabricated or prepared.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #5: No cement evaluation logs were performed after a job with known high calculated risk (mud losses to formation). This shortcut may have saved 8 hours of rig time.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #6: Pressure testing casing less than 24 hours after cement in place can expand the casing before the cement is fully set. This shortcut can “crack” the cement and create a micro annulus which will allow gas migration.[/B][/I]

[I][B]Shortcut #7: Displacing 14 ppg mud from 8000 ft MDRT with 8.7 ppg seawater, less than 20 hours after primary cement is in place. How many tested and proven barriers can you count? I count zero satisfactory barriers. Industry standards dictate that at least two tested (to maximum anticipated pressure) barriers are in place prior to removing the primary source of well control (weighted mud or brine).[/B][/I]

[/QUOTE]

[B][I][COLOR=navy][B][I]Geoffrey Riddell[/I][/B][/COLOR][/I][/B]

[B][COLOR=navy][B]Operations Manager - Central Asia[/B][/COLOR][/B]
[COLOR=navy][/COLOR]
Sounds to me as if this conclusion has been agreed to somewhere before on this thread, minus the statements on the lock down rong not being placed on the casing hanger, becaus I could not get confirmation from a second source. I also did not comment on the casing failure because i may never recieve confirmation of it, altough I cannot disagree with any of this man’s findings. I commend this genleman’s courage of stating his convictions in what is almost sure to cause a wave of controversy for him. I also recieved this in an email from someone close to me.

[QUOTE=ferd;34736]are those methane hydrate flakes dropping thru the ROV footage?[/QUOTE]

I suspect highly that they’re methane hydrate (MH) rising to the surface in currents but before they reach it they will turn to 150x their volume in methane, rising to the top now. It seems MH might form like snow turned to hail stones after gas is being ejected from the well. Water at 4-6C or about 40F is the most dense and MH weighs 90% of H2O so MH floats. I imagine these ‘hailstones’ of MH would cloud and fill the inside of a Top Hat and form an ice shield eventually. Near the top 200’ low pressure water warms and melts it to methane bubbles which collect and grow as they rise. As a corrolary, water that is less dense at the surface 200-1000’ becomes lighter and so oil droplets do not remain buoyant. Water has that peculiar property. Still the oil must be realtively dense compared to what I see is typical crude oil.

I’m utterly fascinated with Methane Hydrate as potentially a critical player in this event and potentially very problematic. I’m not involved in the petroleum industry, a marine geologist, a qualified chemist, but rather a skilled observer of what’s sometimes unseen, a mini-polymath that sees big pictures and small. Below I offer exhibits and attachments that somewhat frighten me when I draw the conclusions.

There is likely a significant layer or layers of conglomerate formed and cemented by MH and forming impermeable barriers (as long as they are not phase shifted back to gas) This consideration of Methane Hydrate deserves a greater discussion. The edited excerpts below support my concern that this leaky hot pipe is at places surrounded by hardened concrete of MH that can phase shift upon change in temperature. This can cause landlslides or sideways channels and reservoirs under other layers, releasing still more, no telling how big this event could one day become. (i.e. Godzilla) I feel alone, hoping I’m concerned about phantoms … Perhaps I should write Sci-Fi novels and keep quiet here. Methane is as 72x the potency of CO2 as greenhouse gas over 20yrs, rising up now as we watch … I hope these crews working on Ground Zero site are prepared well for benzene (neurotoxic carcinogen from oil) and methane gas (odorless in pure form, asphyxiating and flammable, engines blow) … Any prudent mariner has many contingency plans. I have condensed and underlined my big-picture concern below with sources, for your review:

[ATTACH=CONFIG]908[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]911[/ATTACH] [ATTACH=CONFIG]909[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]913[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]910[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]914[/ATTACH]
 
[B]Because drilling can bring warm fluids up from depth, potentially melting the shallower gas hydrate, many researchers and engineers anticipate that drilling through gas hydrate may pose a [U]hazard to the stability[/U] of the well, the platform anchors, the tethers, or even entire platforms.[/B]
http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2003/07/fieldwork.html
 
[SIZE=1][SIZE=2]More than 99% of deep ocean hydrates consists of methane hydrate. If the physico-chemical conditions are satisfied, hydrate will form; however, hydrate is less dense than the surrounding seawater and [U]will float toward the surface until it decomposes[/U]. Thus, [U]natural oceanic hydrates are found in the sediment which traps them in the seafloor[/U] (Dillion & Max, 2000). [/SIZE]
[/SIZE]http://www.mbari.org/education/internship/04interns/04papers/Kristen_Schmidt04.pdf
 
Most methane, however, never makes it even as far as the sediments of the upper seafloor. Instead, as[U] it rises through the deep sediments, it quickly becomes trapped in lattice-like structures or cages (called clathrates) composed of water ice[/U]. At the proper conditions of temperature and pressure, methane or other gases found in the porous sediments spontaneously react with seawater to produce these structures.
 
These great pressures keep hydrate stable even at the increasingly warmer temperatures found in the more deeply buried sediment. Sediment temperatures increase with depth because they are heated from below, by the warmth from the interior of the Earth. [U][B]Typically temperature increases with sediment depth by 40°C to 50°C per kilometer (115°F to 145°F per mile).[/B][/U][I] (This increase is considerably higher than that in the crust of continents, which is about 25°C per kilometer, or 72°F per mile.)[/I] This temperature rise is referred to as the [U]geothermal gradient -- or geotherm[/U] -- for short.
[I](DO THE MATH?)[/I] 
Within the gas hydrate stability zone, methane hydrates typically appear as bright white streaks, lumps, [U]lens-shaped units[/U] [I](with ROV?)[/I] and discontinuous layers in the brownish continental margin muds. Recent laboratory work has indicated that methane hydrate may also exist in[U] thin sheets in layers of certain ocean bottom clays[/U] (specifically, the clays montmorillonite and smectite). Therefore, even where methane hydrate is not visibly present, it may be concealed as part of seafloor muds (Guggenheim and Koster van Groos, 2003).
 
In coarse-grained sediment units -- those composed of sands and gravels rather than muds -- there is greater pore space for hydrates to form. In these units, therefore, [U][B]hydrates can be found as cements -- gluing the sands and gravels together by occupying the spaces between grains and pebbles[/B][/U]. There are also more [U][B]massive, laterally continuous layers, ranging from two meters (yards) up to several tens of meters in thickness[/B][/U] (Clennel, 2000). These hydrate layers and units, thick and thin, form a[U] largely impermeable barrier within the sediment[/U].
 
[U]Below this barrier, however, lies a substantial amount of free methane, too warm to form hydrate[/U]. Some of this free gas undoubtedly trickles upward into the gas hydrate stability zone (GHSZ), but there, because pressure and temperature conditions are right, it also becomes hydrate. Most hydrate, in fact, is likely to have been produced in this fashion. Some free methane, however, is carried upwards in warm fluids (water with dissolved gases, minerals, and/or organic matter) that circulate in the sediments. This methane may [U]make it through the gas hydrate stability zone[/U] and the overlying sediments, evade being consumed by methanotrophs, and [U]escape into the water column[/U] and eventually into the atmosphere.
 
Eventually the increasing warmth in deeper sediments prevents the formation of hydrates. Below a certain depth, depending on the local temperature conditions, hydrates cannot form, and only free methane exists. Between this depth, known as the base of the gas hydrate stability zone (BGHSZ) and the top of the gas hydrate stability zone is where the hydrates are. Thus oceanic methane hydrates are usually found buried in sediments where the overlying seawater is at least 300 meters (yards) deep. Depending on the local geothermal gradient, the [U]hydrates can be found up to about 2000 meters (about 1.2 miles) beneath the seafloor[/U], though typically the depth extends to only about 1100 meters (somewhat more than 0.6 mile) below the seafloor.
 
Numerous attempts have been made to estimate the amount of methane hydrate in the world's continental margins. The task is a difficult one, partly due to the relative scarcity of drill cores into and through the hydrates themselves. Consequently, all quantity estimates must be based on limited data, and on factors such as the amount of pore space available for hydrate storage which also must be estimated. Nonetheless, a recent study that meticulously identified these various factors and determined their probable ranges came up with a global estimate of 5,000 to 20,000 gigatons (billions of metric tons, abbreviated as Gt) of carbon in oceanic hydrate methane (Dickens, 2001).
http://www.killerinourmidst.com/methane%20and%20MHs2.html
 
And it is not only water depth that makes these wells tricky. The Macondo well was drilled to 18,000 feet below the sea floor. The [U]temperatures and pressures at those depths are extreme[/U], and drilling and operating such wells is at the cutting edge of knowledge and technology. [B]In effect, every well is a prototype.[/B]
[http://247wallst.com/2010/04/30/gulf...ing-expansion/](http://247wallst.com/2010/04/30/gulf-oil-leak-will-stall-offshore-drilling-expansion/)
 

BP has stated to the press that this well is “50% gas” as they attempted to minimize the effects to the environment. Linked is video of offshore blowout involving Actinia semi-submersible oil rig, off Vietnam in February 1993. posted here previously:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhZKUYVXM78 as the [I]beginning of a worst case blowout contingency[/I]. Having searched the web for an hour about this event I can find very little detail specifics … and I find that in itself suspicious. This layer of MH conglomerate could form a passageway in theory for lateral breakouts and eventual side flows to new eruption sites in surrounding seabed, perhaps even sink hole collapses or violent gas chamber uprisings, new related blowouts, in my opinion.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4whiKQgnp4w [I]Matt Simmons suspects ancillary leaks 5-7 miles away.[/I]
The best way to prevent hot oil and gas from being injected into surrounding layers might be to reduce backflow pressure, so to let it flow out the top. I hope I am 100% WRONG. I’m concerned about yelling fire in a theater so I speak quietly here to caring folks with good noggins.

Pumping Jack. I would assume you have read the post by another consultant who has 33 years in the business. Let’s consider all or most of these things are proven to be true, which certainly seems to be the case now. If you had a posision of power would you let these people drill another well in the United States based on their word that they’ll do better next time, especially since they mislead the public about the amount of the flow rate after the disaster ? [QUOTE=pumpjack hand;34742]Real time monitoring would be great, BUT, it looks to me that their tool joint had been spaced correctly for circulating, does anyone come up with different numbers?[/QUOTE]

[QUOTE=Alf;34711]Simple answer is … Yes. ie hang off and hopefully hold pressure.

Better answer would be “hang-off” [B]and[/B] close ano ram or annular for backup.[/QUOTE] So why would anyone want to hang off a string of pipe & take the weight from the the string thereby lessening the cutting ability of the shears to work. For instance, one has to realize that 100k of string weight or whatever the number may be hanging wieght will assist the cutting of the pipe a whole lot better than no weight at all. Agree or disagree ?

[QUOTE=Bob S;34746]“and that the entire drilling procedure isn’t automated for safety, to increase productivity and to reduce labor costs.”
** on it since about 1930[/QUOTE]

Maybe I should have been more descriptive, because what I’ve been reading here is not automation. If you are needing to measure and type things in to a spreadsheet it is not automated. If the whole operation can’t take place in an “explosion-proof” box with no human exposed to it (as demonstrated in the video I posted) it isn’t automated. Automated to me means that even if what happened on the DWH happened, those 11 people would still be alive, because they wouldn’t have needed to be exposed to the forces unleashed by that blowout in order to do their job. They could have survived just like everybody else on the rig.

Please look at the video I posted to see what an automated drilling process looks like, I was on that rig, it is in Rotterdam, it was built maybe a year ago. Basicallly the operator pushes a couple of buttons, fires up a smoke, grabs a cup of coffee and watches it run. It can be (and has been) run over the internet… I doubt that has been “on” since about 1930.

“I doubt that has been “on” since about 1930.”
“On it” means on the job
btw, the vise on that workbench in the foreground tells a large tale.

[QUOTE=Bob S;34762]“I doubt that has been “on” since about 1930.”
“On it” means on the job
btw, the vise on that workbench in the foreground tells a large tale.[/QUOTE]

The company (A.P. van den Berg) that built this machine also builds the offshore cone penetration testing equipment (which is what this machine is) used to investigate sea floor sediments for the design of suction caissons for offshore equipment and investigate seafloor sediments for anchoring all sorts of equipment. Their equipment is used all over the world. They have offshore equipment (very much like this) that works at 4000meters (yeah, meters) of depth. The vise in the foreground merely gives you the current scale of equipment like this. It pushes 26 tons on a 46mm drill rod. Do you think these things are built large first, then scaled small? No. They are built small and scaled to larger applications. So, what kind of tale are you getting? Maybe that some imagination could be exercised? Maybe some cross-discipline polination may be useful?

Why do so many people on this thread find the need to swing their dick? Yes, I have run chain tongs on 30" pipe, so freaking what? Jesus. If the offshore drilling industry knows everything needed to be known, why did this event even happen? Maybe it’s the attitude that the industry knows everything needed to be known? Maybe, just maybe, an open mind in light of this catastrophic FAIL?

[QUOTE=richard8000milesaway;34635]is it possible to stop the leak using “the russian method”: by using very very high explosives to collapse and seal the hole? I have read about how the soviets used this back in the day…[/QUOTE]

[QUOTE=CPTdrillersails;34639]How many times must this cockamammie proposal be shot down?
No. No. No.[/QUOTE]

While we wait for chapter 11’s conclusion, in this saga of faulty plumbing … I agree strongly that the nuke idea seems like making bad, a whole lot worse hole. Considering that methane hydrite crystals rise and are trapped in layers of ice, mini nukes are mini-earthquakes and fracture rock by creating chambers around them in a sphere - normally. But down there in strata underwater, who knows? Big risk for sure! All due respects, let’s nuke the nuke idea before it begins again I hope. I’d say X it off the slate. Consider what I found as a [U]Dr. Strangelove[/U] ending:

//youtu.be/TcljKh6eVHA

April 22, according to a translation of the account in the daily newspaper [I]Komsomoloskaya Pravda [/I]by Julia Ioffe of the news website [I]True/Slant[/I].
Weapons labs in the former Soviet Union developed special nukes for use to help pinch off the gas wells. They believed that the force from a nuclear explosion could squeeze shut any hole within 82 to 164 feet (25 to 50 meters), depending on the explosion’s power. That required drilling holes to place the nuclear device close to the target wells

A first test in the fall of 1966 proved successful in sealing up an underground gas well in southern Uzbekistan, and so the Russians used nukes four more times for capping runaway wells.
“The second ‘success’ gave Soviet scientists great confidence in the use of this new technique for rapidly and effectively controlling ran away gas and oil wells,” according to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) report on the Soviet Union’s peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.

A last attempt took place in 1981, but failed perhaps because of poor positioning, according to a U.S. Department of Energy report.

[I][U]Komsomoloskaya Pravda[/U][/I] I[/I] suggested that the United States might as well take a chance with a nuke, based on the historical [U]20-percent failure rate[/U]. Still, the Soviet experience with nuking underground gas wells could prove easier in retrospect than trying to seal the Gulf of Mexico’s oil well disaster that’s taking place 5,000’ below the surface.

[B]The Russians were using nukes to extinguish gas well fires in natural gas fields[/B], [U]not sealing oil wells gushing liquid[/U], so there are big differences, and this method has never been tested in such conditions. [I](liquids don’t compress like gasses) [/I]Besides the possibility of failure, there are always risks when dealing with radiation, though material from the DOE report suggests these are minimal since the radiation [I]would be far underground.[/I]


~ If nukes closing gas on ground wells fail 20%, lesser charges would be useless and may cause fractures, etc. [I]I feel safer with robots. I hope they can do it. [/I]

For anyone who’s interested, it looks like they’re cutting the riser with a casing saw. It’ll beinteresting to see how bad this thing flows when they are through.

Back to the real world… BP’s saw cutter is now just latched around the base of the cleaned up riser and looks ready to start cutting. Amazing video. Will be interesting to see what thay cut through inside the 21" riser.

[QUOTE=charles_oil;34771]Back to the real world… BP’s saw cutter is now just latched around the base of the cleaned up riser and looks ready to start cutting. Amazing video. Will be interesting to see what thay cut through inside the 21" riser.[/QUOTE]Looks like its spewing it’s a… off right now. this cut should take about an hour unless they break the blade er belt.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/docu…esentation.pdf

Smells like BS.

First

“LMRP Disconnect (Auto shear cut in attempt to activate blind shear rams)”

what to hell are they talking about? This stack has a Dead man, not an autoshear…they have the nomenclature all screwed up…

“ROV survey found a number of hydraulic leaks on the system”

More misinformation, the reported leaks were very likely normal slippage across the shuttle, since the ROV did not have sufficient VOLUME to fire the shuttle, that’s why they went down with an accum bank the next time, and it worked. The normal supply, of course, would have had the volume.

“ROV identified hydraulic system errors such that test rams were being activated
instead of lower variable rams”

This one was dirty, no shame here…The SSTV was installed per client request, since, as the customer, they tell us how they want the stack configured. Maybe it was mislabeled, but what does this have to do with the alleged stack failure?

It all looks like assumption and fingerpointing to me.

The BOP passed pressure tests, every 3 weeks. The probability of every ram failing, improbable beyond calculation. I still believe the stack was disabled by casing, cement or some other well related failure. Time will tell.

Are you saying you believe there was possibly no failure in BOP stack at all in your opinion ?[QUOTE=bnhpr;34773]http://energycommerce.house.gov/docu…esentation.pdf

Smells like BS.

First

“LMRP Disconnect (Auto shear cut in attempt to activate blind shear rams)”

what to hell are they talking about? This stack has a Dead man, not an autoshear…they have the nomenclature all screwed up…

“ROV survey found a number of hydraulic leaks on the system”

More misinformation, the reported leaks were very likely normal slippage across the shuttle, since the ROV did not have sufficient VOLUME to fire the shuttle, that’s why they went down with an accum bank the next time, and it worked. The normal supply, of course, would have had the volume.

“ROV identified hydraulic system errors such that test rams were being activated
instead of lower variable rams”

This one was dirty, no shame here…The SSTV was installed per client request, since, as the customer, they tell us how they want the stack configured. Maybe it was mislabeled, but what does this have to do with the alleged stack failure?

It all looks like assumption and fingerpointing to me.

The BOP passed pressure tests, every 3 weeks. The probability of every ram failing, improbable beyond calculation. I still believe the stack was disabled by casing, cement or some other well related failure. Time will tell.[/QUOTE]

Following the Horizon disaster and it’s aftermath has been hard on all of us who have sailed ships or worked on rigs because we know we have all been guilty of taking shortcuts. Sometimes it is just pure laziness but many times it is because we are told to in order to save money[time]. None of us get another penny because of the money we saved the company we just get to keep our jobs. My granddaughter has seen me follow the investigation of the Horizon and she asked me why the guys on the drill floor just didn’t run, why did they stay and die? After a lot of thought I told her it was like those firemen that ran into the World Trade Center. They thought they could solve the problem and they stayed with it to the very end, they were doing their job. She then asked if the companies that let this happen were like the terrorists and would the company go to prison? I told that that unfortunately a corporation is a piece of paper and pieces of paper don’t go to jail, the stock price just falls.

[QUOTE=tengineer;34775]Following the Horizon disaster and it’s aftermath has been hard on all of us who have sailed ships or worked on rigs because we know we have all been guilty of taking shortcuts. Sometimes it is just pure laziness but many times it is because we are told to in order to save money[time]. None of us get another penny because of the money we saved the company we just get to keep our jobs. My granddaughter has seen me follow the investigation of the Horizon and she asked me why the guys on the drill floor just didn’t run, why did they stay and die? After a lot of thought I told her it was like those firemen that ran into the World Trade Center. They thought they could solve the problem and they stayed with it to the very end, they were doing their job. She then asked if the companies that let this happen were like the terrorists and would the company go to prison? I told that that unfortunately a corporation is a piece of paper and pieces of paper don’t go to jail, the stock price just falls.[/QUOTE]
No offense, but I disagree with your statement. Figuring out how to perform a task more efficiently that is just as safe as the original way figured to perform said task is not “shortcutting” if you don’t sacrifice safety to do it. There is inherant risk involved with any task, especially when one is working with pigiron, high pressure & spaces & positions that are not conventional. I hope you are wrong in saying no one will go to jail for this crime, & only time will tell on that issue. However, i don’t see how a company that will almost certainly be found liable for many shortcuts which caused multiple unsafe conditions that led to this disaster can ever be trusted to drill another well in the United States.

[QUOTE=company man 1;34760]So why would anyone want to hang off a string of pipe & take the weight from the the string thereby lessening the cutting ability of the shears to work. For instance, one has to realize that 100k of string weight or whatever the number may be hanging wieght will assist the cutting of the pipe a whole lot better than no weight at all. Agree or disagree ?[/QUOTE]

Again, hangoff is what you do during an EDS due to loss of position, not a well control issue. There should be no reason to EDS for a kick or well control issue. It’s a last resort. No win scenarion, to the point where its rarely even discussed (this will change)

To shear, it doesn’t really matter if your hung off or not (unless you hit a tooljoint…oops) The hangoff just helps you retrieve the fish.

On the last 3 rigs I’ve worked on, the eds sequence includes automatic pickup of the drawworks after shearing. This is so you do not drag the fish out of the hole, and damage profiles, stack etc.

The standing joke is, how will the drawworks pull up if you lose power? In the days of compensators, you had hydraulic lift. With AHD’s blackout means there is no heave compensator!

Closing the annular is a good idea if you have time (slow), so you do not lose the oil based mud in the riser…as an environmental issue.