Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Deepwater Horizon Center Receives 13,000 Claims within first 2 Weeks | BPSettlement.com

http://www.bpsettlement.com/deepwater-horizon-center-receives-13000-claims-in-2-weeks/
(Appears to be a link to BP Settlement National Claim Center from which you can get more claim info and contact points to file a claim, also a forum area to ask questions)

Deepwater Horizon Center Receives 13000 Claims within 2 Weeks
Posted on June 20, 2012 by admin
13,000 damage claims were filed over the economic and property losses caused by the April 2010 BP oil spill since the 18 new, court-overseen, centers began functioning all over the Gulf States affected by the disaster.

The centers started serving oil spill victims 2 weeks back. Earlier, it was a $20 billion fund established by BP that processed the claims filed by Gulf oil spill victims. The administrator of that facility, known as Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), was Mr. Kenneth Feinberg.

The new system is managed by Patrick Juneau, a lawyer appointed by federal judge Carl Barbier. Juneau said he was extremely happy with the way new centers are handling oil spill claims.

According to a variety of sources (including Varco) the Deepwater Horizon was equipped with the Varco “e-drill” monitoring system. No data from this system appears to be mentioned in any of the studies and reports. This seems more than a bit strange. We know that Varco (NOV now) refused to make available the Hitec driller chair system so that investigators could get an idea of what the toolpusher was looking at. Is the absence of e-drill data part of this refusal?

Cheers,

Earl

Study: BP oil leak caused temporary erosion increase | Home | The Advocate — Baton Rouge, LA
http://theadvocate.com/home/3166281-125/bp-oil-leak-caused-temporary

BY AMY WOLD
Advocate staff writer
June 26, 2012
Heavily oiled areas in Barataria Bay showed twice the normal land erosion rates in the year and a half after the Deepwater Horizon/BP oil leak, according to a new scientific study released Monday.

The study, published by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, found that oil coverage killed marsh plants, which led to the higher rates of erosion, but also said the rate of erosion has since returned to more normal levels.

Brian Silliman, associate professor of biology at the University of Florida and lead author of the study, said the normal rate of 5 feet per year of erosion in the bay shoreline doubled to 10 feet per year. However, after a year and a half, healthy marsh started infilling into the shoreline again, and as soon as the roots took hold, erosion rates went back to pre-leak rates.

“It was a temporary event,” he said.

The increased erosion rates are caused when significant oiling covered the marsh grass and the rhizomes, or underground stems that shoot out roots, died. It took between 70 to 80 percent coverage of a stem of marsh grass to actually kill it, Silliman said.

When oil got into the soil, it’s likely the oil’s toxicity also killed the rhizomes underground, he said.

“Once those rhizomes die, those gripping roots are not holding together the sediment anymore,” Silliman said, and that accelerated land loss for a period of time.

The marshes were already eroding before the spill because they are starved of sediment, but the oil spill brought additional stress that amplified the impact, he said.

“Relative to the land loss over 50 years it’s (the oil-related erosion) relatively small,” Silliman said.

In addition, the study found that most of the oiling was kept to the front of the shoreline within the first 15 to 30 feet, he said. He said the theory is that the tall marsh grass acted as almost a wall to keep the concentration of oil on the perimeter.

In another part of the study, Silliman said researchers transplanted marsh grass into areas that had been oiled and also in areas that had been oiled and eroded. In areas that the land had eroded, the marsh grass died as it basically drowned from being at too low of an elevation to survive, he said.

However, Silliman said, some of the best growth occurred in areas that were oiled and went through marsh die-off but didn’t erode. That makes sense, since any competition would have been eliminated along with the marsh grass making it easier for the transplanted material to grow, he said.

“We can infer that it was no longer lethal,” Silliman said about the soil where the marsh grass grew back.

“Our results suggest that there are reasons for both optimism and concern about the impact of this oil spill on Mississippi deltaic marshes of Louisiana,” according to the report. The study results show that marsh plants have an ability to be resilient to oil but that the cost of an oil leak on the shoreline can be high in terms of accelerated erosion, according to the report.
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Bad news/Good News

Expected the initial erosion increase with the die back of marsh grass; wondered if some oil or tar balls might continue washing ashore from wave action.
Seems to have stabilized to normal rate.
GOOD NEWS!!

Also Wondering if Tropical Storm Debby has stirred up any oil by products on the Mississippi/Florida coastline.

KETK NBC: Ex-BP engineer says company records clear him in Gulf spill

Ex-BP engineer says company records clear him in Gulf spill
Jun 28, 2012 5:00 a.m.

A federal judge says he’ll let a former BP engineer share confidential company documents with prosecutors – who accused him of destroying records of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill – in an attempt to clear his name.

Kurt Mix says BP records will clear him of any wrongdoing, but those records are covered by the company’s attorney-client privilege. In an order issued Tuesday, a federal judge in New Orleans ruled that Mix can share the documents only with federal prosecutors, and under limited circumstances.

U.S. District Judge Stanwood Duval concluded that letting Mix show prosecutors those records wouldn’t eliminate BP’s right to keep other documents confidential – and he ordered that the Justice Department can’t use them “in any investigation or litigation” against the company.

Mix has been charged with two counts of obstruction of justice in the first criminal case stemming from the 2010 disaster. The Justice Department says he deleted text messages he had been ordered to save, including one that concluded the undersea gusher that erupted on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico was far worse than reported at the time.

BP said it would have no comment on the ruling, while Mix’s lawyer didn’t return a phone call seeking comment. There was no response from the Justice Department – but in court papers filed in May, prosecutors discounted Mix’s assertion that the documents would provide “compelling and unambiguous” evidence of his innocence.

“It does not appear from the defendant’s description of the information he seeks to use that the information actually concerns his deletion of texts,” they wrote.

Duval wrote that he reviewed the documents in his chambers, and that they “may indeed provide evidence that could lead a reasonable juror to find that Mix did not have the requisite dishonest intent to convict him on these charges.” But he said it was “impossible at this time” to decide whether they could be used as evidence in Mix’s trial, currently set for February.

BP had assigned Mix to help estimate the size of the 2010 spill, ultimately calculated at nearly 5 million barrels of crude. Prosecutors said one of the messages investigators recovered from his phone included “real-time flow-rate analysis” during an effort to plug the damaged well – data that contradicted the company’s public statements about the ongoing disaster. The size of the spill will determine what penalties BP ends up paying for the disaster, which began with an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drill rig that killed 11 workers.

In April, BP announced that it had reached an estimated at $7.8 billion settlement with thousands of businesses and individuals who filed damage claims in the wake of the spill. A federal criminal investigation of the disaster is ongoing.

The following excerpt from the Chief Counsel’s report clarified your question for me The way I interpret this section the only data going to the bank(stored offsite) was Sperry Sun data. Any other data would likely be on storage devices that were destroyed by the fire or submerged 5,000’ on the Gulf floor.

CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT

Page 173
Onshore
Onshore, only the Sperry-Sun data were available in real time.89 The Hitec data and video feeds did not go to shore.90

BP personnel could view the Sperry-Sun data in their Houston offices and in an operations room for the Deepwater Horizon that had dedicated data displays.91 They could also view the data over a secure Internet connection.92 Personnel at Anadarko and MOEX could access the Sperry-Sun data onshore as well.93 BP, Anadarko, and MOEX appeared to have used real-time data to examine geological and geophysical issues.94

Sperry Drilling personnel could access the Sperry-Sun data in their Houston real-time center and Lafayette operations office.95 They appeared to have used their access to provide customer support and quality control.96

None of the entities receiving the Sperry-Sun data onshore appears to have monitored the data for well control purposes.97 (Transocean did not receive data onshore.98)


Referenced to Varco cooperating, why would they? The Government seems intent on filing criminal charges some way some how against somebody. Why would Varco volunteer to put their operation in the gun sights of DOJ when DOJ obviously has little or nothing on Varco.

For example, I don’t recall, Kurt Mix ever being mentioned in the media or testimony anywhere. Then seemingly out of the blue he is arrested, criminally charged with obstruction of justice, shackled, perp walked before national media for DELETING 100 or so text messages.

In the grand scheme of things this action on the government’s part borders on ridiculous. Such actions will not garner voluntary cooperation from
any entity involved.

801 days and government legal eagles apparently are not confident that they can convince a Judge or jury “beyond a reasonable doubt” that there was criminal negligence by any one individual involved in this incident.

Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon Blow Out Preventer (BOP) Malfunction ANIMATION for the Macondo blowout.

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Probably Posted before by someone but I missed it.
Good quality animation professing Transocean’s view point.

From a worldwide industry standpoint, if all BOPs are this marginal at pressures over 12,000 PSI “we in a heap of trouble” as far as high pressure work is concerned.

BP spill settlement talks stepping up: report - MarketWatch

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bp-spill-settlement-talks-stepping-up-report-2012-06-29?link=MW_latest_news

By Steve Gelsi

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) – Talks have stepped up in recent weeks between U.S. authorities, BP PLC and Transocean Ltd. over a multi-billion dollar settlement in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and subsequent Macondo well oil spill, The Wall Street Journal reported Friday.

The blast killed 11 workers and triggered the release of an estimated 4.9 million barrels into the Gulf of Mexico in the worst maritime oil spill in U.S. history.

Thomas Claps, a legal expert cited by the newspaper, estimated BP faces between $7 billion and $10 billion in civil Clean Water Act fines and up to $10 billion in criminal penalties.

Claps said Transocean could face $700 million to $1.2 billion in fines. BP and Transocean declined to comment on the report, the article said.

Shares of BP PLC rose 3.5% and Transocean moved up by 4.6%.
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4.9 million barrels is the estimate for total flow out of the well. 800,000 barrels were captured and measured by the two surface vessels so only an estimated 4.1 million barrels flowed into the Gulf.

So, the repeated assertion by the media and government spokesman that the blowout “triggered the release of an estimated 4.9 million barrels into the Gulf of Mexico” is factually incorrect according to the Governments own report. minor detail, but under worse case conditions the GOV is trying to collect about 2 billion $ for oil that never hit the water. (a ballpark estimate should criminal negligence be affirmed at some point)

QUESTION: Where is Halliburton in this litigation article? Are they off the hook? I think i noticed that they prevailed in almost all of their filings with the court.

[QUOTE=Infomania;72880]Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon Blow Out Preventer (BOP) Malfunction ANIMATION for the Macondo blowout.

<><><><><><><
Probably Posted before by someone but I missed it.
Good quality animation professing Transocean’s view point.

From a worldwide industry standpoint, if all BOPs are this marginal at pressures over 12,000 PSI “we in a heap of trouble” as far as high pressure work is concerned.[/QUOTE]

I think that’s been pretty clear for some time now.

Cheers,

Earl

New deep-water well rules coming soon - Houston Chronicle

>>>Note the bracketed paragraph below, it appears as though the government rule makers basically accepted some of the existing API STANDARDS with the modification of globally changing the term “SHOULD” to “MUST”…infomania <<<<<<<<

WASHINGTON - The federal government soon will issue a final set of standards meant to strengthen the design and cementing of offshore wells in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster two years ago.

James Watson, the director of the Interior Department’sBureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, said the drilling safety measure is under final review by theOffice of Management and Budget.

When the rules come out, they will tweak existing mandates issued in October 2010 in response to the lethal blowout the previous April of BP’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico.

Those rules essentially codified industry’s existing best practices for designing and securing offshore wells. The regulation also imposed new requirements for certifying, inspecting and maintaining blowout preventers, the emergency devices attached to wells as a last line of defense against unexpected oil and natural gas surges.

A forensic examination of the Macondo blowout preventer revealed deficiencies that investigators believe could be widespread among devices still in use.

Interior Department officials have signaled that they may propose requiring offshore drillers to add a second set of blind shear rams to improve the likelihood the devices will cut through drill pipe to seal a well in an emergency. They also have made clear they want blowout preventers to be equipped with better sensors that can tell operators how the devices are functioning and the positions of key components.

But FBR Capital Markets analyst Benjamin Salisburywarned that if the government requires a second shear ram, which would be bigger and take up more space, it could make dozens of deep- water rigs obsolete without major upgrades.

Watson has said his agency will consider a phase-in period so manufacturers have time to redesign blowout preventers and to get the equipment to the marketplace.

Although the October 2010 mandates took effect immediately, regulators made clear they would take public comments and might revise the rules as a result. They also issued a five-page memo in March 2011 meant to clarify the requirements, amid oil and gas industry complaints that the mandates were muddled.

The main problem stemmed from regulators’ decision to refer to two sets of recommended practices for emergency equipment and well design developed by the American Petroleum Institute.

>>Instead of rewriting those mandates in their own words, regulators simply referenced API documents and specified that any time the recommended practices said “should,” the government considered the standard a “must.”<<<<<<<

Industry representatives complained that the change affected more than 14,000 discretionary provisions in 80 different standards and that in many cases the new requirements conflicted. For instance, API’s recommended practices sometimes offer operators an array of choices for securing a well, but the language of the rule seemed to make all of those options mandatory.

About the change in language from “should” to “must”…

I worked 25 years in Traffic Engineering Department after I left the oil industry. TE is a segment of public service that is involved in litigation on a regular basis. Every study, contract, work order, trouble report, scheduled PM inspection etcetera becomes a legal document when signed and dated, is maintained for the life of the geographic location, installation or facility. External Requests by attorneys, insurance companies, and citizens for design and maintenance records are almost a daily affair, depositions average one or two a month and trial testimony several times per year.

“SHALL” was the imperative term used in that industry indicating mandatory, no exceptions, don’t even ask for an exception to the rule or specification, the equivalent of a legal direct order in military terms. Federal standards, Rules and guidelines are generated by a federal agency and have been in existence for probably half a century.
Seems to me, if the legal standard for “SHALL” endures repeated legal tests in one sector of government then maybe it should be “the standard” throughout the government rule making establishment. See next link. (Infomania)

http://www.suijurisforum.com/legal-terms-shall-may-must-t1282.html

Shall. As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term “shall” is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a peremptory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of excluding the idea of discretion, and has the significance of operating to impose a duty which may b enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning, or when addressed to public officials, or where a public interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears. People v. O’Rourke, 124 Cal. App. 752, 13 P.2d 989, 992.

Bouvier’s 1914
MAY. Is permitted to; has liberty to. In interpreting statutes the word may should be construed as equivalent to shall or must incases where the sense of the entire enactment requires it; People v. Common Council, 22 Barb. (N.Y.) 404; Kansas City, W. & N.W.R. Co. v. Walker, 50 Kan. 739, 32 Pac. 365; or where it is necessary in order to carry out the intention of the legislature; Minor v. Bank, 1 Pet. (U.S. 46, 7 L. Ed. 47; Rock Island County v. U.S., 4 Wall, (U.S.) 435, 18 L. Ed. 419; Kelly v. Morse, 3 Neb. 224; or where it is necessary for the preservation or enforcement of the rights and interests of the public or third persons; Bansemer v. Mace, 18 Ind. 27, 81 Am. Dec. 344; Steins v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167, 8 Am. Rep. 87; Com. v. Haynes, 107 Mass. 194, 197; but not for the purpose of creating or determining the character of rights; Ex parte Banks, 28 Ala. 28. Where there is nothing in the connection of the language or in the sense and policy of th provision to require an unusual interpretation, its use is merely permissive and discretionary; Williams v. People, 24 N.Y. 405; Fowler v. Pirkins, 77 Ill. 271; Seiple v. Borough of Elizabeth, 27 N.J.L. 407; Carlson v. Winterson, 7 misc. 15, 27 N.Y. Supp. 368; Com. v. Haynes, 107 Mass. 196. See a note in 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 340.

Bouvier’s 1914
MUST. No definition!

Black’s 5th Special Ed.
Must. This word, like the word “shall,” is primarily of mandatory effect, State ex rel. McCabe v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist.in and for Deer Lodge County, 106 Mont. 272, 76 P.2d 634, 637; andin the sense is used in antithesis to “may”.
>>>>But this meaning of the word is not the only one, and it is often used in a merely directory sense, and consequently is a synonym for the word “may” not only in the permissive sense of that word, but also in the mandatory sense which it sometimes has.

The final report on the crash of Air France flight 447 has been released:

It is worth study as an example of state of the art accident investigation.

Earl

Thanks for posting

Haven’t read the final yet, but, reading the preliminary you first posted, it’s apparent that state of the art equipment cannot completely replace humans in these situations. I am amazed that three experienced flight officers on a flight deck could not in 5 minutes determine looking at flight instruments, attitude indicator, radar altimeter etc. and determine that they were in a stall situation. All things considered, if the air speed dropped to zero(caused by pitot tube icing/failure) the immediate, automatic pilot action would be “stick to the dash, pedal to the metal” to regain airspeed ASAP with one officer calling out altitude while the senior in command took over controls manually.

I was a ground tech on the first aircraft making completely hands off landings in aircraft carriers on the east coast. These were completely hands off landings using 3 channel autopilots providing pitch, yaw and power augmentation coupled to the ship’s ILS system, providing hands off control from the 16 mile window Down to the #3 cable on the flight deck. (see reference below)

On June 24, 1969 the first operational “hands off” arrested landing using the AN/SPN-42, Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS), on a aircraft carrier was performed by Lt. Dean Smith and Lt. (j.g.) James Sherlock from VF-103, when their F-4 Phantom landed aboard the Saratoga.

What happened on Flight 447 is quite disturbing and inexcusable on the part of the flight crew and design of the aircraft. No angle of attack indicator, really???

I received the F 18 Hornet crash into the apartments Va. Beach report on Thursday, will try to post link tomorrow.

I’m done, looking forward to reading the report.
Thanks for posting Earl.

Another example of accident investigation and reporting: NAVAL AVIATION

Subject: F-18 crash attributed to rare dual engine failure - CNN (Civilian news report)
Date: Thursday, July 5, 2012, 7:10 PM
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-02/us/us_virginia-f-18-crash_1_jet-crash-fighter-jet-navy-jet?_s=PM:US

Date: July 5, 2012 14:45:15 CDT
Subject: VFA106-MISHAP-OF-6-APR-2012.pdf. ACCIDENT REPORT

http://media2.wavy.com/html/PDFs/VFA106-MISHAP-OF-6-APR-2012.pdf

(the actual report begins after the preliminary cover letters with comments and approval signatures from
different officers up the command structure. The factual report begins on or about page nine of the report.)

[QUOTE=Infomania;73595]Thanks for posting

Haven’t read the final yet, but, reading the preliminary you first posted, it’s apparent that state of the art equipment cannot completely replace humans in these situations. I am amazed that three experienced flight officers on a flight deck could not in 5 minutes determine looking at flight instruments, attitude indicator, radar altimeter etc. and determine that they were in a stall situation. All things considered, if the air speed dropped to zero(caused by pitot tube icing/failure) the immediate, automatic pilot action would be “stick to the dash, pedal to the metal” to regain airspeed ASAP with one officer calling out altitude while the senior in command took over controls manually.

[/QUOTE]

I think that there’s a lesson here: when an experienced crew does something inexplicable, you don’t just throw up your hands and say “I dunno, they just screwed up,” you look for the deeper causes.

[QUOTE=Infomania;73595]

I was a ground tech on the first aircraft making completely hands off landings in aircraft carriers on the east coast. These were completely hands off landings using 3 channel autopilots providing pitch, yaw and power augmentation coupled to the ship’s ILS system, providing hands off control from the 16 mile window Down to the #3 cable on the flight deck. (see reference below)

http://www.uscarriers.net/cv60history.htm
On June 24, 1969 the first operational “hands off” arrested landing using the AN/SPN-42, Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS), on a aircraft carrier was performed by Lt. Dean Smith and Lt. (j.g.) James Sherlock from VF-103, when their F-4 Phantom landed aboard the Saratoga.

[/QUOTE]

You and I should get together over a beer and trade war stories :slight_smile: I worked on the verification of the software in the JA37B autopilot (the first full authority digital system to fly operationally), PAFAM (a landing aid for the DC10), the Space Shuttle main engine controller and a bunch of other stuff that modesty and Title 18 of the U.S. Code prevents me from describing :slight_smile:

[QUOTE=Infomania;73595]

What happened on Flight 447 is quite disturbing and inexcusable on the part of the flight crew and design of the aircraft. No angle of attack indicator, really???

[/QUOTE]

It’s part of the half-joking description of the Airbus FCS as a system designed to protect the aircraft from the pilot. It’s pretty clear that the manual mode wasn’t really taken seriously by anybody, crews included. Which makes our subthread on-topic for drilling: you drillers and tool pushers are looking at your future as inevitable and irresistible economic pressures cause automation to take over. The crash of flight 447 occurred with the aid of systems that are developed in one of the most controlled fashion in the world. You look at NOV’s stonewalling of the inquiry and you have to ask, “What is it they didn’t want people to see?”

Earl

Second Obama cabinet official faces contempt of Congress charge | Oklahoman.com

http://m.washingtonexaminer.com/second-obama-cabinet-official-faces-contempt-of-congress-charge/article/2501542

“For more than three months, the [Interior] Department has flouted a duly authorized and issued Congressional subpoena for documents that would shed light on these actions, which led to thousands of lost jobs and decreased American energy production in the Gulf of Mexico,” House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings, R-Wash.,wrote in a letter to Salazar on Friday. “The Department’s failure to respond to the request to schedule interviews calls into question the sincerity of its recent statements about wanting to reach a mutually agreeable accommodation of the Committee’s oversight interest into this matter.”

Hastings said Salazar must arrange for several Interior Department officials who worked on the report to interview with the Natural Resources Committee by the week of July 16. Failing that, Hastings told Salazar that his committee “is left with no choice other than to continue to pursue compliance with the subpoena, as well as seek necessary information directly from the officials who were most involved in interacting with the peer reviewers and drafting and editing the Drilling Moratorium Report.”

A contempt of Congress charge for Salazar is not “off the table” if he does not comply, committee spokesman Spencer Pederson toldUSA Today. Last week, Attorney General Eric Holder became the first cabinet member in American history to be cited for contempt of Congress for refusing to produce documents pertaining to Operation Fast and Furious.

Salazar provoked a contempt finding by a federal district court in 2010, for imposing the drilling moratorium despite a federal judge’s preliminary injunction against it. “Such dismissive conduct, viewed in tandem with the re-imposition of a second blanket and substantively identical moratorium, and in light of the national importance of this case, provide this court with clear and convincing evidence of the government’s contempt,” U.S. District Judge Martin Feldman ruled.

The committee’s investigation stems from seven experts who protested the Drilling Moratorium Report released by Salazar, in coordination with the White House, that made it appear that the experts had peer-reviewed and supported the moratorium (which they had not actually reviewed).
((article continues)

How Lousy Cockpit Design Crashed An Airbus, Killing 228 People | Co.Design: business + innovation + design

How Lousy Cockpit Design Crashed An Airbus, Killing 228 People

NEW EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT A LACK OF PILOT FEEDBACK FROM THE COCKPIT CONTROLS LED TO THE CRASH OF AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 447. WHAT LED TO SUCH A DESIGN DISASTER?

On June 1, 2009, Air France Flight 447 crashed into the ocean on its way back from Rio de Janeiro. 216 passengers and 12 crew died on impact. This month, the official investigation is likely to conclude with “human error” as the culprit–pilots making mistakes that forced the plane to crash. But evidence unearthed by The Telegraph tells a different story, that the pilots of the Airbus A330-200, and everyone else on the plane, were really victims of bad design.

DOMINATED BY COMPUTERS, AIRBUS DESIGNS ITS PLANES WITH LESS TACTILE RESPONSE.

And it’s not just one single component that could have avoided the tragedy. Multiple Airbus-designed systems played a role to create a deadly feedback loop that convinced them to climb to the point that the plane stalled and it fell from the sky. By the time the pilots figured out what was going on, they’d lost too much altitude to point the nose down and gain the speed necessary to maintain lift. Even if you have a very basic grasp of how planes fly, I think the cockpit’s last words from the blackbox transcript explain the problem with eerie conciseness:
02:13:40 (Robert) “Climb… climb… climb… climb…
”02:13:40 (Bonin) “But I’ve had the stick back the whole time!
”02:13:42 (Dubois) “No, no, no… Don’t climb… no, no.”
02:13:43 (Robert) “Descend… Give me the controls… Give me the controls!”

(article continues)

It just proves what everbody knows in the industry that modern pilots are not taught to fly anymore

[QUOTE=Infomania;73837]How Lousy Cockpit Design Crashed An Airbus, Killing 228 People | Co.Design: business + innovation + design

How Lousy Cockpit Design Crashed An Airbus, Killing 228 People

NEW EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT A LACK OF PILOT FEEDBACK FROM THE COCKPIT CONTROLS LED TO THE CRASH OF AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 447. WHAT LED TO SUCH A DESIGN DISASTER?

On June 1, 2009, Air France Flight 447 crashed into the ocean on its way back from Rio de Janeiro. 216 passengers and 12 crew died on impact. This month, the official investigation is likely to conclude with “human error” as the culprit–pilots making mistakes that forced the plane to crash. But evidence unearthed by The Telegraph tells a different story, that the pilots of the Airbus A330-200, and everyone else on the plane, were really victims of bad design.

DOMINATED BY COMPUTERS, AIRBUS DESIGNS ITS PLANES WITH LESS TACTILE RESPONSE.

[snip]

(article continues)[/QUOTE]

It’s actually worse than that. The article doesn’t mention that the “side stick” controllers are mounted on the outside of each seat. This means that not only does the pilot not flying have no tactile feedback from what the pilot flying is doing, the actions of the pilot flying are not easily visible either.

The lesson from all of this to the designers of “drill by wire” systems (who I assume are beavering away as I write this) is that your system should augment and not replace human judgement and all forms of feedback, visual, tactile, and auditory, should be used in safety-critical or safety-relevant environments.

Cheers,

Earl

JPT Online - New GE Blowout Preventer Will Make the Cut

http://www.jptonline.org/index.php?id=1656

New Blowout Preventer Will Make the Cut
Stephen Rassenfoss, JPT Emerging Technology Editor

3 May 2012—GE Oil & Gas rolled out a new product that it says can address a major industry concern: cutting and sealing sections of the toughest parts of a drill strings, even if the pipe is off-center.

The new blowout preventer (BOP) was rolled out at the 2012 Offshore Technology Conference where new well control ideas could be found scattered throughout the hall and in discussions during technical sessions. New offerings range from powerful equipment able to take on tougher pipes to new information systems offering real-time health updates on the hydraulic-driven systems.

Much of it reflects a desire for real-time information on the health of well control equipment. “They are wanting to know: Is it ready? If I call on it, is it ready?” said Chuck Chauviere, the general manager for drilling systems for GE Oil and Gas.

The company’s new pipe shearing product is on display of the OTC floor this week, behind a warning to not touch the sharp edges. Its spread-V-shaped blades do not reveal much about the patented processes that the company said allow it to cut through 6⅝ in. pipe joints, which are capable of defeating many older BOP models.

The key to the shearing power of the device is the “distribution of the load” applied by the two blades and driven by a system rated at 15,000 psi, Chauviere said. He declined to offer details on what it allows in terms of shearing tough sections such as connectors, except to say it applies force in a way that ensures the failure of the metal, allowing a quick cut.

The device also employs centralizers capable of pushing a bowed pipe into the middle of the cavity to ensure the blades can drive the pipe into fracture mode. Forensic analysis after the 2010 Macondo disaster concluded that the pressure of the blowout had pushed the pipe off-line, making it impossible for the BOP to sever it.

Improvements have been made in the metallurgy and treatment methods used to toughen the blades, which were not affected by the shards of metal that are knocked off when a pipe is cut, Chauviere said. To back up its claims, the company said tests showing that the shear ram’s cutting power were witnessed by representatives from several leading oil companies.

The company also announced a new connector design that allows a quick release for changing out BOPs from the lower riser package. This makes it easier to pull and replace the device at a time when more drillers are equipping rigs with two BOPs to avoid delays if one of them is in need of repairs.

Previously the company released a sensor that continually tells operators the location of the piston that drives the blades on the BOP. It is available on new orders and can be retrofitted on older BOPs made by the company.

Fuel Fix » Feds lay out plans for new blowout preventer mandates

Obama administration officials today outlined their plans for new regulations designed to boost the reliability and power of emergency equipment used as a last line of defense against surging oil and gas at offshore wells.

Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said the rule, set to be proposed by September, aims to respond to vulnerabilities exposed by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, when the five-story blowout preventer at BP’s doomed Macondo well failed to block a lethal surge of explosive oil and gas.

The foundation of the coming rule was built in the 87 days after the well blew out, when engineers struggled to stop crude gushing into the Gulf of Mexico, Salazar said.

“That was one of the areas of intense focus during those days of the Gulf oil spill, when we were trying to figure out for so long what was happening with respect to the BOP,” Salazar said at an Interior Department forum on blowout preventers meant to help regulators developing the new mandates.

Salazar noted that one question that emerged during the oil spill response was whether the devices should be beefed up with a second set of shear rams to increase the odds of the BOP successfully slicing through drill pipe and debris to seal off a well. Another question, Salazar said, was whether there could be more “sensors and gauges” on the devices.

Blowout preventers are massive sets of valves that sit on top of the wellhead. During an emergency, shearing and sealing rams in the devices can be activated to cut drill pipe and seal the well hole.

But a forensic investigation of the BOP unearthed from the Macondo site determined the device was unable to slash through a piece of off-center drill pipe, seal the well hole and trap oil and gas underground. Surging oil and gas had caused that pipe to buckle and shift outside of the space where those shearing rams could slice through obstacles.

The investigations of the BOP at the Macondo well revealed “some serious issues” that are not unique to Macondo, Deputy Interior Secretary David Hayes said.

Hayes said the Interior Department is forging ahead with a rule that would include at least four main components:

“BOPs need to be able to cut whatever is in their way and completely seal off the well.”
“We need better maintenance for BOPs, like what you would expect of a jet engine or any other very sophisticated mechanical device upon which lives depend.”
“BOPs need better sensors to tell us what is happening at the bottom of the sea.”
“Everyone working with BOPs should be thoroughly and properly trained to handle any contingency.
The drive for more data from the devices was borne out of the response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

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Reuters Exclusive: Riggers sought evacuation before deadly Chevron blast

Exclusive: Riggers sought evacuation before deadly Chevron blast

Wed, Jul 11 13:01 PM EDT

By Oleg Vukmanovic

LONDON (Reuters) - Chevron Corp. left workers pleading to be evacuated from a gas exploration platform off Nigeria which kept drilling while smoke poured from a borehole until an explosion killed two people as the rig became engulfed in flames, according to accounts from four of the platform’s workers.

Chevron, the second largest U.S. oil major, said it did not receive requests to evacuate the KS Endeavour rig and that staff on board had the right to call a halt to work if they believed conditions were unsafe.

“There were no evacuation requests received before the KS Endeavour incident occurred,” the U.S. energy company said in an emailed response to questions from Reuters.

Testimony from some of the 154 workers who were present alleges that, instead of addressing fears that equipment failures and smoke presaged disaster, Chevron flew extra staff to the platform just before the January 16, 2012, blowout.

Chevron says a nationwide Nigerian strike that included staff at airports had disrupted its normal crew changes but that at no time were approved safe manning levels exceeded.

The fire that followed the blast burned on the rig for 46 days until March 2. Chevron drilled a relief well to stem the gas leak, sealing it on June 18. It said in an email to Reuters on July 2 that an investigation with the Nigerian authorities had concluded that an entry of high pressure gas in the wellbore had caused the failure of equipment and fire.

The two who died in the explosion were the installation manager for the rig, Bruno Marce, a French national, and Indian driller Albert Devadas. They worked for KS Drilling, a subsidiary of Singapore-based KS Energy, a sub-contractor employed by Field Offshore Design Engineering (FODE) Ltd to drill a gas exploration well for Chevron off Nigeria.

Transcripts of accounts from three workers were given to Reuters by the offshore oil branch of Britain’s Rail, Maritime and Transport (RMT) trade union which said the documents were genuine but withheld the names of the witnesses to protect their employment prospects. Those accounts were backed by subsequent interviews in Nigeria with a worker who was also on the rig.

FODE declined comment, citing confidentiality clauses in its contract with KS Drilling preventing it making public any information about work for Chevron.

The accounts convey rising panic from some of those on the platform, who fearing a blowout, checked each morning the volume of smoke billowing from the drilling borehole.

“Chevron knew for over a week that the well was unstable yet they refused to evacuate us,” said one of the rig workers who gave his account to the RMT union.

A Nigerian worker who was aboard the rig at the time of the blast said many wanted to be evacuated.

Speaking at a hotel in Yenagoa, the oil capital of the Niger Delta’s oil-rich Bayelsa state, Omietimi Nana, 28, a maintenance worker for FODE said: “We were told we may be evacuated, it was mentioned but it didn’t happen. I don’t know who made the decision not to evacuate but certainly many people wanted to be evacuated because of the situation,” he said.

The most senior witness to give testimony to the RMT, a Frenchman, said a series of pump failures throughout the drilling operation led to a massive build-up of pressure that triggered the blowout.

The Frenchman said rig engineers held a site meeting and advised Chevron to evacuate staff while well pressure control measures were applied.

“That advice was not heeded and additional personnel were even brought onboard to get ahead of what was believed to be impending strike action,” the Frenchman, who was at that meeting, said.

Nana added: “About three days before the accident, the drilling company workers told us they wanted to stop drilling because of the gas pressure but they spoke with Chevron who told them to carry on.”

The French witness said an earlier failed attempt in late December to drill an exploration well near the same was abandoned after the discovery of a gas leak.

He said that “in an attempt to learn from experience” Chevron began drilling a second well “despite repeated failure of the pumps” and often having to stop drilling in order to service the top-drive, the device on the rig that provides rotational force.

Chevron acknowledged that the first exploration well was abandoned but denied it was because of a gas leak.

“SCARED LIKE HELL”

The second well, drilled 300 meters from the first, at a depth of 12,945 feet, soon began to lose pressure integrity, the French witness said.

“At almost every point in time, we saw thick smoke coming out of the open hole, and we were all scared like hell because we could see a disaster happening any moment yet they (Chevron) did not evacuate us - why, I do not know,” the witness said.

“This is the reason so many of us survived because we were all aware that it was going to happen, but just didn’t know when,” he said.

FODE maintenance worker Nana said: “Everyone was talking about how the mud weight had been lost but by then it was too late to stop the gas rising to the surface.”

Within days, said the French witness, rising gas pressure overwhelmed the mud weight in the wellbore spewing gas over the rig, sending workers scrambling for the lifeboats.

“The blowout occurred on Monday at 5.30 a.m., and if Bruno (Marce, the rig manager who died) had not advised as he did that the lifeboats be kept serviced and in functional condition then none of us would have made it out alive,” said the eyewitness.

“Bruno was shouting, but with a very strange voice, over the public address system that everyone should abandon the rig, I really felt for him for if not for his timely intervention myself and others would not have been alive today,” he said.

The witness said that by the time he had reached the lifeboat the rig was smothered in gas. When the lifeboat operator called rig manager Bruno Marce for permission to launch there was no reply, he said. The gas exploded and the lifeboat launched.

“By the time we hit the water the entire rig was engulfed by fire,” he said, describing metal debris raining down.

A second eyewitness described a deafening release of gas followed by “a loud bang and an orange flash as the gas ignited.”

The witnesses described how crew on a barge adjacent to the platform jumped into the water and scrambled into a life raft. The raft quickly began to melt from the heat of the fire, forcing them into the sea to be rescued by fishermen three hours later.

“If it were not for the fisherman those guys would have died in the water,” the French witness said.

CHEVRON RESPONSE

Asked to respond to the principal points of the allegations, Chevron said it was at no time asked to evacuate staff and that all personnel present had the power to order a work stoppage if they felt they were in danger.

“Our employees and contractor are fully empowered to exercise stop work authority (SWA) when they sense an unsafe work environment,” Chevron said, explaining that an SWA gives anyone aboard a rig the power to order a stop to operations in the event safety guidelines are breached.

“At no time was an evacuation initiated by anybody on the rig before the incident occurred,” Chevron said.

The union said it believed workers were worried they would lose their jobs if they quit the rig without permission.

“It appears the Endeavour workforce were reluctant to abandon the rig after the evacuation request was denied for fear of losing their jobs,” said Jake Molloy, head of OILC, the offshore energy branch of the RMT, which had members on the rig.

Molloy said the installation manager’s efforts to prepare lifeboats demonstrated that the danger was known.

“That fear is evident in the actions of the offshore installation manager who, as part of some bizarre ‘risk assessment process’, opted to ensure the lifeboats were in a state of readiness for what appears to be an inevitable evacuation,” the union official said.

Chevron said its rules required that lifeboats should be kept ready at all times and the crew held weekly drills, one of which was scheduled by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) Bruno Marce for the morning of the day before the blow-out happened.

“Like any other personnel, the OIM has full responsibility to stop the operation if he feels conditions are not safe,” Chevron said.

The company said it had launched a prompt, full rescue effort and the evacuation had been orderly and structured, although it acknowledged fishermen had picked up some workers.

“Search and rescue operations began immediately upon being made aware of the abandon ship alarms being sounded,” it said. Nearby vessels were directed to aid the rescue.

“152 of the 154 personnel on board the KS Endeavour and the Mako barge were evacuated immediately. Aircraft operations were impacted initially by darkness and by visibility conditions,” it said.