Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Offshore
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[QUOTE=alcor;51881]I take a flight from A to B. I don’t know who has serviced the plane and have no idea if the ‘competent’ pilot slept well the night before or enjoyed himself out on the town. I don’t know how old the plane is and haven’t checked the weather forecast. I hope they’ve fuelled the plane! I hope the runway is clear of debris. I hope traffic control are awake!
But I get on the plane and fly from A to B. I have taken many risks! Hopefully, the journey goes well. If not, Joe Public will create hell and get to the bottom of the reason for the plane’s failure. But, Planes do crash, even though we use all our resources to prevent such accidents.

The energy supplied to my home comes from many sources. The general public don’t ask too many questions about the source, suffice to say ‘I get mine’! Then, Fukushima disaster occurs, and we discover the engineering and location of the plant have seriously compromised the public health. But, no-one cried before the event. Engineers built the site to withstand an earthquake of a certain tremor value. But the quake exceeded this value with consequential results. Risk was mathematically and scientifically calculated with the odds of such a catastrophic event occurring being practically nil. Risk cannot be nullified in a dynamic world. We think we can manage the risk, but don’t allow for extreme circumstances.

Now, we drill wells all over the world and we know that every single one has a chance of blowing if we don’t manage the risk. To manage the risk we have to understand what’s going on in the well. Once in a blue moon, we get a situation where the well’s barriers are compromised, and those on the vessel, who deal with risk all day long, must take action to remedy the situation and return risk levels to minimum. In the case of the Macondo, the well’s barriers were compromised and no-one knew! Or, they were gambling with risk!
My feeling is that they on the DF conducting the negative test understood the intention of the test, but something happened to cloud their reasoning, and they accepted the test! They did not identify the risk of continuing with the ‘watered down’ test for whatever reason!
I have never suggested that this shouldn’t be investigated, Blisters! I’ve always stuck by the fact that a negative test failure isn’t the end of the world. we still have our other monitoring systems in place to identify the well’s barrier failure, and to re-establish control. This monitoring did not exist, and there wasn’t anyone available to interpret the signs of impending disaster until it was too late. And, recall the emergency in the North Sea, where a well that was proven with a negative test went on to fail in very similar circumstances to the Macondo, during displacement. It was intercepted by a TO observant Driller who understood how to respond to pressure and volume anomalies. The well was managed and the risk to personnel and vessel nullified.

We move on by learning what went wrong, Blisters. We are not in denial. And, I agree with you that this must not happen again and we must ensure we take all required action to do this. But, it won’t stop us drilling and we may just come across this situation again. Remember, this crisis had to get through 2 Company Men, an OIM, A Toolpusher and a Driller. None of them intercepted the signs!!! And, the Logger was dismissed from monitoring, And, the Swaco displacement plan was deficient. It mounts up!!! Risk cannot be completely eradicated.

Meantime, the Gov’t aren’t interested so much in what went wrong as who will pay for it, and the circus of in-fighting is the result. Later, we’ll blame various bodies for their deficiencies, and all the contractors will be answerable then, including the BP Co Men overseeing the negative test. And, even the Gov’t for not ensuring onshore confirmation documentation of the test passing.
Risk, will decrease because of action being taken as a consequence of this disaster, but it will not be eliminated. ‘Totally avoidable risk’, Blisters, does not exist! We work with acceptable levels of risk believing we are managing to withstand an accident or incident.

But, the culture of vengeance which exists in the US means that when something goes wrong we look for a single wealthy party to swallow the Whole Cake, not a slice or two, the whole shebang! When it’s thought to be foreign, we definitely think of the whole cake, and maybe two or three cakes…and if the offending company is wealthy enough, we’ll work on 1000 cakes, a sufficient number to temporarily revive the local economy of…the GOM! We don’t seek understanding, we seek retribution! So, initially we lynch the most obvious candidate, BP, the Operator of the vessel. We’re not that concerned afterwards to discover anyone else had a hand in the disaster…unless it affects our slice of the 1000 cakes! But, it may upset everyone to discover that the media and Gov’t-led persecution of BP may compromise their slice of the cake when they wake up and smell the coffee![/QUOTE]

When you fly from A to B you have no control over how the airline does the job, unlike the level of control a companyman has over drilling operations on a rig hired by his handlers to do the job. One can’t compel a pilot to land an aircraft immediately or divert to another destination as this might amount to hijacking. On the other hand a companyman on a drilling rig can halt drilling or operations, if he knows something’s not right, like a negative test gone wrong or if he knows sufficient centralizers, and cement lab test reports were unavailable.

He can always refuse to carry out the job, rather than chose to play for very high stakes. In the case of the former he will be replaced, might get blacklisted or suffer economic hardship but he’ll sleep well for the rest of his life. Beats being a spineless weak cog in cart wheel that’s surely will give way sooner or later. When I board an airliner I trust the pilot will get me to my destination safely and promptly. This trust is based predominantly on the track record of that airline. I trust the pilot of the airline company I paid my fare to, has sufficient experience and flying hours. Being an airline of supposedly good repute, the thought that the pilot has only flown four single engine flights would never occur to me.

As member of the public I have a choice and have to base a large part of my decision on trust. I could pay top dollar for a seat on a decent airline or one on a cut price shonky airline. However if the wing falls off the cut-price airline in mid flight and I survive, I really need to admit I got what I paid for.The magnitude of the Fukushima disaster like the one on Boxing day was extraordinary. Your Fukushima analogy can’t be applied to Macondo because several deeper wells have been drilled successfully prior to Macondo.

What was extraordinary about Macondo compared to these previously drilled deeper wells ?

What if any were the extreme circumstances that you allude to in your analogy with Fukushima when it comes to BP’s Macondo ?

If risks were managed successfully on previous deeper wells that were P & S for production at a later date, what was different about MC252 ? What did it cost in comparison to previously drilled or similar wells ? Was it level of experience and training of persons in charge that was different ?..or did parties involved reckon they were such experts at drilling deepwater wells that it was Ok to send out company reps with only experience of a few land wells ? Were they mindfull of the potential for “extreme circumstances” .

Do you think cost cutting,shonky well design, sending out inexperienced company reps, mudmen who admit they have not done a well control course ? amounts to – gambling with risks- ? Could have, fatigue and pressure to finish up the job whilst visitors were on board "clouded their reasoning " ?

If risks are man made then they are indeed totally avoidable. Inherent risks such as a mag 7 earthquake emanating directly beneath a rig can’t but still might be manageable if some semblance of an action plan or emergency response is in place.

Economic pressures and Geopressures, like Manmade risks vs Inherent risk, are two very very different things. I hope you are’nt confusing one with the other. If you think manmade risks can’t be avoided then surely at least you must accept that they can be minimized provided we are willing to fork out for the necessary means, costs, equipment and time with which to do the job safely. All blowouts are avoidable – don’t you agree ?

I would also like to know what’s your take on personnel who lose their jobs when they report serious deficiencies at the work place and end up getting ostracized in the process? Do you think this is a main hidden root cause of disasters ?

P/S It is a big mistake to think that the public is dumb. Smacks of a snooty elitist mentality.

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Thank you Blisters. I am sure by now everyone has grown weary of the tale of well control and volumes espoused here ad nauseum. The ones who were supposed to monitor well control and volumes are dead and defenseless. How well control and volumes became uncontrollable and did so very quickly is what we all need to know. Why the BOP did not contain the well is another thing we need to know.
Actually we will probably never know the answers to these questions until many years down the road when people with the answers quit being afraid to speak. Currently lawyers have told knowledgeable people not to talk and it is now a matter of containing the crime and its costs. It will happen again as there has been nothing done to change the status quo. They’ll just cover their tracks better next time.

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Ex-BP chief was pressed over inquiry’s scope

By JOHN SCHWARTZ
NEW YORK TIMES
July 1, 2011, 11:39PM

In testimony before Congress last summer, Tony Hayward, then BP’s chief executive, asserted that his company was conducting a “full and comprehensive” investigation into the causes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster that killed 11 rig workers and spewed millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. He said BP had put in place a sweeping new safety system throughout the company in the wake of lapses in 2006 and 2007.

Last month, however, in grueling depositions in London with lawyers suing BP, Hayward was challenged on his assertions that the company’s safety overhaul was comprehensive and fully carried out.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers argued that the company’s investigation did not examine the role of BP’s top officials in setting the tone for a safety-oriented culture, nor had the safety program been fully under way for rigs in the Gulf.
In hundreds of pages of Hayward’s depositions, Hayward, whose public handling of the April 2010 spill was roundly criticized as clumsy, rejected every contention. But the questions suggest lines of attack that could eventually be used in the many lawsuits consolidated in a federal courtroom in New Orleans, including accusations that the company’s former chief executive lied to Congress.
Ongoing litigation
The deposition was part of ongoing litigation against the British firm and other companies involved in the April 20, 2010, Deepwater Horizon disaster. The government is among the parties suing BP and is expected to impose fines for Clean Water Act violations potentially totaling billions of dollars.
Hayward is considered a critical witness, since he headed BP during and after the disaster until he was ousted in October.
The deposition, which has not been publicly released, was taken over several days in London beginning June 6.
Robert Cunningham, an Alabama lawyer who led off the two-day deposition with a confrontational style, pressed Hayward to admit that the company’s inquiry into the disaster was incomplete. While BP’s team examined immediate causes and events leading up to the blast on the rig itself, it did not include what Cunningham referred to as “root causes,” those involving management and corporate culture, and which the company’s own policies call for after major accidents.
Hayward acknowledged that the initial investigation “did not look at the overarching management process at that time,” but he bristled at the suggestion that the investigation was incomplete.
“This was an investigation that was open, transparent, it was communicated as soon as we had the results,” he said, adding, "in stark contrast to anyone else involved in this accident."
Lawyers for BP and Hayward raised objections to the tone of nearly every question — more than 400 objections in the first day of depositions alone. In many of Hayward’s responses, he said he did not remember certain incidents, argued that he had not been involved in an issue at the level of decision-making, or that incidents had occurred after he had left the company.
Many times, he declined to answer questions that he said would call on him to speculate. Cunningham asked Hayward how his appearance before Congress was received within the company. "Did your PR people congratulate you on how you did after your testimony was concluded?"
Hayward replied, "No one congratulated me after that day. Thank you very much."
Another contentious line of questioning involved BP’s expenditures on safety; Cunningham argued that cost cuts at BP had raised risk, but Hayward countered that whenever he spoke, he would emphasize that “reliable operations come first, whatever the cost” - and insisted that the corporate budget-cutting affected operations, not safety.
But Cunningham scoffed, "If the first words out of your mouth every time you open it were ‘I am Superman,’ that wouldn’t make you Superman, would it?"
A lawyer for BP responded, "Objection to form."
BP’s response
In a statement Friday, BP downplayed the significance of the line of questioning and Hayward’s responses. The company said the court will decide the civil cases based on the evidence presented at trial, "not the questions or cross talk of lawyers or snippets of testimony from any single deposition."
Hayward also fought off accusations that he sought to prop up BP’s falling share price through his subordinates’ daily media briefings on the Gulf oil spill.
During the proceedings, an attorney for the state of Louisiana pointed to an email Hayward sent to an aide asking him to arrange a media briefing to counter information that was hurting BP stock. The share price rose after the briefing.
An attorney for the state of Louisiana, Allan Kanner, asked Hayward about a June 25, 2010, email to BP’s former head of exploration and production, Andy Inglis. According to Kanner, it said, "Andy, can you make sure we get the technical briefing on the relief well out today? There are all sorts of ridiculous stories going around. It’s the main reason behind the share price weakness."
At the time, the well was still spewing oil. It wasn’t capped until three weeks later. And it wasn’t until September that a relief well sealed what had become the worst U.S. offshore oil spill.
The day of the email, BP’s stock price closed at $26.53, a 6 percent drop from the previous day’s close. A BP executive, Kent Wells, held a media briefing three days later saying the relief well was only 20 feet away from the blown-out well. He also told reporters the company had a high degree of confidence in the relief well and a backup one it was drilling.
By June 30, 2010, BP’s stock was back up to $28.35 - slightly higher than what it closed at on June 24, the day before the Hayward email.
Didn’t recall writing email
Kanner asked Hayward if he remembered writing the email. He said he didn’t.
“Was one of the goals of the technical briefings and the media blitz, if you will, to keep the share price up?” the attorney asked.
“No,” Hayward responded. "The objective of the technical briefing was to provide clear, coherent factual information as to what was and was not going on at any moment in time, and then people could form their own view as to whether that was good or bad for the share price."
In another part of his deposition, Hayward was reminded of his testimony before Congress in which he talked about attending a memorial service for the 11 men who died aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig. Asked during the deposition if he could remember the men’s names,
Hayward misidentified one man and could name only two others.

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I hope the remainder of the deposition had more substance than is depicted in this story.

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Cuomo Will Seek to Lift Ban on Hdrofracking in New York state - NYTimes.com

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[QUOTE=BLISTERS;51936]When you fly from A to B you have no control over how the airline does the job, unlike the level of control a companyman has over drilling operations on a rig hired by his handlers to do the job.
[B]A Company Man spends maximum 5% of his day on the drill floor. The operations are left to the Toolpusher and Driller, who are supposed to ensure the job is carried out. The remaining 95% of the day means that they are the ones conducting all operations and are responsible for ‘tracking’ the well.[/B]
One can’t compel a pilot to land an aircraft immediately or divert to another destination as this might amount to hijacking. On the other hand a companyman on a drilling rig can halt drilling or operations, if he knows something’s not right, like a negative test gone wrong or if he knows sufficient centralizers, and cement lab test reports were unavailable.
[B]It’s also possible for anyone on the vessel to highlight anomalies, and if you’re the driller or Toolpusher you better understand the operational requirements. There’s no such thing as a Co Man spoonfeeding the drill crew. Naturally, he’ll help when assistance is required. But, he usually goes through the OIM, the most senior person on the vessel who is in a position to ordain operations. No operation takes place without his ok. But this is the GOM![/B]

He can always refuse to carry out the job, rather than chose to play for very high stakes. In the case of the former he will be replaced, might get blacklisted or suffer economic hardship but he’ll sleep well for the rest of his life. Beats being a spineless weak cog in cart wheel that’s surely will give way sooner or later. When I board an airliner I trust the pilot will get me to my destination safely and promptly. This trust is based predominantly on the track record of that airline. I trust the pilot of the airline company I paid my fare to, has sufficient experience and flying hours. Being an airline of supposedly good repute, the thought that the pilot has only flown four single engine flights would never occur to me.
[B]Risk still exists![/B]

As member of the public I have a choice and have to base a large part of my decision on trust. I could pay top dollar for a seat on a decent airline or one on a cut price shonky airline. However if the wing falls off the cut-price airline in mid flight and I survive, I really need to admit I got what I paid for.The magnitude of the Fukushima disaster like the one on Boxing day was extraordinary. Your Fukushima analogy can’t be applied to Macondo because several deeper wells have been drilled successfully prior to Macondo.
[B]My Fukushima analogy, applies to the risk the engineers and politicians took in building a plant near a fault line. I’m just highlighting that they didn’t anticipate the risk to be so high. A simple illustration of our human failings. And additionally, Joe Public in Japan, never even considered such a scenario developing. They were ignorant of the true potential of Mother Earth! Perhaps, the engineers were blind to all other facts and constructed a facility capable of withstanding 99% of scenarios.[/B]

What was extraordinary about Macondo compared to these previously drilled deeper wells ?
[B]They allowed a blowout to occur. 5 Leading Personnel failed to recognise a negative test gone wrong. But, no blowout has occurred. The Drill crew was unable to interpret data during the displacement.[/B]

What if any were the extreme circumstances that you allude to in your analogy with Fukushima when it comes to BP’s Macondo ?
[B]None, I merely highlight the fact that risk exists all around us, and level of risk must be reduced as much as possible. We can never eliminate it completely.[/B]

If risks were managed successfully on previous deeper wells that were P & S for production at a later date, what was different about MC252 ? What did it cost in comparison to previously drilled or similar wells ? Was it level of experience and training of persons in charge that was different ?..or did parties involved reckon they were such experts at drilling deepwater wells that it was Ok to send out company reps with only experience of a few land wells ? Were they mindfull of the potential for “extreme circumstances” .
[B]People on the vessel screwed this up. But, you don’t want to hear that![/B]

Do you think cost cutting,shonky well design, sending out inexperienced company reps, mudmen who admit they have not done a well control course ? amounts to – gambling with risks- ? Could have, fatigue and pressure to finish up the job whilst visitors were on board "clouded their reasoning " ?
[B]Naturally, a stupid Co Man is never a good thing on a vessel. But, you fail to realise that the OIM and Toolpushers are in a position to ensure ALL operations are carried out according to the standards defined by the drilling contractor. That means they require intelligent personnel on the drilling side to make decisive decisions…your Co Man might be on the toilet! Decisions still have to be made! Shut the well in! At the very least monitor volumes and pay attention to pressure fluctuations and anomalies! TO, give the impression that the drilling contractor follows instruction word for word. Not even a child buys that one. They become frustrated! So, the contractors procedures are utilised. When work outside this definition occurs you’d be pretty stupid to carry on if you knew that we’d be losing any monitoring of the well. But, that’s what TO did! They went blind![/B]

If risks are man made then they are indeed totally avoidable. Inherent risks such as a mag 7 earthquake emanating directly beneath a rig can’t but still might be manageable if some semblance of an action plan or emergency response is in place.
[B]Very true, we need to manage all risk with clear analysis of what the risks are. In the case of the negative test, the OIM should have been in a position to advise his crew how the negative test should take place. He insisted on a test. Why didn’t he articulate how that should be performed…on his vessel, not BP’s. Remember, no driller proceeds with any action he doesn’t understand. Stop and confirm that all is as it should be. If he continues without understanding the consequences of his actions then he’s ‘underqualified’ and TO need to address the training issue. If he was following the company man’s orders without his own or the TP’s interpretation then he was not following his own company’s operational procedures. [/B]

Economic pressures and Geopressures, like Manmade risks vs Inherent risk, are two very very different things. I hope you are’nt confusing one with the other. If you think manmade risks can’t be avoided then surely at least you must accept that they can be minimized provided we are willing to fork out for the necessary means, costs, equipment and time with which to do the job safely. All blowouts are avoidable – don’t you agree ?
[B]I have always said all blowouts are avoidable. And, if you look closely at the statistics, the ownership of blowouts is largely down to ineffective drill crews who miss the signs, somewhat similar to the Macondo prospect. You cannot get a blowout if you monitor and control well volumes and shut in your working BOP![/B]

I would also like to know what’s your take on personnel who lose their jobs when they report serious deficiencies at the work place and end up getting ostracized in the process? Do you think this is a main hidden root cause of disasters ?
[B]Onshore management have to ensure that culture in the industry changes, and that they have a responsibility to listen to their men and value their input. Those who fail to change must leave the industry, the dinosaurs!
I think one of the root causes of this disaster is a lack of TO understanding what the objectives are? Who could possibly sanction displacing the well without any volume control. Worse than that, TO still deny this.[/B]

P/S It is a big mistake to think that the public is dumb. Smacks of a snooty elitist mentality.
[/QUOTE]

[B]The public know no more about the drilling industry than I do about gynacology. I am elitist because I know my subject. I’ve been involved in the drilling industry for more than 25 years. When I need an expert I get one. Joe Public is not an expert! And never can be! Joe Public, listens to the media, journalists who have not one bit of understanding about what they’re reporting, technically. Sure, they can see a spill visually, but their misguided intentions means it’s going to take years to change the public’s perception of what happened and who is to blame. The only people who really know and understand how well’s flow (blow) are drilling and oil industry personnel. You can’t read it in a book or newspaper. Sure, you can study the principles, but you never get the feel of things until you actually ‘fly’.[/B]

[B]Blisters, I think you mentioned in earlier mail that you work in the drilling industry. Let me ask you a question or two:
Suppose a negative test takes place and it is considered a good test would you instruct your crews to ignore all well volumes during the displacement? What is the policy of your company regarding the monitoring of wells’ volumes and what is written in the contract between your company and the Operator? Would you tell the logger to ignore volume monitoring? Are you weary of this subject?
Or, would you simply say ‘The Operator told us to do this’? Because that appears to be TO’s current position. Apparently, they have NO responsibility!!!
And, after the event, would you be embarrassed that your company accepted zero liability? What message does this send out to your fellow workers? Are we protecting them or not?

Remember all the speculation about the reason for the blowout…going back to May-June of 2010? This speculation set the tone for the public’s perception of the accident and why it happened. Did BP ever say they were exclusively to blame? No, they merely admitted that they were contractually bound to pay for any spill/discharge to the ocean. No-one anticipated a scenario of the well flowing for months. But, speculation continued, and suddenly, armchair experts offered their technical expertise! Media went crazy with a variety of journalistic interpretational bullshit, blaming BP for this situation. Since then, other contractors such as Halliburton have been challenged over the cement job (totally innocent in my opinion). Even today, media do not understand how a well can blow out. It accepts that the Operator is the fundamental reason. Whereas, the truth is that the drilling contractor who runs all operations according to the OIM on the vessel is the ‘lifeline’ between ‘intercept’ and ‘blow-out’. The vessel belongs to TO. The Captain of that vessel has 100% responsibility for all activity onboard whether TO management like it or not. TO, sanction the Operator’s decisions. They are ultimately responsible for all operations on the vessel. And, I’ve never heard of an OIM or Toolpusher who sees it differently.[/B]

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[QUOTE=tengineer;51937]Thank you Blisters. I am sure by now everyone has grown weary of the tale of well control and volumes espoused here ad nauseum. The ones who were supposed to monitor well control and volumes are dead and defenseless. How well control and volumes became uncontrollable and did so very quickly is what we all need to know. Why the BOP did not contain the well is another thing we need to know.
Actually we will probably never know the answers to these questions until many years down the road when people with the answers quit being afraid to speak. Currently lawyers have told knowledgeable people not to talk and it is now a matter of containing the crime and its costs. It will happen again as there has been nothing done to change the status quo. They’ll just cover their tracks better next time.[/QUOTE]

You strike me as Joe Public! Are you ‘weary’? of hearing what you don’t like! Perhaps, ad nauseum is what TO needed to preach to their crews. The interesting thing if you have time to look is that the Deepwater Horizon daily reports produced by the driller and Toolpusher always refer to volumes…[B][U]on every single line and hour of the report prior to the event[/U][/B]. Why did they give up monitoring volumes? TO, know their responsibilities! They didn’t perform their duties as per contract. Why tell the logger to ignore volumes?

Joe Public, doesn’t know it, but we in the industry have the unique responsibility to monitor volumes in order to intercept a kick. This is a drilling contractor/logger responsibility. It does not belong to the Operator. If the drilling contractor tells the logger to essentially ignore volumes then we have a very serious behavioural issue that to this day TO may not be addressing. The innocent who died deserve a better response than ‘I am sure by now everyone has grown weary of the tale of well control and volumes’ as you have suggested, tengineer!

The BOP is a very serious issue. And, I’m personally not satisfied with the DNV report. We need to wait for more information. Hopefully, it’s coming!

Regarding the status quo, I can assure you that every Operator in the industry has not ignored this issue and that all BOPs on every rig are under a fuller examination of their capabilities. Three weeks ago we conducted a surface shear Ram test successfully at surface after it had been 4 months in service subsea. Standards are changing.

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BP Plaintiff Steering Committee having trouble with responses: ‘Authority’ is ‘vague’ and ‘ambiguous’

http://www.louisianarecord.com/mobile/story.asp?c=236556

NEW ORLEANS - Lawyers leading litigation over the Deepwater Horizon explosion can’t wriggle out of answers to sharp questions, U.S. Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan decided on June 24.

She utterly rejected a plaintiff steering committee’s June 13 responses to requests that it admit facts to oil company BP and rig investor Anadarko Petroleum.

“Having reviewed the requests for admission and the PSC responses, the undersigned finds that BP and Anadarko are entitled to know what the plaintiff steering committee currently contends as to the facts,” she wrote.

She wrote that federal rules of civil procedure provide that if a matter is not admitted, the answering party must deny it or state why it can’t deny or admit it.

She entered the order without any motion and without any delay.

BP lawyer Timothy Duffy of Chicago sent her a letter on June 23, claiming only four of 58 responses from the committee complied with procedural rules.

He wrote that 47 responses were variations of a statement that the committee would enter a stipulation depending on whether other parties agree.

“Offering to consider entering into a stipulation, if various preconditions are met, is no substitute for admitting or denying a request for admission,” he wrote.

He wrote that BP responded to 221 requests for admission, “not one of which was given the back of the hand shown here by the plaintiff steering committee.”

Next day, Shushan ordered committee lawyers to supply unqualified stipulations for 53 BP requests that they answered with qualified stipulations.

Some responses from committee lawyers sounded like parodies.

When BP asked them to admit that federal regulations govern blowout preventers, they answered that “the term ‘governed’ is vague and ambiguous.”

When BP asked them to admit the preventer passed federally mandated function tests, they wrote that “federally mandated” and “function tests” were vague and ambiguous.

When BP asked them to admit Transocean personnel were required to activate the preventer as quickly as possible after detection of a kick, they wrote that “required,” “activate,” “detection,” and “as quickly as possible” were vague and ambiguous.

When BP asked them to admit Transocean knew the rig wasn’t seaworthy and negligently operated it, they offered stipulations “if and as appropriate.”

Shushan struck the words, “if and as appropriate,” from the responses.

She told the committee to admit or deny that the Coast Guard did not identify failures in rig owner Transocean’s safety management system in time to ensure the rig’s safety.

She told them to admit or deny that a blowout prevention device sealed an annulus between a drill pipe and an inner wall in pressure tests on the day of the explosion.

She also ordered them to admit or deny nine Anadarko requests they tried to dodge.

When Anadarko asked them to admit they had no evidence of communications between it and anyone on the rig, they wrote that “communications” was vague and ambiguous.

When Anadarko asked them to admit no one gave it authority over relief activities, they wrote that “authority” was vague and ambiguous.

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Seems as though hardly anyone is qualified to perform their jobs in a professional and dignified manner anymore.
While trying to discredit the defendants, the plaintiff’s attorneys seem hell bent to discredit themselves.

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Oil spill:

An example of risk in our society:

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A reminder:

The incident occurred at the Sedco 711 location in the North Sea. At that well, Transocean made a decision to displace the mud with seawater and had a blowout. This was the same thing that happened on the Deepwater Horizon prior to the explosion that destroyed it along with 11 lives

A full investigation into the incident was conducted by Transocean following the mishap along with a report detailing all the necessary recommendations to prevent such incidents from recurring. Unfortunately, the Deepwater Horizon never received the report.

But that is not the only similarity with the Deepwater Horizon disaster. These drilling rigs are equipped with a general alarm designed to go off and signal an evacuation if two or more sensors are triggered within a zone. On the Deepwater Horizon, the general alarm had been intentionally “inhibited”, in essence, it was disabled for well over 8 months prior to the April 20th event. In the North Sea incident, alarms were also being continually activated until they were disabled as well.

The main point that was addressed in the North Sea incident was lack of well control at the time of well completion when the drilling mud was being displaced with sea water. This situation was exactly the same on the Deepwater Horizon. Early in the day on April 20th a controversial decision was made by BP and agreed upon by Transocean to displace the drilling mud with salt water. This decision directly lead to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

So what went wrong with management? The North Sea incident occurred about 4 months prior to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Transocean’s internal report on the incident was dated April 14, 2010 – 6 days prior to the disaster on April 20, 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico at the Macondo well.

Had the report and subsequent recommendations from the North Sea incident been disseminated to the drilling management for the Gulf of Mexico operations, then it is likely that the Deepwater Horizon disaster would have been completely avoided.

Transocean is the world’s largest offshore drilling company with three main divisions – North Sea, Asia and North America. It is management’s responsibility to coordinate the various activities under one’s charge. There is no excuse for poor coordination at management level especially when it comes to safety.

Transocean discovered vital information from the North Sea incident that would have prevented a disaster and saved lives. How could the largest oil drilling company in the world be so lax on such critical safety issues as to repeat the same mistakes just four months later? It was their duty to demand that this information be known and proper procedures followed throughout all their locations.

Further, they were lucky in the North Sea incident that the Blowout Preventer worked and prevented a similar disaster. Relying on the Blowout Preventer to do its job should be a last resort measure only as an emergency. The engineering requirements, in the oil field industry, require that there at least be two “barriers”, e.g., mud and cement, mud and annular, etc. Transocean operates as if the BOP is a barrier when, in fact, it is an emergency device.

Transocean was very aware of loss to its reputation after the North Sea incident. The report stated that the incident resulted in 11.1 days of lost time at a cost of approx £5.2M (approx $8.1M) and “significant loss of reputation to Transocean”.

The April 14th report was limited to the North Sea Division, as opposed to distributing the information to all three major Divisions. These are fundamental problems that should have applied to all drilling locations. The fact that their report predates the Deepwater Horizon disaster, coupled with the fact that it was intentionally limited in its distribution, reveals a corporate lack of continuity in its safety policies and programs.

Had they decided to correct the problems company-wide rather than trying to treat the one incident in the North Sea as an isolated incident, then it is likely that the Deepwater Horizon disaster would have never occurred.

Although the North Sea Division is a separate division, it is the responsibility of upper management to coordinate all areas under their charge. This failure to do so, resulted in death, injury, and destruction of four state’s eco-systems.

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[QUOTE=alcor;51989][B]The public know no more about the drilling industry than I do about gynacology. I am elitist because I know my subject. I’ve been involved in the drilling industry for more than 25 years. When I need an expert I get one. Joe Public is not an expert! And never can be! Joe Public, listens to the media, journalists who have not one bit of understanding about what they’re reporting, technically. Sure, they can see a spill visually, but their misguided intentions means it’s going to take years to change the public’s perception of what happened and who is to blame. The only people who really know and understand how well’s flow (blow) are drilling and oil industry personnel. You can’t read it in a book or newspaper. Sure, you can study the principles, but you never get the feel of things until you actually ‘fly’.[/B]

[B]Blisters, I think you mentioned in earlier mail that you work in the drilling industry. Let me ask you a question or two:
Suppose a negative test takes place and it is considered a good test would you instruct your crews to ignore all well volumes during the displacement? What is the policy of your company regarding the monitoring of wells’ volumes and what is written in the contract between your company and the Operator? Would you tell the logger to ignore volume monitoring? Are you weary of this subject?
Or, would you simply say ‘The Operator told us to do this’? Because that appears to be TO’s current position. Apparently, they have NO responsibility!!!
And, after the event, would you be embarrassed that your company accepted zero liability? What message does this send out to your fellow workers? Are we protecting them or not?

Remember all the speculation about the reason for the blowout…going back to May-June of 2010? This speculation set the tone for the public’s perception of the accident and why it happened. Did BP ever say they were exclusively to blame? No, they merely admitted that they were contractually bound to pay for any spill/discharge to the ocean. No-one anticipated a scenario of the well flowing for months. But, speculation continued, and suddenly, armchair experts offered their technical expertise! Media went crazy with a variety of journalistic interpretational bullshit, blaming BP for this situation. Since then, other contractors such as Halliburton have been challenged over the cement job (totally innocent in my opinion). Even today, media do not understand how a well can blow out. It accepts that the Operator is the fundamental reason. Whereas, the truth is that the drilling contractor who runs all operations according to the OIM on the vessel is the ‘lifeline’ between ‘intercept’ and ‘blow-out’. The vessel belongs to TO. The Captain of that vessel has 100% responsibility for all activity onboard whether TO management like it or not. TO, sanction the Operator’s decisions. They are ultimately responsible for all operations on the vessel. And, I’ve never heard of an OIM or Toolpusher who sees it differently.[/B][/QUOTE]

[B]Glad to see that you are taking pains to explain yourself but I suggest you avoid being evasive because it is time to tuck your tail in and walk away. Have you not previously mentioned, in more than one post at this forum, that all blowouts are preventable ??? But now you contradict yourself by saying the risks taken, pertaining to MC252, were unavoidable. Looks like your are losing track of your own BS and worse, starting to believe in it.[/B]

[B]I have not and still do not dispute the importance you place with regard volumes and pressure or misinterpretation of the negative test. However I still wonder why the plan required it prior to P & S, meaning why underbalance the well, why not bring into neutral ?.[/B]

[B]With regard to your constant harping, and plastering of this discussion with slogans about pressures and volumes, all indications are that you are trying to brain wash Joe public into a tunnel vision loop. This is not a “ which come first ? the chicken or the egg ? situation ”. The question is, what was the root cause, NOT CAUSE, that allowed such pressures and volumes to infiltrate into the wellbore in the first place ? We all saw what happened and it is pointless trying to erase it from the public’s psyche. Why keep flogging a dead horse to death and keep harping on the last lines of defence? How about looking at the drawing board first if you are not afraid at tackling the root cause. What set the tone for the public’s perception was a steel mountain at sea exploding and sinking with loss of several lives and livelihoods , oiled bird and sea life, unprecedented massive destruction of an ecosystem and public disgust at a juvenile level of badly orchestrated inconsistent BS that ensued from most parties involved, and oh yes not to mention, those infamous photoshopped pictures released to Joe Public ??? Perhaps you have developed such a thick hide believing your own spin that you have become impervious to embarrassment. Life goes on, the show must go on, but to forgive and forget is a recipe for another disaster. Then what will you have to say ?[/B]

[B]Based on media reports, I am not impressed about how TO dealt with survivors onshore but so far their version and video of why the BOP failed to shut-in is the most technically consistent version of what happened based on tangible evidence retrieved to shore but I need time to compare it with the Halliburton charts. But prior this disaster I held BP as the best, by light years, but then I had not work with them for about a decade. If you must know, I have worked with, TO previously on various rigs but never for them and they run quite a tight ship. How about you ? Do you work for BP ?..perhaps I’m asking a stupid question ?[/B]

[B]Joe Public might not know much about the intricacies of drilling engineering but they sure know how what Photoshop can be used for. Even a gynacologist can figure that out [/B]

6572

[QUOTE=BLISTERS;52005][B]Glad to see that you are taking pains to explain yourself but I suggest you avoid being evasive because it is time to tuck your tail in and walk away. Have you not previously mentioned, in more than one post at this forum, that all blowouts are preventable ??? But now you contradict yourself by saying the risks taken, pertaining to MC252, were unavoidable. Looks like your are losing track of your own BS and worse, starting to believe in it.[/B]

[B]Blisters, I have consistently said that all blowouts are avoidable, if you care to read the response I gave in the previous post.[/B]

[B]I have not and still do not dispute the importance you place with regard volumes and pressure or misinterpretation of the negative test. However I still wonder why the plan required it prior to P & S, meaning why underbalance the well, why not bring into neutral ?.[/B]
[B]
Sea Water would be neutral and it’s the only way of testing the barriers for the intended displacement. And, if TO had any idea of how to perform such a test we would never be in the situation we’re in. BP, have a big ownership of responsibility because they employed TO to perform the task which was screwed up from start to finish.[/B]

[B]With regard to your constant harping, and plastering of this discussion with slogans about pressures and volumes, all indications are that you are trying to brain wash Joe public into a tunnel vision loop. This is not a “ which come first ? the chicken or the egg ? situation ”. The question is, what was the root cause, NOT CAUSE, that allowed such pressures and volumes to infiltrate into the wellbore in the first place ? We all saw what happened and it is pointless trying to erase it from the public’s psyche. Why keep flogging a dead horse to death and keep harping on the last lines of defence? How about looking at the drawing board first if you are not afraid at tackling the root cause. What set the tone for the public’s perception was a steel mountain at sea exploding and sinking with loss of several lives and livelihoods , oiled bird and sea life, unprecedented massive destruction of an ecosystem and public disgust at a juvenile level of badly orchestrated inconsistent BS that ensued from most parties involved, and oh yes not to mention, those infamous photoshopped pictures released to Joe Public ??? Perhaps you have developed such a thick hide believing your own spin that you have become impervious to embarrassment. Life goes on, the show must go on, but to forgive and forget is a recipe for another disaster. Then what will you have to say ?[/B]

[B]So, you want to differentiate root cause from cause? Like all wells everything can go wrong. Wells collapse, hydrocarbons enter, casing collapses, losses of fluid occur etc…the list is endless. Bottom line is that the drilling crews have to police the well. No point in telling everyone at a later date that the rig went down because of the Operator. Bullshit! Your vessel, better take your responsibilities more seriously![/B]

[B]Based on media reports, I am not impressed about how TO dealt with survivors onshore but so far their version and video of why the BOP failed to shut-in is the most technically consistent version of what happened based on tangible evidence retrieved to shore but I need time to compare it with the Halliburton charts. But prior this disaster I held BP as the best, by light years, but then I had not work with them for about a decade. If you must know, I have worked with, TO previously on various rigs but never for them and they run quite a tight ship. How about you ? Do you work for BP ?..perhaps I’m asking a stupid question ?[/B]

[B]I work for a drilling contractor, and have worked for Sedco for a short period, which has now been swallowed up by Transocean. Let me emphasize one more time that we police the well.[/B]

[B]Joe Public might not know much about the intricacies of drilling engineering but they sure know how what Photoshop can be used for. Even a gynacologist can figure that out [/B][/QUOTE]

[B]I asked you many questions and you haven’t answered![/B]

6573

If all blowouts are preventable as you have quoted several times previously, then in your book is it possible to eliminate all the risks involved ? FYI: in my book all blowouts are preventable provide we don’t go about primary well-control in a hurry, are afforded the time to train personnel and investigate anomalies before proceeding further and not go about it in a slip shot manner under pressure to save costs or gamble.

6574

SevenTransocean Offshore workers from the Deepwater Horizon explosion won’t let their employer examine their bodies or minds.

http://www.louisianarecord.com/mobile/story.asp?c=236554

NEW ORLEANS - Seven workers claiming orthopedic and emotional injuries from the Deepwater Horizon explosion won’t let their employer examine their bodies or minds.

They failed to set appointments with Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling doctors, even after U.S. Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan prodded their lawyer to do so.

Shushan, who helps District Judge Carl Barbier handle explosion and spill suits from many federal courts, sought cooperation in a June 2 email to Anthony Buzbee of Houston.

Buzbee had ignored a May 16 letter from Transocean lawyer Dan Goforth of Houston.

Shushan wrote, "Dear Tony, I would appreciate your responding promptly to the request by Dan Goforth to schedule examinations by Drs. Likover, Thompson and Greve.

“If you will coordinate dates with your clients, they can be accommodated in either Houston or New Orleans by Drs. Greve and Thompson.”

Her message achieved no effect.

On June 24, Transocean lawyers Steven Roberts of Houston and Kerry Miller of New Orleans called on Shushan to set appointments and produce medical records.

They asked her to schedule Michael Burrell, Stephen Davis and Dennis Martinez with orthopedic surgeon Larry Likover of Houston on July 7.

They proposed to schedule Patrick Morgan with Likover on July 12, Eugene Moss and Samuel Pigg on July 14, and Micah Sandell on August 4.

They offered no dates for the seven to see psychiatrist John Thompson or clinical neuropsychologist Kevin Greve.

“Importantly, it is not possible for Transocean to obtain the information that would result from mental and physical examinations of claimants through less intrusive means,” they wrote.

“Indeed, there is no other way for Dr. Likover, Dr. Thompson, and Dr. Greve to fully evaluate claimants’ claims except through mental and physical examinations of them,” they wrote.

Buzbee represents six other workers that Transcoean doesn’t wish to examine.

Buzbee challenges the constitutionality of the 160 year old Limitation of Liability Act, which limits a vessel owner’s liability to the value of the vessel.

He wrote last year that it deprives his clients of property rights without due process.

“Claimants sustained severe bodily injuries,” he wrote.

"Claimants have suffered physical pain and mental anguish and, in reasonable medical

probability, will continue to do so for the balance of their natural lives," he wrote.

He claimed loss of past and future wages, medical expenses, permanent impairment and loss of ability to perform household services.

6575

That would seem a violation of prvacy, to force someone to be re examined, by another physician. That patient, physician relationship , is very private. The patient’s physician, has rules of ethics to abide by, just like attorney / clients have, and could lose their license to practice, if there was even a hint, of unethical behavior.

6576

Two videos Transocean produced for their report, the first a detailed animation showing what the company believes happened to the BOP during the accident. The second details the operations of the Automatic Mode Function on the BOP that’s designed to seal the well should the BOP lose contact with the rig.

6577

A reminder of some of the BOP observations back in late March 2011 according to the chief counsel\s report:

https://s3.amazonaws.com/chief_counsel/pdf/C21462-217_CCR_Chp_4-9_The_Blowout_Preventer.pdf

And, the negative test:

http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C21462-214_CCR_Chp_4-6_Negative_Pressure_Test.pdf

6578

[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;52040]That would seem a violation of prvacy, to force someone to be re examined, by another physician. That patient, physician relationship , is very private. The patient’s physician, has rules of ethics to abide by, just like attorney / clients have, and could lose their license to practice, if there was even a hint, of unethical behavior.[/QUOTE]

All who survived this tragic accident deserve recompense for the injuries sustained, both physical and mental, but the society we have created and live in, our democracy, has its flaws! We apparently don’t trust the word of one doctor against another. Often, when we are diagnosed with an illness, we ourselves, seek another doctor’s opinion. So, there is an element of distrust in our society and I don’t see why the medical world should feel exempt from this. Some doctors are as bad as the politicians! The truth is that the medical world is a very prosperous industry, and economics may have long ago superceded the noble intentions of our forefathers, and ethics are a guideline, whereas temptation, a delicious and prosperous alternative, Eve’s Apple!

These guys have gone through tremendous trauma. What hurts is where this trauma is examined and tested, and a negotiated value of recompense is offered accordingly. Transocean, will offer the least amount of settlement with the additional provision that no detail of settlement is revealed, but only where their ‘doctors’ are allowed to ‘examine’ the patient. This is business, and leaves us all with a sense of ‘economic transaction has taken place’.

What does it say about our society where distrust of those who have gone through severe trauma is questioned? Do Transocean feel that some of them are less injured than others? And yet, our society encourages lawyers to seek extortionate recompense value, so that, they get their 30% commission!!! And in the midst of this each party is trying to show its ‘nobility’!!!

What is the procedure in the military, Infomania? Earl Boebert? How do we look after our soldiers? Do we neglect them? Are the lawyers performing a great act in the courtroom whilst lining their pockets with chunks of gold?

And, what does it all say about the distrust that exists between folk on this website, and its debate on the causes of the accident? I’m crucified every time I open my mouth!

Would I turn down a couple of million dollars, to reflect my trauma? I’m not sure Mother Theresa would reject it, but like everyone else she’d reflect privately on how financial settlements ‘buys our tongue’! We are all afflicted! Not just TO and BP!

6579

I don’t have personal experience so the little I know is hearsay. One of my friend’s had a knee replacement at the VA hospital that was botched…had to have a redo.
Needless to say He isn’t impressed.

As far as plaintiffs being examined by defendants medical professionals, several injury cases I am familiar with back to 1980, mostly employment related and vehicle accidents, it’s normal operating procedure for the defense team to get their own medical experts to examine the plaintiff. This is not out of the ordinary. I would guess it’s part of the discovery process.

I understand NOLA’s concern about patient privacy provisions, that’s part of her job. However, when filing suit I would imagine some patient rights are over ridden by the defendant’s right to verify the facts in the case.

6580

[QUOTE=Infomania;52123]_____________________
I don’t have personal experience so the little I know is hearsay. One of my friend’s had a knee replacement at the VA hospital that was botched…had to have a redo.
Needless to say He isn’t impressed.

As far as plaintiffs being examined by defendants medical professionals, several injury cases I am familiar with back to 1980, mostly employment related and vehicle accidents, it’s normal operating procedure for the defense team to get their own medical experts to examine the plaintiff. This is not out of the ordinary. I would guess it’s part of the discovery process.

I understand NOLA’s concern about patient privacy provisions, that’s part of her job. However, when filing suit I would imagine some patient rights are over ridden by the defendant’s right to verify the facts in the case.[/QUOTE]

As a US president once said “trust but verify”.
The whole matter at hand is the ability of the wronged to recover damages. In the US we are lucky in that respect because the threat of a lawsuit which could cost millions affects the behavior of corporations more than the laws they write that govern/regulate them. That is why whenever “tort reform” is mentioned I get nervous because the ability to recover damages in court is the last thing the working person has left in their favor nowadays.

6581

Leaked Deposition Videos Show BP Blames Eleven Victims for [B]Deepwater[/B]
By Public Intelligence
Over three days of sharp questioning, a haggard-looking Tony Hayward shows flashes of anger and remorse as he defends his handling of the [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I] disaster in a recent videotaped deposition obtained exclusively by The Daily.
Public Intelligence
//youtu.be/D1yhJde39Y0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=i43OGcq8rJw
//youtu.be/i43OGcq8rJw
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoX0vkjGHz0&feature=player_embedded
//youtu.be/eoX0vkjGHz0

//youtu.be/VUINT2ibjSE