Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Infomania · June 28, 2011, 10:46am

I am beginning to suspect that some of the “testimony” illicited from some of these Commission hearings, Congressional Investigations, and various internal investigations may not be allowed as evidence to obtain convictions, especially in criminal litigation.

I am speaking strictly from memory without much research here; basically laying out some thoughts I’ve been having as I watched testimony being taken on national TV, witnesses being sworn in and being sternly warned about “perjury and associated penalties”. Later, several witnesses were added to a list as follows:

Parties in Interest

http://www.deepwaterjointinvestigation.com/go/page/3043/46559/

The following are a list of the parties of interest who are part of the BOEM/USCG Marine Board of Investigation for the Deepwater Horizon MODU explosion.

The purpose of this joint investigation is to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon MODU explosion and loss of life on April 20, 2010. The facts collected at this hearing, along with the lead investigators’ conclusions and recommendations will be forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters and BOEM for approval. Once approved, the final investigative report will be made available to the public and the media. No analysis or conclusions will be presented during the hearing.

Per the USCG Marine Safety Manual Volume V, parties-in-interest are statutorily defined in 46 USC 6303 and produce evidence for the board to consider. Parties-in-interest exercise their rights by requesting them through the Investigating Officer, who (because they retain control of the investigation) will determine whether the evidence and witnesses are necessary and relevant to the investigation’s purposes. In a formal investigation, parties-in-interest are designated in writing.

BP - Antonio Rodriguez, Esq.
Transocean - Edward Kohnke, Esq.
Halliburton - Donald E. Godwin, Esq.
Cameron - Brad Eastman, Esq.
M I Swaco - Tobin Eason, Esq. and Gregory Attrep, Esq.
Weatherford - Michael LeMoine, Esq.
Anadarko Petroleum - Thomas Wagner, Esq.
MOEX USA Corp. - Matt Pulman, Esq.
Dril-Quip - Lee Kaplan, Esq.
Jimmy Harrell, Offshore Installation Manager - Pat Fanning, Esq.
Curt Kuchta, Master of Deepwater Horizon MODU - Kyle Schanekas, Esq.
Douglas Harold Brown, Chief Mechanic on Deepwater Horizon MODU - Steve Gordon, Esq.
Steve Bertone, Chief Mechanic on Deepwater Horizon MODU - Stephen London, Esq.
Mike Williams, Chief Engineer Technician on Deepwater Horizon MODU - Ronnie Penton, Esq.
Patrick O’Bryan, Vice President of Drilling and Completions, BP - Rick Simmons, Esq.
Robert Kaluza, Well Site Leader, BP - Shaun Clarke, Esq.

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Within a few days I started thinking (something I don’t do very often) that the Department of Justice and other Government entities and prosecutors were using testimony from proceedings where witnesses were not being Mirandized or being advised of their Fifth Amendment Rights and possibly intended to use this sworn testimony as the basis for filing criminal charges against the witnesses at some time in the future. When this became apparent future witnesses began taking their Fifth Amendment Rights as they well have the right to do.

Seems to me, each witness should have been formally read their rights on the record BEFORE being interrogated by members of the Commissions or Committees. If these rules had been followed then testimony gathered could have been used as Evidence, untainted and without a cloud hanging over the information as to it’s admissibility at a later date and venue.

In my mind, the actions in the investigation may be as faulty as as the actions or inactions on the rig leading up to the blowout and the inept response failing to contain the spill to an area offshore and away from the coast.

Below is a reference for history of Miranda Rights, it’s proper use and intent.

http://www.usconstitution.net/miranda.html

The Miranda Warning

The Constitution reserves many rights for those suspected of crime. One of the fears of the Framers was that the government could act however it wished by simply saying an individual was a suspected criminal. Many of the rights in theConstitution and the Bill of Rights, such as habeas corpus, the right to remain silent, and the right to an attorney, are designed to ensure that those accused of a crime are assured of those rights.

Police were able to take advantage of the fact that not everyone knows their rights by heart. In fact, it is likely that most citizens could name a few of their rights as accused criminals, but not all of them. The police’s position was that if the accused, for example, spoke about a crime without knowing that they did not need to, that it was the person’s fault for not invoking that right, even if they did not know, or did not remember, that they had that right.

This was the crux of the issue in Miranda v Arizona. In 1963, Ernesto Miranda was accused of kidnapping and raping an 18-year-old, mildly retarded woman. He was brought in for questioning, and confessed to the crime. He was not told that he did not have to speak or that he could have a lawyer present. At trial, Miranda’s lawyer tried to get the confession thrown out, but the motion was denied. In 1966, the case came in front of the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the statements made to the police could not be used as evidence, since Miranda had not been advised of his rights.

Since then, before any pertinent questioning of a suspect is done, the police have been required to recite the Miranda warning. The statement, reproduced below, exists in several forms, but all have the key elements: the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. These are also often referred to as the “Miranda rights.” When you have been read your rights, you are said to have been “Mirandized.”

Note that one need not be Mirandized to be arrested. There is a difference between being arrested and being questioned. Also, basic questions, such as name, address, and Social Security number do not need to be covered by a Miranda warning. The police also need not Mirandize someone who is not a suspect in a crime.

As for Ernesto Miranda, his conviction was thrown out, though he did not become a free man. The police had other evidence that was independent of the confession, and when Miranda was tried a second time, he was convicted again. After release from prison, Miranda was killed in a barroom brawl in 1976.

The following is a minimal Miranda warning, as outlined in the Miranda v Arizona case.

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an attorney, and to have an attorney present during any questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for you at government expense.

The following is a much more verbose Miranda warning, designed to cover all bases that a detainee might encounter while in police custody. A detainee may be asked to sign a statement acknowledging the following.

You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions. Do you understand?
Anything you do say may be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand?
You have the right to consult an attorney before speaking to the police and to have an attorney present during questioning now or in the future. Do you understand?
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand?
If you decide to answer questions now without an attorney present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to an attorney. Do you understand?
Knowing and understanding your rights as I have explained them to you, are you willing to answer my questions without an attorney present?

New_Orleans_Lady · June 28, 2011, 10:52am

Interesting how pleading the 5th excused all 5 of not appearing at the coast guard hearings. That was not legal!

Alf · June 29, 2011, 3:44am

[QUOTE=Infomania;51755]I am beginning to suspect that some of the “testimony” illicited from some of these Commission hearings, Congressional Investigations, and various internal investigations may not be allowed as evidence to obtain convictions, especially in criminal litigation.

I am speaking strictly from memory without much research here; basically laying out some thoughts I’ve been having as I watched testimony being taken on national TV, witnesses being sworn in and being sternly warned about “perjury and associated penalties”. Later, several witnesses were added to a list as follows:

Parties in Interest…

[/QUOTE]

Oh dear, what a senseless and total F*** U*… does that mean that everything that was ‘garnered/interpreted’ from all those US CoastGaurd sessions was meaningless and means …[B]ABSOLUTELY NOTHING?[/B]

Sometime back, we had amongst us in this forum a ‘learned’ Legal representative. (I have forgotten his name for now and will look back… but maybe someone remembers it?)

A comment by someone of similar standing would be welcome.

Alf · June 29, 2011, 3:55am

[QUOTE=Alf;51789]Sometime back, we had amongst us in this forum a ‘learned’ Legal representative. (I have forgotten his/her name for now and will look back… but maybe someone remembers it?)

A comment by someone of similar standing would be welcome.[/QUOTE]

The name was ‘[B]dell[/B]’.

[B]dell[/B]…“Are you still around?”

alcor · June 29, 2011, 3:58pm

Comment From ‘The Telegraph’:

BP gets £46m settlement from oil-spill rig parts maker
Shares in BP rose by 4pc after the company received a $75m (£46m) payment from Weatherford, the maker of a key part in the oil company’s exploded Gulf of Mexico Well.

The settlement, though small, raised hope among analysts that some of BP’s contractors may be tempted to pay out rather than fight lengthy court battles.

These could include Halliburton, which made the cement, and Transocean, which operated the Deepwater Horizon. However, both have fervently denied any responsibility so far.
Other part-makers facing litigation include Cameron International, which made the blow-out preventer that failed to stop oil bursting through the top of the well.
Mitsui, which owned 15pc of the well, has contributed $1bn towards costs. [B]But Anadarko, a 25pc owner, is holding out against payment, alleging that BP was negligent.[/B]

[B]BP strongly denies that it will be found guilty of any negligence and maintains that the accident was the result of multiple causes and the fault of multiple parties.[/B]

The president of BP America, Lamar McKay, called on other companies to come forward and negotiate to pay towards the costs of the spill.
Mr McKay said: "We are gratified that in the wake of the reports issued by the Presidential Commission and the US Coast Guard, some of the companies involved in the Macondo well have stepped forward to recognise the findings of those investigations."
Lucas Herrmann, of Deutsche Bank, said: “As the first contractor to settle it marks a new line of recovery for BP, in which the decision to settle [U][U][B]potentially speaks more loudly that the disaster reflected failings across the oil and gas industry rather than specific to gross negligence on the behalf of BP.[/B][/U]”[/U]

The final comment, underlined and in bold print, is most likely to be the final analysis in my opinion, right or wrong! All offshore Operators speculate for oil with a certain amount of risk. We need knowledgeable contractors who are prepared to put their hands up and say “We cannot proceed because we have not achieved the criteria for continuation”. Those Contractors do exist in the market. But, there are many Operators who will be taking note of Transocean’s publicised view that they merely follow all instruction from the Operator, without any requirement to intervene, apparently! I don’t know of any Contractor that operates in this manner. Drilling Contractor’s have a responsibility to all personnel on the vessel and therefore need to understand the consequence of every action and step in the process of drilling the well.
They don’t put their hand in the fire because the Operator tells them to. Transocean, are conveniently arranging facts and contract interpretation to suit their legal stance. Contracts for TO, in the future, may suffer due to lack of responsibility ownership.

New_Orleans_Lady · June 30, 2011, 5:49am

Well, if BP is found innocent,then all I can imagine is they had some very good attorney’s, who knew how to manipulate our judicial system! ie OJ Simpson lol

New_Orleans_Lady · June 30, 2011, 6:01am

But . Public opinion …we know BP was grossly negligent. Read Transocean’s Report esp. the most incriminating section, re. the P&A interactions by the Tidey White shirt BP Engineers, who will probably use the excuse of, eating too many Tweenkies!

Infomania · June 30, 2011, 9:46am

One afternoon a wealthy lawyer was riding in his limousine when he saw two men along the roadside eating grass.

Disturbed, he ordered his driver to stop and he got out to investigate.

He asked one man ‘Why are you eating grass?’

‘We don’t have any money for food,’ the poor man replied ‘We have to eat grass.’

‘Well, then, you can come with me to my house and I’ll feed you’, the lawyer said.

‘But sir, I have a wife and two children with me. They are over there, under that tree’.

‘Bring them along,’ the lawyer replied.

Turning to the other poor man he stated,‘You come with us also.’

The second man, in a pitiful voice then said, ‘But sir, I also have a wife and SIX children with me!’

‘Bring them all, as well,’ the lawyer answered.

They all entered the car, which was no easy task, even for a car as large as the limousine was.

Once underway, one of the poor fellows turned to the lawyer and said, ‘Sir, you are too kind. Thank you for taking all of us with you.’

The lawyer replied, ‘Glad to do it. You’ll really love my place; the grass is almost 3 feet high!’

Lesson : Don’t trust kind lawyers. (Also, don’t send this to your good friend who is also a lawyer)!!

alcor · June 30, 2011, 10:38am

The Challenger accident:

The images are indelible for those who saw them. Contrails in the sky billowing out like leafy stems from a flower. The face of Grace Corrigan peering skyward, etched in confusion, shaded by a hand. Her daughter Christa McAuliffe, NASA’s first “teacher-in-space,” was aboard the Space Shuttle Challenger with six other astronauts. She scoured the Florida sky for the spacecraft, but saw only smoke and debris.

Changes at Thiokol
In 1988, Howard Berkes went back to Morton Thiokol to see what lessons were learned from the Challenger explosion, and how the company had changed in response.

Berkes Thiokol Safety Report

All seven astronauts aboard died: Commander Francis Scobee, Pilot Michael Smith, Mission Specialist Ellison Onizuka, Mission Specialist Judith Resnik, Mission Specialist Ronald McNair, Payload Specialist Gregory Jarvis and McAuliffe.

Three weeks later, in a living room in Brigham City, Utah, a proud space program engineer watched the scene again. It played and replayed on television screens, endlessly it seemed. “I should have done more,” the engineer told me, shaking his head. “I could have done more.”

That engineer and several others were not surprised when Challenger exploded 73 seconds after liftoff on Jan. 28, 1986. They worked for Morton Thiokol (now ATK Thiokol), the Utah-based NASA contractor which produced the solid rocket motors that lifted space shuttles from their launch pads. The rockets were like stacked metal cans stuffed with highly explosive propellant. The forces of liftoff tended to pull the cans apart slightly where they joined. Rubber o-rings lined those joints and kept burning propellant from leaking out.

Some of those Thiokol engineers expected o-ring failures at liftoff. They knew that cold overnight temperatures forecast before launch would stiffen the rubber o-rings. They knew that stiff o-rings didn’t provide a secure seal. In fact, there had been evidence of leakage, what the engineers called “blowby,” on an earlier shuttle flight. This would be the coldest launch ever.

As I sat with that despondent Thiokol engineer in his home in Utah, my colleague Daniel Zwerdling stood outside a hotel room door in Huntsville, Alabama. Another Thiokol engineer was inside. He first spoke through the door, weeping at times. When the door finally opened, Zwerdling heard a remarkable tale, matching in almost every detail the story that simultaneously unfolded to me in Utah. The engineers had resisted the launch, had recommended against it, citing the “blowby” in an earlier low-temperature launch and studies of the elasticity of the o-rings. The night before liftoff, these two Thiokol engineers, along with several colleagues, tried to convince NASA to postpone liftoff.

“I fought like hell to stop that launch,” one of the engineers told Zwerdling. “I’m so torn up inside I can hardly talk about it even now.”

Both engineers asked that we not reveal their names in 1986. They feared for their jobs. Neither has released us from that pledge of confidentiality, so they shall remain unnamed.

It wasn’t long after the Challenger explosion that word of a pre-launch argument leaked out. A source who asked to remain anonymous told me that Morton Thiokol was “coerced” into approving the launch, after the company’s engineers voiced their objections. The source gave me three names. I reached two of the engineers and the wife of a third on the phone. Each confirmed the notion of a coerced launch approval. But none would consent to a detailed interview or on-the-record conversation.

I tried again over the next several weeks, getting a few more details but little substance. Three weeks after the launch, on Feb. 19, I headed to Brigham City, Utah, the town closest to Thiokol’s remote plant. Many Thiokol workers lived in Brigham City and the town was taking the disaster hard. Vandals had scrawled the words “Morton Thiokol Murderers” on a railroad overpass on the road out to the Thiokol plant.

That same day, I huddled on the phone with NPR Science Editor Anne Gudenkauf and Correspondent Daniel Zwerdling. We decided to follow-up on my earlier leads, on new leads found in newspaper stories and in information Zwerdling developed in his own phone conversations with the wives of several Thiokol engineers. We knew that there was a bigger story out there that was still untold.

Zwerdling learned that one of the engineers who opposed the launch was sent to NASA’s Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Zwerdling discovered the name of the hotel where the engineer was staying. He hopped on a plane for Huntsville.

In the meantime, Gudenkauf and I worked through a directory of Thiokol employees. We took the names we already had, and figured that the other engineers involved in the pre-launch meeting would have offices nearby. A list evolved of co-workers with office and phone numbers a few digits different. I matched the list to names in the Brigham City phone directory and began knocking on doors. Other reporters were on the same trail. Some doors had a dozen business cards tucked into them, from reporters all over the world.

This was in an era when NPR reporters did not have cell phones or laptop computers. Zwerdling and I worked independently, phoning in progress reports to editor Gudenkauf in Washington, when we could get to telephones. Neither of us knew it, but doors opened to each of us simultaneously. We heard many of the same details, including exact quotes. We listened to emotionally-charged accounts of a desperate and frustrating attempt to keep Challenger on the launch pad. Fearing for their jobs, neither engineer would permit us to record them, let alone name them.

That night, in a three-way conversation with Gudenkauf, we compared our astonishing notes. There were details no one else had yet revealed. A presidential commission was already investigating the Challenger disaster. But one of the engineers, a key player in the pre-launch debate, had not yet been contacted by the commission.

That engineer told me something that would later become symbolic of NASA’s Challenger failures. He described the tense discussion about the cold temperatures forecast for the launch. The Thiokol engineers presented data about earlier low-temperature launches, including evidence of “blowby.” To him and his colleagues, the message was clear: it was too cold to launch. At first, the Thiokol managers backed their engineers. They formally recommended that the launch be postponed.

The NASA officials on the line were perplexed. They were trying to establish the Space Shuttle as a regular and reliable means of conducting scientific and commercial missions in space. They had an ambitious launch schedule. Classrooms across the country were ready for the first science class taught from space. And in just a few days, during the State of the Union address, President Ronald Reagan was planning to mention Challenger’s launch as a space program achievement.

NASA’s Lawrence Mulloy reacted to the resistance this way: “My God, Thiokol. When do you want me to launch? Next April?” That turned the tide of the discussion. The Thiokol managers pressed their engineers to reverse themselves. When that failed, the managers simply overruled them, and submitted their own launch recommendation.

The next morning, two of the engineers told us, they fully expected Challenger to blow up at launch ignition. One of the engineers silently prayed during the countdown. At liftoff, with no explosion, he began to wonder whether he’d been wrong. The relief didn’t last. Seventy-three seconds into the flight, as the spacecraft began an expected roll, the forces on the solid rocket motors began to pull one of them apart. The cold and stiff o-rings at one joint didn’t flex and seal as designed. Searing hot gasses escaped. In an instant, the sky was filled with smoke and debris. The engineers were filled with grief. And as one later told Zwerdling, “…we all knew exactly what happened.”

[B]Engineers know of the risk involved. Mistakes happen. They aren’t considered guilty of a crime, but there’s a pervading thought that they should have done more, and that the accident was preventable. So, are we going to lambast them forever? No, we move on. [U]No-one intended to kill[/U]. We live our lives nowadays with huge risk and considerable consequence. Not everything is black and white!
BP, and the Contractors must move on. All must admit to their part in this accident. All! But no-one is guilty of intentionally trying to kill someone. There may be a case for manslaughter, and for me there are three surviving individuals who are accountable.
As for the Spill, it’s completely unacceptable, and yet, we know that there is always potential for this to happen! We haven’t had one spill worldwide. We’ve had hundreds. The risk of recurrence is high![/B]

Infomania · June 30, 2011, 11:49am

Re: The Challenger accident

Good post and analogy Alcor.

I remember the Challenger accident well.

Infomania · June 30, 2011, 6:41pm

http://www.manufacturing.net/News/Feeds/2011/06/mnet-mnet-industry-focus-quality-iso-action-plan-proposes-standards-to-combat-oil-s/

ISO action plan proposes standards to combat oil spill disasters

ISO has developed an action plan on International Standards that could help the oil and gas industry prevent or mitigate disasters like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and the Montara oil spill off the coast of Western Australia in 2009. Drawing on the lessons learned from the two disasters, the plan:

– Provides an inventory of relevant standards that are already available

– Proposes a programme for the development of new standards or improvement of existing ones.

The action plan covers drilling, well construction and well operations standards relevant to the Deepwater Horizon (also known as Macondo) and Montara events. It has been developed by ISO technical committee ISO/TC 67, Materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries.

Neil Reeve, Chair of ISO/TC 67, comments: “As an international industry, the lessons learned from an accident in one country must be transferred globally. International Standards developed by ISO/TC 67 are one way of achieving this.”

The inventory includes 71 existing standards and related documents available from ISO or other organizations, particularly the American Petroleum Institute (API). The programme proposes 31 standards or related documents for development or update by ISO, the API, or other organizations.

The ISO/TC 67 management committee states: “In the Macondo and Montara accidents, our industry lost 11 colleagues, caused much environmental damage, and caused material, financial and reputational loss. Standards bodies such as ISO (via its ISO/TC 67), API, and others have developed and maintained standards that are intended to facilitate the defence against such accidents. In order to continue with this, it is now essential that the recommendations identified are implemented in the International Standards portfolio.”

ISO/TC 67 underlines the importance of implementing the standards: “Developing and maintaining consensus-based International Standards is only the first step. These remain only as paper and electronic documents, until implemented in or by a particular country project or user.”

Hundreds of experts from 30 countries participate in the work of ISO/TC 67, with another 30 countries as observers. Currently, the TC’s portfolio comprises 150 new or updated standards. They are not only being increasingly adopted by regional or national standards bodies in North and South America, China, Europe, the Gulf States, Kazakhstan and Russia, but also increasingly referenced in national regulations.

LINK TO ISO ACTION PLAN:
http://www.iso.org/iso/tc_67_action_plan.pdf

Alf · July 1, 2011, 12:07pm

[QUOTE=alcor;51834]The Challenger accident:
…The images are indelible
[/QUOTE]

Yes they were. I was in America at that time… and the whole country literally ‘stood still’ when it happened. Pure Shock.

[QUOTE=alcor;51834]
[B]Engineers know of the risk involved. Mistakes happen. They aren’t considered guilty of a crime, but there’s a pervading thought that they should have done more, and that the accident was preventable. So, are we going to lambast them forever? No, we move on. [U]No-one intended to kill[/U]. We live our lives nowadays with huge risk and considerable consequence. Not everything is black and white!
BP, and the Contractors must move on. All must admit to their part in this accident. All! But no-one is guilty of intentionally trying to kill someone. There may be a case for manslaughter, and for me there are three surviving individuals who are accountable.
As for the Spill, it’s completely unacceptable, and yet, we know that there is always potential for this to happen! We haven’t had one spill worldwide. We’ve had hundreds. The risk of recurrence is high![/B][/QUOTE]

I think I generally agree with your comments. The bigger problem here though is that more ‘lives and people’ were impacted by the Horizon than by the Challenger.

So, as a consequence… there are far more ambulances to chase and more money to be made. Everyone knows that the Oil Industry spends many millions daily as compared to the smaller amounts by NASA… so there is a big potential to make money out of this and from all the ‘trivia’ of it.

BLISTERS · July 1, 2011, 3:07pm

[QUOTE=alcor;51834]The Challenger accident:

<b>Engineers know of the risk involved. Mistakes happen. They aren’t considered guilty of a crime, but there’s a pervading thought that they should have done more, and that the accident was preventable. So, are we going to lambast them forever? No, we move on. [U]No-one intended to kill[/U]. We live our lives nowadays with huge risk and considerable consequence. Not everything is black and white!
[/QUOTE]

I’m not buying this. It sounds like the creative manoeuvrings of a two bit lawyer. Me thinks Alcor is confusing Inherent Risks with totally Avoidable Risks. It appears that he suffering from an advanced state cognitive dissonance …ie: that conundrum when folks chose to only see fault outside of themselves. If we simply shrug it off and move on as he suggests, and persist in a state of denial, this will happen again. I hope not. Sending a lynch mob after patsies won’t do much good either. We have to own up and be held accountable as a whole.

alcor · July 1, 2011, 4:45pm

[QUOTE=BLISTERS;51876]I’m not buying this. It sounds like the creative manoeuvrings of a two bit lawyer. Me thinks Alcor is confusing Inherent Risks with totally Avoidable Risks. It appears that he suffering from an advanced state cognitive dissonance …ie: that conundrum when folks chose to only see fault outside of themselves. If we simply shrug it off and move on as he suggests, and persist in a state of denial, this will happen again. I hope not. Sending a lynch mob after patsies won’t do much good either. We have to own up and be held accountable as a whole.[/QUOTE]

I take a flight from A to B. I don’t know who has serviced the plane and have no idea if the ‘competent’ pilot slept well the night before or enjoyed himself out on the town. I don’t know how old the plane is and haven’t checked the weather forecast. I hope they’ve fuelled the plane! I hope the runway is clear of debris. I hope traffic control are awake!
But I get on the plane and fly from A to B. I have taken many risks! Hopefully, the journey goes well. If not, Joe Public will create hell and get to the bottom of the reason for the plane’s failure. But, Planes do crash, even though we use all our resources to prevent such accidents.

The energy supplied to my home comes from many sources. The general public don’t ask too many questions about the source, suffice to say ‘I get mine’! Then, Fukushima disaster occurs, and we discover the engineering and location of the plant have seriously compromised the public health. But, no-one cried before the event. Engineers built the site to withstand an earthquake of a certain tremor value. But the quake exceeded this value with consequential results. Risk was mathematically and scientifically calculated with the odds of such a catastrophic event occurring being practically nil. Risk cannot be nullified in a dynamic world. We think we can manage the risk, but don’t allow for extreme circumstances.

Now, we drill wells all over the world and we know that every single one has a chance of blowing if we don’t manage the risk. To manage the risk we have to understand what’s going on in the well. Once in a blue moon, we get a situation where the well’s barriers are compromised, and those on the vessel, who deal with risk all day long, must take action to remedy the situation and return risk levels to minimum. In the case of the Macondo, the well’s barriers were compromised and no-one knew! Or, they were gambling with risk!
My feeling is that they on the DF conducting the negative test understood the intention of the test, but something happened to cloud their reasoning, and they accepted the test! They did not identify the risk of continuing with the ‘watered down’ test for whatever reason!
I have never suggested that this shouldn’t be investigated, Blisters! I’ve always stuck by the fact that a negative test failure isn’t the end of the world. we still have our other monitoring systems in place to identify the well’s barrier failure, and to re-establish control. This monitoring did not exist, and there wasn’t anyone available to interpret the signs of impending disaster until it was too late. And, recall the emergency in the North Sea, where a well that was proven with a negative test went on to fail in very similar circumstances to the Macondo, during displacement. It was intercepted by a TO observant Driller who understood how to respond to pressure and volume anomalies. The well was managed and the risk to personnel and vessel nullified.

We move on by learning what went wrong, Blisters. We are not in denial. And, I agree with you that this must not happen again and we must ensure we take all required action to do this. But, it won’t stop us drilling and we may just come across this situation again. Remember, this crisis had to get through 2 Company Men, an OIM, A Toolpusher and a Driller. None of them intercepted the signs!!! And, the Logger was dismissed from monitoring, And, the Swaco displacement plan was deficient. It mounts up!!! Risk cannot be completely eradicated.

Meantime, the Gov’t aren’t interested so much in what went wrong as who will pay for it, and the circus of in-fighting is the result. Later, we’ll blame various bodies for their deficiencies, and all the contractors will be answerable then, including the BP Co Men overseeing the negative test. And, even the Gov’t for not ensuring onshore confirmation documentation of the test passing.
Risk, will decrease because of action being taken as a consequence of this disaster, but it will not be eliminated. ‘Totally avoidable risk’, Blisters, does not exist! We work with acceptable levels of risk believing we are managing to withstand an accident or incident.

But, the culture of vengeance which exists in the US means that when something goes wrong we look for a single wealthy party to swallow the Whole Cake, not a slice or two, the whole shebang! When it’s thought to be foreign, we definitely think of the whole cake, and maybe two or three cakes…and if the offending company is wealthy enough, we’ll work on 1000 cakes, a sufficient number to temporarily revive the local economy of…the GOM! We don’t seek understanding, we seek retribution! So, initially we lynch the most obvious candidate, BP, the Operator of the vessel. We’re not that concerned afterwards to discover anyone else had a hand in the disaster…unless it affects our slice of the 1000 cakes! But, it may upset everyone to discover that the media and Gov’t-led persecution of BP may compromise their slice of the cake when they wake up and smell the coffee!

alcor · July 1, 2011, 5:51pm

[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;51826]But . Public opinion …we know BP was grossly negligent. Read Transocean’s Report esp. the most incriminating section, re. the P&A interactions by the Tidey White shirt BP Engineers, who will probably use the excuse of, eating too many Tweenkies![/QUOTE]

Public opinion thought this guy was guilty! Does that make the public gullible or simple?

My recent experience of well intervention included 5 days of posturing and prevaricating! Nothing unusual in coming up with a final plan. And, no Operator can depict word for word how the Contractors conduct their duties. They are performed according to their own procedures, recognised by the Operator during contractual negotiations. Don’t swallow all that TO publicize. Remember, they are trying to save themselves Billions! They screwed up Very Big Time! They failed to recognise a flowing well. Let’s be bold and call it as it is: No-one on the drill floor recognised the signs, and TO management have to answer why this is the case.

So that all understand, it is not the sole duty of the drilling contractor to follow the wishes and program of the Operator. When situations arise that threaten a vessel and all personnel onboard, action is taken immediately to secure the well. No request is made to the Operator. Action is taken by the driller to secure the well based on his capability to recognise anomalies. His ability to recognise such anomalies is derived from a training programme authored by the Contracting Company. The Operator, sanctions the personnel employed as drillers based upon the fact that He has a proven recorded and verified capability. Perhaps, standards must improve. Remember, the Toolpusher who was with the driller was to take up a new position within TO as the person Training the Drillers in Well Control procedures and practices. And yet, he did not recognise any problem with ignoring volume control. Actually, it must be assumed that he was probably the most competent to interpret the negative test.

alcor · July 1, 2011, 6:20pm

[QUOTE=Infomania;51843]http://www.manufacturing.net/News/Feeds/2011/06/mnet-mnet-industry-focus-quality-iso-action-plan-proposes-standards-to-combat-oil-s/