The same government who oversaw/oversees this huge mortgage fiasco is now going to “regulate the minute details” for exploration, drilling, completion and production phases of the oil industry.
[QUOTE=BLISTERS;48412]I hate to agree with an asshole. Well control does involve volume control, but Wellcontrol does not begin and end with volumes control. It starts at drawing table and safe implementation of a non-shonky well design including implementation. Well planners have to be constantly mindful of the maximum required integrity and not let cost control overide this fact. And Alcor will have to widen his boring narrow view of well control and take a look at the bigger picture if he sincerely wants to find the root cause of this problem and not pretend, or confuse fantasy with reality like as if he was on that rig on that fateful night with those hard working brave men.Either that or, or go apply his skills in Japan where it is badly needed right now. There’s several levels of prostitution and yours is the lowest I have ever encountered considering your tenacity at trying to warp what really happened on that rig. Are you totally impervious to shame you wanker ? You might appear human, physically, but beats me what type of spirit is housed in that body and mind of yours. I hope those men who died, whom you try so hard to pin the entire balme of this disaster on, pay you a visit just as you are start falling asleep or better still just beofre you wake up to a new dawn. Have a nice day.[/QUOTE]
Obviously, I hit a very raw nerve!
The point I’m making is really quite simple. In the absence of any advice as to how Contractors avoid a similar outcome, I advocate a system of total and absolute control of volume and pressure throughout the drilling and completion of all wells drilled. As I’ve pointed out before, anything can fail in the well, and the only method of knowing if the barriers have been breached is to observe volumes and pressure. Both the Macondo and the well Sedco 711 drilled, resulted in sudden realisation that the wells were flowing, too late. This is simply not good enough. A directive should be sent by the authorities who’ve replaced the MMS informing all Operators and Contractors that it is hereby illegal to displace a well without monitoring volumes…in order to ensure we CONTROL the well. This has not taken place…in the media! But, you can bet your ass that the practice is not ignored anymore, like silent whispers that the media don’t get to hear about…in case it affects the trials to come!
Naturally, I wasn’t on the rig on the fateful night. We’ll never truly know what actions were taken, but we know that serious mistakes were made, and of the 11 who died at least two were involved in the assessment of pressure and volume. And, they had a sheen test which wasn’t performed according to industry standards. We can ignore these facts and come to conclusions which nail BP or we can face up to the fact that Contractors are supposed to have in place systems to control massive intake of hydrocarbons into the well. This is a fact.
What message do all the other drilling vessels worldwide receive when no-one is allowed to implicate those who perished or even consider the fact that they made mistakes? It’s like there’s a media providing misinformation because the suggestion that any of the 11 who died were victims only. The truth is that two had a hand in their own fate and two more were accountable for volume issues. Nevertheless, 11 needlessly died and in order to prevent repetition you’re going to have to ‘stomach’ points being raised by others who try to probe the reason for failure, especially when you are only satisfied with nailing BP, as if the investigation stops there!
[B]And, well control is volume and pressure control, contrary to what you have learnt in the industry. It would be handy to have a working BOP too. When you have these in place you don’t get blowouts! [/B] This is a very emotive subject, and I seek to find where fault lies. What the courts conclude is another matter, because I don’t trust them to conclude truthfully.
[QUOTE=Infomania;48415]When I initially read the report I thought some of the assumptions were horse manure. They talk about drill pipe like it is a straw or spaghetti.
Read parts to a friend who is a retired tubular goods salesman and he laughed his butt off at the implications.[/QUOTE]
Have a look at this drill pipe being ejected from a gas well blowout. The forces are incredible!
Or this…sudden blowout!
I wouldn’t argue with the physics involved with pushing the pipe up into the Annular and though the VBRs are closed it’s possible for the pipe to be pushed against the wall of the BOP. I didn’t believe it either when I first looked, but the distance from the Annular to the VBRs is sufficient for the pipe to be forced upward and horizontally.
My issue is with the BSR. It should shear the pipe in any position.
One thing that puzzles me is this: Assuming the Annular and VBRs closed successfully, as suggested by DNV, why was external flow not contained? It would mean flow would only occur up the pipe. The assumption is that the external pressure on the pipe caused it to collapse. Did this occur? I’m still trying to make sense of the DNV report.
Gulf oil spill investigation: Firm that tested blowout preventer says it didn’t cut corners
The Associated Press In this September 2010 file photo, workers watch as the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer stack is lifted onto the deck of the Helix Q4000 on the Gulf of Mexico near the coast of Louisiana. (AP Photo/Patrick Semansky)
METAIRIE, Louisiana — An investigator who examined the safety device that failed to prevent last year’s BP oil spillsaid today his firm did not skip critical tests under pressure to meet a deadline to file a report on what caused the contraption not to work.
Neil Thompson, a Det Norske Veritas vice president, told a federal investigative panel that tests that were removed would not have affected the determination of why the blowout preventer failed.
DNV’s March 23 report concluded the device failed because of faulty design and a bent piece of pipe.
“We don’t believe that conclusion would change,” Thompson said.
The report appears to shift some blame for the disaster away from the oil giant and toward those who built and maintained the 300-ton safety device. It was built by Cameron and maintained by Transocean.
At least one outside expert has said the findings cast serious doubt on the reliability of all other blowout preventers used by the drilling industry.
BP and the U.S. Chemical Safety Board argue more testing should have been done before conclusions were reached. Cameron argues backup data should have been given to the parties when the report was filed.
Under intense cross-examination from a Cameron attorney, Thompson acknowledged that a final DNV computer model of where the pipe was believed to have lodged inside the blowout preventer was not completely accurate. He also acknowledged he has no operational experience on a drilling rig and had never laid eyes on a blowout preventer before being asked to participate in testing the device used with BP’s Macondo well.
Among other things, Thompson said DNV did not consider whether any damage to the side sealing packers on the blowout preventer may have contributed to the device’s failure.
The blowout preventer report by the Norwegian firm DNV was not the final word on the Deepwater Horizon disaster that killed 11 workers and led to more than 200 million gallons of oil spewing from a BP well a mile beneath the Gulf of Mexico.
Monday’s testimony came during the seventh round of hearings before the joint U.S. Coast Guard-Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement investigative panel, which is looking into the causes of the April 20, 2010, rig explosion and oil spill off Louisiana. The panel expects to release some preliminary findings a few days before the anniversary of the disaster later this month.
[B]_____[/B]
[I]Associated Press Writer Harry R. Weber wrote this report.[/I]
[I]http://savethegulf.gulflive.com/savethegulf/db_101513/contentdetail.htm;jsessionid=A6DD4EA217EF7F05D6459825A6F0F62A?contentguid=frJr1fFG&full=true#display[/I]
It shouldn’t be too hard to resolve the hypothesis/counter hypothesis about the DNV conclusions. Just build a test rig that duplicates the geometry the DNV asserts is the case, put a hydraulic ram on the end of the pipe and see a) how much pressure it takes to make it bend and b) whether it really does spring back to straight after the pressure is relieved. Sheesh. Places like Sandia Labs do this sort of thing all the time. As far as computer models go, I’m with statistician (and model builder) George Box who once said: “All models are wrong but some are useful.” Useful to suggest what may be tested in a real experiment.
Cheers,
Earl
what happens when hydraulic pressure ruptures the casing just beneath the BOP where the well head bolts up? I have seen this first hand on a gas well back in the day the BOP worked just fine. It took three weeks to drill the relief well. It’s just a thought.
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;48431]It shouldn’t be too hard to resolve the hypothesis/counter hypothesis about the DNV conclusions. Just build a test rig that duplicates the geometry the DNV asserts is the case, put a hydraulic ram on the end of the pipe and see a) how much pressure it takes to make it bend and b) whether it really does spring back to straight after the pressure is relieved. Sheesh. Places like Sandia Labs do this sort of thing all the time. As far as computer models go, I’m with statistician (and model builder) George Box who once said: “All models are wrong but some are useful.” Useful to suggest what may be tested in a real experiment.
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
It would certainly prove the point.
From personal experience I know that on making a connection if you set down more than 2 ton the 90 ft drill pipe stand will bend. So, there is flexibility/elasticity. And it will re-shape. This could take place between the VBRs and the Annular if sufficient force is applied from below and the friction factor to slide through the VBRs is overcome. But we’re talking about 20 ft in this case.
But, they should conduct the experiment to prove the case.
http://send2pressnewswire.com/2011/04/05/s2p4372_075917.php
STUDY RESULTS FOR STOP WORK AUTHORITY.
HOUSTON, Texas, April 5 (SEND2PRESS NEWSWIRE) — A great number of accidents and injuries could have been prevented if someone had simply “spoken up.” The prevalence and magnitude of this problem often gives rise to public frustration and, at times, indignation. To better understand why employees so frequently choose not to say anything in the face of potential disaster, The RAD Group conducted a large scale study of “Safety Interventions.”
The results of the study, which focused heavily on the Oil and Gas industry, showed that the problem is perpetuated by the incorrect assumption that employees know HOW to stop unsafe operations.
The 2010 study, conducted by The RAD Group, surveyed more than 2,600 employees in 14 countries and found that employees intervene in only 39 percent of the unsafe operations that they observe in the workplace. Moreover, when they do intervene, employees fail to stop the unsafe action/condition 20.7 percent of the time. The data indicate that employees remain silent NOT because of company pressure or pressure from supervisors and peers. The primary reasons that employees gave for not intervening in someone’s unsafe action or decision were (1) “The other person would become defensive or angry,” and (2) “It would not make a difference in the other person’s behavior.” The implication is that employees do not intervene because they had tried in the past and were not able to do so effectively. The survey revealed a common assumption among respondents that would explain their inability to intervene effectively — employees tend to address the wrong underlying causes of coworkers’ unsafe actions and decisions, and in doing so, produce defensiveness and resistance to change.
“Because employees are not equipped to understand others’ behavior, they are less likely to stop unsafe actions and less effective when they do choose to intervene,” says Dr. Ron Ragain, Executive Director of The RAD Group. Based on the results of this study, Dr. Ragain suggests that companies treat the “Safety Intervention Conversation” as a core employee competency. “When employees are silent in the face of what they know to be unsafe, I often hear people attribute it to weakness or even moral deficiency; but this is usually both wrong and counterproductive. Getting employees to speak up is not simply a matter of motivation; it is also a matter of ability.”
The likelihood of workplace incidents and injuries can be significantly reduced by making employees competent at holding intervention conversations.
Results of The RAD Group’s “Safety Interventions Study” are published in Drilling Contractor magazine (Jan/Feb 2011) and will be published in the May/June edition of EHS Today magazine.
The RAD Group is an international training and consulting firm that has served the Oil and Gas industry for more than 30 years. They specialize in organizational and cultural assessment, behavioral safety and human factor solutions.
LEGAL NOTICE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL LAWSUIT
FILING DEADLINE IS APRIL 20, 2011
[PDF] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA In re …
Feb 23, 2011 … OilSpillCourtCase.com, and the telephone script for the … Call 1-877-497-5926 or visit OilSpillCourtCase.com. …
[video]http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/26/us/20101226-deepwater-horizon-rig-video-diagram.html?ref=oilspills[/video] [B]Final Moments[/B] on the [B]Deepwater Horizon[/B] - Interactive Feature [B]…[/B] Video and diagram showing the final [B]moments[/B] of the [B]Deepwater Horizon[/B] oil rig.
[LEFT][SIZE=3]UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY [/SIZE]
[SIZE=1][FONT=Garamond,Garamond][SIZE=1]BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • MERCED • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ
[/SIZE][/FONT][SIZE=1]Center for Catastrophic Risk Management Robert Professor Robert Bea, Ph.D., P.E.
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Deepwater Horizon Study Group
212 McLaughlin Hall Tel: (510) 643-8678
Berkeley, California 94720-1710 Fax: (510) 643-8919
Tel: (510) 642-0960 bea@ce.berkeley.edu
[/SIZE][I][SIZE=1]ce.berkeley.edu ccrm.berkeley.edu [/SIZE][/I][/LEFT]
November 24, 2010 [B][I][SIZE=3]
[LEFT]Conclusion: BP’s temporary abandonment procedures introduced additional risk [/LEFT]
[/B][/I][U][FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman][SIZE=3]Comment[/U]: The revised temporary abandonment procedure was proposed to the MMS on April 14, 2010 and approved by the MMS on the same day. Additional changes were made, all of which added to the risks associated with the temporary abandonment procedure. The available evidence and testimony indicates the temporary abandonment procedure had several parts that were of major concern to the Transocean drill crew and Offshore Installation Manager. The revised temporary abandonment procedure was introduced in the final days of completing the drilling of the Macondo well. The temporary abandonment procedure involved major changes from completing the well as an exploratory well to completing it as a production well as the Commission investigators clearly documented in their Master Presentation. Such modifications were made to expedite ‘early production’ from the prolific hydrocarbon formations that had been discovered at this location.
[/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE]
The parts of the temporary abandonment procedure that did result in a substantial increase in risk were: (1) the lack of engineering guidance on expected results and interpretation in the planning for the underbalanced test, (2) conducting the test before the bulk of cement had time to develop strength, and (3) the plan to under-balance test with the drill string 10,000 feet off bottom. Whether the surface plug was planned to be 300 ft below mud line or 3300 feet is almost immaterial. A robust under-balance must be used to provide meaningful results in either case to confirm barrier(s) before the heavy mud in the long drill riser can be prudently removed… This test procedure required that the well be under-balanced – the external (zonal) pressures acting on the well at the bottom would be greater than the internal pressures inside the well structure. If the ‘plugs’ at the bottom of the long-string well structure (cemented shoetrack and flapper float collar) were reliable, if the external ‘seals’ (cement sheath, casing body and connections and casing hangar seal, provided for that long-string well structure were reliable, and if no hydrocarbons had been allowed to enter the well bore during the completion work and reside in the drill column, then the temporary abandonment procedure could have worked as expected. However, the evidence indicates that the provisions for isolation at the bottom of the well did not provide a reliable barrier and that hydrocarbons entered the well bore during the long-string completion and temporary abandonment processes. When the well was progressively under-balanced by displacing the heavy drill mud in the upper 8,300 feet with much lighter sea water, the hydrocarbons in the well bore migrated undetected to the surface with ensuing catastrophic effects.
[/SIZE]
GAWLEE, New Orleans Lady,
You really are knocking it out today…
You must be on DAYS OFF!!!
http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/2214497/
DRILLING GIANT’S CHECKS FLAWEDFIRM ‘COMMITTED TO INCIDENT-FREE WORKPLACE’
Gulf oil-spill operator told to improve North Sea safety
The drilling company responsible for running the Deepwater Horizon rig, which exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, has been given a North Sea safety ultimatum.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;48505]http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSG_lettertoNationalCommission.pdf
[LEFT][SIZE=3]UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY [/SIZE]
[SIZE=1][FONT=Garamond,Garamond][SIZE=1]BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • MERCED • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ
[/SIZE][/FONT][SIZE=1]Center for Catastrophic Risk Management Robert Professor Robert Bea, Ph.D., P.E.
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Deepwater Horizon Study Group
212 McLaughlin Hall Tel: (510) 643-8678
Berkeley, California 94720-1710 Fax: (510) 643-8919
Tel: (510) 642-0960 bea@ce.berkeley.edu
[/SIZE][I][SIZE=1]ce.berkeley.edu ccrm.berkeley.edu [/SIZE][/I][/LEFT]
November 24, 2010 [B][I][SIZE=3]
[LEFT]Conclusion: BP’s temporary abandonment procedures introduced additional risk [/LEFT]
[/B][/I][U][FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman][SIZE=3]Comment[/U]: The revised temporary abandonment procedure was proposed to the MMS on April 14, 2010 and approved by the MMS on the same day. Additional changes were made, all of which added to the risks associated with the temporary abandonment procedure. The available evidence and testimony indicates the temporary abandonment procedure had several parts that were of major concern to the Transocean drill crew and Offshore Installation Manager. [B]This is more of an emotive comment than accurate reflection of facts. They did not question it, take it further with their superiors onshore or even consider shutting down the operation. Actually, the OIM insisted on having the negative test. The big question is this: Why was he not present to confirm the pass/fail of the test?[/B]
The revised temporary abandonment procedure was introduced in the final days of completing the drilling of the Macondo well. The temporary abandonment procedure involved major changes from completing the well as an exploratory well to completing it as a production well as the Commission investigators clearly documented in their Master Presentation. Such modifications were made to expedite ‘early production’ from the prolific hydrocarbon formations that had been discovered at this location.
[/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE]
The parts of the temporary abandonment procedure that did result in a substantial increase in risk were: (1) the lack of engineering guidance on expected results and interpretation in the planning for the underbalanced test [B](TO personnel on this vessel have conducted negative tests before, and for someone to exagerate the complexity of the operation merely serves to admonish the Operator, whereas, it is largely the Contractor who performs the job)[/B] ,
(2) conducting the test before the bulk of cement had time to develop strength [B](this is a concern from the point of view that if BP want to successfully isolate the hydrocarbon zone it may not be achieved)[/B]
and (3) the plan to under-balance test with the drill string 10,000 feet off bottom. Whether the surface plug was planned to be 300 ft below mud line or 3300 feet is almost immaterial. A robust under-balance must be used to provide meaningful results in either case to confirm barrier(s) before the heavy mud in the long drill riser can be prudently removed… This test procedure required that the well be under-balanced – the external (zonal) pressures acting on the well at the bottom would be greater than the internal pressures inside the well structure. If the ‘plugs’ at the bottom of the long-string well structure (cemented shoetrack and flapper float collar) were reliable, if the external ‘seals’ (cement sheath, casing body and connections and casing hangar seal, provided for that long-string well structure were reliable, and if no hydrocarbons had been allowed to enter the well bore during the completion work and reside in the drill column, then the temporary abandonment procedure could have worked as expected. However, the evidence indicates that the provisions for isolation at the bottom of the well did not provide a reliable barrier and that hydrocarbons entered the well bore during the long-string completion and temporary abandonment processes. When the well was progressively under-balanced by displacing the heavy drill mud in the upper 8,300 feet with much lighter sea water, the hydrocarbons in the well bore migrated undetected to the surface with ensuing catastrophic effects.
[B]This part of the commentary by Berkley University is poorly written and confusing![/B]
[/SIZE][/QUOTE]
Everything about the Macondo well is unremarkable, from the point of view of it being just another well.
When the cement job was completed all was fine. No flow, no losses, and no gas at surface.
BP, decided on a method of negative testing the well at 8367 ft.
To achieve this the drill crew ran pipe to 8367 ft. They then pumped a heavy Slug/Pill which was supposed to be placed above the BOP. Various other hiccups occurred, including bleeding off twice through the drill pipe and the Annular failing to seal.
The volumes bled off should have immediately alarmed the drill crew. This tells me that they had no idea what the plan was, for which, the BP Co Man and in particular the OIM are responsible. Why particularly the OIM? Because, it’s his vessel and he sanctions all activity.
So, no viable plan was in the hands of the Driller, and when the volumes bled off were in excess of theoretical values, the well started to flow. But, the debate on the DF will have been about U-tubing the heavy slug, convincing themselves that the source of re-pressurisation was from the Slug U-tube effect and the excess bleed-off volumes were explained by this fact (my opinion only).
Then, they decided to re-test using the Kill Line to confirm communication in the well. The kill line Failsafe on the BOP was opened and after a certain amount of back-flow, no further flow occurred. Line-up was confirmed and nothing flowed. And yet, the drill pipe was registering pressure. Both guages should read zero.
This is the crucial part of the investigation. We’re in the process of examining whether the barriers exist or not. They do not exist, and it is incredible for me and colleagues in the industry to understand how they got this wrong, how they convinced themselves that this test passed.
The fact that they spent hours over this test leads me to suspect they weren’t convinced of the outcome. More importantly, when they decided to continue with the displacement they also ignored the volumes from the well. These two factors allowed the well to flow and erupt/blowout. They failed to recognise that remedial action needed to be taken to seal the hydrocarbon zone. And it could have been taken as soon as the negative test failure was recognised. Failure in other areas of this well are irrelevant to the blowout occurring. The blowout occurred because barriers were breached, the very barriers they spent hours contemplating the data.
What are the lessons to the rest of the industry? What do the other rigs drilling right now need to know?
Negative test means both guages have to read zero.
All volumes have to be controlled continuously.
I realise that Universities like to examine failure modes, but everything in a well has to be seen as a series of building blocks. We driil a bit, case it off, test it, drill a bit, case it off etc…If we don’t understand how to test then we have a bigger problem in the industry! And remember, a barrier can fail at any time. The only way to recognise barrier failure is by ensuring volume and pressure control.
These are the facts that all other drilling rigs require, the facts that affect the contractor’s drilling personnel, the facts which enable us to recognise breaches in the well’s integrity.
Doubt over the validity of the DNV report!
Good post Alcor.
More doubt about BOP report. 100,000+ PSI. Not realistic at all.
http://mobile.nola.com/advnola/pm_103999/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=Mu3Xbpl2
But under questioning earlier this week, Det Norske Veritas officials acknowledged that they had no physical evidence of the pipe bending and that the elastic bowing of the pipe was simply their theory of what happened based on modeling.
Seizing on that, McWhorter faulted the examiners for not presenting several other things that he believes could have gone wrong to prevent the rams from cutting properly – things that wouldn’t have required the pipe to bend and would have resulted from poor maintenance of the blowout preventer’s components by the rig’s owner, Transocean.
The Cameron executive questioned whether there could have been enough pressure to buckle the pipe, which by Det Norske Veritas’ own calculations, would have required an incredible 113,000 pounds per square inch of force.
Highlighting a bit More BOP testimony from the Coast Guard hearing on Friday, also from the NOLA link I posted earlier. I seem to remember the headlines back when the BOP was brought to the surface about how the FBI had secured the BOP and the government was adamant about preserving the evidence in it’s exact condition as found. Now we have testimony that “Also, people opened and closed valves and rams in the BOP when it was first brought to the surface and was still on a ship. That again moved devices before the forensic examiners had begun their review”…so, apparently the FBI did not maintain a pristine custody chain as they had been assigned to do.
Highlighting More “questions” from the NOLA article below:
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Investigators did find that a solenoid valve that helps trigger emergency closure of the BOP’s rams worked only intermittently during later testing. That, McWhorter said, also could have yielded a partial closure of the blind shear rams even if the pipe had been properly centered.
It’s been difficult for investigators to get a clear picture of why the “fail-safe” mechanisms in the BOP didn’t work, or, for that matter, when various functions of the BOP activated. Specialists spent two weeks after the explosions trying to get rams and valves to work using remote-controlled submarines, which meant the blowout preventer was not in the same position as it was on April 20, by the time it was brought to the surface in September.
Also, people opened and closed valves and rams in the BOP when it was first brought to the surface and was still on a ship. That again moved devices before the forensic examiners had begun their review, which started when the BOP stack got to the NASA facility at Michoud in New Orleans. Videos of valves and rams being opened on the ship were posted on YouTube in September.
McWhorter said Det Norske Veritas didn’t take all of that tinkering into account when it made assumptions about what conditions and positions the various BOP components were in during the emergency.
Deepwater Horizon: Family settles claim for rig worker killed in explosion that led to Gulf spill
The Associated Press
Published: Apr 8, 2011 6:25 PM
NEW ORLEANS – The parents of a rig worker killed in the Deepwater Horizon explosion nearly a year ago have settled their legal claims against companies involved in the Gulf of Mexico disaster.
A New Orleans federal court filing Friday says the parents of M-I Swaco mud engineer Blair Manuel had settled with more than 2 dozen companies, affiliates and entities. Among those covered by the settlement: BP, Transocean, the U.S. government and M-I Swaco, a unit of oil field services firm Schlumberger.
Family attorney Matthew Shaffer says he can’t disclose the financial terms, citing a confidentiality agreement.
Families of at least 5 of the 11 men who died on the rig have now resolved claims with rig owner Transocean. The explosion led to the worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history.
Associated Press Harry R. Weber wrote this report.
[QUOTE=Infomania;48563]More doubt about BOP report. 100,000+ PSI. Not realistic at all.
http://mobile.nola.com/advnola/pm_103999/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=Mu3Xbpl2
But under questioning earlier this week, Det Norske Veritas officials acknowledged that they had no physical evidence of the pipe bending and that the elastic bowing of the pipe was simply their theory of what happened based on modeling.
Seizing on that, McWhorter faulted the examiners for not presenting several other things that he believes could have gone wrong to prevent the rams from cutting properly – things that wouldn’t have required the pipe to bend and would have resulted from poor maintenance of the blowout preventer’s components by the rig’s owner, Transocean.
The Cameron executive questioned whether there could have been enough pressure to buckle the pipe, which by Det Norske Veritas’ own calculations, would have required an incredible 113,000 pounds per square inch of force.[/QUOTE]
113,000 [I]pounds per square inch[/I] is totally unrealistic-- the only problem is that is not what the report says. DNV reported that a calculated value of 113,568 [I]pounds[/I] [I]of force[/I] would be needed to buckle the pipe, not 113,000 psi. 113.000 lb seems like a plausable level of force, but even DNV recognized that that further work was needed to verify.