I’m an advocate of well volume control by the rig and by the logger as back-up!
AHTF is an advocate of repeating the horizon experience…who needs to monitor volumes!!!
Houston, we have a problem!
And I realise why he may be concerned. He hopes to defend TO by detracting from the facts, and the facts speak thus: No-one on the vessel was concerned with volume control. That’s how you get a 1000 Bbl blowout!
[QUOTE=alcor;47598]
Houston, we have a problem![/QUOTE]
with [B]alcor[/B]!
he needs to confess.
In the absence of any sane commentary from this FOOL I’ll look in on the site from time to time and offer a factual opinion.
Meantime, be very wary of this idiot, who seems to be going around in circles.
One fact is this: [B]The Horizon had no volume control at all, neither the rig’s nor the logger’s! Therefore, the invitation for failure was offered by those on the DF!
That is a fact that even a Fool couldn’t argue with![/B]
I hope people reading this aren’t deceived into thinking operations offshore are conducted in the way this Fool suggests. He has one mighty chip on his shoulder and it appears he’s worked for the worst companies in the industry judging by his behaviour and attitude!! He advocates not requiring loggers to ‘watch’ the well. And, he insinuates rigs don’t use the logger’s data. I suggest, his experience of the offshore industry is a poor one. What’s his gripe? Did he lose his job? I wouldn’t be surprised! Not getting enough? Very likely!
AHTF: Insanity personified! And very angry for some reason. Maybe you need to consult your analyst…for a confession, perhaps?
AHTF: The advocate of 1000 Bbl well control philosophy! You are awarded the Donkey’s ears for ignorance! Hee Haw!! Hee Haw!
[QUOTE=alcor;47600]In the absence of any sane commentary from this FOOL I’ll look in on the site from time to time and offer a factual opinion.[/QUOTE]
bye bye.
Come back when you have something sensible and worthwhile to say.
You guys bring up a good point,despite your urges to open up a can "whoop-ass"with each other. Coordination of services by a primary "expert ".,who has no preferences,or anything to profit from all “parties”. Functional operations tend to be like turtles,unwilling to share information due to the competitive nature of your business. So many things went wrong with mecondo… Even the snotty lcm was a factor. One common variable was doing things half assed and not performing each task with completeness.(dotting the eyes,and crossing the t’s) And of course making poor judgement calls by the men on charge,who had an arrogance of “and this is how it’s going to be” despite vets on board, expressing their doubts. Both you guys take your work seriously,but we all can learn something from each other including how not to act.Therefore I must thank both of you, for that. And by all means, read John"s book as I know you both contributed with your knowledge.,passion, and experience. Maybe,from all this you will prevent a repeat of mecondo and all your brothers will make it home safely.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47604]You guys bring up a good point,despite your urges to open up a can "whoop-ass"with each other. Coordination of services by a primary "expert ".,who has no preferences,or anything to profit from all “parties”. Functional operations tend to be like turtles,unwilling to share information due to the competitive nature of your business. So many things went wrong with mecondo… [B]Even the snotty lcm was a factor[/B]. One common variable was doing things half assed and not performing each task with completeness.(dotting the eyes,and crossing the t’s) And of course making poor judgement calls by the men on charge,who had an arrogance of “and this is how it’s going to be” despite vets on board, expressing their doubts. Both you guys take your work seriously,but we all can learn something from each other including how not to act.Therefore I must thank both of you, for that. [B]And by all means, read John"s book[/B] as I know you both contributed with your knowledge.,passion, and experience. Maybe,from all this you will prevent a repeat of mecondo and all your brothers will make it home safely.[/QUOTE]
alcor can’t and won’t accept that he is wrong. There lies his basic fault. Myopic vision and living in his unreal world just compounds his problems.
I’m not sure I understand all you said above… but clarify this part…" [B]Even the snotty lcm?? (OIM?) was a factor[/B]."??
“[B]And by all means, read John"s book…[/B]” I’d like to but can’t afford it.
A clarification for the benefit of all, and even alcor…
…3rd party data (including mud loggers) is provided for and paid for by the operator…(ie bp, shell, exxon etc). If the rig owner can’t work without having this data available then he has a serious problem in what he is doing.
All rig owners provide their own independent means of monitoring volumes, pressures etc. The quality of what they provide depends on how much money they want to spend. In the old days… (and some rigs still have it) it was a basic rotating drum/chart with ink pens. No ink = no charts = no data recorded.
Modern rig monitoring systems are computerised and very prone to error. It needs an IT guy to set it up/get it working properly… so it’s beyond the capabilities of the OIM/Toolpusher/Driller etc.
I would say that they only work 30% effective because the rest is too complicated/cumbersome to keep upto date.
3rd party data is supposed to be an independent means of monitoring basic data (volumes, pressures etc) or providing additional 'real time" data for specialised tools.
A rig should be able to operate safely without it. alcor would have you believe otherwise.
[QUOTE=alcor;47600]
One fact is this: [B]The Horizon had no volume control at all, neither the rig’s nor the logger’s! Therefore, the invitation for failure was offered by those on the DF![/B][/QUOTE]
Oh but they did and it was monitored.
How else did those Halliburton strip charts get produced. Did someone invent them?
The fact that people chose to ignore that data is another and real issue.
[QUOTE=alcor;47600]I hope people reading this aren’t deceived into thinking operations offshore are conducted in the way this Fool suggests. Hee Haw!! Hee Haw![/QUOTE]
The Deepwater Horizon rig blew up. That’s how they conducted their operations on that rig!
adding to your posts after someone has replied so that thereafter you appear to look good…is childish.
Same for post 6058
[QUOTE=alcor original post;47598]I’m an advocate of well volume control by the rig and by the logger as back-up!
AHTF is an advocate of repeating the horizon experience…who needs to monitor volumes!!!
Houston, we have a problem!![/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=alcor revised post;47598]I’m an advocate of well volume control by the rig and by the logger as back-up!
AHTF is an advocate of repeating the horizon experience…who needs to monitor volumes!!!
Houston, we have a problem!!
And I realise why he may be concerned. He hopes to defend TO by detracting from the facts, and the facts speak thus: No-one on the vessel was concerned with volume control. That’s how you get a 1000 Bbl blowout![/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=alcor;47598]And I realise why he may be concerned. He hopes to defend TO by detracting from the facts, [/QUOTE]I don’t defend anyone for killing 11 people.
[QUOTE=AHTF;47622]Oh but they did and it was monitored.
How else did those Halliburton strip charts get produced. Did someone invent them?
The fact that people chose to ignore that data is another and real issue.
The Deepwater Horizon rig blew up. That’s how they conducted their operations on that rig![/QUOTE]
Hee Haw Hee Haw! You are a Donkey!
Halliburton’s logging, records all data occurring on the vessel. If a pit fills up it’s recorded.
But, even a Donkey must realise, that the pit should only fill up with the volume being pumped. Volume in should be volume back. I realise you are a donkey, but I’m going to persist with the explanation.
If I’m pumping at 1000 gpm I expect to see 1000 gallons return to a pit we call the ‘Active’ pit each and every minute. It’s important you understand this…we have to select those pits as ‘Active’ in order to monitor whether or not volumes are correct or not! If someone starts backloading from the ‘Active’ pits then control of volumes is lost! If the Driller chooses to ignore the volumes from the well versus volumes pumped then control is lost. If the A/D tells the Logger to ignore monitoring the well’s volumes, then well volume control is lost.
Anything can happen! 1000 Bbl gain tells the whole world that monitoring of volumes by a logger or Driller did not occur on the Macondo. A Donkey may have trouble understanding this!
Now, just because you’re a Donkey, capital ‘D’, I hope some of this information is entering your brain and processing of the data is occurring. If not, you may well be the Donkey who causes the next blowout!
[QUOTE=alcor;47629]Hee Haw Hee Haw! You are a Donkey!
Halliburton’s logging, records all data occurring on the vessel. If a pit fills up it’s recorded.
But, even a Donkey must realise, that the pit should only fill up with the volume being pumped. Volume in should be volume back. I realise you are a donkey, but I’m going to persist with the explanation.
If I’m pumping at 1000 gpm I expect to see 1000 gallons return to a pit we call the ‘Active’ pit each and every minute. It’s important you understand this…we have to select those pits as ‘Active’ in order to monitor whether or not volumes are correct or not! If someone starts backloading from the ‘Active’ pits then control of volumes is lost! If the Driller chooses to ignore the volumes from the well versus volumes pumped then control is lost. If the A/D tells the Logger to ignore monitoring the well’s volumes, then well volume control is lost.
Anything can happen! 1000 Bbl gain tells the whole world that monitoring of volumes by a logger or Driller did not occur on the Macondo. A Donkey may have trouble understanding this!
Now, just because you’re a Donkey, capital ‘D’, I hope some of this information is entering your brain and processing of the data is occurring. If not, you may well be the Donkey who causes the next blowout![/QUOTE]
very immature. it’s no wonder rigs blow up with people like you around them.
[QUOTE=AHTF;47636]very immature. it’s no wonder rigs blow up with people like you around them.[/QUOTE]
Hee Haw, Hee Haw!
Far from immature!
Full of factual statement on how to control volume…in order to prevent hydrocarbons entering a well!
You, on the other hand offer Donkey commentary, brief Hee Haw, Hee Haw. Nothing helpful in understanding why a rig decides volumes should be ignored.
You actually appear to support the lack of volume control, a rare and very Donkeyish concept! This is the communication style a Donkey understands and I’m doing my best to reach your Donkey instinct. So, I call out to you: Hee Haw!
[QUOTE=alcor;47639]Hee Haw, Hee Haw!
Far from immature!
Full of factual statement on how to control volume…in order to prevent hydrocarbons entering a well!
You, on the other hand offer Donkey commentary, brief Hee Haw, Hee Haw. Nothing helpful in understanding why a rig decides volumes should be ignored.
You actually appear to support the lack of volume control, a rare and very Donkeyish concept! This is the communication style a Donkey understands and I’m doing my best to reach your Donkey instinct. So, I call out to you: Hee Haw![/QUOTE]
you’re playing in the wrong playpen bubba… the monkeys are down the road on the left, in the zoo.
I’ve never stated that volume control should be ignored… your own myopic opinions came to your dumb conclusion.
As much as I hate to break into this lovely flame war 
the Chief Counsel’s Report was released on 17 Feb. This has much more meat in it than the Commission report. Here are the findings from the executive summary:
Technical Findings
The root technical cause of the blowout is now clear: The cement that BP and Halliburton pumped to the bottom of the well did not seal off hydrocarbons in the formation. While we may never know for certain the exact reason why the cement failed, several factors increased the risk of cement failure at Macondo. They include the following: First, drilling complications forced engineers to plan a “finesse” cement job that called for, among other things, a low overall volume of cement. Second, the cement slurry itself was poorly designed—some of Halliburton‘s own internal tests showed that the design was unstable, and subsequent testing by the Chief Counsel‘s team raised further concerns. Third, BP‘s temporary abandonment procedures—finalized only at the last minute—called for rig personnel to severely “underbalance” the well before installing any additional barriers to back up the cement job.
BP missed a key opportunity to recognize the cement failure during the negative pressure test that its well site leaders and Transocean personnel conducted on April 20. The test clearly showed that hydrocarbons were leaking into the well, but BP‘s well site leaders misinterpreted the result. It appears they did so in part because they accepted a facially implausible theory suggested by certain experienced members of the Transocean rig crew. Transocean and Sperry Drilling rig personnel then missed a number of further signals that hydrocarbons had entered the well and were rising to the surface during the final hour before the blowout actually occurred. By the time they recognized a blowout was occurring and activated the rig‘s blowout preventer, it was too late for that device to prevent an explosion. By that time, hydrocarbons had already flowed past the blowout preventer and were rushing upward through the riser pipe to the rig floor.
Management Findings
The Chief Counsel‘s team concluded that all of the technical failures at Macondo can be traced back to management errors by the companies involved in the incident. BP did not fully appreciate all of the risks that Macondo presented. It did not adequately supervise the work of its contractors, who in turn did not deliver to BP all of the benefits of their expertise. BP personnel on the rig were not properly trained and supported, and all three companies failed to communicate key information to people who could have made a difference.
Among other things:
BP did not adequately identify or address risks created by last-minute changes to well design and procedures. BP changed its plans repeatedly and up to the very last minute, sometimes causing confusion and frustration among BP employees and rig personnel.
When BP did send instructions and procedures to rig personnel, it often provided inadequate detail and guidance.
It is common in the offshore oil industry to focus on increasing efficiency to save rig time and associated costs. But management processes must ensure that measures taken to save time and reduce costs do not adversely affect overall risk. BP‘s management processes did not do so.
Halliburton appears to have done little to supervise the work of its key cementing personnel and does not appear to have meaningfully reviewed data that should have prompted it to redesign the Macondo cement slurry.
Transocean did not adequately train its employees in emergency procedures and kick detection, and did not inform them of crucial lessons learned from a similar and recent near-miss drilling incident.
What the men and women who worked on Macondo lacked—and what every drilling operation requires—was a culture of leadership responsibility. In remote offshore environments, individuals must take personal ownership of safety issues with a single-minded determination to ask questions and pursue advice until they are certain they get it right.
Regulatory Findings
The Commission‘s full report examines in depth the history of Minerals Management Service (MMS) regulatory programs and makes specific recommendations for regulatory reform of what is now the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE). The Chief Counsel‘s team found that the MMS regulatory structure in place in April 2010 was inadequate to address the risks of deepwater drilling projects like Macondo. Then-existing regulations had little relevance to the technical and management problems that contributed to the blowout. Regulatory personnel did not have the training or experience to adequately evaluate the overall safety or risk of the project.
The full (25MB) file can be found at:
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/chief-counsels-report
Make sure you check out the animations.
Fascinating stuff.
Cheers,
Earl
Thanks for posting that link Earl.
I had been meaning to do that but kept forgetting.
Moving on from alcor’s myopic world…
has anyone seen/heard or found any updates/info on the investigations into the retrieved BOP?
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;47683]the Chief Counsel’s Report was released on 17 Feb. This has much more meat in it than the Commission report. Here are the findings from the executive summary:
…Fascinating stuff.
Earl[/QUOTE]
Thanks Earl
Thanks Earl.
It’s a much better report than any of the previous early conclusions, and most importantly, the ‘language’ and style are professional.
[QUOTE=alcor;47717]Thanks Earl.
It’s a much better report than any of the previous early conclusions, and most importantly, the ‘language’ and style are professional.[/QUOTE]
You’re quite welcome This thing was not prepared to educate the public. The Chief Counsel, Fred H. Bartlit, Jr., has the following resume:
University of Illinois College, 1960, J.D., magna cum laude
United States Military Academy, West Point, 1954, B.S., Engineering
Four years military service: U.S. Army Ranger (Ft. Benning); Military engineering experience in analog and digital computers, construction, radar, guided missile technology including control systems, optics, navigation and rocket engines.
Tried over 50 major cases since 1970. (51 weeks on trial during last four years) Featured in ABA Journal article: “7 over 70: Lions of the Trial Bar”. Trial techniques described in recent books on the leading trial lawyers in the United States. (“The Trial Lawyers,” St. Martin’s Press, NY (1988); “America’s Top Trial Lawyers – Who They Are & Why They Win,” Prentice Hall, NJ (October 1994)). Described by The National Law Journal as “… personally one of the most successful corporate defense litigators ever, with a long history of big wins.” “The 100 Most Influential Lawyers,” The National Law Journal, 1997.
The vids were produced by TrialGraphix, a Kroll subsidiary who advertises themselves thus:
TrialGraphix experts offer a comprehensive, consultative approach when translating legal arguments into winning trial strategies and creating powerful courtroom visuals.
As Obi-Wan Kenobi said when the Millennium Falcon popped out in front of the Death Star: “That’s no moon, that’s a battle station.”
This could get real ugly.
Cheers,
Earl
[B]United States: Effect of the National Commission’s Recommendations and Final Report on the “Deepwater Horizon” Incident on the Offshore Industry. 09 march 2011 2011 [B]Article by Jonathan K. Waldron 
[/B] http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=125518[/B]
[B]As scheduled, the National Commission on the BP [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I] oil spill submitted its report and recommendations to President Obama on January 11, 2011. The National Commission, co-chaired by former Florida Governor and Senator Bob Graham and former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency William K. Reilly, was tasked with providing recommendations on how we can prevent—and mitigate the impact of—any future spills that result from offshore drilling.[/B]
[B]In essence, the final report warns that dramatic steps are required to prevent another failure and, if that occurs, the public will wonder why Congress, the Administration, and the industry allowed this to happen again. On the other hand, the oil industry quickly struck out against the report, stating that companies with good safety records should not be subjected to costly new rules and warned that a major new set of regulations would slow production and drive up prices. Objections were also raised against the recommendation that the cur rent $75 million cap on liability for accidents be raised by an unspecified amount.[/B]
[B]The final 380-page report includes an additional 60 pages of recommendations. The report lays most of the blame for the accident on the three companies responsible for drilling the well and concludes that there are “systemic” problems across the industry. Moreover, many commentators have declared the report as a scathing indictment of the industry in its failure to prepare adequate plans to respond to a major incident, exacerbated by federal oversight that has been grossly inadequate.[/B]
[B]Listed below is a summary of the key findings.
[ul]
[li]The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been prevented.[/li][li]The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such syste matic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.[/li][li]Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared.[/li][li]Fundamental regulatory and policy reforms are required to assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production.[/li][li]The oil and gas industry will also need to take its own, unilateral steps to dramatically increase safety throughout the industry.[/li][li]The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up spills lag behind the real risks associated with deepwater drilling.[/li][li]Government must close the existing gap and industry must support, rather than resist, that effort.[/li][li]Scientific understanding of environmental conditions related to deepwater drilling are inadequate.[/li][/ul]So what does all this mean? Will the cognizant agencies implement new regulations and policies, and will Congress enact laws as a result of these recommendations? Indeed, the White House noted in a statement, “In keeping with the series of recommendations included in the commission report, our Administration has already taken important steps to implement aggressive new reforms for the offshore oil and gas industry . . . and will take the panel’s additional recommendations into account as it adopts additional changes.” The White House went on to say that: “The mistakes and oversights by industry as well as government must not be repeated.”[/B]
[B]To answer these questions, it must be kept in mind that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) has been busily moving forward with changes and new requirements to provide for a safer offshore regime following this incident. In addition, high levels of the Administration will most assuredly review and consider implementation of many of these recommendations. Similarly, the Coast Guard will also be reviewing this report and its recommendations in consideration of future improvements.[/B]
[B]Looming over the horizon, however, is the release of the much anticipated results of the joint Coast Guard and BOEM investigation, which continues to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I] explosion and loss of life. As of the publication of this article, the joint investigation’s final hearing to review the results of the blowout preventer (“BOP”) stack forensic testing had been delayed until the week of April 4. The deadline for the investigation team to submit its final report to Coast Guard Headquarters and BOEM is now July 27, 2011. Once the final report is released to the public, there will be much interest from federal agencies, the public, and Congress to compare the final report and recommendations from the National Commission and the joint investigation before determining future agency actions and legislation.[/B]
[B]Another factor that could affect future actions will be the decisions that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) takes once it has seen a final draft of the joint investigation report. It is expected that DOJ will review the report and move forward with its grand jury investigation as it will be able to review the findings in the draft report to confirm that its prosecution theories will not conflict with the investigative findings. Based on what we know today, we would expect DOJ to start subpoenaing individuals sometime after they review the draft report and then move forward with criminal charges against the companies it decides to target sometime in the second or third quarter of 2011.[/B]
[B]Meanwhile, the release of the final report has rekindled interest in Congress. Various Congressional hearings have already been held and others are being scheduled. A number of Senators and Representatives have indicated they intend to introduce legislation incorporating many of the National Commission’s recommendations, including raising the ceiling on damages. Some have indicated that it is time to take action on the oil spill legislation that was passed by the House last year, H.R. 3534, the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009 (the “CLEAR Act”), or provisions of the consolidated Senate oil spill version that failed to pass, S. 3663, the Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Spill Accountability Plan.[/B]
[B]Others are taking a more neutral approach and have indicated that they would study its report and propose legislation if appropriate. The fact of the matter is that the National Commission was under a tight deadline and failed to address a number of key matters, including why workers on the rig made the decisions they made before the explosion and why the BOP failed because of uncompleted tests.[/B]
[B]The key to what action Congress may take is the fact that the joint investigation report is not completed, and it is unclear exactly what action may be taken by DOJ. As stated during a hearing of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on February 11, 2011 by the Chair of the Subcommittee, Representative Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ) and Representative Don Young (R-AK), the joint report from the Coast Guard and BOEM is likely to offer differing opinions and recommendations than the National Oil Spill Commission report, and they want to be able to take into consideration all suggestions before drafting any legislation.[/B]
[B]In conclusion, the National Commission Report is important and it should, and will, be taken into consideration by the cognizant federal agencies and Congress, but it is premature to make any final conclusions until the joint investigation’s report is released and action taken by DOJ is assessed.[/B]
[QUOTE=john;31180]Fire on the Horizon: The Untold Story of the Explosion Aboard the Deepwater Horizon - Amazon Book Link[/QUOTE]
Not that i have any business commenting, (at page 53 I think it will be a great read) but wouldn’t it be better to have this post lead, or trail the thread, as the intertubes go, this thread is historic,and the first page perhaps the most gripping thing ever published.