Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[QUOTE=john;40407]I was at the hearings this week and a good looking blonde approached and, after a bit of chit chat, asked for my business card… then she told me she was a BP PR rep keeping tabs on journalists. Cleaver indeed.[/QUOTE]

Be aware, some of them weigh 250 lb and look like the rear end of a water buffalo.

[QUOTE=jmccaski;40403]There is such a capability. I suppose several companies can do it, but I know Expro has a Down Hole Video system that works well. But you run it in on a tubing string, so you need clearance for the tubing. It’s good for 10KSI, IIRC.[/QUOTE]

Just FYI, New Orleans Lady - A couple of clips from Downhole video cameras. There’s beeter ones available on the net. Just google or youtube for downhole camera. Note that they can’t see through translucent mud in the wellbore -not sure but I’ve heard of talk using microwave to see through murky fluids. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITuHKh4Yad4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rKBbd1Se6C0

The Titan rig ,could be Rig of the future{Must Read},Again,BP chose to save money,{they are still in the 18th century mentality } http://caps.fool.com/Blogs/titan-rig-could-be-rig-of-the/407968 John, I hope the cute, little blond, reads this, and takes it back to the BP frat house.

[B]Diverter plumbed into “poor-boy degasser[/B]”…

[B]CM1[/B], remember that I brought this up a couple of weeks ago?..

…I’ve just been listening to the “interrogation” (and character assassination - [B][I]my opinion[/I][/B]) of Prof Smith from last Friday.
The Cameron lawyer mentioned/quoted “[B]…if the diverter is plumbed to a degasser…[/B].” etc

I think that we can take it as read, that was how it was physically “piped up” on the DWH.

ps… one reason not to be an “expert witness”… you are never given all the facts and relevant data!.. everything is subject to who controls and disseminates that data… and you make assumptions that can easily be countered/negated.

[QUOTE=dell;40383]Glad to Alf. To actually sound like a lawyer, particularly on cross-examination, you should ask the question in this form: “Isn’t it true that a ‘bladder effect’ is…” The way you phrased it is frighteningly open-ended; I’m not sure I would trust most of my own witnesses, let alone an adverse one with so great an opportunity to filibuster, philosophize, go where I may not want them to etc.

:wink: (Hey, you asked…)[/QUOTE]

[B]dell…[/B]

I ask you, as an Expert Witness…

‘Isn’t it true… that “a Bladder Effect” is BS?’

and… ‘in your experience, as “an Expert Witness”…’

‘Isn’t it true that “a Bladder Effect” only occurs after 3 pints of real beer?’

[QUOTE=Alf;40415][B]Diverter plumbed into “poor-boy degasser[/B]”…


ps… one reason not to be an “expert witness”… you are never given all the facts and relevant data!.. everything is subject to who controls and disseminates that data… and you make assumptions that can easily be countered/negated.[/QUOTE]

Not exactly: the expert is given one fact state (“the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone, the thigh bone is connected to the hip bone”), and gives his opinion. Then, on cross, because he’s an expert in the field, he is subject(ed) to alternative hypotheticals (IF the knee bone was connected to the elbow; you will note 'IF the diverter is plumbed to a degasser") and is asked if that changes his opinion, how, and why. It can get tiresome, argumentative, wearying, annoying–and confusing.

It’s not that they’re playing hide and seek with all the facts and relevant data, but rather the way its spoon-fed in. Don’t take the alternative fact states as necessarily true. Cameron MAY have some evidence to that effect, or their lawyer may be off in the wild blue yonder somewhere (“IF the moon was made of green cheese, would that affect tidal forces?”). So too the ‘expert’: they may be making s&*% up as well.

BTW, y’all have noticed those words “negotiated exit” next to Hayward’s name in all the stories, right?

Should we start a pool, or an over/under?

I say a total package valued @ US$60m–with, if they have any sense at all, most of it deferred until after 2015 or something.

Negotiations proceeding frantically as we speak…

[QUOTE=dell;40418]BTW, y’all have noticed those words “negotiated exit” next to Hayward’s name in all the stories, right?

Should we start a pool, or an over/under?

I say a total package valued @ US$60m–with, if they have any sense at all, most of it deferred until after 2015 or something.

Negotiations proceeding frantically as we speak…[/QUOTE]

They will be paying the “$60 M” to keep him quiet. That would be my guess. You gotta love those sociopaths. I hope that it is deferred to 2015. Tony might have to sell his yaght.

In Gulf oil disaster, cameras can’t capture the human toll

http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/07/26/mental.health.gulf/index.html?hpt=C1

Which Sepulvado was it Ronnie or Murray ?

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40401]I am not sure about this but Donald Vildrine (who seems to be the one with more offshore experience) was out there as well. Hopefully we’ll hear in August whether he was contacted by Sepulvado and why they did not call town.

Don’t want to get too much into your culture and all your other questions but let me say the following:

  1. The offshore personel should work as a team that clicks like clockwork, where everyone is equal and knows each others’ strengths and weaknesses. Problem is if someone comes to the rig who thinks he/she is superior or is new to the ‘team’, or if there is a fear, like the independent audit seems to indicate existed on the TO Deepwater Horizon rig, and elsewhere in the GOM, as this Forum seems to indicate.
  2. If there is an offshore disagreement between leaders then each one should call their boss in town who should try to resolve it amongst themselves, or with a call in which the onshore and offshore teams participate. I have been involved in many calls like that, sometimes in the middle of the night, to get concensus.
  3. Don’t think they took intented shortcuts in this well. You could argue about the casing vs. liner decision, especially since a paper exists in which the liner is recommended, but John Guide seems to have had semi-reasonable arguments why he was in favor of the casing. His arguments are valid for the long-term but only hold true if a good cement bond is obtained. What is lacking is a paper with pros and cons for running casing and why the casing is the right option. Too often Team Leaders, like John Guide, make decisions off the cuff (like the centralizers) without looking properly at all the pros and cons.

Think you look too much at the corner cutting stuff. The issue is risk analysis and how to do it properly. It is easy to find pros and cons but then to give each probabilities to get a result is difficult since every well is different and since valid probability numbers are hard to come by.

  1. A lot of things go right offshore since a lot of factors have to go wrong for a major incident to happen. For example in this case, if 15 centralizers had been run then the cement bond may have been good and then we would not be writing anything about this well since it would have been suspended successfully. Or if the lock hanger assembly had been run, or if they had discussed the negative tests with town a bit more: any of these event may have broken the incident ‘chain’…[/QUOTE]

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/bp_ceo_tony_hayward_to_step_do.html#modg_smoref_face

An official says BP CEO Tony Hayward will step down in October and take a job with TNK-BP, the company’s joint venture in Russia.

Is Tony moving to Russia?

And has anyone see Doug Suttles in the media or touring around anywhere? Or is he keeping a low profile? Or thinking about a Russian assignment?

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66N1LC20100725?rpc=64

BP Chief Executive Tony Hayward will collect a pay and pension package worth at least 11.8 million pounds ($18.03 million) when he steps down from his role at the company, the Times newspaper reported on Sunday.

The Times said Hayward will be giving up 546,000 share options and a maximum of 2 million shares in the company under a long-term incentive plan, now worth an estimated 8 million pounds.

BP chief executive Tony Hayward will get an immediate annual pension worth about £600,000 ($930,000) when he leaves in October, the BBC has learned.

[QUOTE=AHTS Master;40430]Which Sepulvado was it Ronnie or Murray ?[/QUOTE]

I should have written Robert Kaluza, not Sepulvado. Sepulvado had gone off while they ran the casing.

[QUOTE=john;40407]I was at the hearings this week and a good looking blonde approached and, after a bit of chit chat, asked for my business card… then she told me she was a BP PR rep keeping tabs on journalists. Cleaver indeed.[/QUOTE]

Sounds like one of the Russian spies.

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40435]I should have written Robert Kaluza, not Sepulvado. Sepulvado had gone off while they ran the casing.[/QUOTE]

It is still not clear to me which one out of Kaluza or Vidrine was [supposed] to be on immediately prior to the disaster. I believe shift change for the TO folks was at the sixes, but; that wouldn’t necessarily mean that either one or both company men wouldn’t be there for the negative tests.

Regarding competency, who among us can say? I’ve got my ideas, but that’s like opinions and armpits. I do think we can say that neither had much HPHT / deepwater experience. Less than a week for Kaluza, and six months for Vidrine? That’s from my recollection. I hope someone will correct me if it is in error. How many wells did the DWH drill (prior to Macondo #1) this year? two? three?

I don’t know if the following factor will make a difference, in the outcome, but, what I would like to know, was this rig’s work enviroment, “toxic”, where by you felt intimidated, to speak up,and give your point of view, because, if that was the case,then that factor in itself, could be very important. For example, <sorry my referance, is the hospital setting, but this still can apply> I have worked, on excellant units, where by we felt comfortable, to ask, suggest, and there were no “Bullies” to intimidate us, and no “clicks” which you better not cross , or disagree with. And , on the other hand, I ve worked in units, where there were “workplace bullies”,aggressive, sub ordinates, who ruled, lthe head nurses, and supervisors, and the end result was horrible pt care,I had to leave that unit, because, after I followed, the chain of command, to voice, my concerns, I was essentially going to be set up. which , I could sense, and just decided to quit,…<Best decision,> Forltunetley, now I m working with a fantastic, crew of nurses,and we love our job,s and enjoy giving great patient care. That’s where, it comes into play, in any job, if the workplace enviroment is toxic,itls usually best to leave.

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/static_kill_will_begin_on_bps.html

BP and federal officials expect to begin a static kill operation on the runaway Gulf of Mexico oil well on Monday, Aug. 2, National Incident Commander Thad Allen said in a press briefing in Washington, D.C. on Monday afternoon.

Officials will spend Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of this week preparing the well, and Wednesday through Saturday or Sunday running casing pipe in the primary relief well.

Pressure in BP’s runaway oil well stands at just above 6,900 pounds per square inch and continues to rise slowly, Allen said.

Why is the pressure continuing to rise? Is it because the reservoir is “recovering” from production? Possibly due to more oil and gas “draining” or permeating into the reservoir causing the pressure to increase?

[QUOTE=27182;40438]It is still not clear to me which one out of Kaluza or Vidrine was [supposed] to be on immediately prior to the disaster. I believe shift change for the TO folks was at the sixes, but; that wouldn’t necessarily mean that either one or both company men wouldn’t be there for the negative tests.

Regarding competency, who among us can say? I’ve got my ideas, but that’s like opinions and armpits. I do think we can say that neither had much HPHT / deepwater experience. Less than a week for Kaluza, and six months for Vidrine? That’s from my recollection. I hope someone will correct me if it is in error. How many wells did the DWH drill (prior to Macondo #1) this year? two? three?[/QUOTE]

You didn’t need much HPHT / Deepwater experience to supervise a negative inflow test on that rig: just common sense. Having zero pressure / flow on the kill line but a lot of pressure / flow on the DP just does not make sense and warranted a team meeting with town that never took place.

Negative inflow tests are pretty routine but as Professor Smith stated no standard procedure seems to exist, or at least he could not find any. Maybe they should exist since the cold fluid could potential have caused casing lengthening without the lock down assembly.

The negative pressure test is a critical test and the most senior Rep (Vildrine) should have been fully in the picture, especially since it was repeated several times; I do not think one should look at these offshore team leaders as doing 12/12 jobs. Hopefully we’ll get more info on this in August when Vildrine and/or Guide’s boss will testify.

[QUOTE=alvis;40443]http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/static_kill_will_begin_on_bps.html

Why is the pressure continuing to rise? Is it because the reservoir is “recovering” from production? Possibly due to more oil and gas “draining” or permeating into the reservoir causing the pressure to increase?[/QUOTE]

No; it is just a regular pressure buildup after closing in a reservoir. Have a look at the graph in the Kent presentation of 7/21: it is a typical graph. First the pressure builds up quickly and then the increase slows down. You can actually extrapolate it to what it will ultimately reach unless there is a sudden leak; then it will drop quickly.

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40444]You didn’t need much HPHT / Deepwater experience to supervise a negative inflow test on that rig: just common sense. [/QUOTE][I]Just have the rig crew fiddle with it until it comes out the way I want…Right?[/I]

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40444]Having zero pressure / flow on the kill line but a lot of pressure / flow on the DP just does not make sense and warranted a team meeting with town that never took place.[/QUOTE]Or with Guide’s boss, who was [B]on the rig himself.[/B]

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40444]Negative inflow tests are pretty routine but as Professor Smith stated no standard procedure seems to exist, or at least he could not find any. Maybe they should exist[/QUOTE]It seems to me like a negative (or positive) pressure test is a pretty general and simple concept. Isolate some portion of the well, create a pressure differential across it and the remaining parts, wait some amount of time, observe pressure gain/loss.

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40444]since the cold fluid could potential have caused casing lengthening without the lock down assembly.[/QUOTE] [I]“Cold fluid could potential have caused casing lengthening” [/I]The cold fluid being the seawater and spacer? Please explain. Something here I don’t understand.

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40444]The negative pressure test is a critical test and the most senior Rep (Vildrine) should have been fully in the picture, especially since it was repeated several times; I do not think one should look at these offshore team leaders as doing 12/12 jobs.[/QUOTE]Sure, but I wouldn’t be surprised if they tended to alternate with the day/night crew, to work with the same people, and have somewhat of a routine. I could be wrong. Meh, not like it even matters. What I’d like to know is who was on point immediately prior.

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40444] Hopefully we’ll get more info on this in August when Vildrine and/or Guide’s boss will testify.[/QUOTE]
I’m not holding my breath for either of those two (to testify), or Kaluza without someone starts passing out get-out-of-jail-free cards.