Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40305]Listening to it now and the professor (John Smith) mentioned:

  • they actually seem to have done 4 negative inflow tests
  • when they did it correctly (with the cement unit) and an IBOP on the DP they kept on getting flow back and pressure.
  • during the 4th inflow test they started looking at flow and pressure in the kill line. When this was negative (zero pressure and zero flow) they concluded the well was ‘safe’, even though the DP had pressure and flow…
  • the professors thinks that the spacer had somehow gotten into the kill line and gave the false indication.
  • he further concluded the well started to flow during the 2nd inflow test at circa 17.55hrs and that the well flowed until 21.30hrs when the rig finally took action (too late; well should have been closed in at 1800hrs).
  • also stated that 3 key safety components seem to have failed: the cement, casing (hanger or float or casing itself) & BOP.
  • calculations should be made whether the casing hanger moved up under the differential pressure (with no lock down sleeve in place).

Transocean is again a pain and tries to discredit the professor’s report (that studied only the last 24hrs). Said the professor’s report is mainly based on data as outlined in a draft BP report that still needs to be finalised and may still be full of errors, and that some statements in the professors report have since been withdrawn or changed … Also tried to get the professor to state that the casing hanger could have moved up after the negative tests (during the full displacement); he said he had not studied that.

Now 6pm on East Coast and am logging off…[/QUOTE]

re:- during the 4th inflow test they started looking at flow and pressure in the kill line. When this was negative (zero pressure and zero flow) they concluded the well was ‘safe’, even though the DP had pressure and flow…- the professors thinks that the spacer had somehow gotten into the kill line and gave the false indication.Perhaps that was the semi-solid “snot” that resulted from the 2-component mix of “spacer” which was done to permit dumping of otherwise hazardous-waste?

Weather channel Simulation effect Hurricanes may have on spill off La coast.

http://www.weather.com/outlook/videos/what-hurricanes-may-do-to-the-oil-spill-17794

[QUOTE=alvis;40247]I don’t understand how all of the rig registration and “lawyering up” work… Why is an attorney from the flag state that the Deepwater Horizon is registered in being called for follow up questioning of the witnesses? What asset does the flag state attorney represent and protect?[/QUOTE]

Some kind of sovereign reciprocity, maybe? I don’t claim to know; just speculating… Admiralty is a [I][U]very[/U][/I] weird area…

[QUOTE=alvis;40257]Found this abstract written in 2007. http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/app/Preview.do?paperNumber=SPE-105198-MS&societyCode=SPE

Also this: http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/servlet/onepetropreview?id=SPE-105198-PA&soc=SPE[/QUOTE]

But,but, but: Chinese refurbishment (modification?) of the BOP. Was “excellent agreement” demonstrated thereafter? Two common threads: BP gets what it wants from MMS and BP (and, it looks like, Transocean too) always, always, always goes for the approach that “reduces time and cost”. And eventually, any safety margin gets reduced below nil.

[QUOTE=tengineer;40266] *** I saw the complete report and didn’t see anything indicating TO was any better or worse than most other rig companies in the GOM.

Well, holy $%@^!!! As bad as that report is reported to be in the NYT piece, and you say (I’m [I][U]not[/U][/I] questioning your judgment on the point) that it revealed the GoM norm!! That–alone–is near to enough to convince me that a great big time-out, like, ahem, a six-month moratorium, [B][I][U]is[/U][/I][/B] needed–for all concerned, for restoration of a culture of safety as distinguished from a culture of cutting time and costs.

[QUOTE=Alf;40226]I’m sure bp are ‘miffed’ at be excluded and it being done in such a public way.

However, in other parts of the world the oil companies (or fraternity as you called it) do cooperate and get together and combine their expertise and ‘basic costs and preparations’ to provide for similar eventualities.

The thinking is…‘we all may need this someday, we all have to provide it, hopefully none of us will need to use it… so why don’t we pool our resources and have something that we can all call on should we need it’[/QUOTE]

Alf,

I’m not disagreeing with what you posted, but I think there is more to it than just shared resources. Remember, they shared resources in the GoM before, which is what gave BLISTERS his avatar and location. What this is, is more of a shout-out that “We’ve learned!! We’re rehabilitated!! Let [I]us[/I]–the good actors–drill!!” and the start of that campaign by the participants.

WOW! Inside the BP board room: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56fab34e-9694-11df-9caa-00144feab49a.html

Side note for Alcor: note how the words “ARCO” and “Amoco” are nowhere to be found in the word cloud of this story?

Also, note the cost estimate.

[QUOTE=dell;40314]WOW! Inside the BP board room: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56fab34e-9694-11df-9caa-00144feab49a.html[/QUOTE]
Registration required? I no can get the ling to work.

OK problem solved. From FT.com

David Cameron stepped off the Amtrak train at Penn Station this week to a traditional New York welcome from Mayor Mike Bloomberg: a hot dog from a street vendor. Just off camera was a less welcome sight for Britain’s prime minister, in the form of a stand selling the New York Daily News. The tabloid, less than impressed by Mr Cameron’s attempts to defend BP in the US, headed its front page simply: “British Bull”.

BP has been in political trouble in the US since oil started gushing from its well in the Gulf of Mexico in April. But on a visit intended to seal his promising relationship with President Barack Obama, Mr Cameron endured a gruelling two days defending the oil company and trying to explain why the group, in spite of having lobbied the previous government to speed up a deal on a prisoner transfer agreement with Libya, was not responsible for the release of the Lockerbie bomber, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, from a Scottish jail last year.

For BP itself, by the standards of the past three months, this has been a pretty good week. The prime minister had at last come out swinging on behalf of the country’s largest industrial company. A swiftly struck deal with Apache, the US oil independent, raised $7bn (£4.5bn, €5.4bn) to ease its immediate cash worries. And although bad weather on Friday forced delays to the effort to seal permanently the Macondo well, the cap bolted to the top of it has stopped oil escaping into the water for eight days.

The tactical successes have, however, thrown the strategic challenge all the more starkly into relief. With liabilities estimated at $40bn-plus, a demoralised workforce, and the hostility of the US administration and Congress, the group is facing a bleak and uncertain outlook.

The board has long been criticised for weak leadership, accused of standing by as management presided over mistakes in the US that culminated in the Deepwater Horizon disaster, in which 11 died. On Tuesday, when BP announces second-quarter results, the 12 men and two women who lead it have a chance to show they can turn the company round. If they fail, the group’s survival as an independent business will be in doubt.

As one leading shareholder puts it: “The board is now under a lot of pressure. In the face of the disaster, it has to do a full management and strategic review with its back to the wall and the headlights coming straight at it.”

As Mr Cameron’s British Airways flight arrived back in London on Thursday morning, the directors were gathering in the boardroom in the St James’s Square headquarters to agree the plan for next week’s announcement. In their first statement since June 16 – when BP announced it would pay $20bn into a fund to compensate victims of the spill and would suspend dividend payments for the rest of the year – they aim to set out a vision of a future in which the group can retain its position in the US, and offer growth for its investors.

Company insiders talk about a six-point plan: stopping the leak and paying the damages claims; stabilising the financial position with asset sales; uncovering the causes of the accident; taking action to put right the weaknesses that lay behind it; restoring the company’s reputation; and setting its new strategy.

Although there are concerns among BP’s leadership about the risks of operating in the US in terms of the high potential cost of any further accidents, advisers still believe the company has a future in the country. In time, as the oil is cleaned up and fishing resumes, public fury will fade. The spill, while huge, will probably turn out not to have been America’s worst environmental catastrophe, as commentators have claimed.

For Tony Hayward, the chief executive who is America’s hate figure, it is almost certainly too late. He commands in*vestors’ respect for improving financial performance, but his board colleagues and their advisers conclude his US standing has been destroyed.

Carl-Henric Svanberg, the charming, tanned Swede who took over the chairmanship in January and was plunged into one of the greatest crises in the group’s history, may have done enough to save himself for the time being. Excoriated by shareholders for his initially hands-off attitude, he is now playing a much more visible role.

Other newly arrived directors, Ian Davis, former chairman of the McKinsey consultancy, and Paul Anderson, former chief executive of miner BHP Billiton, who both joined this year, have been central in setting a course out of the maelstrom. Along with Douglas Flint, the chief financial officer of HSBC who chairs the audit committee, they are the most influential figures at the company.

Sir William Castell, the former chief executive of Amersham medical technology group who is the senior independent director, has been authorised to conduct a review of culture and attitudes in the group, and is supervising BP’s work with the many external inquiries into the disaster. He has also been talking to investors about possible management changes.

Yet in their bid to take command of the crisis, they are fighting a legacy of long-running weakness in the board. For more than a decade, the company was dominated by the forceful personalities of Lord Browne, obliged to resign abruptly as chief executive in 2007, and Peter Sutherland, who stepped down as chairman last year.

After Lord Browne left, Mr Sutherland promised to “refresh” the board. Directors such as Sir Ian Prosser, deputy chairman from 1999 until this year, and Sir Tom McKillop, former Royal Bank of Scotland chairman, stepped down, and Mr Davis and Mr Anderson were appointed.

In spite of those changes, several investors have not been happy with board performance during the crisis. It was “slow on the uptake and made several mis-steps”, one shareholder says. “While the non-executive directors might have good reputations as individuals, collectively the board didn’t work well.”

The leeway given to Mr Hayward has epitomised that failure, some BP insiders believe. His decision to lead the response personally was right at first; but, after it became clear he was making the communications problem worse, he should have been recalled earlier than mid-June, critics say. Some have also criticised him for speaking openly about the possibility of suspending the dividend when this was a decision for the full board.

The crisis has tested the board in other ways. No non-executive has the industry knowledge needed seriously to challenge management’s account of the spill and its response. In addition, despite the fact BP was committing half of its global capital spending to the US, “it was obvious that the board did not have people with access to the corridors of power in Washington”, says another shareholder.

A further problem is that the directors’ role has become extremely time-consuming, with meetings generally every week. That has raised the pressure on directors with other full-time commitments, such as Cynthia Carroll, chief executive of mining group Anglo American and chairman of Anglo Platinum.

A seat on the board is now coming free, with DeAnne Julius, a non-executive director who is chairman of the Chatham House think-tank, due to step down at the end of her standard 10-year stint next year.

One investor suggests BP could bring in a deputy chairman from outside, who would have the confidence of the City of London and be able to exercise considerable power. Others fear this could exacerbate tensions within the board. Even if that idea is rejected, it is clear that the leadership, both executives and non-executives, will have to be strengthened.

To be allowed to resume offshore drilling in the US, BP faces the task of showing that it understands how to stop such a disaster happening again. That will mean adopting gold-plated safety standards and spill-response systems. It will probably mean restructuring the Houston-based exploration and production division.

Above all, though, it means new faces at the top. Mr Hayward is likely to be replaced by Bob Dudley, the Mississippi-raised managing director for the Americas and Asia who has done a world of good for BP’s image as head of its spill response. Andy Inglis, head of the E&P division that was responsible for the Macondo well, may also step aside, as may Mr Svanberg, depending on how he performs over the next few months.

With the well sealed, the worst of the spill cleaned up, a stable financial position and new leadership in place, by the end of the year BP’s prospects may not look so bleak. However, there will still be threats from the succession of investigations into the company: its own internal inquiry, the National Commission, the Coast Guard’s Marine Board, the Department of Justice and others.

If the evidence emerges that BP wilfully ignored safety warnings, or knowingly ran critical risks to save money, the attitude of US authorities will be unforgiving. However, convincing the ideas set out by BP next week, if it loses its licence to operate in the country, all its plans will be cast into doubt again.

[QUOTE=dell;40312]Alf,

I’m not disagreeing with what you posted, but I think there is more to it than just shared resources. Remember, they shared resources in the GoM before, which is what gave BLISTERS his avatar and location. What this is, is more of a shout-out that “We’ve learned!! We’re rehabilitated!! Let [I]us[/I]–the good actors–drill!!” and the start of that campaign by the participants.[/QUOTE]

Thanks for adding to this dell. I was trying to keep it simple for others.
But you are right, and I’m pretty sure there is more to it as you point out.

[QUOTE=dell;40310]But,but, but: Chinese refurbishment (modification?) of the BOP. Was “excellent agreement” demonstrated thereafter? Two common threads: BP gets what it wants from MMS and BP (and, it looks like, Transocean too) always, always, always goes for the approach that “reduces time and cost”. And eventually, any safety margin gets reduced below nil.[/QUOTE]

dell, I have never seen this type of software used specifically with pressure testing a BOP which is why I posted the initial question for more info etc. I’m trying to find out more from others in the industry specifically related to BOP pressure testing. if I find out more I’ll post it.

I’ve seen similar (not the same) software used for other purposes related to pressure testing equipment… it is some kind of pressure trend monitoring and analysis software usually independent of the equipment being tested. Idea being to remove some of the ambiguity caused by different interpretations of if the test is good, save some time and hopefully make the overall process more professional.

How acceptable this technique is to MMS and other govt regulators around the world?.. guess you might want to ask them over lunch?
But, but, but… !

if mike William speak lies he maybe go to jail for long long time. then bye bye mr mike

if mike speak truth then bp an transocean in big trouble
transocean have poor maintenance, lots spares on order = no maintenance= it not work!!= no one cares
transocean kill alarm system = no active monitoring = write log in book= no one cares

abs/moduspec/bp audits=problems=spares on order= no maintenance= it not work!!= no one cares

bp do audit=lots and lots of problems seen=spares on order= no maintenance= it not work!!= bp no care

bp leaders know problems=spares on order= no maintenance= it not work!!= bp no followup= bp no care

final result

bp/transocean dwh operation in gom=it cost money to repair=nobody care cos parts on order=nobody want to pay=nobody check cos nobody monitor and it is not my problem= big time oil on beaches!

is that too simple for yer masa alcooor?

just getting back to Professor John Smith. With his last statement (when he was asked whether he had anything else to say) he really thrust the dagger into Transocean’s heart. He said that circulating willy nilly for a long time into the sea (the LSM spacer) and onto the boat (the mud) with no tank control and bypassing all sensors was against MMS policies and that riser booster pumps could have been used with a closed system. Not so sure about that but the displacement procedure needs a good overhaul since what they did was quite common throughout the oil patch.

Kent Wells Technical Update - 21 July 2010

http://bp.concerts.com/gom/kentwellstechupdate_072110a.htm

[QUOTE=alvis;40338]Kent Wells Technical Update - 21 July 2010

http://bp.concerts.com/gom/kentwellstechupdate_072110a.htm[/QUOTE]

All in all very interesting but the probability of actually hitting the original well with the relief well at 17,200 TVD and then milling the casing to get into the well must be virtual nil or has technology improved so much that they will be able to do it?

[QUOTE=dell;40311]Well, holy $%@^!!! As bad as that report is reported to be in the NYT piece, and you say (I’m [I][U]not[/U][/I] questioning your judgment on the point) that it revealed the GoM norm!! That–alone–is near to enough to convince me that a great big time-out, like, ahem, a six-month moratorium, [B][I][U]is[/U][/I][/B] needed–for all concerned, for restoration of a culture of safety as distinguished from a culture of cutting time and costs.[/QUOTE]

A moratorium will not help, it will only hurt the working folks. Given a choice between making additional profits or maximizing safety profits always win. If the existing laws were enforced and the oil companies were forced to have a REAL contingency plan for the inevitable spill oil could be safely extracted.
The culture change would have to begin with the law enforcement people ie., former MMS, EPA, and even the the USCG. The oil business has always been run on the short term view. Drill, produce, do it quick and cheap while the price is high because tomorrow the price may go down and we’ll be outta business. The government officials charged with overseeing them have been compromised by politics and money. This is proven at almost every audit of their performance.
These oil companies are in the business to find oil and make money, period. You want them to do it without killing people and screwing up the environment you better hit them in the wallet and put a few violators in jail. The board of the directors will understand the money part of it and the guys on the job calling the shots will understand the jail part.

[QUOTE=27182;40287]re: Williams’ testimony that alarms were inhibited.

Oh, another pet peeve of mine. Poor quality system design (too many false alarms). Driven by a too conservative approach to liability exposure.

Problem: If an alarm isn’t sensitive enough, it may allow a dangerous condition to go undetected.
Solution: Alarm is set to trigger on a low threshold. Otherwise the alarm company will be on the stand somewhere answering for why their alarm failed to give warning.

But the solution creates a problem in itself. If the alarm “cries wolf” too many times: Nobody pays attention to it. If they did, they’d never get anything done.

There is no feedback to the alarm manufacturer from the end user. If there was, the mfr’s told the end users to stuff it.[/QUOTE]

Thanks for bringing your thoughts to the table. I can speak from an end user’s perspective in that [B]USUALLY[/B] not enough input from “operations” is requested or accepted during the front end engineering design (FEED) process in the beginning of the project. By the time that us “operators” get to use the equipment, the construction of the equipment is complete and any changes will cost more money and possibly time delays that the “project team” are not willing to accept. An opportunity for “final” operator’s acceptance and possible device modification would greatly improve our situation. Periodic “follow-ups” and time & material estimated prices should be included within the contracts so that managers have a general idea what suggestions from offshore operation may cost them before they go to their bosses with their “hat-in-hand”.

I know that we would never get anything done without “proper” engineering but but I plead with management to allow us “operators” the aforestated opportunity.

[B]Just because it works on paper does not mean it “works” offshore![/B]

[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40339]All in all very interesting but the probability of actually hitting the original well with the relief well at 17,200 TVD and then milling the casing to get into the well must be virtual nil or has technology improved so much that they will be able to do it?[/QUOTE]
Tech has improved. They can do it. They may have to back out, plug w/cement and try again a few times, but they can do it
[RIGHT].[ATTACH=CONFIG]1053[/ATTACH][/RIGHT]

[QUOTE=27182;40342]Tech has improved. They can do it. They may have to back out, plug w/cement and try again a few times, but they can do it
[RIGHT].[ATTACH=CONFIG]1053[/ATTACH][/RIGHT][/QUOTE]

Regarding the attached picture, is that what you call directional drilling?

Another opinion on Matt Simmons.