Be the one Restorethegulf.com Petition http://www.restorethegulf.com/
Louisiana Gulf Economic Survival Petition to oppsose moritorium http://www.crt.state.la.us/gest/petition.aspx
Thank you Blisters,I suggest you add, a little Whiskey, to that kool aid, you re drinking. niters. Nola
He seemed, to me, to be a reasonable Supervisor, and I could not see any signs of poor judgement,only because, I m ignorant of the safe practises.
Not to be too rude or direct, but if you’re ignorant of what safe practices are, then why even hold any opinion, at all, about whether he is a reasonable supervisor/use poor judgement? Unless you just like to hear yourself talk?
One of the main things wrong with this country is that lots of people,—as in “almost everyone”----seems to have an “opinion” that they feel the need to express, vote upon, etc. That, along with the usual cabal of shysters and weasels who pretend they have an “opinion”, when what they’re really trying to do is sway “opinion” over to their side with that aw-shucks, doe-eyed, “common person” persona that they craft.
Plato identified three types of "knowledge:
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Based upon facts and reason/logic, even better when verified by experience, which he deemed “wisdom”
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Beliefs. When facts aren’t available or just won’t cut the mustard.
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Opinions. Based upon emotions; like a well-known body part, everyone’s got at least one of these.
Capt. I am not too proud to admit, when I lack the knowledge, to make an informed , decision, or form, an opinion. I value opinions of the men, here on this thread. You have your opinion, and I m sharing mine. You are not only rude, you are arrogant, and need to practise what you preach. Remember, you have 1 finger, pointing at me, and 3 more at yourself.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;40269]Let me rephrase , then. With all the variables, involved on day to day decisions, on a rig, Do you feel Guide 's judgement calls were reasonable? He seemed, to me, to be a reasonable Supervisor, and I could not see any signs of poor judgement,only because, I m ignorant of the safe practises.[/QUOTE]
NOLA,
It was as, BLISTERS said, a fairly lengthy questioning process.
I’ve so far only viewed a 1/3 of it. If there’s something you’d like some clarification to… feel free to ask, and I’ll try and help.
One thing I observed, … if someone, perhaps like you, had gone up to him and said “BOO”… I think he may have started crying??
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;40269]Let me rephrase , then. With all the variables, involved on day to day decisions, on a rig, Do you feel Guide 's judgement calls were reasonable?[/QUOTE]
No. He appears to be motivated entirely by cost.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;40269]He seemed, to me, to be a reasonable Supervisor, and I could not see any signs of poor judgement,only because, I m ignorant of the safe practises.[/QUOTE]
Some questions to ask yourself:
[ul]
[li] Did he know the possible negative consequences of his decisions?[/li][li]Was he made aware of the possible negative consequences, in relation to this project?[/li][li] Would Mr. Guide have made those same decisions if his infant/wife/mother/family/self/whatever lived on that rig.[/li][/ul]
I was surprised to see that testimony yesterday. Maybe BP is throwing him under the bus. Guide certainly appears to be part of the problem. But I don’t think that the buck stops with him.
re: Williams’ testimony that alarms were inhibited.
Oh, another pet peeve of mine. Poor quality system design (too many false alarms). Driven by a too conservative approach to liability exposure.
Problem: If an alarm isn’t sensitive enough, it may allow a dangerous condition to go undetected.
Solution: Alarm is set to trigger on a low threshold. Otherwise the alarm company will be on the stand somewhere answering for why their alarm failed to give warning.
But the solution creates a problem in itself. If the alarm “cries wolf” too many times: Nobody pays attention to it. If they did, they’d never get anything done.
There is no feedback to the alarm manufacturer from the end user. If there was, the mfr’s told the end users to stuff it.
Mike Williams talked about the computer running the drilling chairs kept crashing with a “Blue Screen of Death” (BSOD). There is some software called a tag replicator that makes sure the data values across the chairs are synchronized after the drilling computer recovers (reboots). After a BSOD crash, the tag replicator software failed to sync the latest well data and was displaying erroneous well data to the driller. During that period of erroneous data display, they started to take a kick from the well.
Bump…
I don’t understand how all of the rig registration and “lawyering up” work… Why is an attorney from the flag state that the Deepwater Horizon is registered in being called for follow up questioning of the witnesses? What asset does the flag state attorney represent and protect?
Have you guys seen this?
I wish I understood this document. Is it juicy? lol
[QUOTE=alvis;40289]Bump…
I don’t understand how all of the rig registration and “lawyering up” work… Why is an attorney from the flag state that the Deepwater Horizon is registered in being called for follow up questioning of the witnesses? What asset does the flag state attorney represent and protect?[/QUOTE]
The only thing that I could guess, and this is a guess.
The flag state probably gets paid good money for their “service”. One thing that’s at risk for them is that in the future, the US Gov. may disallow foreign-flagged vessels drilling in the GOM / off the US coast. If the flag state’s counsel’s questions tend toward demonstrating that the (advantages brought about by the) DWH’s licensing aren’t a contributing factor to the incident, that might support my speculation. As far as why the Coast Guard has allowed them to be represented, beats me. I assume that they have a set of rules / procedures for this, but maybe they are making it all up as they go. Who knows? Not me.
[QUOTE=alvis;40289]Bump…
I don’t understand how all of the rig registration and “lawyering up” work… Why is an attorney from the flag state that the Deepwater Horizon is registered in being called for follow up questioning of the witnesses? What asset does the flag state attorney represent and protect?[/QUOTE]
The flag state attorney represents the country which flagged the vessel and said it was safe. A merchant ship or rig is said to be flying a flag of convenience if it is registered in a country different to that of its owners “for purposes of reducing operating costs or avoiding government regulations and reducing labor costs”. Flags of convenience have been used for years by shipping companies to avoid the more stringent regulations of countries such as Norway, UK, USA etc. It’s a money saving thing. The flag of convenience country wants to maintain it’s “reputation” so that rig/vessel owners will continue to pay them large sums of money to let them do as they wish.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;40267]ExCompanyMan:,thanks for your opinion re., John Guide’s testimony. It would be interesting to hear others,’ opinions, as well for the sake of us , who are unfamiliar, with the nuts and bolts, of this industry.[/QUOTE]
I guess there are many John Guides out there who see similarities in themselves; I have known many Team Leaders just like him… I think that is why not many have anything to say about yesterday’s hearing. Then there are those that have no clue about the issue and just want to see their words of ‘wisdom’ on this forum.
Problem is he relied too much on people, systems, 3rd party contractors, Transocean, etc. to supply quality people, work safely, follow procedures, perform maintenance routines, etc. etc. In his role he should have probed and audited until he was blue in his face so that he was respected and a real ‘Team Leader’. I have done his job running a similar rig and can talk from experience.
During the late 90’s the term ‘Drilling The Limit’ process was introduced. It was introduced by upper management at all the Majors to make a step change in well costs since they were improving with time but not enough in the view of upper management. Major driving force in well cost is rig time (time is money as the Transocean a-hole lawyer kept on saying; now I even have less respect for Transocean by hiring such an arrogant bastard) so there was a lot of pressure to reduce wells from say 40 days to 20 days. Anyway, sometimes it is difficult to quantify all the additional risks you run when reducing time and some low probability risks are often overlooked. That’s why none of the Majors were prepared for the major incident like we had (the probability of it was just too low). This is just for background info to indicate that this is a general problem and not just BP’s.
But it should be part of the discussion when Patrick o’Brian will be interviewed as indicated here:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383330524596218.html
This o’Brian was on the rig during the incident and was Guide’s boss and was probably ultimately in charge of several rigs. Technically he should have more experience than Guide and should have been asked about the dubious negative inflow test, especially since Guide was NOT called (this is still something that blows me away). So it was not just some VIP who was on board; it was the guy ultimately accountable for this rig and for appointing John Guide as its Team Leader!
I would also ask o’Brian about the issue of the Drilling Engineers. Both the onshore and the offshore ones seem to have worked for an Engineering Manager in town. I always had issues with this concept: the offshore one’s boss should have been the offshore Team Leader, the onshore one’s boss should have been the Rig Team Leader (John Guide); just my personal opinion. Maybe the safety aspects would then have been better addressed…
Also have an issue with Halliburton’s cement proposal & simulation which was talked about a lot yesterday. Key issue there was that the differential was only 35 psi (to prevent losses - that’s why the nitrogen ceement was used) and that John Guide looked only at the ECD calcs; not at the probability of gas channeling. But this (high probability) risk was somewhere on page 10 of 16. Halliburton should stick their tail between their leggs and admit that a high probablity risk should be on page 1 and not somewhere where it could be easily overlooked. I always used my Drilling Engineers to read these proposals & similations in detail and make sure there were no issues with them…
[QUOTE=MikeDB;40290]Have you guys seen this?
I wish I understood this document. Is it juicy? lol[/QUOTE]
A similar document should have been introduced by John Guide yesterday to explain why a casing instead of a liner was run. He baffled a bit that a casing was ultimately safer (and agreed it was cheaper) but more evidence of his arguments should have been introduced.
(was this for ‘our’ well that blew out? If so why do they recommend running liner and where is the paper to reverse that decision?)
[IMG]http://cfs1.gcaptain.com/cfs/forum/images/misc/quote_icon.png[/IMG] Originally Posted by [B]MikeDB[/B] [[IMG]http://cfs1.gcaptain.com/cfs/forum/images/buttons/viewpost-right.png[/IMG]](http://gcaptain.com/forum/offshore/4805-deepwater-horizon-transocean-oil-rig-fire-206.html#post40290) Have you guys seen this?
http://energycommerce.house.gov/docu…ng.Version.pdf
I wish I understood this document. Is it juicy? lol
[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40295]A similar document should have been introduced by John Guide yesterday to explain why a casing instead of a liner was run. He baffled a bit that a casing was ultimately safer (and agreed it was cheaper) but more evidence of his arguments should have been introduced.
(was this for ‘our’ well that blew out? If so why do they recommend running liner and where is the paper to reverse that decision?)[/QUOTE]
The pdf document is dated sometime around the 14th/15th April as they were in the last stages (run 5 of 6) of wireline logging operations.
The strip chart (pages 6-8) is from the MWD tools used whilst drilling the hole so that would be dated approx 9th April.
Page 10 clearly states ‘7" Liner (with 7" x 9-7/8" XO x 11-7/8" Versaflex hanger) is now the
recommended option’.
No indications as to who produced the document within bp, but the question remains as to why the recommendation wasn’t followed?
Does anyone have links to the documents which are bring discussed right now? Please and thank you.
You are not only rude, you are arrogant, and need to practise what you preach. Remember, you have 1 finger, pointing at me, and 3 more at yourself.
Wow, the shyster spews the moral maxims heavy and thick.
Go smell yourself, sweetie…
[QUOTE=27182;40298]Does anyone have links to the documents which are bring discussed right now? Please and thank you.[/QUOTE]
Don’t think they are available yet but probably will be added to this list after today:
http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doctype/3043/59279/
Interesting what the professor had to say although I missed most of his testimony and will listen to it in full later.
[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40301]Don’t think they are available yet but probably will be added to this list after today:
http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doctype/3043/59279/
Interesting what the professor had to say although I missed most of his testimony and will listen to it in full later.[/QUOTE]
Yeah, I’d like to be able to follow along with him as he goes through the documents.
Still haven’t found what I wanted but I did find a useful way to search which I will share
“pdf site:http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100614/”
Copy and paste the above (without quotes) into Google. Change the date for different days, or play with the search terms. The documents are named properly so that you can tell what’s in them without downloading and reading them.
[QUOTE=ExCompanyMan;40301] Interesting what the professor had to say although I missed most of his testimony and will listen to it in full later.[/QUOTE]
Listening to it now and the professor (John Smith) mentioned:
- they actually seem to have done 4 negative inflow tests
- when they did it correctly (with the cement unit) and an IBOP on the DP they kept on getting flow back and pressure.
- during the 4th inflow test they started looking at flow and pressure in the kill line. When this was negative (zero pressure and zero flow) they concluded the well was ‘safe’, even though the DP had pressure and flow…
- the professors thinks that the spacer had somehow gotten into the kill line and gave the false indication.
- he further concluded the well started to flow during the 2nd inflow test at circa 17.55hrs and that the well flowed until 21.30hrs when the rig finally took action (too late; well should have been closed in at 1800hrs).
- also stated that 3 key safety components seem to have failed: the cement, casing (hanger or float or casing itself) & BOP.
- calculations should be made whether the casing hanger moved up under the differential pressure (with no lock down sleeve in place).
Transocean is again a pain and tries to discredit the professor’s report (that studied only the last 24hrs). Said the professor’s report is mainly based on data as outlined in a draft BP report that still needs to be finalised and may still be full of errors, and that some statements in the professors report have since been withdrawn or changed … Also tried to get the professor to state that the casing hanger could have moved up after the negative tests (during the full displacement); he said he had not studied that.
Now 6pm on East Coast and am logging off…