Didn’t they change the lowest ram into a test ram? Could someone comment on this?
[LEFT][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]9.5.6 The lowermost ram shall be preserved as a master valve and shall only be used to
close in the well when no other ram is available for this purpose.[/LEFT]
[/SIZE][/FONT]
[QUOTE=rlanasa;37896]Lot’s of politics here. So watch the cat fur fly:
[I]“The Jones Act, deals with cabotage (i.e., coastal shipping) and requires that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried in U.S.-flag ships, constructed in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens, and crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents. The purpose of the law is to support the U.S. merchant marine industry, but agricultural interests generally oppose it because, they contend, it raises the cost of shipping their goods, making them less competitive with foreign sources[/I].”
The above is just one small part of a very old law that controls everything about ships in the United States.
In the case of the spill we really could use some specialty vessels, boats and barges that are not US flagged. Only way we can use those tools is to suspend the rules. The safety people will hate that and many of the union types on this site will hate that.
The question is do we let the earth and all of us suffer long term or do we use every available tool right now to stop and clean up this mess?
Later we can talk about what parts of this arcane law to change to make us more competitive as a county. Today the Jones Act grossly inflates the cost of anything marine in the US and at the same time helps keep down the cost of global shipping by clearly defining and limiting liability.
IMO the free market and tort reform are the way to go! Let the cat fur fly![/QUOTE]
Free market plus tort reform approximately equals no recourse for the common man, depending on the reforms of course. We would have to be very careful here. Perhaps the trick is to have sensible regs that acutally help and not hinder. Good luck with that, but it’s better than the alternative. My last political post. I swear.
the guys working the relief wells are doing a great job, ddlll is almost there or pretty close to it
[QUOTE=company man 1;37915][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][LEFT]All drilling and well operations shall have plans to cover emergency management,
spill contingency and blowout response. These plans shall be specifically designed
for application in the local environmental and operating conditions and be approved[/LEFT]
by the appropriate Business Unit Leader or delegate.
I wonder how they grade out on this?
[/SIZE][/FONT][/QUOTE]
They received a categorical exemption.
[B][I][U]BINGO! WE HAVE A WINNER![/U][/I][/B] This was certainly not adhered to by BP’s engineering department and for that they should all hang.
[LEFT][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][B][U]At all stages during the drilling of a well it shall be assured that assumptions made[/U][/B]
[B][U]during the casing design are not violated.[/U][/B][/LEFT]
10.4
[/SIZE][/FONT]Is not running the last string of casing part of the drilling process? Then why did they make a change in the original casing design from a tie back to a tapered string? This violation placed the well in direct danger of an underground blowout.
[QUOTE=Cynthia;37928]They received a categorical exemption.[/QUOTE]
This does not excuse them from not following their own best practices. I doubt taking care of the Louisiana walrus is one of the things people are most upset about right now.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37930][B][I][U]BINGO! WE HAVE A WINNER![/U][/I][/B] This was certainly not adhered to by BP’s engineering department and for that they should all hang.
[LEFT][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][B][U]At all stages during the drilling of a well it shall be assured that assumptions made[/U][/B]
[B][U]during the casing design are not violated.[/U][/B][/LEFT]
10.4
[/SIZE][/FONT]Is not running the last string of casing part of the drilling process? Then why did they make a change in the original casing design from a tie back to a tapered string? This violation placed the well in direct danger of an underground blowout.[/QUOTE]
The original well design was an exploration well. When they applied to convert to production this was granted by the MMS. The tieback should have been run. However, on application for one string, the MMS approved it.
Could the rig and all personnel have been saved even with this single string from Reservoir to WH? This is a very important question. The answer is yes. Why? Because the negative tests were not completed properly and there were question marks over volumes back after pressuring up the string. The well could have been shut in at this point. I’d like to know who accepted the test results? Who gave the ok regardless of well pressure increasing to 1400 psi?
Here is the coup de gras. Did this design follow the guidelines set in the preface of this manual. It most certainly did not. The cementing work was also not performed up to BP requirements as per API recommended practices. There are no excuses. When you specifically deviate away from your own bible, how can anyone expect you to follow anyone else’s recommendations, best practices, rules, regulations, or laws? In short how can youever be trusted not to do it again. In short, you can’t.
[FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]
[LEFT]13.5 Casing and liner setting depths shall be selected to provide a sufficient safety
margin between formation fracture pressure and well control or casing cementing
operations. Limitations on allowable well control operations shall be detailed in
the design.
13.6 All casing and liner shall be designed to withstand reasonably foreseeable well
control burst loadings.
The starting point for well control burst loading shall be gas to surface from
casing shoe, or lower open hole fracture pressure. Casing designs using lesser well
control loadings shall be subject to review as in Well Category 3 above. Casing
designs shall include definition of the well control scenarios they accommodate
and their rationale based on subsurface information, local experience and
operational well control capabilities.[/LEFT]
13.7 All
[/SIZE][/FONT]
[QUOTE=alcor;37933]The original well design was an exploration well. When they applied to convert to production this was granted by the MMS. The tieback should have been run. However, on application for one string, the MMS approved it.
Could the rig and all personnel have been saved even with this single string from Reservoir to WH? This is a very important question. The answer is yes. Why? Because the negative tests were not completed properly and there were question marks over volumes back after pressuring up the string. The well could have been shut in at this point. I’d like to know who accepted the test results? Who gave the ok regardless of well pressure increasing to 1400 psi?[/QUOTE]
Still figuring a way to blame the government for completely disobeying your own rules & practices. This is exactly why BP should, can, & will go under. It is exactly why there will be many in the company management go to prison.
[QUOTE=~~~;37919]With this huge beast-of-a reservoir, a shitty casing job, breached casing, and hurricane season – is there anyone with O&G experience and in their right mind that thinks there’s a snowball’s chance in hell that this well will be killed within the month of August?[/QUOTE]
It isn’t looking very good is it?
[QUOTE=alcor;37933]The original well design was an exploration well. When they applied to convert to production this was granted by the MMS. The tieback should have been run. However, on application for one string, the MMS approved it.
Could the rig and all personnel have been saved even with this single string from Reservoir to WH? This is a very important question. The answer is yes. Why? Because the negative tests were not completed properly and there were question marks over volumes back after pressuring up the string. The well could have been shut in at this point. I’d like to know who accepted the test results? Who gave the ok regardless of well pressure increasing to 1400 psi?[/QUOTE]
You know I read their drilling bible & no where did it list what you are using for excuses as excuses for not following their own procedures in design & design modification which was the ROOT CAUSE OF THIS DISASTER>
[QUOTE=alcor;37933]The original well design was an exploration well. When they applied to convert to production this was granted by the MMS. The tieback should have been run. However, on application for one string, the MMS approved it.
Could the rig and all personnel have been saved even with this single string from Reservoir to WH? This is a very important question. The answer is yes. Why? Because the negative tests were not completed properly and there were question marks over volumes back after pressuring up the string. The well could have been shut in at this point. I’d like to know who accepted the test results? Who gave the ok regardless of well pressure increasing to 1400 psi?[/QUOTE]
Look… I may just be a dumb old directional hand, but I know one thing, the client calls the shots (he who pays tune analogy). You ask who gave the OK? I wasn’t there, but, dollars to doughnuts, a BP Rep on board would have approved. That’s just the way the oil patch works.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37934]Here is the coup de gras. Did this design follow the guidelines set in the preface of this manual. It most certainly did not. The cementing work was also not performed up to BP requirements as per API recommended practices. There are no excuses. When you specifically deviate away from your own bible, how can anyone expect you to follow anyone else’s recommendations, best practices, rules, regulations, or laws? In short how can youever be trusted not to do it again. In short, you can’t.
[FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]
[LEFT]13.5 Casing and liner setting depths shall be selected to provide a sufficient safety
margin between formation fracture pressure and well control or casing cementing
operations. Limitations on allowable well control operations shall be detailed in
the design.
13.6 All casing and liner shall be designed to withstand reasonably foreseeable well
control burst loadings.
The starting point for well control burst loading shall be gas to surface from
casing shoe, or lower open hole fracture pressure. Casing designs using lesser well
control loadings shall be subject to review as in Well Category 3 above. Casing
designs shall include definition of the well control scenarios they accommodate
and their rationale based on subsurface information, local experience and
operational well control capabilities.[/LEFT]
13.7 All
[/SIZE][/FONT][/QUOTE]
The manual clearly shows how BP would like to operate. But for a few decisions, this well could have been shut in, even with the single completion string. Is anyone prepared to explore this possibility
[QUOTE=DDdon;37941]Look… I may just be a dumb old directional hand, but I know one thing, the client calls the shots (he who pays tune analogy). You ask who gave the OK? I wasn’t there, but, dollars to doughnuts, a BP Rep on board would have approved. That’s just the way the oil patch works.[/QUOTE]
Ddon, I see you may have just joined this thread recently. Just to let you know that is the same lame ass excuse he uses every weekend. I think you commented on the flame throwing this morning. By Sunday night you will wish he was in your grasp so you can choke him.
[QUOTE=alcor;37933]The original well design was an exploration well. When they applied to convert to production this was granted by the MMS. The tieback should have been run. However, on application for one string, the MMS approved it.
Could the rig and all personnel have been saved even with this single string from Reservoir to WH? This is a very important question. The answer is yes. Why? Because the negative tests were not completed properly and there were question marks over volumes back after pressuring up the string. The well could have been shut in at this point. I’d like to know who accepted the test results? Who gave the ok regardless of well pressure increasing to 1400 psi?[/QUOTE]
If negative and positive pressure tests are run before the cement has ‘set enough’, is it possible to negatively affect the cement intergity?
[QUOTE=DDdon;37941]Look… I may just be a dumb old directional hand, but I know one thing, the client calls the shots (he who pays tune analogy). You ask who gave the OK? I wasn’t there, but, dollars to doughnuts, a BP Rep on board would have approved. That’s just the way the oil patch works.[/QUOTE]
100% correct. One persons decisions may have been enough to cause all this mayhem. He operated outside the BP best practices. He made decisions despite being warned. And those who warned backed down putting the vessel and crew at risk. Vidrine is responsible for the most horrendous decisions. The question is: Who else knew?
And he didn’t ‘approve’, as you put it. He discounted other opinion.
Is the whole BP organisation going to crumble because of this man and a few others. If that happens, then goodbye Corporate America. The rest of the world is an easier place to operate, a place where accountability for actions is the norm.
[QUOTE=Cynthia;37944]If negative and positive pressure tests are run before the cement has ‘set enough’, is it possible to negatively affect the cement intergity?[/QUOTE]
Absolutely. Halliburton recommended waiting on cement 48 hours to obtain the proper compressibility strength. This recommendation was totally ignored by BP even thought their own bible clearly states to use API guidleines & have a sample premade. I think you are staring to get your own picture of just how agregious these acts were. You have to understand when you come into this thread late that it takes a few weeks to set in just how guilty these people are.
[QUOTE=Cynthia;37944]If negative and positive pressure tests are run before the cement has ‘set enough’, is it possible to negatively affect the cement intergity?[/QUOTE]
By performing a negative test you simulate the conditions of displacement to SW in advance of performing this function. This would not be possible to 8300 ft. But it was performed at the WH. And what was the outcome? They got 15 bbls back when bleeding off pressure instead of 5 Bbls. This means fluid in the Annulus have moved. At the same time pressure was rising on the standpipe guage. Why? It can only be gas.
This all occurred at approx 1900 hrs. Plenty of time to shut in.
What happened instead. They displaced the Riser to SW which will have allowed further influx to enter the well. They didn’t see this because of the backloading.
At some point, the pressure built up and blew out the Seal Assy and casing hanger.
I’m not saying that all of this is 100% correct. But, I assure you we must recognise when a kick is coming.
I’d like to know who told them to displace to SW without any effective volume control.
[QUOTE=alcor;37947]By performing a negative test you simulate the conditions of displacement to SW in advance of performing this function. This would not be possible to 8300 ft. But it was performed at the WH. And what was the outcome? They got 15 bbls back when bleeding off pressure instead of 5 Bbls. This means fluid in the Annulus have moved. At the same time pressure was rising on the standpipe guage. Why? It can only be gas.
This all occurred at approx 1900 hrs. Plenty of time to shut in.
What happened instead. They displaced the Riser to SW which will have allowed further influx to enter the well. They didn’t see this because of the backloading.
At some point, the pressure built up and blew out the Seal Assy and casing hanger.
I’m not saying that all of this is 100% correct. But, I assure you we must recognise when a kick is coming.
I’d like to know who told them to displace to SW without any effective volume control.[/QUOTE]
Oncer again for the fiftieth fricking time, do you have evidence to back up these claims? I have asked you to produce this evidence for three weeks now & you provide no link with data.
[QUOTE=Cynthia;37944]If negative and positive pressure tests are run before the cement has ‘set enough’, is it possible to negatively affect the cement intergity?[/QUOTE]
I 100% agree with CM1!!!
Samples of the cement are collected on the rig as the cement job is being performed. These samples are placed in an oven and the exact downhole temperature is simulated. If they harden, we are normally good to perform our pressure tests.
If we perform the tests without the cement hardening we may cause fractures in the cement downhole allowing hydrocarbons communication with the surface if we go underbalanced and the Seal Assy doesn’t seal. It is not unusual for Seal Assy to fail.