[QUOTE=rlanasa;37600]The “cloudy” stuff is really green dye in the methanol ect coming out of the bottom of cap. They need the dye to see what is happening down there.[/QUOTE]
Thanks, but it was something entirely different from the small green clouds. It was white, like the dispersant, and covered the BOP from top to bottom.
Keep watching it is dye coming out the bottom of the cap. More volume more cloud…
[QUOTE=Walton;37601]Thanks, but it was something entirely different from the small green clouds. It was white, like the dispersant, and covered the BOP from top to bottom.[/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=rlanasa;37602]Keep watching it is dye coming out the bottom of the cap. More volume more cloud…[/QUOTE]
I am watching. This was quite a while back (a little over two hours) before they started moving the cap and it wasn’t near the BOP.
This may be a dumb question to those of you that have lived and worked oilfields/rigs all your lives…but I would like to know is there any possibility the US officials would remove BP from this and turn it over to another company, with BP footing the bill of course, to stop the leak and do the clean up? It is obvious BP does not know how to stop this and is flying by the seat of the pants scrambling to do so. If they had a way to stop it, surely it would have happened by now.
It just seems that after all this time and really no progress…there has to be a better way. With hurricane season rolling into full bloom and a storm out there right now building strength and the forecasters now saying 26 storms predicted instead of 21…and this rig would need 3 to 7 days to shut down in the event of a hurricane…doesn’t matter where landfall along the coast predicted…any storm in the gulf means another disaster for so many.
Thanks to all of you for the info and ideas and knowledge you share here.
[QUOTE=Walton;37603]I am watching. This was quite a while back (a little over two hours) before they started moving the cap and it wasn’t near the BOP.[/QUOTE]
I saw it too. I can’t say how much it was though. It looked like they were dispensing the dispersant with a square or rectangular frame, I couldn’t see the whole thing, that was atomizing the dispersant really well so it came out as a fine mist (in air). And that mist would either get sucked into the oil/gas flow coming out or sometimes it would waft outside of it.
I think they got it!
Now, for the next time they need something to tie the hoses back so they don’t have to keep stopping and wrapping them around the vents…and they need to fix the rubber gasket they broke on the first attempt today. The first attempt the tophat was placed off-center. They pulled it off, took a look around and part of the rubber was flapping around as if it had been torn. It’s still not everything, but it’s better than no cap at all.
Edited to add: you can see the rubber flapping on Enterprise 2 right now. 7:38p EDT.
They dropped the cap back down.
Apologies for the offending remarks I made a couple of days ago. They were completely inappropriate. Having felt a certain amount of provocation, I stupidly responded with out of character remarks. Again, my apologies. I will focus on being objective and considerate of other opinions.
I’m quoting this from another site to highlight the dilemma facing all of us. The Uk economy will go down the tubes and so will the US economy, it is suggested:
Quite frankly, very few people do have a clue about the science of offshore drilling. It’s a complicated world, with lots of science and technology. Usually, non-specialists leave it to the specialists and hope they know what they are doing. What other choice is there?
This time, the specialists and their managers made a series of decisions that, in hindsight, appear to have reckless and negligent, and motivated by BP’s greed. That’s not bile or a desire for retribution, but a reasonable view based on a close reading from a variety of sources. What matters now is whether or not the next fix, the relief well operation, can seal the blowout.
If it succeeds, then BP will survive, probably $40 billion or $60 billion poorer when it’s all said and done. If it doesn’t succeed, well, from everything I have read, then the well will flow at 150,000 bbl/day for the next two to four years. Make no mistake about what will then happen: BP will be bankrupt; the British economy will go into a depression; the Gulf Coast will be inundated; and the U.S. economy will collapse.
I realize how “dramatic” this all sounds, but I think it’s the simple reality that we face. President Obama really has no control over the situation. The $20 billion downpayment from BP is on the order of a goodwill gesture. The Coast Guard is subordinate to the industry relief operation, and I think it’s clear that there’s nothing else that they can be, given that the Coast Guard doesn’t generally include “drilling for oil” in its mission statement.
All of us who don’t have a clue are now looking for the oil industry to do its job, and fix the mess. If they succeed in capping the well, we’ll all have the typical happy fight over the spoils. If they fail, then we have an American version of Chernobyl, and social and economic chaos on a grand scale. Whether this is was two or three people, or BP, or the man in the moon really doesn’t matter right now. All that counts is that your industry focus on one thing, because never before has this one thing counted more.
Good luck. The whole world is watching. Really.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37586][QUOTE=company man 1;37519]
Is it possible that BP is sending us loop video sometimes instead of live feed? I reported @ 2:00 AM monday morning about the top hat blowing off the stack & what was going on live between 2:00 & 4:00 AM. I was then accused of sensationalism & being a member of the tin foil brigade. When they put the cover over the well Monday morning it fit over the whole flange of the BOP all the way down to the annular. Then last night I saw what appeared to be the top hat in the same exact placement as it had been. I know there is monkey business going on at least with their reporting the numbers. <snip> All this cloke & dagger we’re smarter than you shit must stop. If the COast Guard command won’t stop it then he has to be replaced by someone who will.[/QUOTE]
I was going to say I would be beyond incredulous if that is found to be the case. But then I remembered the Gulf of Tonkin. I also remember that it is only illegal to lie if you are under oath. I bet they remember that as well.
rlanasa,
I realize that this would, in normal circumstances, be a closely guarded commercial secret, and I respect that. But these are, I think we all can agree, anything but normal circumstances. What are the low and high estimates of the volume of the reservoir that Macondo 1 tapped?
Alcor,
Re your #3523: two observations: first, I don’t see how it follows that Britain goes bust. OTOH, an open reservoir for many years would devastate at least the whole GoM, altering the entire regional economy to devastating effect.
And what about hurricanes? Those [B][I]will[/I][/B] happen–at some point. Don’t they agitate all the water in the Gulf to some considerable depth? Plus, storm surges…
[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;37579]Well then, let me quote someone who knows:
(Borrowed from http://drillingclub.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=wellcontrol&action=display&thread=4840&page=42 post 1245.)
Makes about as much sense as anything I’ve read.
[B]Re: Cause of Blowout/Fire on Horizon[/B]
« Reply #1245 Yesterday at 3:16pm »You may find this interesting as well
This is only my opinion, I can not prove any
of it, but I think it will come to light.
Everyone is saying they can not figure out what cause the Rig to Explode so quickly, the loss of 11 souls, the failure of the BOP. It is not that hard to figure out. I have been in the drilling business for almost 21 years. I could not get exact information as to casing strengths and all the data that would have been helpful to come up with perfect calculations, but there is only one circumstance and scenario that can cause this to happen in my opinion.
The information has slowly passed across the internet as to all the well data: mud weights, depths etc. I have had to piece and
separate the facts from the fiction to come to my conclusions.
I see where they are holding the Captain responsible for the largest oil
spill in History and saying anyone on that rig could have simply called a time out. I will assure you that that Captain had nothing to do with
this spill, nor could he have prevented it. Nor could have the 11 men
that died or the men that lived through a fiery hell.
In my opinion using my knowledge and experience no one could have stopped what appears to me was the makings of a disaster. They built the 20 hour bomb accidentally and it would have been impossible for anyone to detect what was going on until it exploded.
I believe they made a grave mistake in their design and then continued to make others after it started going wrong.
The secret to this I am sure is when they decided to pump Nitrogen cement into an abnormally pressured deep-water well. They should have never done this is my opinion. The last thing you would ever want; is to end up with gas behind the casing string in a Deep-water well. You do not want gas behind any casing string anywhere.
It is different on a land rig or a surface BOP where you can actually
let the nitrogen surface as it breaks out of the cement. It is not
contained and even if you install the hanger seal you can still monitor
the pressure behind the casing through a well head wing valve. But if
you do this on a Deep-water well as soon as they installed the pack off
in the casing hanger at 5000 ft. it was the same as lighting the 20 hour fuse. The gas continues to migrate and there is no place to monitor it or to bleed it off. The pressure just keeps building.
It is one thing to positively design a well and use all the
data and information from books and manufacturers design criteria
considering known or expected pressures, but wells also need “WHAT IF CALCULATIONS” I call it (negative or what if) Engineering.
Three “WHAT IF” calculations should have been made and
apparently they were not.
-
What if the Nitrogen migrates up the annulus behind the casing after the seal assembly is set?
-
What if the cement job fails altogether and the shoe is not encapsulated and the formation is not isolated either?
-
What if both of these occurred?
I believe these things happened on the HORIZON and that is what has caused this disaster.
Gas has to expand somewhere to relieve the pressure of the bubble as it migrates to surface or to shallower depths.
(MIND YOU THERE SHOULD NEVER BE ANY GAS BEHIND CASING IF ALL IS DONE CORRECTLY).
One barrel of gas from the bottom of this well will increase in size by approx. 884 times when it reaches the surface. This is 884 barrels or 37,142 gallons from the original 1 barrel of gas which entered the well bore at 18,000 feet. Gas expands based on Boyle’s Law.
P1 X V1 = P2 X V2.
I personally believe the nitrogen cement job started the events although it seems other bad practices had occurred prior to the cementing job. It really does not matter if it was from the nitrogen migrating after breaking out of the cement or the fact they should never have pumped nitrogen light cement into this well reducing the
hydrostatic and allowing an influx from the formation.
It is just the fact that gas “was migrating” behind casing after the seal assembly was set and that is what created the un seen 20
hour bomb.
The true sequence of events that no one could see. What happens now? A lot of things start happening that are impossible for anyone to detect or to see. It is not important how much training you have had, how vigilant you are, how much you like your job or how many children you have.
This includes the driller or anyone else on the rig which have been trained to notice pressure differences, flow differences, gains or
losses from the well.
Every monitor on the rig will look normal because it is impossible to monitor the pressure build up behind the casing with the seal assembly in the casing hanger.
The first thing that started happening is the casing you ran in to the well and hung off in the well head on the casing hanger is starting
to get lighter and lighter. There is no way to see this. The casing is
no longer connected to the rig at all. It has become a permenant part of the well. But it no longer weighs 400,000 or 500,000 lbs.
A compressed gas bubble exerts equal pressure in all
directions. UP, DOWN, FRONT, BACK, LEFT, RIGHT AND ANY OTHER DIRECTION YOU CAN IMAGINE. It is like the rays coming from the sun in all directions.
There are two different scenarios I could talk about, but since there was a loss zone in the well and it took 20 hours after cementing for the “well” to kick and the rig explode I am sure the gas was expanding as it was migrating. If it was not; the occurrences probably would have taken place much sooner.
As the gas behind casing was migrating, it was gradually forcing more and more of the 14 PPG mud and cement downward into the loss zone and into the actual oil // gas bearing formation. This is not changing the BHP (bottom hole pressure) of the well because there is a loss zone, but it is drastically changing the weight of the casing. The reason for this is because as more and more mud and cement is replaced with gas behind the casing there is more and more pressure exerted upwards against the bottom of the casing hanger. There
are around 205 square inches below the hanger if you base it on a 18.75” X 9.625 casing hanger. But in reality there was another (size step down)
in the
well casing design because they ran a 7” X 9.625” casing string.
The actual square inch surface area that pressure will react against is 18.75” X 7” = 237 square inches.
By the time the gas had migrated upwards the first 1000 feet or forced away 1000 feet of cement; there was 728 PSI exerted against
the bottom of the casing hanger.
If you remember the total weight of the casing was 400,000 to 500,000 pounds. With this 728 PSI now pushing up on the bottom of the 237 square inches of the casing hanger it creates an upward force of 728 X 237= 175,536 pounds. The hanging weight on the hanger now is 500,000 – (subtract) 175,536 = casing weight of 324,464 pounds. The gas migrates another 1000 feet and forces the mud and cement back into the loss zone. The casing weight has lost another 175,536 pounds. Total casing weight is now 148,928 pounds. By the
time the gas migrates 1000 feet more there is now a negative casing
weight of (-26,608) pounds and instead of the hanger supporting weight; it is now holding pressure and pushing upwards with a force of 26,608 pounds. The actual mud or cement which has been displaced and replaced with gas at this point is about 67 barrels. There had only been 51 barrels of cement pumped during the cement job.
The cement would have covered about 2,200 feet behind casing
originally or an interval from 18, 336 ft to 16,136 feet.
It must be realized that since the well is now blowing out and the oil and gas is coming from the formation at the bottom of the well there can not be any cement around the casing at the top of the oil and gas bearing formation. Therefore it must have pushed most of the 48
bbls of cement into the formation as described above. There would have been about 3 bbls of cement between the float collar and shoe inside of the casing. There was 51 barrels total cement pumped.
If the gas had migrated 1000 more feet and forced another 1000 ft of mud back into the formation; there would now be about 90 barrels of compressed gas behind casing. The top of this gas bubble would be at a depth of 14,336 feet from the surface and still 9,336 ft below the BOP. The casing weight would now be a negative (-202,144) pounds and this is also the force pushing up on the bottom of the hanger.
Even at this point the hanger could have been blown out of the well head if there was no cement at all around the shoe.
I do not know when they actually displaced the inside of the casing from mud to sea water or how much they displaced, but it would also have an affect; making a greater upward force.
They have now decided to displace the marine riser from 14 PPG mud to 8.6 PPG sea water. This is going to react and increase the lifting
forces because the downward forces are being reduced. If they had
finished displacing the 14 PPG mud with 8.6 PPG sea water it would have reduced the hydrostatic by an additional 1,404 PSI. This is when the failure occurred and the well kicked and blew out.
The upward force at this point on the casing string and casing hanger was 534,892 pounds above the actual weight of the casing that was
ran.
-
There was a column of gas in the annulus with a volume of approximately 90 + barrels. It had a bubble pressure equal to BHP (bottom hole pressure) which is 13,000 PSI.
-
The top of the bubble was about 14,000 feet ± from surface and only 9,000 feet from the BOP. The well had more or less been displaced to sea water and the hydrostatic at 14,000 feet with sea water would be 6,260 PSI.
-
One of two things occurred.
-
a) Either the shoe turned loose and the whole casing string blew out and up through the BOP and the blow out occurred behind casing from the annulus only. At this point it only needed to blow out
approximately 200 bbls before gas would be above the BOP stack. That would not take 5 seconds with that type of pressure build up. -
b) The casing actually parted and the hanger and the casing blew up through the BOP and the kick is coming from inside and outside the casing.
-
As far as the kick and the burning of the rig it really does not matter at this point which of the two occurred the result is exactly the same and the time for it to occur would have only been milliseconds difference.
-
It might make a difference now, concerning the killing of the well. If the casing shoe pulled out of the remaining cement and the casing is intact then the complete casing string blew up out of the hole so the casing hanger must be above the BOP. If this was the case then if the annular was closed it should have at least partially stopped the flow. The casing hanger and seal assembly was 18 ¾” which is the same as the I.D. of the well head and BOP. It would have blown up
inside the 21” riser to create enough by-pass for the well to blow out
around it between the O.D. of the hanger and the I.D. of the marine riser. -
If the casing parted somewhere below the hanger (which it most likely did) then the hanger itself could actually be in the BOP stack or again it could be above it with casing still inside the BOP.
-
Regardless this was failure is equivalent to a 6,740 PSI under-balanced kick with a volume of approximately 100 barrels of compressed gas stored and waiting with a bubble pressure of 6,740 PSI and then an open formation with a BHP of 13,000 PSI following behind. It would have been next to impossible for a driller or anyone
else to push the buttons fast enough to close the BOP in time. If the
casing and hanger blew into the BOP there would have been nothing in the BOP that could have closed to stop the flow. (I believe this is the case.) -
To my knowledge there is not a condition existing such as this in nature any where on this planet. While drilling formations from one to another; they do not have that rapid of a pressure change, nor do
they have the ability to have that type of stored volume the moment you drill into the formation. This is more like drilling into the side of a compressed oxygen bottle with 6,740 PSI with a electric drill. Normal compressed gasses in bottles of any kind only have 3,000 PSI. -
That Blow out is equal to a 9.25 PPG kick at 14,000 feet under the conditions described above and the gas build up behind casing. I have never heard of a kick greater then 3 PPG as a natural occurrence.
-
From what I read there was drill pipe in the hole at the time of the kick and explosion, so if the casing and casing hanger blew up through the BOP there was nothing that could actually close to seal this well. There were no casing rams in the BOP, and even if there had been the driller would not have closed them. If something could close around the casing such as the annular then there would still
be flow between the inside of the casing and the drill pipe. -
There was not supposed to be casing in the BOP. Casing had been ran and cemented 20 hours before. The driller would have closed the pipe rams, but they would not close on casing.
-
The driller under these conditions probably would have pushed the shears to shear the drill pipe. If he did not, then the automatic system operated when communication was lost to the Pods and the shear rams tried to close automatically; they would not have been able to shear casing with drill-pipe inside. That would be why they
did not have enough force to close and secure the well and that is the
events that I believe have caused this disaster.
I just do not believe that so many things could have failed at the same time. I believe the BOP worked to the best of its ability, but could not cut because the casing had blown out of the hole. Many drill strings around the world weighing 100s of thousands of pounds have been blown out of the hole. There is no reason that would prevent casing from doing the same thing if gas was trapped behind casing.
If what I have described above is what in fact happened, then they can reinvent the subsea BOPs and install 15 pipe rams and 2 blind shears and they still will not close if this should happen again. They need to make sure they understand the ROOT cause and fix that. Other wise jobs are lost, money is spent and the situation has not changed and the danger is still real.
I am confident they will probably discover that what I have described above happened if they are successful at cutting off the top of the marine riser. But they should consider this as a possibility. Looking at their latest plan it appears they are going to make a first cut on the riser using a large shear. The way I see it they are going to crimp the riser shut when they make this cut. If they close in this well it is going to try to achieve a shut in pressure. That may blow the riser off the top of it and that won’t be good. If they are going to do the first cut with a shear they need to have a good flow path to the recovery vessel and establish flow up to the vessel via choke and kill before they go fooling around with trying to make the first cut. If they were real lucky they might crimp the riser without increasing the flowing pressure inside the BOP and all oil flow would be recovered to the vessel. Just do not try to shut it in at any time after this. If that does not happen then they may have to cut riser with the diamond saw,
but if I am correct they will also have to cut through casing and then drill pipe to successfully clear the top of the well bore above the LMRP. If they only get it half done they are going to make the leak worse without having another corrective action. The should also consider the fact as soon as they cut into the riser there is going to be a lot of pressure oil and gas coming out of the cut and it will blind all the cameras on the ROV if it is up close. If that happens they will be trying to work blind at the bottom of the sea.
Also if there are additional strings inside the riser it could break the diamond band blade in the diamond saw. Since they have choke and kill lines hooked up now, why do they not try to flow the oil up to a recovery vessel through the choke and kill lines.
I am guessing at this, but I believe they said once that there was about 1600 PSI flowing pressure and I would have to assume that is above sea water hydrostatic of ±2236 PSI giving an actual well flowing pressure of 3836 PSI.
There are some real intelligent people working the numbers on that end, but it seems to me if they could flow up through the choke and kills to the recovery vessel holding some back pressure at surface to prevent rapid gas bubble expansion the oil and gas column would be much lighter then the hydrostatic of 5000 ft of sea water which is ± 2236 PSI. If they could get enough flow to reduce the pressure inside the BOP so that it was less then 2236 PSI, you would be recovering all the oil and the sea water hydrostatic would prevent oil and gas from coming out of the ruptured riser. I have not tried to run any numbers on this because I do not know exactly what they have hooked up.
[/QUOTE]
To me, this has been the most illuminating thread concerning the ‘reasons’ for the DWH disaster. The fact that we have a ‘weak formation’ above the Reservoir is highly illuminating. I wouldn’t say that the author has all the facts in place, but it is very plausible.
So, based on what went wrong here I can personally assure all on this site that when it comes to any future wells drilled we use the 2 phase completion plan, a lower and an upper completion.
It may be that we learn more concerning the ‘negative tests’ which may still implicate decision makers on the rig. We’ll ave to wait for more information to be revealed by BP and TO.
One of two scenarios occurred:
Either, the well had a sudden catastophic failure, as suggested in the article, or there was a constant leak of the Seal Assembly, due to a build up of pressure which was not interpreted on the rig. I think every authority in the land is still debating what may have gone wrong. Some of my earlier conclusions may have to be denied by myself and, yet again, apologies offered. I’m still waiting for more information.
Regarding work resuming, I believe every Oil Company operating worldwide has taken note of the possible deficiencies of the Macondo well.
All Operators need to go back to work asap. Immediate legislation can be put in place to have sufficient consultative bodies to reflect on the validity of an Operator’s plan to drill and explore in the GOM.
It’s time to go back to work.
rlanasa,
I [U]really[/U], [B][I]really[/I][/B], [B]REALLY[/B] hope that, in drilling the relief wells, y’all put your best people on the job, rather than another bunch like the Macondo 1 team. And I [U]really[/U], [B][I]really[/I][/B], [B]REALLY[/B] hope that, in drilling the relief wells, and despite the urgency, corners are not, once again, being cut.
Do you have any assurances to offer?
[QUOTE=alcor;37623] * * * It may be that we learn more concerning the ‘negative tests’ which may still implicate decision makers on the rig. We’ll ave to wait for more information to be revealed by BP and TO.
One of two scenarios occurred: … or there was a constant leak of the Seal Assembly, due to a build up of pressure which was not interpreted on the rig. I think every authority in the land is still debating what may have gone wrong.[/QUOTE]
I realize, from Kasol’s posts, that the North Sea area has made greater efforts and progress to tie the rig to HQ as a single integrated unit/team. But the U.S. telemetry isn’t so lagging that such indications, such readings wouldn’t [B][I]also[/I][/B] have been seen in Houston, right? Thus, I still react with skepticism to your (nothing if not persistent) efforts to hang culpability on the rig’s personnel, separate from the failings in Houston.
[QUOTE=dell;37620]Alcor,
Re your #3523: two observations: first, I don’t see how it follows that Britain goes bust. OTOH, an open reservoir for many years would devastate at least the whole GoM, altering the entire regional economy to devastating effect.
And what about hurricanes? Those [B][I]will[/I][/B] happen–at some point. Don’t they agitate all the water in the Gulf to some considerable depth? Plus, storm surges…[/QUOTE]
Dell,
Thanks for accepting my apology,
Regarding the author’s comment about the devastating economic effects on the UK and American economies all I can suggest is that He’s talking about in the worst case scenario where the company goes bust. This won’t be good for the US economy and it will be very bad for the UK economy.
So what’s our position?
Shall we let BP go ‘under’?
The problem is that so much of the economic framework of our society is built in to the success of the major Oil Companies. When they cough, we get severe flu, possibly even pneumonia!!
Natuurally, we all recognise the fact that BP have failed beyond anuone’s imagination with this well. Actually, it’s not important who failed, which I have often failed to understand. The fact is that we have a failure. I repeat, we have a failure. And it’s unbelievable what the cost of oil exploration will truly unfold in terms of the damage to our environment. For some reason, we have accepted certain amounts of pollution in the past and carried on drilling. The truth is that it’s possible to drill these difficult wells as long as we follow rules and seek countenance. I believe that’s in place with all the Operators in the GOM without legislation even having to be passed. But, we need the legislation too.
Meantime, let’s get back to work.
My personal opinion is that BP won’t go down the tubes as long as they kill this well within the next 5 weeks. And, the whole world’s offshore community will learn from the Macondo disaster.
Regards, the GOM weather threats, in the form of terrifying Hurricanes, well you guys have managed those successfully up to now, and I’m sure the strings will be tightened somewhat. Everything has changed, but we can still get back to work, and be monitored while performing the work. Obama, needs to let the oil industry get back to work.
[QUOTE=dell;37625]I realize, from Kasol’s posts, that the North Sea area has made greater efforts and progress to tie the rig to HQ as a single integrated unit/team. But the U.S. telemetry isn’t so lagging that such indications, such readings wouldn’t [B][I]also[/I][/B] have been seen in Houston, right? Thus, I still react with skepticism to your (nothing if not persistent) efforts to hang culpability on the rig’s personnel, separate from the failings in Houston.[/QUOTE]
Truth is I still have no idea who’s culpable, and I’m a drilling man who eats up pressure and volume indications on a daily basis when offshore. I put a post on drilling club 3 days after the DWH disaster suggesting the failure of the Negative tests. We, still don’t know whether they passed or failed. I hear rumour of 50 Bbls back to surface whilst inflow testing. That means 50 Bbls of fluid have come up the Annulus.
As a drilling man, I’m interested in every stage of the well. There are certain points you get to in a well where focus of all personell is paramount, and their are moments of ‘relaxaton’, the difference being where you might be threatened by gas.
Regarding telemetry, Houston has it all, I’d say.
[QUOTE=dell;37625]I realize, from Kasol’s posts, that the North Sea area has made greater efforts and progress to tie the rig to HQ as a single integrated unit/team. But the U.S. telemetry isn’t so lagging that such indications, such readings wouldn’t [B][I]also[/I][/B] have been seen in Houston, right? Thus, I still react with skepticism to your (nothing if not persistent) efforts to hang culpability on the rig’s personnel, separate from the failings in Houston.[/QUOTE]
Because of that very telemetry, we are able to discuss with onshore, problems we may anticipate on each stage of the well’s development, on an hourly basis if required, and I’m talking about full video conference. Consider 10 minds working together on a daily basis delivering a plan to the driller. And, the question uppermost in everyone’s mind is: Does this work? Have we included all considerations? Are we fullfilling our legal obligations?
These are very real questions that are considered on a daily basis.
Ok Alcor, now give me back my Outta jail card!!,Welcome back!!
Breaking news tonight on CNN. We have been shut down on finishing the sand berms on the pelican breeding ground of one of the Chandelier Islands. This wouldn’t have anything to do with our governor petitioning the federal courts to remove the 6 month moritorium on deepwater drilling would it? Also CNN reports that the Coast GUard didn’t want to know the flow rates because they were hopeful that the well would be capped early. With all due respect, nobody gives a rat’s ass about the economy in the UK if BP fails as a company. As a matter of fact if the people of the UK who have influence in the company cared, they would not have allowed BP to fail in following sound safety procedures that would have prevented this disaster. As far as allowing BP to continue in their charade, our fearless leader?will still get the chance to remove BP. Only it will be another month and a half down the road when nobody will possibly want to step up & take their place. The damages will become so untenable & the president’s stand against the industry as a whole will have placed him in direct conflict with every deepwater operator in the gulf. Way to go BP. Way to go Thad Allen. Way to go Obama.
There is an old saying in the oilfield. If you can’t get it done you can’t stay. That’s what we define in the oilfield as being run off. Well it’s past time to run off BP & Thad Allen. We’ll run off Obama in two years.