Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

cm1,

Re your #3068: I’m going to, at this point, stay silent on this because I have nada to contribute on the technical end. But sometime, after the dust has settled on that end, I think there is another piece, an important piece, that needs to be looked at. Compare the failings that you are outlining in #3068, the tone and attitude manifested in the BP internal emails disclosed to date with what went on in the company that bigmoose is affiliated with, and that he discussed in #3067 just above yours.

I would argue that those technical failings wouldn’t/couldn’t happen at the bigmoose company, because the safety culture there wouldn’t tolerate it: if a person even had such a thought it would be as quickly internally squelched as, say, the urge to fart in church.

Maybe, in a few days, you could recycle this piece, as updated in subsequent discussions, to have this ‘culture’ discussion.

(Incidentally, I was at a safety-related meeting our VP-Operations and 3 regional VP’s with operational responsibility this afternoon, and I brought up–made a point of bringing up–what a similar meeting must be like at BP these days. [B][U]Everybody[/U][/B] had been thinking about that. That may be the only silver lining in this Charlie Foxtrot–it’s got everybody thinking, hard.)