[QUOTE=HellSD;36938]If anyone is curious as to what 25,000 barrels of oil looks like… This is a video of a rendering of 25,000 barrels of oil for some perspective. It’s as depressing as it is impressive.
Made with one of the Unreal engines, I believe.[/QUOTE]Now multiply that by 2 or better times 60. The damage is incomprehensive.
[QUOTE=MichaelWSmith;36952]Yes, it’s quite common for statists like Obama to speak in this fashion – they think the citizens exist only by the consent of the government.[/QUOTE]
And how, exactly, would you have handled this situation, Mr. Smith, as it unfolded? Perhaps you, too, would have apologized to Tony Hayward for the shameful way in which he has been treated?
Unbelievable, I never thought the “little people” would get through… I guess the board of directors just spoke! Tony Hayward relieved of CEO “managerial” duties… http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100618/bs_ynews/ynews_bs2709_2
The main reason for the shift is plain enough for anyone who’s been following the spill: BP executives acknowledge Hayward has blown it as the company’s face during the crisis. Svanberg, while defending the BP CEO, acknowledged the Hayward’s comments have not been helpful to the company’s efforts to control fallout from the disaster.
“It is clear Tony has made remarks that have upset people,” Svanberg tells Sky News. “This has now turned into a reputation matter, financial and political and that is why you will now see more of me.”
Late Edit 6/18/2010 BP Clarifies statement on Tony Hayward: BP CEO Hayward still in control of Gulf oil spill response - CNN.com
BP spokesman Andrew Gowers tells CNN that Svanberg was just reflecting a June 4 announcement about BP Managing Director Bob Dudley taking over the long-term disaster response. He said Hayward’s current role has not changed.
They’re rearranging the deck chairs.
BREAKING: the latest BP plan is apparently called the “Wedding Ring.” It’s a fancy, ridiculously expensive ring-shaped device and the idea is that once we install it on the well, it should stop putting out almost immediately.
[QUOTE=HellSD;36951]At the risk of oversimplification, for all intents and purposes oil drilling (and especially in deep water) is akin to working on top of a giant shotgun
…snip
For whatever reason, the inexplicable bad actions usually just get ascribed to monumental stupidity or some potentially sinister motives when the people who fucked up were smart enough that they had to have known better. [B] However a lot of the time accidents are the result of someone being tired, stressed, and/or distracted.[/B] In fact, this is where the explanation of sinister motives actually does apply to BP here: they knew full well the severe risks of pushing people too hard and cutting corners. But they did it anyways out of greed. What makes this especially damning is BPs apparently long-running disregard of the safety of its employees. …snip[/QUOTE]
Let me share a little story and email I got today from my company. I have shared that I am retired from the first career in aerospace, and back a couple of days/week as a mgmt consultant to the company. Well my company had a safety stand down[B] day [/B]last month. Not a safety message, not an hour talk. A[B] safety stand down day.[/B] Not just for the company employees (around 2000) but also all contractors (another 2000 ish) and it is/was [B]mandatory[/B]. I got the memo today that if you didn’t do it in real time because of travel/vacation/sick time, you have to make it up, contractors included. No if, ands or buts.
We have been stressed a bunch lately, and our management was tracking the nuisance near miss, small lost time; and felt a big one was developing, and pulled the plug for a day to reset everyone’s attention and focus. It can be done, it was done. I attended the stand down real time and it was productive. About 4 hours of the day was spent in work unit groups discussing where we were cutting corners to make schedule, and what needed to be unwound to [B]get us back to safe, quality operations[/B]. My group was visited for an hour by our managing VP, and I have to say his presence did not change the dialog. It was straight up before, during and after his visit.
Why do I bring this up? Because this is what BP needs to do. There need to be a clear and identifiable change of post Tony BP culture. They need to start this next week, rotating through the company, highest risk units first.
Since we the people are going to be taken into a realm of what I believe will become out of control political infighting & out of control spin between now & the next elcetion cycle, I would like to review as many of the direct causes & possible causes which led to the occurance of 4/20/10. I would like to do this in as much of an objective view point as lies within me based on the revelation of true facts & the disclosure of possibilties & nondisclosure of information. I am a conservative by nature & am all for the ability of business to be able to conduct business in a responsible manner without unreasonable control of government in levying unreasonable licenses & fees that hinder the ability of business to turn a profit, which is the motivator for business to employ people & make a positive contribution to society.
This “accident” is not the result of responsible business in fullfilling its role in society of making good reasonable profits for its shareholders & contributing to the greater good of society. It is not a political football to be used as a weapon by anyone on either side of the aisle for personal gain or the gain of their political party. Rather it is an attack against we the American people. It is an onslaught of what should be a great blessing to the continuation of American independence being turned into one of the greatest curses ever reaped upon us as a nation. We are now at war with the unleashed forces of nature which has been our defined role to master in a responsible manner by our creator. To this point I will now list in order these causes/ possible contributing causes & the list of irresponsible actors since this occurance that have helped exasterbate & increase the damage caused by this accident & assign those causes by name of the responsible parties.
The change of casing design from a two cased system with 4 barriers between the zone of interest to prevent an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons into the GOM.
Responsible parties- BP did not donsider the likelihood that this would not give proper safety & control over Macondo#1 by reason of isolation.
BP for reasoning that it was more important to save time & money than it was to assure these barriers were in place.
BP for not understanding that their own previously run safety features such as rupture discs placed in the intermediate casing could be turned into flow paths to
allow for unconrolled flow outside of any predetermined barriers, thereby making it much more unlikely that a relief well would be able to kill the well in the event
of a worst case scenario.
MMS for rubber stamping permission to run this redesign as well as taking many other shortcuts without proper review of design changes & the possible effects of this redesign & other changes in a worst case scenario.
The lack of proper centralization between the production casing & the wall of the well bore to ensure proper offset by the casing to allow for the proper amount of cement placement to ensure proper bonding & prevent channeling of hydrocarbons from the zone of interest up the casing annuli in an uncontroled manner.
BP for totally disregarding the implied strong recommendations of its cementing vendor that the well would be subject to sever gas flow problems.
BP for deciding that it was more financially feasible to not run available centrailzers due to the time & excess money it would cost to install recommended centralizers.
The possible contamination of cement designed to bond casing to the well bore wall & contain hydrocarbons in place as the primary source of well control
BP for disregarding its own procedures by reason of not explicitly following instructions written on its cementing procedure.
BP for not circulating a complete hole volume before pumping cement as instructed in writing by procedure based on the fact the string took extra slack off weight to
get the casing string to bottom.
The very highly likely loss of cement bond strength to the casing & well bore wall due to premature pressuring up of casing, causing casing to swell by reason of
hydrostatic pressure imposed by extra volume placed into casing by premature pressure tests.
BP ignored the recommendations of its cement vendor when the vendor had run laboratory simulations of the effects of temperature & hydrostatic conditions on the
cement placed on it by hole conditions.
BP ignored these recommendations which were to allow the cement time to gain sufficient compressibility strength of 1500 PSI over 48 hours to ensure pressure
testing would not crack the cement by virtue of swelling the casing due to said pressure testing procedures. Instead initial tests were done 10.5 hours
after cementing was completed to save 38 hours of rig time.
There was no casing cement bond log run to prove the bonding strength to the casing & well bore walls. This was in direct violation of BP’s own instructions which
approved by MMS as well as recommendations of its cement vendor in writing days before the actual cement job occured.
BP for not following its own recommendations, the recommendations of the MMS, & the recommendations of its cement vendor.
The premature displacement of kill weight mud from some 3300’ below the BOPs to the BOPs before testing the casing seal assembly for integrity.
BP representatives on the rig recieved instructions from the Houston office to prematurely displace 3300’ of kill weight mud prior to testing well head caing seal
as well as annular seal of zone of interest. This assumed that tests would pass even before they were conducted.
The possible failure of positive & negative testing on the well head casing seal & the annulus of the isolation barrier of cement.
BP’s representatives possibly proceeded to instruct its vendor TO to displace well based upon results of failed tests on such barriers.
TO for allowing BP to place its rig & personnel in danger by virtue of allowing the continuation of such activities to continue after the results of such possibilities existed.
The insufficient testing of critical barriers designed to isolate the well & maintain well control.
BP for not using standardized recommendations of its vendors, the API, & its own standard practices as set forth in its own safety manuals.
TO for allowing BP to depart from API standards in its tesing procedures thereby endangering its rig & its employees from the possible uncontrolled release of
hydrocarbons on its location.
The premature removal of most or all of the location’s kill weight mud in the event of the release of hydrocarbons.
BP for departing from API standard practices a guide lines as enforced by MMS edict.
TO for following BP instructions to remove a critical well control device while not having absolute proof of passed tests combined with a final cement barrier in the
well.
TO for allowing the removal of said barrier to take away its ability to monitor fluid returns properly & thereby maintain volume control which is a critical factor in
maintaining well control.
There was no lock down ring installed on top of the well head production casing hanger.
BP for prematurely displacing the well to an underbalance condition without having a critical component in place to assist in holding down the production casing &
thereby holding a seal in the annulus.
TO for allowing BP to instruct them to displace the well prematurely without having all possible pressure control devises in place for proper well control thereby exposing
its rig & personnel in danger due to an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on their rig.
I can not comment on BOP status due to the lack of properly disclosed information by BP & TO. There are too many possibilities for the cause of failure of this system
to make an educated response at this time. One has to trust that with coculprits on location together, they will balance each other out in finding out the root cause of
the failure of this system.
Failure to disclose proper & pertinent information to allow for proper response planning & action to take place since this occurance.
BP for lying & omitting the truth by reason of covering up well known flow rate estimates.
The US Coast Guard for being an accomplis to such activities by virtue of not making a suspect reveal all possible scenarios & assisting the main culprit in the
release of such bogus information to the American public.
The President of the United States for not understanding the urgency of this event immediately & need to more closely monitor the activities or inactivities of the
responsible party. For appointing someone who was certainly not qualified for this big of emergency situation. For not realizing the need for an immediate national
response & siezing command & control & placing it in the hands of a well qualified leader who had prior knowledge of how to assign & coordinate activities
of local communities with the resources of the various states affected & demand the responsible party to commit any & all available resources throughout the world
to address such needs immediately. No questions asked. To give authority to such a leader to hold or imprison anyone who by reason of monetary interests, to cover
up or omit damages caused as a direct result of such actions. The continual trust in the main culprit of the damages caused & the attempted cover up of such
damages as proven by the denial of the leader of this company to admit his company’s direct responsibility before the House of Representatives of the people of the United States, by virtue of decision making within his company from
the bottom up & the top down.
I made a promise a few weeks ago that I would place the results of this evidence into the record of public opinion for all to view. Then I began to see the immensity of it & had to retract that promise to the readers of this thread. I have had no choice by virtue of the uncovered evidence & the immense enormity of the negligence involved & the incalculable damage which resulted & continues to result from such actions to make known to all interested parties these results.
[QUOTE=bigmoose;36969]Unbelievable, I never thought the “little people” would get through… I guess the board of directors just spoke! Tony Hayward relieved of CEO “managerial” duties… http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100618/bs_ynews/ynews_bs2709_2
Me thinks the BP think tank has discerned that Sir Tony is costing them their families inheritance…[/QUOTE]
I don’t think that’s such a good thing for BP.
[QUOTE=company man 1;36977]I don’t think that’s such a good thing for BP.[/QUOTE]
you don’t think giving Tony the boot is a good thing?
[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;36978]you don’t think giving Tony the boot is a good thing?[/QUOTE]
I don’t think the dummy who hired him is any bette with his small people comments to get anyone on his side either. Let’s just face it we’re screwed if we have to wait on guys like this to get anything done.
Lets summarize beyond the technical details.
The US tops the bill in energy consumption per capita and it’s commitment to oil exploration in every available corner should therefor come as no surprise. What’s been overlooked or mostly ignored until now are the associated risks. Alaska was as close as it got but thats not exactly the average Joe’s backyard so who cares. Thats was until now. All of a sudden oil addiction has a price-tag and the present situation in the GOM makes it all too clear.
Who knows what will happen in the (near) future on US, Brazilian, Continental Europe, African or Far East coasts. This won’t be the last incident but more importantly it won’t be the end of the world either. So let’s have a look what can be done to minimize any possible future accidents. My personal future scenario looks like this:
The oil industry has a huge task ahead and after this incident they all know it. Standard practice will be reviewed, new and better technology developed, safety first will go up a notch or two. Then its back to business as usual. BP will evolve as a company that has changed it attitude because no one will allow them the slack that they have indulged from during the past.
Government should scrutinize its existing rules and regulations with regards to putting effective oversight in place. A new MMS sufficiently funded (so that they can afford top notch specialists) should be able to exercise enough power and expertise to enforce and if need be talk shop by immediately blocking risky or non compliant behavior.
As we have learned by know in emergency cases, sufficient clean-up equipment should be available on short notice. Every drilling operation should have immediate access to this pool of equipment and pay its fair share on mandatory standby fees. This would require new legislation, and lets all hope that it can be achieved regardless of undoubtedly fierce opposition.
Again legislation. Money is what counts in this industry so make accidental spills or any other form of accident expensive as hell. Management will start calculating before making any risky decisions, you can rest assure, thereby curbing the oil industry into a new form of mindset and operating procedures.
Attitude. A good example for this kind of procedure applies to the prevailing faith in oil industry technology. Don’t! There is no such thing as 100% safe technology. A BOP is a form of last resort that should be avoided at all cost. Designed as a failsafe device it can and evidently will fail if circumstances permit it. So again DON’T rely on technology as the answer to all problems. Instead start working safe all through the organization. This fundamental change will have to take place in the minds of everybody involved. It’s basically an attitude problem that works both ways, ground up and top down, and it will take time.
Now for BP. I guess they are between these scenarios. They started the top down process apparently when Tony Hayward took over. Personally I think that his devastation is not just a show, nor his commitment to safety. The point is you can’t turn a global company with 100.000 employees 180 around in 3 years time. And even if you were able to do so there’s a bunch of shareholders you have to convince also. 3 years? It’s just not possible.
BTW to anyone that holds an understandable grudge against Mr. Hayward or BP in general I would recommend studying the way Union Carbide handled the BOPAL accident as an example of corporate behavior. By comparison BP looks like another fine example of corporate greed albeit rather bleak.
So what can, and what should BP be doing in the next couple of months? First of all stay focused, second stay open and lastly try to minimize consequences for anyone/anything involved. And thats exactly what it’s CEO was preaching during the congressional hearing all day long.
Let me explain that a bit more in detail.
Remember he is the CEO of a HUGE corporation an as thus he can’t have detailed knowledge of every operational aspect. His job is to provide guidelines and delegate every aspect of this policy. Secondly he has to make sure that everybody performs according to these guidelines and apparently that still isn’t the case. Thats behind his first mantra stay focused.
Any axing or blame-games at this stage will be counter productive in many respects. Shareholder driven enterprises can’t afford this kind of financial risk in general and the oil industry is no exception. To anyone who even remotely thinks that axing BP would be a good idea I can only say ‘don’t even think about it’ The intricacies of corporate business are firmly in place with a multi like BP and you can rest assure that they will survive on the expense of the American tax-payer if push comes to shove. BP US will file for chapter eleven and BP global will commence business as usual. So don’t! A good way to avoid this from BP’s points of view is to stay open.
His last mantra (putting things right) is solidified with an absolutely unprecedented $ 20 Billion escrow account. So yes I think BP is on the right track.
Now what did congress expect in it’s hearing? BP pleading guilty on all accounts? Get a life. It doesn’t work that way, neither in the US nor any other place worldwide. Too many vested interests on both sides. Any tough conclusions about cause and who is to blame? No sir not in this stage.
Yes, the CEO knows what happened on board the DWH and HQ back on land. He knew that within 48 hours max. But the puzzle is still missing a major part, and thats attached to the riser 4900 ft. below sea level. As soon as BP has the chance to recover the BOP from the sea floor the investigation will commence and conclusions can be drawn. This accident is a combination of decisions and mechanical failures not unlike an airplane with engine failure, falling from the sky. To put this in perspective: since when has the NTSB been able to provide a detailed conclusion within 2 months while important evidence, the engine or in this case the BOP, is still missing?
So what was this hearing from congress all about? To be frank in my opinion it was a show to convince to American public that politics is acting tough. Asking questions about cement jobs, liners, BOP’s and any other technical detail is ridiculous. Do they honestly believe that the CEO personally supervises every operational decision and intervenes if necessary based on personal technical know how? Leave it to the experts, period! BP will reach their own conclusion in due time and the CEO has personally stated that the results will be presented no holds barred. He certainly didn’t come voluntary to plead guilty on all charges. So lets just say that his answers or lack of should suffice for now.
On the other hand of what we saw was anger and frustration that culminated during this hearing and its understandable. The associated expectation to get conclusive answers at this stage was as ignorant as it was down right naive. The only benefit to be had was free publicity for all candidates and a shameful display of mutual helplessness. BP stumbled into another PR disaster and as a consequence Tony Hayward has been relieved of his job. You could call it collateral damage I guess, but is won’t change a thing on the outcome of this event.
Now this may all sound like I think that BP is innocent so let me summarize Thursdays most important question: Has BP cut any corners and let costs prevail over safety?
Yes they have, but as long as the complete picture is missing it’s too early to tell no matter how much speculation and hear-say are tied in together. It’s the way these investigations work. I am quit confident that 3 individual investigations will leave no stone unturned but they all need time. The moment to put the blame on somebody /something will come.
The only preliminary conclusion that can be drawn at this stage is that the oil industry as a whole will be undergoing a fundamental change that forces them to reconsider their business practice. Nobody in his right mind will ever undertake this kind of risky behavior again. These changes will go a long way from absolutely ground floor to CEO and shareholders alike and can be summarized in one single phrase ‘remember DWH?’ The key to these changes is the money involved and governments doing their job in establishing new regulations and oversight.
On a side note: I don’t think that Tony Hayward’s decision to establish the famous relief fund was cleared with BP’s executive board. Impossible you think? You would be surprised. He has however by doing so created a precedent that will echo for decades to come and for that, strange at I may seem, we should be grateful. Combined however with his catastrophic appearance before ‘court’ his ousting was inevitable. Now let’s see how BP will handle this crisis in the near future.
I call bullshit on most of this post/. While there are some very good points made there is a whole bunch of excuse making combined with fingerpointing & systemic blame for outlaw cover up. BP has shown through years of safety negligence they do not deserve another chance anywhere much less the United States & the congress you so blatantly dismiss is the people’s congress. It represents the people of the United States & the will of the people will prevail.
Once again, someone defending Tony Hayward’s lack of time to make changes when he was appointed 1st VP over BP america giving him all decision making ability for the company in the United States for over 11 years. This just adds to his arrogance & lack of respect for we the SMALL people of the United States.
Does anyone know what Skandi 2 ROV is up to at the moment - looks like it is trying to join two sections of pipe together (time - 01:10 CET)
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9033572&contentId=7062605
Thanks
Thanks [B]stratege[/B], a voice of reason along with Alcor.
There has been far too much BS on here recently, to the point I finally registered rather than continuing to lurk in happy anonymity.
BP was #4 on the Global 500 in 2009. I suspect that Tony Hayward made a PR mistake in being too visible in the Gulf, albeit for the right motives. As a result, he presented a target as being ‘informed about the disaster’, when in fact he was running a company with 92,000 employees and there is no way in heck that he had clue one about the DWH before things went bang aside from being told about the discovery. The company he runs is BP Plc BTW, not the American Exploration and Production group.
Anyone who thinks otherwise is a troll at best, or is simply not paying attention. Also BTW, I think yesterdays hearings, complete with the lack of due process and shrill grandstanding were a complete disgrace and embarrassment. Read the Cullen Report on Piper Alpha for how to do this properly and actually come out of it with something to help both people in the industry and the American public at large!!!
[[B]stratege[/B]](http://gcaptain.com/forum/members/stratege.html), I can't believe you mentioned Bhopal. Good for you. Compare Tony Hayward to the CEO of Union Carbide...
Do we have a clear idea that Tony is toast, or is this the planned execution of the announcement a week or so ago that the front line presence would devolve to the American operations group? I have a feeling that the latter is true, but don’t trust the media reporting. I suspect that BP has this orchestrated pretty well behind the scenes. Take the hit now, get over it and move forward…
Also consider that Carl-Henric Svanberg has Swedish as his first language. Yes, using ‘little people’ was bad news, but I guarantee I have made far worse gaffes in Farsi, Arabic and Pashtun, not to mention any one of a half-dozen European languages. I also don’t speak ‘good old boy’ as well as I used to…
Regardless, Tony is going to fall on his sword over this mess eventually, just a matter of the right timing. Personally, I think BP is now doing a reasonable job considering the enormity of the circumstances. No one has ever had to do this before on this scale, and they are improvising as they go. Hopefully its going to get a lot better fast. That is no excuse, but it does recognize reality.
By the way, CM1, before you get going about me working for BP, I lost a lot of close friends on Piper Alpha and have been through this kind of mess up close and personal and have the deepest sympathy for ALL those involved in this disaster. If you want to compare pedigrees, you may be very surprised!!
I come from the days when a Drilling Supervisor was the boss, not a ‘Well Site Team Leader’. We knew who the Drilling Supervisor was, and onshore we knew who the Drilling Superintendent was.
Perhaps being the sole operator representative on board, and dead on your feet after 72 hours fighting the well wasn’t such a bad deal after all, at least we all knew who was running the shop…
I also come from the days when the OIM (a TO position in this case) had the ultimate safety of the platform on his plate. No ifs, no buts, no maybes. In a SOLAS situation, the operator was invited to sit the hell down and shut the hell up. This disaster seems to be surrounded by ‘maybes’ as to who was in charge.
[QUOTE=Jones the Fish;36987]
Also consider that Carl-Henric Svanberg has Swedish as his first language. Yes, using ‘little people’ was bad news, but I guarantee I have made far worse gaffes in Farsi, Arabic and Pashtun, not to mention any one of a half-dozen European languages. I also don’t speak ‘good old boy’ as well as I used to…
[/QUOTE]
It’s not the words so much as it is the mind-set or perspective he has. If you don’t understand that, well…
No way.
edit: You need to have lived/worked in Scandinavia to really get where I am coming from on this. Sweden is the epitome of the welfare state. The guy is Swedish. The national psychology is NEVER to dis the little guy. Never, ever. They look out for everyone, every time. My business partner is from a Swedish family. He will cut your gonads off and feed them to you unless he feels you need help. Then he drops everything else and helps!!! :end edit:
I understand you can choose to be a victim or a survivor. The guy was saying what he felt, that the small businesses and normal (small) people needed to be looked after. You can read whatever you want into this, but suggest you look at the video clip first.
Or not.
Righteous indignation really doesn’t cut it any more, BP has 40% American shareholders, and 2/3rd of their workforce is American.
Get up on your high horse and wreck the company. Excellent time to choose considering how strong the rest of the economy is, or maybe on further consideration, perhaps not.
Or we can hold BP to account, make sure that everyone whose life was wrecked over this disaster is made as close to whole as reality allows, and get on with our lives.
Pick one. The American people are justly famous for overcoming diversity. I can barely start to list the achievements made over the last two hundred plus years. Whining isn’t in the national makeup…
I have one question that doesn’t seem to have been discussed much. How much of a distraction was there from this event? Assuming this reference from WikiPedia is accurate, which is a big if, were the BP and Transocean supervisors as involved in resolution of the down-hole problems as they normally would be, or were they busy keeping the ‘brass’ entertained?
When the blowout occurred, 4 BP and Transocean executives were on board the platform for a tour of the rig, maintenance planning, annual goals review, a “Drops” safety campaign, and to congratulate the senior staff of the rig for 7 years of operations without a lost time incident (MMS reports show a lost time accident occurred 2008-03-06 on a service vessel at a lease being worked by the Deepwater Horizon, in preparation for a crane operation under control of the Deepwater Horizon);[47] they were injured but survived.
I am trying to understand why a liner/tieback gives 4 barriers when a casing string gives 2.
A) As I understand it, the casing is just 18,300 of pipe hung of the wellhead. It is cemented to the well-bore at the bottom, and hangs off a seal to the hanger at the top. No other connections. The wellhead supports the entire weight. Correct?
B) I am confused by the term liner/tieback. Dril-quip’s web site helped a little. Does the tieback make a connection [I]all the way[/I] from the casing hanger to the wellhead? If so, I can see the 4 seals – the liner is cemented to the bottom of the well, the casing hanger seals the flow between the liner and the casing, cement seals the flow between the tieback and the casing, and the tieback hangs off a seal at the wellhead. (And the tieback locks into the casing hanger, so you cannot get from inside to outside at that point.) Is that about right?
Z) I am [I]really [/I]having a problem understanding Halliburton’s well-bore schematic.
To me it looks like there is no seal at the bottom of the 9-7/8" string at 17,168 feet. Or does the grey on the outside also imply cement on the inside? If not, and hydrocarbons could reach the outside of the well-bore at 17,168 then what prevented free-flow through the 9-7/8 to the wellhead?
cm1,
Re your #3068: I’m going to, at this point, stay silent on this because I have nada to contribute on the technical end. But sometime, after the dust has settled on that end, I think there is another piece, an important piece, that needs to be looked at. Compare the failings that you are outlining in #3068, the tone and attitude manifested in the BP internal emails disclosed to date with what went on in the company that bigmoose is affiliated with, and that he discussed in #3067 just above yours.
I would argue that those technical failings wouldn’t/couldn’t happen at the bigmoose company, because the safety culture there wouldn’t tolerate it: if a person even had such a thought it would be as quickly internally squelched as, say, the urge to fart in church.
Maybe, in a few days, you could recycle this piece, as updated in subsequent discussions, to have this ‘culture’ discussion.
(Incidentally, I was at a safety-related meeting our VP-Operations and 3 regional VP’s with operational responsibility this afternoon, and I brought up–made a point of bringing up–what a similar meeting must be like at BP these days. [B][U]Everybody[/U][/B] had been thinking about that. That may be the only silver lining in this Charlie Foxtrot–it’s got everybody thinking, hard.)
JTF ref. #3078, “I have one question that doesn’t seem to have been discussed much. [B]How much of a distraction[/B] was there from this event? Assuming this reference from WikiPedia is accurate, which is a big if, were the BP and Transocean supervisors as involved in resolution of the down-hole problems as they normally would be, or were they busy keeping the ‘brass’ entertained?”
So you think that the cause of this “accident” was because of the “Brass” onboard possibly distracting the crew the night it happened? If anything, the “Brass” added to the number of people in danger but the explosion and ultimate sinking of the DWH was “in the works” long before they arrived.