Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Since we the people are going to be taken into a realm of what I believe will become out of control political infighting & out of control spin between now & the next elcetion cycle, I would like to review as many of the direct causes & possible causes which led to the occurance of 4/20/10. I would like to do this in as much of an objective view point as lies within me based on the revelation of true facts & the disclosure of possibilties & nondisclosure of information. I am a conservative by nature & am all for the ability of business to be able to conduct business in a responsible manner without unreasonable control of government in levying unreasonable licenses & fees that hinder the ability of business to turn a profit, which is the motivator for business to employ people & make a positive contribution to society.
This “accident” is not the result of responsible business in fullfilling its role in society of making good reasonable profits for its shareholders & contributing to the greater good of society. It is not a political football to be used as a weapon by anyone on either side of the aisle for personal gain or the gain of their political party. Rather it is an attack against we the American people. It is an onslaught of what should be a great blessing to the continuation of American independence being turned into one of the greatest curses ever reaped upon us as a nation. We are now at war with the unleashed forces of nature which has been our defined role to master in a responsible manner by our creator. To this point I will now list in order these causes/ possible contributing causes & the list of irresponsible actors since this occurance that have helped exasterbate & increase the damage caused by this accident & assign those causes by name of the responsible parties.

  1. The change of casing design from a two cased system with 4 barriers between the zone of interest to prevent an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons into the GOM.
    Responsible parties- BP did not donsider the likelihood that this would not give proper safety & control over Macondo#1 by reason of isolation.
    BP for reasoning that it was more important to save time & money than it was to assure these barriers were in place.
    BP for not understanding that their own previously run safety features such as rupture discs placed in the intermediate casing could be turned into flow paths to
    allow for unconrolled flow outside of any predetermined barriers, thereby making it much more unlikely that a relief well would be able to kill the well in the event
    of a worst case scenario.
    MMS for rubber stamping permission to run this redesign as well as taking many other shortcuts without proper review of design changes & the possible effects of this redesign & other changes in a worst case scenario.

  2. The lack of proper centralization between the production casing & the wall of the well bore to ensure proper offset by the casing to allow for the proper amount of cement placement to ensure proper bonding & prevent channeling of hydrocarbons from the zone of interest up the casing annuli in an uncontroled manner.
    BP for totally disregarding the implied strong recommendations of its cementing vendor that the well would be subject to sever gas flow problems.
    BP for deciding that it was more financially feasible to not run available centrailzers due to the time & excess money it would cost to install recommended centralizers.

  3. The possible contamination of cement designed to bond casing to the well bore wall & contain hydrocarbons in place as the primary source of well control
    BP for disregarding its own procedures by reason of not explicitly following instructions written on its cementing procedure.
    BP for not circulating a complete hole volume before pumping cement as instructed in writing by procedure based on the fact the string took extra slack off weight to
    get the casing string to bottom.

  4. The very highly likely loss of cement bond strength to the casing & well bore wall due to premature pressuring up of casing, causing casing to swell by reason of
    hydrostatic pressure imposed by extra volume placed into casing by premature pressure tests.
    BP ignored the recommendations of its cement vendor when the vendor had run laboratory simulations of the effects of temperature & hydrostatic conditions on the
    cement placed on it by hole conditions.
    BP ignored these recommendations which were to allow the cement time to gain sufficient compressibility strength of 1500 PSI over 48 hours to ensure pressure
    testing would not crack the cement by virtue of swelling the casing due to said pressure testing procedures. Instead initial tests were done 10.5 hours
    after cementing was completed to save 38 hours of rig time.

  5. There was no casing cement bond log run to prove the bonding strength to the casing & well bore walls. This was in direct violation of BP’s own instructions which
    approved by MMS as well as recommendations of its cement vendor in writing days before the actual cement job occured.
    BP for not following its own recommendations, the recommendations of the MMS, & the recommendations of its cement vendor.

  6. The premature displacement of kill weight mud from some 3300’ below the BOPs to the BOPs before testing the casing seal assembly for integrity.
    BP representatives on the rig recieved instructions from the Houston office to prematurely displace 3300’ of kill weight mud prior to testing well head caing seal
    as well as annular seal of zone of interest. This assumed that tests would pass even before they were conducted.

  7. The possible failure of positive & negative testing on the well head casing seal & the annulus of the isolation barrier of cement.
    BP’s representatives possibly proceeded to instruct its vendor TO to displace well based upon results of failed tests on such barriers.
    TO for allowing BP to place its rig & personnel in danger by virtue of allowing the continuation of such activities to continue after the results of such possibilities existed.

  8. The insufficient testing of critical barriers designed to isolate the well & maintain well control.
    BP for not using standardized recommendations of its vendors, the API, & its own standard practices as set forth in its own safety manuals.
    TO for allowing BP to depart from API standards in its tesing procedures thereby endangering its rig & its employees from the possible uncontrolled release of
    hydrocarbons on its location.

  9. The premature removal of most or all of the location’s kill weight mud in the event of the release of hydrocarbons.
    BP for departing from API standard practices a guide lines as enforced by MMS edict.
    TO for following BP instructions to remove a critical well control device while not having absolute proof of passed tests combined with a final cement barrier in the
    well.
    TO for allowing the removal of said barrier to take away its ability to monitor fluid returns properly & thereby maintain volume control which is a critical factor in
    maintaining well control.

  10. There was no lock down ring installed on top of the well head production casing hanger.
    BP for prematurely displacing the well to an underbalance condition without having a critical component in place to assist in holding down the production casing &
    thereby holding a seal in the annulus.
    TO for allowing BP to instruct them to displace the well prematurely without having all possible pressure control devises in place for proper well control thereby exposing
    its rig & personnel in danger due to an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on their rig.

  11. I can not comment on BOP status due to the lack of properly disclosed information by BP & TO. There are too many possibilities for the cause of failure of this system
    to make an educated response at this time. One has to trust that with coculprits on location together, they will balance each other out in finding out the root cause of
    the failure of this system.

  12. Failure to disclose proper & pertinent information to allow for proper response planning & action to take place since this occurance.
    BP for lying & omitting the truth by reason of covering up well known flow rate estimates.
    The US Coast Guard for being an accomplis to such activities by virtue of not making a suspect reveal all possible scenarios & assisting the main culprit in the
    release of such bogus information to the American public.
    The President of the United States for not understanding the urgency of this event immediately & need to more closely monitor the activities or inactivities of the
    responsible party. For appointing someone who was certainly not qualified for this big of emergency situation. For not realizing the need for an immediate national
    response & siezing command & control & placing it in the hands of a well qualified leader who had prior knowledge of how to assign & coordinate activities
    of local communities with the resources of the various states affected & demand the responsible party to commit any & all available resources throughout the world
    to address such needs immediately. No questions asked. To give authority to such a leader to hold or imprison anyone who by reason of monetary interests, to cover
    up or omit damages caused as a direct result of such actions. The continual trust in the main culprit of the damages caused & the attempted cover up of such
    damages as proven by the denial of the leader of this company to admit his company’s direct responsibility before the House of Representatives of the people of the United States, by virtue of decision making within his company from
    the bottom up & the top down.

I made a promise a few weeks ago that I would place the results of this evidence into the record of public opinion for all to view. Then I began to see the immensity of it & had to retract that promise to the readers of this thread. I have had no choice by virtue of the uncovered evidence & the immense enormity of the negligence involved & the incalculable damage which resulted & continues to result from such actions to make known to all interested parties these results.