I don’t believe that an ECR mic is a requirement, I haven’t seen one yet. I did sail one ship where the regular bridge phone was recorded on the VDR, so any calls between the ECR and bridge were recorded.
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My thought also. Missed Him 
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I posted this earlier in the thread but didn’t seem like anyone had an opinion. Having not sailed as a pilot; do any of the pilots (or wannabe’s claiming to be pilots ;)) here believe it’s possible there was a misunderstanding with the English and/or just pure confusion among what was happening?
“Do you have steering?” Can mean a couple things - is the rudder moving? Being one; or do you have positive control of the ship and is she behaving the way you ask her to? If shits hitting the fan idk if someone with English as a 2nd or 3rd language is going to be able to discern what the question is specifically.
Also, again keeping in mind everything is going to shit, a helmsman could believe the rudder order he is giving, as in what he has turned the wheel to, is actually doing something when in fact the rudder isn’t actually moving at all.
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Looking at the transcript again:
0126:11.9
PILOT port twenty. (pilot orders port 20)
0126:13.1
MAST port twenty.
0126:13.4
HELM port twenty sir. (Helmsman repeats command)
0126:15.0
PILOT port. [shouted.]
0126:15.8
HELM yes sir. port twenty sir.
Next that was related to the helm.
0126:34.9
HELM wheel on port twenty sir.
That’s wheel on port twenty, not the rudder
Next - this is likely a report wrt the rudder
0127:04.7
HELM port twenty sir. (Helmsman reports rudder is port 20)
Then:
0127:23.0
PILOT hard port [shouted.] (pilot repeats hard port order)
0127:23.9
HELM hard port sir. [shouted.] (Helmsman repeats command)
Again the same from the helm, a report about the wheel:
0127:36.0
HELM wheel on hard port sir.
Next:
0127:46.3
PILOT full to port. [shouted.] (Pilot order full to port)
0127:46.9
MAST full to port full to port.
[exclaimed.]
0127:47.2
2ND full to port. [exclaimed.]
Then again, must be the rudder.
0128:51.0
HELM hard port sir. (Helmsman reports rudder hard port)
0128:53.1
PILOT great
this is the last time HELM occurs on the transcript,
Next was about the bowthruster:
0127:42.2
PILOT captain do we have a bow
thruster? [shouted.]
IIRC there may have been only one steering pump with less capacity on-line which might explain why the rudder response was slower than expected.
Hopefully one of the things that should come out of this is management of the bridge alarm systems. Here we needed clear and concise communication between a number of people and over radio, telephone and face to face over alarms that could have been silenced and continued to have a visual indication and a display detailing in one line for each alarm what it is, listed in priority.
Perhaps such a display would have listed steering motor failure at the top.
IMHO expecting ship’s crew to remain in harms way to control the letting go and operation of the anchor is a non starter.
I’m not sure what the anchor would have achieved and it would depend on the nature of the bottom. If the anchor had come fast there is a likelihood that the chain would have parted before giving much change to the vessels direction. The vessel is of a size that the anchor is no longer an accessory for manoeuvre and is there to anchor in a controlled manner. In my experience a container ship of half the displacement of the Dali parted her chain in the Elbe at the same speed.
The Transcript does not indite any of the bridge staff.
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I think 14 is the radio channel. That was probably to the trainee pilot who was calling the tugs. I believe the course was 141 or 140.
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From the transcript it seems to me ( my humble opinion) , that close loop communication regarding steering was not utilised . If it was, there would be no need to spend much time on interpretation now on who said what and what he meant by saying it
Example of close loop communication with hard port command.
- PILOT - wheel hard port or hard port
- Master/OOW repeats - wheel hard port or hard port
- helmsman repeats after Master/OOW - wheel hard port or hard port
- helmsman confirms the helm possition - rudder/helm on hard port Sir!!!
If this is not followed by helmsman then Pilot /Master should react immediately and demand adherance.
Simple as that.
Illumination: One will only guess what works(lights) and what not,without simulating blackout in the hrs of darkness.
I am sure , that every time I tested it despite E/R protests and bemoaning the bridge and radio room( part of the bridge) were illuminated by red ceilling red lights mcy batteries supplied and at least in three locations there were torches available not to mention private ones.
I also have a problem with anchors and forward stn manning as described.
As a second mate on conro ships( 100 mtrs shorter then Dali with bow and stern thrusters ) calling same port and same terminal I was kept with the bosun & A/B untill we passed the bridge.
Then and only then i was ordered to stand down and come on the bridge to relieve the ch/off and take over the watch. Some 10-15 minutes later bosun was released with A/B or O/S remaing forward . Both were trained regarding lashing , unlashing , preparation and letting go via manual break release.
Stern thrusters were shut down after the bridge while bow thruster was available on very short notice untill shortly before pilot disembarcation.
I will not comment what others understand by : have both anchors ready/stand by and one man forward ordered by Pilot .
I can only say what I understand by it and what must be done to fulfill Pilot order and what in my mind makes sense.
a) if one man is to stand by fwd for the purpose of letting go anchor in emergency , this one man must know everything what has been described above . It makes no sense to send a man who will need somebody to call somebody else to assist as there is no time in emergency for such circus.
b) the readiness of anchors must be complete , meaning both are ready to let go by means of manual break release ( or automatic ) . There can not be any obstructions , gillotine or other in locked/closed position, otherwise the anchors are not ready for emergency deployment. To make sure the anchors will go as required walking them a foot or two from the hosepipe is a good practice.
I completely can not understand why such obstruction was present on Dali what proved fatal as it resulted in delayed release of the anchor not to mention calling for bosun , chief mate - this set up was a disater as far as I am concerned.
If they put the guillotine stopper to prevent the anchor from slipping due to alleged vibrations at dslah, slah then it is possible they had manual break lining maintenance issue = LACK OF MAINTENANCE due to whatever reasons ( could be office related , caused by shore side slackers) .
IMHO i saw 3 worrying items here: lack of close loop communication regarding steering , both anchors were not ready despite Pilot orders, forward stn team was incomplete and not fit to perform expected task of mcy anchor use.
Can not judge if the proper use of anchors would be effective in this particular case but those doubting it , pls refer to the thread, where bigger then Dali vessel cut the gantry cranes like a harvester in Busan. Comments there leave no doubt that at least some consider the proper use of anchors necessary.
Correction : looks it was cantainer ship in Turkey that i had in mind . Sorry.
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Yes, agreed, I edited that part out to declutter the post.
I also put the closed loop in bold so it’s clear the ship does in fact have steering. (rudder was answering the wheel).
Here’s just the pilots and helmsman relevant orders/response:
0125:18.6
PILOT one-four-one.
0125:20.6
HELM one-four-one sir
0126:11.9
PILOT port twenty. (pilot orders port 20)
0126:13.4
HELM port twenty sir. (Helmsman repeats command)
0127:04.7
HELM port twenty sir. (Helmsman reports rudder is port 20)
0127:23.0
PILOT hard port [shouted.] (pilot repeats hard port order)
0127:23.9
HELM hard port sir. [shouted.] (Helmsman repeats command)
0128:51.0
HELM hard port sir. (Helmsman reports rudder hard port)
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That’s certainly possible. If it was in fact a wrong way helm it was for about 3 seconds vs the full minute it took for the rudder to reach port 20.
KC,
I have had innumerable wrong ways over my tenure and the instant response is twofold…..you point in the relevant requested helm direction and you use one word……port or starboard. This is what has happened in the transcript……look at the timeframes.
The “port” reprimand was also shouted by the Pilot.
Wrong way helm.
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Yes, I agree that it’s possible.
But there is still a bit of a puzzle because the helm had, just before, reported that the ship was swinging to starboard:
Why would the rudder be to starboard if the ordered course was 141° and the ship was in fact swinging to starboard? Also was the pilot looking at the RAI or watching the swing?
Edit, maybe the rudder was moving to starboard.
Here is the intangible.
The helmsman reported that the vessel was swinging to starboard and the WHEEL was hard-a-port……not the rudder….the wheel. During this timeframe the EG was coming on line…..so did he have steering? Shortly thereafter there was a power change over and the Pilot requested Port 20.
Now if the vessel is swinging to starboard and the helmsman has reported the wheel being hard-a-port, why would the Pilot ease to Port 20?
Perhaps the rudder was in another position and remained so until the EG connected to the ESB.
Edit: Perhaps it was not a wrong way but the rudder was returning from its frozen position once emergency power was on line. It could have been over to starboard and this is what created the sheer. Up until that point the Pilot had not given specific helm orders but instead a course to steer which indicates that it was unlikely that he was monitoring the RAI.
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So I am not mariner, but it’s been a subject of interest to me for many years. I know enough to be dangerous but certainly can’t hang with any of yall. I do however understand machinery quite well. From the day this happened after looking at the video I was wondering if the servo in the steering hydraulics lost its mind (lost its null) during the power loss/changover and failed hard to starboard. I have specifically seen this with servos at the power plants. Also many of you might recall us air flight 427 crash in Pittsburgh in the mid 1990’s. Same deal.
This would explain the swing to starboard and the pilot yelling port. Again, the rai data would be invaluable to really understand this.
“Speaking entirely out of my ass…”
When you find yourself beginning a comment with those words it might be a good idea to hold back.
You are writing a comment intended to call into question the observation of a retired professional pilot. In this case you are suggesting that the “powers that be will be hiring consultants who have the necessary experience if it falls outside their scope.” Where will those powers find such a consultant? You have circled back around to “the only people who can give an informed opinion are the people who have actually stood on the bridge of a ship of moderate size size as The Dali.” The very observation that prompted your comment.
I am a retired pilot as well. To my knowledge the NTSB here in the states has not made a practice of soliciting pilots for help in accidents and often makes silly mistakes that could be easily corrected by someone with bridge experience. Before you say it - a ship captain or Coast Guard officer who is not a pilot is likely to be a fine, intelligent person but they are like a general practitioner doctor providing expert testimony in the case of a specialized heart surgeon.
I once worked with a scientist on fatigue issues as they affect seamen. We remained in contact through a mutual friend. Many years after our fatigue work he was appointed to be one of the board members of the NTSB. At that time ship squat was the fashionable issue to investigate. He sent me four NTSB final reports and asked me to look at them to see if squat had possibly been an issue in any of the accidents. Squat had not been a problem, but all four investigations were seriously flawed by questions that were not asked and conditions that were ignored. I decided to take the opportunity to make a case for participation in investigations by pilots when it would be appropriate. I took the time to outline the mistakes and omissions in each report. They were not minor issues. After sending this back to the NTSB member he wrote that he was interested and had forwarded the letter to the head of the investigative department. I never heard back from them.
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IMO - there is something very wrong in the statement that has the ship swinging to starboard - unable to maintain course, at 6 or so knots with the rudder full to port.
when, if, we get this to make some sense - I think we will be on to something -
All things in the fullness of time I guess.
There is no reason I can think of why NTSB would not be looking for experts like pilots to help their investigations. Surprised I guess.
Although some years ago there were many pilots in many ports without the technical knowledge to articulate what they knew how to do by repetition and experience. I am pretty sure that is not the case anymore.
As an example, years ago, many times I tried to explain saturation speed to pilots as the ship is shaking and they are asking for more turns.
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I made the observation in an earlier thread on this issue that the sheer to starboard was caused by the ship’s proximity to shallow water on the port side and the widening of deep water as the ship approached a channel junction. Either condition will cause the ship to seek the middle of the channel as she feels it. It is a common phenomenon in Houston where I was a pilot. We had two places where this was an issue and the older pilots took pains to instruct apprentices about them. To me it makes perfect sense that the ship would begin swinging to starboard and that hard over rudder at only six knots would be too weak to overcome the swing.
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While I agree - in that case I might have an issue with the pilot. If the ship was developing a bank cushion while steering a course the helmsmen would have been carrying rudder that the pilot should have noticed - and taken control of the wheel. Hard to believe the helmsman went directly to hard rudder to maintain his course.
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The NTSB is concerned about the “brotherhood” of pilots. They suspect that pilots would be reluctant to testify against another pilot. That is a legitimate concern. I wouldn’t hang another pilot out to dry in a public investigation. Mostly because I wasn’t in his/her shoes. But pilot error is an issue that is usually addressed by the pilots in house without making a public issue. There are plenty of other issues that pilots can offer worthwhile testimony on. Bridge operations, manning, squat, fatigue, ship design, dock configuration, tugboat use…
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