Dali Chief Engineer Admits Criminal Conduct in Baltimore Bridge Allision

The agreement also sheds additional light on communications between Deenadayalan and Radhakrishnan Karthik Nair, a Synergy technical superintendent who was indicted last month alongside two ship management companies.

According to the filing, Deenadayalan admitted that Nair directed him to send a “convincing” email to the vessel’s charterer regarding the Dali‘s fuel consumption to avoid drawing attention to the use of the flushing pump.

Deenadayalan was the Chief Engineer.

More that Federal prosecutors, I think the one who have reached a deferred prosecution agreement is the chief engineer and this may give him the chance to reduce final punishments, but hazard to the safe navigation of the vessels and endanger bridges, structures and shore facilities is the full lack of risk assessment of old design conception of this infrastructure, and inadequacy to today’s ship dimensions, speed, etc. from shore institutions, port authorities, coast guard watch, etc.

Technical superintendent and ship management companies are the most weak shackle in the chain not covered by failing to due diligence, where the crew is covered.

The 2 paragraphs below from the gCaptain article were the most puzzling to me. I’ve heard proper names of equipment butchered all kinds of ways depending on the type of vessel, country & even what body of water ships sailed on. I had to use A.I & research to ensure I knew what the NTSB was talking about with the term, “flushing” pump. When this incident happened none of the professional mariners on this forum were in the ballpark concerning the cause if the NTSB is pinning it on modified fuel pumps on the generators. From what I read those guys on the Dali had a really weird set up. I’m not sure I completely understand it still.


From the gCaptain article:

“At the center of the case is the flushing pump, which prosecutors say was improperly used to supply fuel to two diesel generators despite not being designed to automatically restart after a blackout. As a result, the generators allegedly lost fuel supply following the first outage, leading to a second blackout that left the vessel without propulsion or steering moments before impact.”

“Separately, shipbuilder HD Hyundai Heavy Industries has alleged that the vessel’s operators bypassed built-in redundancies after delivery by replacing automatic fuel supply pumps with the non-redundant flushing pump, a modification the company said violated classification rules and contributed directly to the second blackout.”

Pages 90-94 explain it pretty well.

Other observations:

  • In the report it says that neither of the CEs interviewed knew how long the flushing pump was being used instead of the circ/supply pumps. This could easily be determined by the flow meter in that loop. If hours on GEs 3 and 4 are increasing but the flow meter reading is not increasing, then they are on the flushing pump. (Assumes meter is not bypassed)
  • gCaptain article says both federal prosecutors and the builders yard claim there were illegal modifications made. The problem is not the modifications (which were surely class approved as part of the exhaust gas scrubber installation) but rather how they were operating the plant. Using the flushing pump (no standby pump, no auto restart feature) as a normal lineup ESPECIALLY during maneuvering is inexcusable.
  • Based on the lineup in use at the time of the blackout (page 92), once the ME circ/supply pumps restarted, GEs 1 and 2 should have been available. I realize the recurring electrical fault made this moot, but just curious why all the focus is on DGs 3 and 4 being unavailable as if those were the only available DGs.

Flushing pumps were mentioned a couple time before the NTSB preliminary report was released:

Chief Makoi Video Transcript

A sudden stoppage of the fuel supply would explain why both generators would shut down at the same time, as they share a common fuel line, and also prevent the standby generator from starting automatically. But since the ship was presumably using LSMGO, they might have been using the small flushing pump instead of the dedicated fuel oil booster pumps for the generators.

Also discussed after the report:

Just a question from a simple driver.

So emissions control complicated the system so much that the designed system could not be used for fear of prosecution from the eco idiots so the Dali used a work around that failed under stress.

Good job eco idiots :+1:

No air pollution :+1:

Just 6 dead brown people so no big loss there :+1:

A few more brown people still stuck in Baltimore ( allegedly a worse place than Islamabad):+1:

Oh and a flimsy non protected bridge in the river

Wow :astonished_face:

I as a fellow driver I have a fair idea what it is like to change over machinery that is being running on HFO heated to approximately 140°C throughout the fuel system and replace it with MDO at ambient temperature 8 hours before standby. Then straight into a programmed liner replacement alongside by ship’s staff. ETD 18 hours later.

Has the Master been charged? You suppose he was out of the loop on this jury-rigged system?

This is the key section from the article in the OP

The agreement also sheds additional light on communications between Deenadayalan and Radhakrishnan Karthik Nair, a Synergy technical superintendent who was indicted last month alongside two ship management companies.

According to the filing, Deenadayalan admitted that Nair directed him to send a “convincing” email to the vessel’s charterer regarding the Dali‘s fuel consumption to avoid drawing attention to the use of the flushing pump.

The admission is closely tied to the broader criminal case unveiled in May against Singapore-based Synergy Marine Pte Ltd, Chennai-based Synergy Maritime Pvt Ltd, and Nair.

Federal prosecutors allege the defendants knowingly operated the Singapore-flagged containership with unsafe modifications that contributed to the blackout sequence that ultimately caused the vessel to strike the Francis Scott Key Bridge on March 26, 2024.

Where was your question? I read some STATEMENTS you made that highlight (1) your lack of understanding of the engineering concepts involved, and (2) your willingness to inject the skin color of people involved without indicating why that is relevant. More aligned with the actions of a troll than a driver.

Hopefully the CE had that direction in writing. Nair would have to be a idiot to give that tasking in an email. In writing or not, the CE (and 1AE) were grossly negligent in the performance of their duties by operating the plant in this manner (this is true regardless of their skin color for those who think that matters).

Also curious what exactly that “convincing email” would say to convincingly explain why MGO ROB continues to drop by 5-10 MT/day once the vessel is outside the ECA.

Ok point taken.

Only the first paragraph was a question, my bad.

The rest of it is my frustration at the attitude of yeah let’s just prosecute a damn foreigner. That will make things better.

Is it your position that the actions/inactions of the tech supt./CE/1AE in the Dali case didn’t warrant prosecution?

Conversely, is it your position that if the facts of the case were the same except that the people involved were non-foreigners and/or white skinned that the investigation/findings/decisions to prosecute would have been different?

To your second question. If they are Jonny Foreigner then yes

Don’t you think someone should be prosecuted for allowing a 300 m container ship anywhere near a bridge with no protection without compulsory tug escort.

Nahh better to sue some Jonny Foreigner.

Better still if he is brown skinned.

No, laziness on the part of two different CE’s to make the system functional is what lead to the work around. The second laziest way to handle this would have been to line up 3/4 on MGO through the boost/feed pumps and pump a few cubes through with the returns lined up to a FO tank.

From the NTSB report:

According to the chief engineer and previous chief engineer, for at least 7 months leading up to the accident, the crew exclusively used the flushing pump to supply fuel to DG3 and DG4. The crew believed that the DG supply and booster pumps and the associated piping contained other fuel (VLSFO or HFO) that was not compliant with emissions regulations in certain geographic areas, and that the pumps and piping may have contained bacterial growth that could have contaminated the entire fuel system (a common occurrence with stagnant marine fuels). The crew explained that cleaning the system to use the supply and booster pumps would have taken several days, so they and the previous chief engineer chose to keep the DG fuel supply system configured to run DG3 and DG4 solely with the flushing pump.

The scrubbers allowed the vessel to burn HFO in the main engine, DG1, and DG2 and remain compliant with emissions requirements.

Outside the ECA the ship must have been using HFO in DG1 and DG 2 ?

In any case sounds like this arrangement allowed them to avoid going off-hire for several days to clean the fuel system.

Of course. They must also have been required to run #3 and/or #4 DG due to reefer load or maintenance on #1/2 hence the need for the “convincing letter” to explain to the charterer why (much pricier) MGO ROB is continuing to go down after exiting the ECA.

Hard to believe they couldn’t find the necessary window in the previous 7+ months to get this done. Especially with the pace of US longshoremen.

Regardless of any circumstances, operating in this manner for this long through many many maneuvering evolutions is not ok. If the ship has to come off charter to fix this, so be it.

Would you, as captain, be ok operating for 7+ months with one steering pump incapable of being in standby and requiring someone to go to the steering gear room to start it? That’s the equivalent to what these guys were doing.

Who should we be prosecuting then? The pilots? They were the only Americans onboard the ship when it hit the bridge.

Let’s just put this on the record.

As a fellow pilot ( now retired) I think the pilots did a Stirling job of warning of the impending disaster.

I will also bring to your attention that I am not one who will defend other pilots blindly , if you look back at my posting history. If they perform badly I will call it out.

I don’t understand the relationship between pilots and Harbor masters in the USA.

I do know that it can be a little fractious in some Ports in the UK.

I was fortunate in my Port to enjoy a good relationship with our Harboumasters so as a pilot I would have been confident to shout and scream and stamp my foot if I could see a dangerous practice happening. I don’t know how the relationship existed in Baltimore.

So that is my only criticism of the Baltimore Pilots.

There was one time at my Port a relatively new chief harbour master did a trip with me when we had a serious issue at the port.

I was confident enough to tell him straight that when, not if, the brown stuff hit the fan it is him that is ultimately in charge of the port and he was going to get hung by his own petard.

So back to your question.

Who to prosecute?

Who is/was in charge of the Port ?

Was his authority being undermined?

By whom?

Was he under Commercial Pressure?

Where was the Risk Assessment?

Do you want me to continue?

I have said this before.

Who the f##k thought it was in any way acceptable to allow a 100k t + ship to steam under a Bridge with bugger all protection on its supports without Tug escort.

Ps I have no idea what a Petard is

Today it would be termed a breaching charge. The one I remember was a small rectangular metal box with a triangular void space at the bottom, the rest of the box was packed with explosive. That is all that I remember from one of the most enjoyable courses that I did as a young man. The Petard dates from medieval times and being hoisted with your own was not to be recommended.