Cruise ship Viking Sky in problem

Hmmm.
A few years ago. Before all the modern hi tec BS.
One of the basic fundamentals of rules for a Marine Engineer.

Keep the plant running, contact the bridge, before shutting down.
Why, no point saving the engine if in doing so you loose the ship?

Why would the Bridge say no? It would be highly unusual to say no. Even when not saying no? The Bridge still requires warning.

Modern engines with auto shut down by passing this step is in my opinion not a good thing.
Which is why on any ships bridge with this type of engine. There is an alarm system readout. Emergency shut downs and emergency overrides.
The ship deck officers should know What they are, what they mean and how to use them.
Typically there are some auto shut downs which can be overridden and some which can’t be overridden.

Lube oil low pressure can be overridden on any system I have sailed with.
Lube oil temp can be overridden on any system I have sailed with.
The time frame when a problem occurs. I have always heard from the engineer before we ever get to this question.
I could reduce speed, and they kept the plant running.

When safe to do so shut the plant down. It’s vital to overall ship safety not to shut down until the ship is safe.

The only none override shut downs on similar engines I have sailed with are.
Crank case oil mist detector. Auto shut down, no override.
Main engine govener. Auto shut down,no override.
Main engine over speed. Auto shut down, no override.

Those of course might lead to catastrophic failure. Rather than just engine damage.
Although oil mist might occur after running with loss of lube oil for some time.
Once upon a time long ago oil mist detector response was slow down to DS. Keep running so lube oil kept flowing and cooling continued.

This ship was almost lost due to an auto shut down feature which could and should have been overridden. By an engineer in consultation with the bridge or in extremes by the bridge.

2 out of 10 for both Deck and Engine Room watch keeping.
8 out of 10 for the recovery.

Zero for designe.

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It may be the trend.
This incident. Show why the trend may be a hazard. Should wake the authorities up and be a reminder why the human engineer on watch exists.

Automation or not I was thinking more in terms of plain old ordinary safety margins. If the ship is said to be able to handle 8 meters seas then set the operational limit to 6 meters. Not always possible but the ship will spend less time in heavy seas which is risk factor.

I wrote this nine years ago but it applies here as well:

Lesson learned - avoid heavy weather. Hidden flaws, the so-called latent condition… are more likely to reveal themselves when the ship is being tossed about in bad weather, just when you can least afford to cope with it.

and this:

It is not only the vessel that encounters heavy weather, it is the vessel, crew and cargo. Operating vessels and their crews near limits increases risks and chances of failure, - but the path of failure may not be the one expected.

Doesn’t most ships today have UMS/E0 Class?? (= unmanned engine room for extended periods)
This applies to ships with automation to operate in UMS/E0 mode during normal at sea or manoeuvring conditions. Max duration is 18 hrs. (LRS/ABS) or 24 hrs. (DNV-GL)
This is subject to a lot of preparations, rules and regulations:
http://www.machineryspaces.com/unmanned-machinery-spaces.html

I believe it is possible for the Engine crew to leave the ERC on Friday afternoon, Duty Eng. make a round to repeat the checklist on Saturday and Sunday, which reset the time to Monday morning. (??)

It’s been a while since I’ve been on a UMS ship.
Back in my day. They were not UMS all the time and certainly not in pilotage waters. UMS over night when Full Away usualy with a designated nite on duty engineer. Who would conduct a set of rounds and do a log around midnight.
The Alarm would sound in public crew areas of the ship and the duty engineers cabin.
Required to be answered within I can’t rember how many minutes or the Engineers alarm would sound calling all engineers to the ER.
Things may have changed.
I doubt very many passenger ships run UMS and even those only well of shore.
I would be very surprised if this vessel was running UMS.

Although some European vessels have the ECR on the upper deck. For some strange reason.

On the subject of calm communications from engine room to bridge.

About 03:00 we got a call from downstairs asking we reduce to 2/3 speed. “We have a slight problem”.

After about an hour and no communication at all I asked the OOW if I should perhaps wander downstairs and speak to the Chief Engineer. The OOW agreed so I strolled downstairs and was greeted by all the engine room crew (both on watch and supposedly off) with faces as long as your arm but doing nothing apart from looknig glum… One of the main engines was stopped. The Chief pointed to the stopped engine and told me to look along the inboard side…

There was a con rod sticking out the side of the entablature!

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The strange reason is that it is easier to escape from the ECR if it is above deck. (Refr. Bourbon Dolphin) Besides, you cannot see or hear anything better from an enclosed and air-conditioned ECR by it being within the E/R. Access from the ECR to the E/R from above deck is via direct staircase.

The V.S. has UMS class but I agree, she is unlikely to have had unmanned ECR during this incident, especially since she was on a coastal passage in bad weather and it was middle of day.

PS> She also had class notation “Safe Return to Port” (SRtP), which should make a total stoppage of main power supply near impossible. I would think that there will be a review of the requirement to obtain that notation after this.

MAN confirm finding by NMA:

Google translate

The experts from MAN who have investigated the causes of the engine breakdown on board the “Viking Sky” confirm that the cause of the engine failure was low lubricating oil levels. This is communicated by Managing Director Jan Hoppe to the Ship Revenue.

By Sigbjørn Larsen

ADVERTISEMENT

A team from the engine supplier MAN has been on board the “Viking Sky” to do their own investigations of the engine failure.

“Our experts have confirmed the findings that the engine stopped due to low lubricating oil levels,” says Jan Hoppe to the Ship Revision. He is the communications director at MAN. - I remind you that this is preliminary results, says Hoppe. There are still open questions to be clarified and the investigation continues. I’m afraid we can’t or won’t add anything more to the official statement that has already come out.

The shipwreck has also asked MAN for a comment on the objections to the design that have come from several motor-skilled seafarers in the debate that is now taking place fully.

  • When it comes to the design of the ship or the energy management system on board, we cannot comment on this as both were not made by MAN Energy Solutions, Hoppe says.

Experienced seafarers ask more questions

“I have never seen anything like this in almost 40 years at sea, it must be a serious design error,” writes Asbjørn Kiran in Skipsrevyens comment field.

  • This sounds very strange, as I understand this, these engines have dry sump, that is, the return oil goes to tank, Stein Robertsen points out in the same commentary field to the Ship Revenue. In that tank, there is a level switch that provides a low level alarm. If the design is such that the pump can suck air at a low level then the whole design is wrong. Then, if the level remains low then a certain amount of time for auto stop is activated and the engine stops, then one should normally be able to reset this alarm and then start the engine again. I realize that it can be difficult and pointing a tank when there is bad weather, but you do not have to be a space researcher and understand this, writes Robertsen and characterizes the explanation of cause as “thin”. Hans Hilton Thorstensen replies that according to a news report there is a wet swamp on the engines. Normally, there is no “shut down” of the engines due to the low level, but there is a class requirement for “shut down” at high temperature and high pressure. Nor is it shut down due to tight filters, says Thorstensen.

-It is a plausible explanation, but it should at the same time be a wake-up call for many, writes Jan Poseidon Welde. In the design side, one fights to reduce weight, perhaps one has been tricking a bit far with the capacity of the lubricating oil tanks. Perhaps one should have had a little more delay before the full shut-down on some alarms.
There are also other moments, but I know too little to be categorical - but I’m not a journalist either.

  • If it seems very strange that all 4 engines in 2 separate engine rooms get oil from the same lubricating oil tank, I think that one had never been approved, writes Per Bråtun. It is probably more likely that the oil level on both / all tanks has been in the smallest team before they start crossing …

-The point is automatic systems that have come all over, which can hardly be overrun manually … when the machines auto-stop signals indicating that the engine is living dangerously, which it actually does … it can quickly become dangerous on the sea, writes Nils Johansen. Experienced with a 1500 caterpillar brand new … stop with indication of overpressure in the bottom boiler … bad weather and sensitive donor rush. It was almost on the shore outside Bodø … happily the engineer got the alarms (limp home mode) after being in contact with cat centrally … so there are many that can happen.

  • Surely too expensive to fill in Norway so they should wait, writes Stian Holst.

Engine power

The “Viking Sky” has four MAN main engines, two series nine-cylinder engines (9L32 / 44CR of 5.040 kW each) and two 12-cylinder V-motors (12V32 / 44CR of 6,720 kW each). They are configured with two engines distributed on a main engine and an auxiliary motor in each engine room, separated by fire and waterproof bulkheads and doors. According to MAN, the engine type is specially designed for the use of heavy oil (HFO according to DIN ISO 8217 specifications). The engines are turbocharged with MAN’s own MAN TCR system.

  • The automation and control system is also developed by MAN (Sacos one), writes Teknisk Ukeblad. According to a brochure from MAN there is separate lubricating oil filter on each engine, while the water cooling takes place via a two-strand high and low temperature system.
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Resetting a DG alarm on the diesel electric plants I’ve worked on involved resetting it on the ECR console and the local DG panel. Often just cycling a switch to “reset” and someone else clicking the reset button in the ECR.

The ECR panel should’ve had a UPS so it would still be functional.

The Generators would need to be reset and be in a ready to start condition (Prelube).

Prelube supplied from E-Bus as per MAN manual.

Able to emergency start MANs as per the manual. This also allows you to start without any interlocks (as per MAN manual) One ship (MAN dg’s) I was on all starting we did was with the local emergency start. The C/E didn’t like using the remote console, preferred to have the guy starting it right there watching it.

If all 4 had tripped off on low LO pressure I would be wary of overriding alarms. Yes you want to save the ship, but how much time would a generator run with no/intermittent LO. Then you would be close to the coast with fucked up engines.

Maybe a better solution to rolling would be to increase the time delay on the low LO pressure alarm. That way you still have the protection of the alarm and allow the plant more time to recover from its rolling.

If a LO storage tank could be gravitated down to the sumps (likely) than that might’ve taken some time. Working in the heavy rolling with the man in the ECR getting millions of alarms and phone calls.


Fraqrat

Ambassador to Norway

Top Contributer

@Fraqrat is that you? Where you been? Nice of you to drop in on the folks onboard the Viking Sky.

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This is from gCaptain via Reuters

It’s not 100% clear what happened, low level or low pressure? it says the black-out was caused by low oil pressure. But it also seems to be saying that the loss of supply to the pumps triggered an alarm which in turn shut down the engines. The NMA statement also seems to be saying that the tank low-level alarm had not been triggered “at this time”.

I assume the loss of supply to the pump caused a drop in pressure and the loss of pressure was sensed which then shut down the engines but that’s not what it says;

This triggered an alarm indicating a low level of lubrication oil,

The Norwegian Maritime Authority’s full statement is below:

Last night, the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) granted the company a permit to sail on a single voyage to Kristiansund to have necessary repairs made. Throughout the night, the NMA has worked together with the ship’s classification society, Lloyd’s, and the company in order to identify the reason why the Viking Sky suffered power “blackout” at Hustadvika in challenging weather conditions on Saturday 23 March.

For the present, our conclusion is that the engine failure was directly caused by low oil pressure. The level of lubricating oil in the tanks was within set limits, however relatively low, when the vessel started to cross Hustadvika. The tanks were provided with level alarms, however these had not been triggered at this time. The heavy seas in Hustadvika probably caused movements in the tanks so large that the supply to the lubricating oil pumps stopped. This triggered an alarm indicating a low level of lubrication oil, which in turn shortly thereafter caused an automatic shutdown of the engines.

The NMA has drawn up a general safety notice about ensuring a continuous supply of lubricating oil to engines and other critical systems in poor weather conditions. This should be done in cooperation with the engine supplier and, moreover, be included in the ship’s risk assessments in the safety management system.

Viking Ocean Cruises has made the following statement: “We welcome the prompt and efficient investigation carried out by the NMA and we fully understand and acknowledge their findings. We have inspected the levels on all our sister ships and are now revising our procedures to ensure that this issue could not be repeated. We will continue to work with our partners and the regulatory bodies in supporting them with the ongoing investigations,”

Norwegian Maritime Authority is in a continuous dialogue with the company and classification society, and this cooperation has been successful. We will follow up the ongoing work to rectify damages on vessels. Furthermore, we will continue the constructive dialogue with the classification society, company and the Accident Investigation Board Norway in order to reveal underlying causes and identify appropriate measures.

The statement also wisely points out the need for lube oil in an engine.

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This is the kind of sage advice you get when “safety professionals” get involved.

This only makes sense if you add the word “pressure” after oil (all caps added above). It’s not very grammatical but makes more sense in a english-as-asecond-language way.

Who knows what this plant actually had but a trunk piston engine should have a low oil LEVEL alarm whether dry sump with reservoir below or wet sump. This should alarm before a pump looses suction. It should have a time delay to filter out meaningless nuisance alarms. An alarm and monitoring system should have an analog point with the ability to monitor for high and low “warning” set points and high and low alarm set points in this case engine LO pressure. This point should have a hysteresis setting to prevent spurious resets. The engine controls should have a low oil pressure shutdown. This should be by device (pressure switch) separate from the alarm and monitoring system. It should be routinely tested. Since we are talking about a DE plant I don’t believe that should be “inhibit-able” but maybe this “safe return to port rules” have something else to say about it. (If the propulsion motor had a low oil pressure shutdown that would be the thing to inhibit in an emergency maneuvering situation - for a DG the next one should just come online, subject to throttle phase back and load shedding of course)

If the above assumptions on plant arrangement are close to reality, then one can imagine scenarios where human actions loom large in ending up where they did. Total blackout, anchors out and looking at rocks and struggling to start a DG.

They need to go much deeper into this if they really want to learn something for next time.

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6 posts were split to a new topic: Engine Failure on Tug

If anybody were in doubt about how close they were to get the bottom ripped out on the rocks, this may end any speculations:


Copied from Captain’s Voyage Forum:
http://www.captainsvoyage-forum.com/forum/windjammer-bar-maritime-interest/maritime-accidents-and-disasters/214928-viking-sky-drifting-with-engine-problems/page3

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You’ve pretty well nailed it. Most duty engineers I knew had finished their evening rounds by 2300 and on their way to bed. The more experienced the Engineer meant the less likely an alarm between then and 0800 the next morning.

I have been following the discussion on this incident both here and with the shipsnostalgia forum. In both cases there are very interesting comments from knowledgeable professional mariners. My understanding is that after loss of propulsion power there was significant drift towards a rock bound lee shore in stormy weather conditions. Furthermore those same conditions meant passenger evacuation by lifeboat and liferaft would be extremely hazardous. Understandably the situation called for distress ( mayday ) signal and attempting anchoring and helicopter evacuation. My interest is in how the crisis management team on board then decide how to organize the passengers into “flights” of a dozen or so per chopper. With about a thousand passengers to be winched up, either individually or even in pairs, and even with multiple choppers this is a lengthy process. In about sixteen hours they managed to evacuate under half the pax ( about 490 ) on board before stopping because the vessel was seaworthy with power again. What criteria, if any, are used to decide who goes first/next ? Is there a “triage” type of system or a “line up” or “queue” equivalent with people moving nearer the front? Who decides or is there a company policy for such a situation? Does the system vary from company to company or between flag states? After many years ashore I am still interested. I thought the situation was handled very well under circumstances and a credit to all involved. I would be grateful for a reply from someone who sails in these ships and has experienced a similar helicopter evacuation of large numbers.

It was reported that after those who were hurt was lifted off they had a kind of raffle by cabin no. but some “winners” preferred to take their changes on board, rather than be winched off.
Whether this was per some prepared procedure is doubtful, as it would be hard to envisage a situation quite like this.

As cruise ships get bigger and bigger, the traffic planning becomes even more important. How you’re going to move that number of people around the ship, give access to the lifeboats or at least to the muster stations, that are some of the concerns. What it essentially amounts to is crowd control.

Cruise lines use software that simulates an emergency and evacuation and is used in the design process to ensure that crowds could move off the ship safely. International regulations require that lifeboats should be launched with everyone on board within 30 minutes from the time an abandon ship order is made.

This is all theory. It all depends on the prevailing conditions during an emergency such as the weather and sea condition, in case of flooding the list of the ship which could prevent life boats from being lowered, fire, black outs and not to forget panic. It is probably for this reason that the cruise lines advocate ‘the ship is your best lifeboat’ theory.

Cruise lines should better prepare for disaster scenarios in a variety of locations, develop worst-case scenarios in real time, with real people and real hardware drills that clearly identify where the holes in the system are.

One major consideration is, or should be, that there are only coverage of 35% of total complement in lifeboats on either side. (70% of total) The rest is covered by life rafts, but only to cover 100% if total number on board.

If, because of list or fire, the lifeboats and rafts on one side (refr. C.Concordia) is unable to launch that leaves half the people on board without any means of escape, unless by outside sources.
The 2010 amendment “safe return to port”:
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/Pages/PassengerShips.aspx
is probably the best bet, but in this case that proved not to function as it should.