Costa Concordia Disaster - What happened?

Professional Mariner Forum
143

If the VDR data is corrupted or worse, there isn’t any then sorting all this out will prove to be one very large mess of spagattini (sorry)

What I suspect would have happened in the engineroom is that upon the impact, the breakers to the running generators would have tripped but the engines might have continued to operate. The engine controlroom (ECR) would have been manned continuously thoughout and they would have tried to reset the breakers using a machinery management system or have brought on standby engines to prevent a total blackout.

It is possible that the engineers did get power back fop a short while until the flooding reached the generators when they would have each shorted out one after another until the ship would have only been on the emergency generator. I am wondering if during this period before the main buss when black if Schettino backed and filled to bring the ship around quickly without a danger of making a round turn with a ship rapidly flooding. John’s depiction of the ship only being turned by wind and current doesn’t seem to me to fit here. She came around pretty quickly once that maneuver started and I believe that at least bow thrusters were being used. Then again this is all conjecture based without hard data.

Ultimately, engineroom did completely flood and only the egen was running doing exactly what is was supposed to do by keeping the critical lighting on and boat davitrs working.

144

The port side lifeboats were almost all launched in this photo

and in this photo the ship is settled very low in the water and the starboard boats are still in their davits.

So did any of the starboard boats get launched? If they didn’t wait too long on the port side to lower the boats they shouldn’t have had that happen on the starboard?

There is so much here that just doesn’t make sense!

145

[QUOTE=c.captain;61416]If the VDR data is corrupted or worse, there isn’t any then sorting all this out will prove to be one very large mess of spagattini (sorry)

What I suspect would have happened in the engineroom is that upon the impact, the breakers to the running generators would have tripped but the engines might have continued to operate. The engine controlroom (ECR) would have been manned continuously thoughout and they would have tried to reset the breakers using a machinery management system or have brought on standby engines to prevent a total blackout.

It is possible that the engineers did get power back fop a short while until the flooding reached the generators when they would have each shorted out one after another until the ship would have only been on the emergency generator. I am wondering if during this period before the main buss when black if Schettino backed and filled to bring the ship around quickly without a danger of making a round turn with a ship rapidly flooding. John’s depiction of the ship only being turned by wind and current doesn’t seem to me to fit here. She came around pretty quickly once that maneuver started and I believe that at least bow thrusters were being used. Then again this is all conjecture based without hard data.

Ultimately, engineroom did completely flood and only the egen was running doing exactly what is was supposed to do by keeping the critical lighting on and boat davitrs working.[/QUOTE]

Here’s more on the VDR:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-22/concordia-captain-says-black-box-wasn-t-working-repubblica-says.html

Anyone do the math, 5 compartments flooded, would that be enough weight to sink her?
Did the Captain know 5 compartments would be shortly flooded?
If he did his only option was to ram her ashore as best he could, if he knew 5 flooded compartment makes for adios, we’re going down.
Had the vessel sank in deep water I feel it would not sink as the Titanic, it woulds be quick, the Concordia being so top heavy she probably would roll over with a loss of lives difficult to comprehend.

146

I’m not really surprised that the VDR wasn’t functional. It happens. I had a tech come to a ship I was on to service it and informed me that the magic gizmo hadn’t recorded a thing in 7 months because the backup batteries were dead. Oops. But, we didn’t run aground.

147

This is interesting:

from Bloomberg:
Carnival Corp (CCL)’s Costa Crociere SpA unit asked for the “salute” on Jan. 13 that led the cruise liner to sail close to the small island of Giglio where it struck rocks, la Repubblica cited Schettino as saying.

148

[QUOTE=NimitzFan;61414]There is video showing Costa Concordia staff telling passengers that there had been an electrical problem and that everyone should return to their cabins.

Is it possible that the leadership of the ship did not realize that the main engineering spaces were flooded?

Otherwise, I’d have to assume irrational behavior on the part of the ship’s officers.

Why? Was the Costa Concordia operating with unmanned main engineering spaces? The loss of power would have affected the information reaching the bridge, but surely there is an alarm that says, “MAIN ENGINE ROOM FLOODING,” that keeps working even without power.

In effect I’m asking - [U]Could we be seeing the result of too much automation here?[/U][/QUOTE]

Perhaps, all the gizmos in this world are no comparison to seasoned, intelligent, capable seamen doing what they know best.
The Concordia disaster is the result of mismanagement on all levels.
Mistakes were made.

149

[QUOTE=New3M;61421]I’m not really surprised that the VDR wasn’t functional. It happens. I had a tech come to a ship I was on to service it and informed me that the magic gizmo hadn’t recorded a thing in 7 months because the backup batteries were dead. Oops. But, we didn’t run aground.[/QUOTE]

It’s prudent to post, New3M, that such blatant disregard to the Black Box will soon change.
There are Air Lines Pilots on this forum who will have something to say about this.

150

[QUOTE=Sweat-n-Grease;61424]It’s prudent to post, New3M, that such blatant disregard to the Black Box will soon change.
There are Air Lines Pilots on this forum who will have something to say about this.[/QUOTE]

Yes, but the airlines have a whole other set of rules. I would guess that if the black box on an airplane isn’t working, that thing will sit there until it gets fixed. I was on a flight where we had to go back to the gate because come clip on some little door on the underside of the plane broke and it took them 2 hours to fix. I would assume the black box is definitely a “no-fly.”

We both know that ships sail with stuff not working all the time. If we weren’t able to leave because of one small thing or another, the ports would be full and the oceans would be empty. I’m not saying that the VDR is a ‘small thing,’ quite the opposite. The VDR is a vital piece of equipment in case something like this happens. Maybe the VDR being operational will become an 835 item in the future, but I doubt it.

151

[QUOTE=New3M;61425]Yes, but the airlines have a whole other set of rules. I would guess that if the black box on an airplane isn’t working, that thing will sit there until it gets fixed. I was on a flight where we had to go back to the gate because come clip on some little door on the underside of the plane broke and it took them 2 hours to fix. I would assume the black box is definitely a “no-fly.”[/QUOTE]
I know a few things about flying airplanes, I’ll give way to the Air Lines Pilots on this.

[QUOTE=New3M;61425]We both know that ships sail with stuff not working all the time. If we weren’t able to leave because of one small thing or another, the ports would be full and the oceans would be empty.[/QUOTE]
TRUE,
My final ship during my decades at sea was delivering grain to a starving nation, North Korea.
The ship was not in good shape, I took the job as First Engineer anyway.
We made it, delivered our load, and returned safely.
Does this make it right? I don’t know, except in my mind, as in all the crew’s minds, the attitude was we can do it, and we done it.
There lies the difference between pros and what we may be seeing in the cruise industry.

152

As far as I’ve seen, Concordia was designed to SOLAS 90 passenger ship standards, which only require survivability long enough for evacuation with two compartments flooded. I can’t imagine her being over designed to survive five flooded compartments.

Did the Captain know 5 compartments would be shortly flooded?

Court documents I linked to in post #136 state that he knew, but don’t say when he knew.

From the International Business Times:

The culpable behaviour Capt. Francesco Schettino is charged with results from all the records of investigation compiled in the immediacy of the tragic event, who, with a highly imprudent manoeuvre brought the cruise ship Costa Concordia too close to the coastline of the island Isola del Giglio … caused the impact with a large coastal reef that sprung a leak in the bottom of the craft. The route deviation and the approach to 0.28 nautical miles from the coast of the island was admitted even by the captain … affirming becoming aware only visually that there was a jutting reef … The impact with the reef caused … water flooding the engine rooms and causing the electrical system of the engines to fail, leading to the blackout within the ship, which first veered on the port side, then began to ship water and list on the opposite side. … [T]he captain, … underestimated the extent of the damage and failed to notify the coastal authorities of the accident in timely fashion, reporting that an electrical problem was involved (blackout), without mentioning immediately the impact that had caused the springing of the leak and the flow of water into five compartments of the ship’s engine room … [T]he captain could not help being aware immediately of the seriousness of the damage produced both due to the ever increasingly more evident tilt of the ship and because advised by the crew of the huge amount of water shipped … . [T]he captain lost control of the ship, which had its engines off and shifted position only by means of inertia and the rudders. The SOS was only sent 30-40 minutes after the impact … in the meantime no external alarm signal was given to the coastal authorities to make the real seriousness of the situation aboard understood. At this point, as one also learns from the declarations of Capt. Schettino … , he ordered to drop the anchors and the ship, progressively increasing the tilt starboard, ran aground in the proximity of the coast of the island.

153

On a ship near 1000 feet with over 10 decks how does the bridge make the call to put the elderly, women and children plus drunks off the drifting ship and into small boats run by waiters on the dark sea?

In this case much of the ship was dark in seconds and coms must have been limited.

At what point would any of us start pushing cruise people into life boats and over the side?

How would the master have any idea how much of the hulled was holed?

154

[QUOTE=rlanasa;61433]On a ship near 1000 feet with over 10 decks how does the bridge make the call to put the elderly, women and children plus drunks off the drifting ship and into small boats run by waiters on the dark sea?

In this case much of the ship was dark in seconds and coms must have been limited.

At what point would any of us start pushing cruise people into life boats and over the side?

How would the master have any idea how much of the hulled was holed?[/QUOTE]

I’m sorry but WTF?

155

I second that, wtf ??

156

Gentlemen,

My first post to your forum and like many others share an interest in this unfortunate incident.

I am an Australian Harbour Pilot with 15 years experience with prior seagoing experience of 24 years, 10 of which were in command.

When Piloting large passenger vessels, I find that the greatest challenge is not the actual Pilotage but welding into what normally presents as a tight, defensive and normally well-oiled bridge team. I am an imposition within their domain and I need to sell myself in order to undertake the task. The overall plan is agreed to and understood by all parties and subject to the rigours of Bridge Resource Management. The outcome is often subject to debriefing.

The quality of the bridge teams vary markedly and can be sheeted back to cultural issues within a mixed team. Power distance between the Master and subordinates can be significant to the point where challenges are not forthcoming. Our Airline Pilot colleagues, on this forum, may well relate to this with regard to CRM and the Tenerife disaster.

My experience has been, within an effective Bridge Team, that when a passenger vessel is in close proximity to any danger, two duty officers man their individual radar/ECDIS units updating on CTE along with the Master watching another. Clearly, this is dependant on the age/fitout of the particular vessel. “Costa Concordia” was handed over in 2006 and no doubt her suite of electronics was WBP.

Irrespective of other well documented failures of the Master, I struggle to understand, whilst under the guidance of an effective Bridge Team how the turn to starboard was delayed, lateral drift was not detected, ECDIS prediction was not monitored and how she struck an island. This may be an “assumption based on scanty information” but one can only conclude that the Bridge Team’s efficacy was close to non-existent. Another failure of the Master and those before him. Why has this not been picked up under safety management principles. Plenty of great procedural safety concepts let down by the usual poor maritime implementation.

I am astounded and saddened. It proves, once again, the power of AIS data. Even if the VDR data is corrupted (for whatever reason) the AIS data paints a very clear and irrefutable picture. I look forward to the findings. Hopefully we can all learn from them. It will be a hard learned lesson.

157

Yes, but the airlines have a whole other set of rules. I would guess that if the black box on an airplane isn’t working, that thing will sit there until it gets fixed. I was on a flight where we had to go back to the gate because come clip on some little door on the underside of the plane broke and it took them 2 hours to fix. I would assume the black box is definitely a “no-fly.”

The Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder are both no-go items in aviation.

We both know that ships sail with stuff not working all the time. If we weren’t able to leave because of one small thing or another, the ports would be full and the oceans would be empty.

Aircraft fly all the time, as well, with all sort of minor faults. We have a book called Minimum Equipment List. If something is broken you can look it up to check if it may be broken or not, and if there are any special precautions to be observed or actions to be taken. Usually each item will have a time limit for how long it may be broken.

On a ship near 1000 feet with over 10 decks how does the bridge make the call to put the elderly, women and children plus drunks off the drifting ship and into small boats run by waiters on the dark sea?

I am a bit surprised by the two “WTF” replies.

Comparing again with airline industry, this is quite relevant question. Let’s say you have an engine fire during the take-off run. You abort the start before coming airborne and start braking. Most people wold probably assume that as soon the aircraft comes to a stop an evacuation would be started immediately. However, it is not so.

Statistically there is a high risk of serious injuries and even possibilities of deaths occurring during an evacuation (imagine 400 panicking people trying to get through 10 doors in a few minutes, hitting each other while having to slide down etc). For that reason the first thing to do is try to control the fire. Only if the fire is not controllable the evacuation will be started. The attempt to control the fire may delay the evacuation for at least a minute if not more. If the fire is successfully put out, the next problem may be hot brakes and new associated risk of fire in the brakes. Again you would try to deal with that before starting the evacuation.

This is just one example of many - evacuation is always the last resort, and by giving the command you know it might cost lives in the process. And here we are talking about leaving an object that is firmly planted on the ground!

Why wouldn’t such considerations have to be taken on a cruise ship as well, i.e. that it would have to be evident that it is sinking before taken the action to abandon ship?

158

[QUOTE=Capt.Felix;61440]I second that, wtf ??[/QUOTE]

Let me make it real simple for you? When do you break the real simple stay with the boat rule and force passengers off the warm dry ship into the dark open water?

When and armed with what information do you stop trying to save the ship and order the focus on getting 4,000 off the warm, dry ship.

Hint, that will take more than a few minutes and in Costa’s case you are expected to call home first.

159

GOOGLE TRANSLATION

Grosseto - A few minutes after the impact with the rocks Francesco Schettino was informed that the situation was serious. He was told that he had been “lost control of the ship.” But despite this he decided to delay the order of abandonment of Concord, as he himself was later forced to admit the choice of specifying that you have shared with Roberto Ferrarini, the head of the Crisis on the Coast. This was revealed by the officers who were on the evening of Friday, January 13 on board, some present with him on the bridge. Among them, even the “third” Silvia Coronika, according to which “the people rose with Schettino on deck maneuvers disturbed.” The records obtained by prosecutors on the day after the sinking island of Giglio rebuild the agitated and dramatic of the disaster, but above all the commander’s chain of errors. And court documents reveal how the “captain” - while he was an emergency - is back in the cabin “to get the documentation, but did not succeed.”

“There is water” - The chief engineer Joseph Pilon is among the first to realize what is happening. "I heard the shots that I attributed to the cages outside the baggage. The time to go to the central engine room officer told me: “There is water, no water.” All this happened in a very short, time to get up, get out of the office, 3 or 4 feet and I was in Central. I told him to check that all watertight doors were closed as expected. The time to say, and the blackout was total. It is off more … I opened the main door, I opened the engine room and bridge, the water was already at 0, came straight to the cabinet. I gave the situation to the commander Schettino, I told him that the engine room, electrical panel and aft were flooded. I told him we had lost control of the ship … I informed the commander of the serious situation to worsen, I then informed later a few times. I do not know exactly what he was doing in those moments, I was committed to see what was going on. "
It is the “head of an engineering watch” Alberto Fiorito to confirm as was clear from the outset that the situation was dramatic. "At about 21:30 I felt a crush on the starboard side, then across to the left, then again across to starboard. All I was flying from the console. In an instant I felt the blow in the middle. Everything was shaking. I knew we had something. I got up, I called down in the car to evacuate. All the alarms sounded. I moved away from the center to open the vacuum masses. Going down the ramp of the bridge B in the local generators of the bow I opened the door and saw the gash in the side of the ship and the water that came … Within two minutes it was all flooded. I opened the door of the premises of the main electrical panel, but there were already almost two feet of water. Pilon asked me to suck but it was flooded and the pumps are not turned. The blackout was almost immediate … We counted five rooms flooded and we know that the ship can carry up to three rooms flooded … The first emergency signal came after about half an hour. With a colleague we tried to help douse the spears. We advised the passengers to go on the starboard side because that side of the spears had been dropped. 3 At the bridge was already on the water. I witnessed the arrival of the boatswain and I opened my heart because I knew I was safe. I was taken to the ground and I started driving a lance to try to retrieve the passengers, but due to technical problems we had to return to earth. I do not know what he did the commander, the voices that I heard is that it is thrown into the water first assume that all passengers were evacuated. "

Lies to the Master - Silvia Coronika is the third officer, with Schettino has already worked on another ship, in Brazil. She is to focus on the dramatic moments on impact with the rock. "There was so much confusion and my memories are unclear and because of the many communications received and the screams could be heard. They tried to figure out how many compartments were flooded and many were working. After about two minutes the commander did call the hostess to make announcements to passengers and crew to reassure them that the situation was under control and peace of mind. Within a few minutes, however we realize that the situation was serious because the ship has become ungovernable. "
Coronika still says: "The Port Authority of Civitavecchia asked if there were problems on board and the captain ordered the officer in charge of the radio to report that there was a blackout. When asked if we needed assistance said: “Not at the moment.” Just then the captain discussed with those present that he needed the tug, but did not explain the reason for this request. "

Schettino, “inattentive” - To hear the statements of the woman comes the confirmation that several crew members followed the example of the master and left the ship before all the passengers were rescued. "When I came down from the bridge I have not seen any person in the sea, I saw when I went on the starboard side, but not right away because there were already lowered their spears and rafts in the course of inflation on which then climbed the people. Soon after, as the ship moved swiftly lurches to the right side, people started to jump into the sea. At some point I also 20:30 with people we dived into the sea. In swimming I reached the rock nearby and there among the other people were Ciro Ambrosio and Christidis Dimitrios (the closest collaborators of Schettino, editor’s note) and other officers reported that they were dry and I have gained ground with a boat. "
The captain admitted that he rose to go to the commands with the young Moldovan Domnica Cemortan and the maitre d '. Coronika says: "I mean that the number of people present on the bridge climb with Schettino, not responsible for services related to the purpose of navigation, including the Hotel Directory. Who asked that island was the maitre d 'who was talking, in fact disturbed maneuvers resulting in a decline of attention. "

The cards in the cabin - on the Concordia While passengers are in a panic and the situation is spiraling out of control, Schettino goes towards their accommodation. He himself to admit it and this feeds the suspicion that it may have taken away valuable material for the investigation, especially now that is not his computer. Holds the record: "I went into my cabin, I wanted to take some register. The moment I went into the cabin, in the dark, have opened the drawers, the doors of my documents, all of which are kept in carpette and are almost slipped, luckily I have not broken his head against the desk … Basically the ship was so, books and exercise books have flown on the floor, the floor became slippery, so much so that I had to go crawling to the door. "
What is able to take away? Mystery. Shortly after Schettino landed on the rock and there is his “second” and several senior officers. Many passengers are still on board, on the other boats, others are still trying to save themselves by swimming. They have already done so despite the law requires that they should be the last to abandon ship.
Fiorenza Sarzanini
January 23, 2012 | 14:54
© All rights reserved

160

[QUOTE=rlanasa;61452]Let me make it real simple for you? When do you break the real simple stay with the boat rule and force passengers off the warm dry ship into the dark open water?[/QUOTE]

Let me make this real simple for you. Aboard the Costa Concordia, when you know, or strongly suspect, more than three compartments are flooded.

[QUOTE=rlanasa;61452]When and armed with what information do you stop trying to save the ship and order the focus on getting 4,000 off the warm, dry ship.[/QUOTE]

Aboard the Costa Concordia, when you know, or strongly suspect, more than three compartments are flooded.

[QUOTE=rlanasa;61452]Hint, that will take more than a few minutes and in Costa’s case you are expected to call home first.[/QUOTE]

Hint. you are quite condescending, ain’t cha.
If the Captain knew the vessel would sink I feel his only action was to ram the vessel ashore. The Concordia would not go down slowly, being so top heavy it more than likely would roll over, that would cause a terrible loss of life.

161

Well from the report provided it appears that they never did get power back to the main buss but I am still confused about all this 5 compartments flooded? Look at the length of the breach in the hull. It isn’t long enough to breach through 4 bulkheads and allow 5 compartments to flood. I can see 3 flooded compartments but not 5. Were watertight doors left open?

btw…I am sure the ship had a stability computer that could very quickly calculate the loss of stability from any three compartments flooded and if she would still remain afloat. One would know how many and which compartment were flooding based on reports coming into the bridge and bilge level alarms going off. That info should have Schettino pretty quickly afterwards.

I have also heard about “aft engineroom” in some account of the ship flooding. Did the CC have two seperate generator rooms?

162

WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES?

The thread by AustralianPilot just reminded me on another subject, discussed in on this forum:

In the post he mentions Bridge Resource Menagement.

Well, my question, popping out at the moment is:
Who was on the bridge at the moments of accident, and how did they respond?
The bridge team so - far, has not been publicly known (or not entirly), thus saving them from any public crticism, and keeping the captain in the spot light.

Most certainly, the better part of responsibility by law, ad tradition goes to captain.
However, reading many of safety accident reports on MAIB, or NTSB, the safety investigations highlight all contributional factors leading to accident, which quite often points to bad bridge team management, or on occasion - individuals team members.

So far, the public lynch hits the captain, but the question I would like to ask is:
Who were the rest of bridge team, and why / what prevented them in monitoring the safe course of the voyage?

(Navigation, lets be reminded is consisted of: voyage planning, appraisal, execution and monitoring)
Whilst the execution obviously failed, (lets pin it on captain), who was monitoring and backing up the master during shiphandling.

Secondly, as there is obviously nuomerous contributory factors leading to this accident, lets mention the dangerous practise, which already has a name: touristic navigation.
http://gcaptain.com/costa-concordia-showing-off/?37739

After similar manouvre, publicly known, the question is: Did company make anything to prevent such manouveres in the future?