Costa Concordia Disaster - What happened?

[QUOTE=Heiwa;62187]The above summary will also assist how to plan the salvage, i.e. to what position you need to move the vessel (on the rocks) to pump the undamaged compartments dry! [B]And re-float the vessel![/QUOTE]

If repaired and placed back in service what name will grace the vessel, [I]La Costa Phoenix[/I], perhaps [I]Costa Concordia Due[/I]?

[QUOTE=Heiwa;62187]The above summary will also assist how to plan the salvage, i.e. to what position you need to move the vessel (on the rocks) to pump the undamaged compartments dry! [B]And re-float the vessel! [/B][/QUOTE]

If repaired and placed back in service what name will grace the vessel, [I]La Costa Phoenix[/I], perhaps [I]Costa Concordia Due[/I] ?

[QUOTE=c.captain;62205]It’s staggering to think that main machinery spaces in a passengership would only have thin shell plating seperating them from the sea outside,[/QUOTE]

Yes, doesn’t it?

[QUOTE=c.captain;62205]but maybe this was the case with the CC?[/QUOTE]

Bet’cha you’ll find more in Costa’s Fleet.

The VDR is broken, and the crew has been sent home. Who is going to do the investigation? The same people who prosecuted Amanda Knox? Let’s be real here. The veracity of the Italian "ABS’ classification society (RINA) is what is at stake here. They are going to do ANYthing to make them selves look good, and to downplay any part they may have had to ‘approve’ a vessel design that is, shall we say
 circumspect!

I doubt she plummeted. there was -0- righting arm in any direction. She simply rolled down to a 90 and found her ‘new’ waterline.

There was an earlier comment from what sounded like an Italian seaman/Officer on these boards, commenting on such mundane things as housekeeping continually blocking WT door thresholds, etc etc. I surmise that this will have quite a lot do do with the final findings.

[QUOTE=c.captain;62205]It’s staggering to think that main machinery spaces in a passengership would only have thin shell plating seperating them from the sea outside, but maybe this was the case with the CC?[/QUOTE]
Hmmmm Obviously I need to bring you aboard my tug!!!
Double hull= -0-
ballast tanks= -0-
reserve buoyancy=-0-
what else have I missed?

[QUOTE=cappy208;62214]Hmmmm Obviously I need to bring you aboard my tug!!!
Double hull= -0-
ballast tanks= -0-
reserve buoyancy=-0-
what else have I missed?[/QUOTE]

Tugs aren’t built to the same rules as pax ships! Hell, I once ran 340’ fish processor in Alaska that literally did not have one true watertight bulkhead from the collision bulkhead to the afterpeak tank. The bulkheads between the holds had been cut through to allow a forklift to drive their length and even the forward bulkhead of the engineroom only had a hinged w/t door that had to be manually closed and dogged. Sliding and closable from anywhere other than at the door itself? Hell NO! They were an uninspected vessel and nobody thought at all about the critical importance of subdivision there! On top of that no bilge system! I was told by the owners that it would never work if it was ever needed so why bother! Structure fire protection? Never heard of it! In conclusion a ship both built to burn but also to sink.

Still I was young and stupid and she was an early command of mine in my career so I was hungry. I may have been hungry but in hindsight, I was also damned lucky too! Glad that most of those death traps are now gone but not all and the fact that one hasn’t burned and/or gone down with massive loss of life is a miracle!

[QUOTE=c.captain;62216]Tugs aren’t built to the same rules as pax ships! Hell, I once ran 340’ fish processor in Alaska that literally did not have one true watertight bulkhead from the collision bulkhead to the afterpeak tank. The bulkheads between the holds had been cut through to allow a forklift to drive their length and even the forward bulkhead of the engineroom only had a hinged w/t door that had to be manually closed and dogged. Sliding and closable from anywhere other than at the door itself? Hell NO! They were an uninspected vessel and nobody thought at all about the critical importance of subdivision there! On top of that no bilge system! I was told by the owners that it would never work if it was ever needed so why bother! Structure fire protection? Never heard of it! In conclusion a ship both built to burn but also to sink.

Still I was young and stupid and she was an early command of mine in my career so I was hungry. I may have been hungry but in hindsight, I was also damned lucky too! Glad that most of those death traps are now gone but not all and the fact that one hasn’t burned and/or gone down with massive loss of life is a miracle![/QUOTE]

That wouldn’t be the OCEAN PHOENIX?

I think there is a difference between the theory and the reality. The first priority of the Master, particularly in this case and many others, seems to be in reality the achievement of the desired objective of his employer, which is to maximize the profits. To reach that goal, he has to operate the vessel at the lowest coast and create fidelity so to maintain his vessel up to capacity. On a cruise ship, the money comes from the passengers. So you have to do everything possible to satisfy them. One of the most important fascination for the passengers, is to have a human contact with the Master. He is then required to give a Captain’s gala, photographed when shaking hands, cocktails, dinners, socializing and so on. Delegating these tasks to existing entertainment/cruise/hotel/passenger directors would not have the same impact, as to hand over it to a honoris causa PR Captain. Passengers wants to hear The Tales of Seas stories by a real Captain, not by a cabin tender.

Public relations carry out by the Master are time consuming, demanding and at the limit, exhausting. So do you believe that a Master which has been giving gala with all the adjoining activities, is duly fit afterward for duty on the navigation bridge in times of urgent situation. I don’t think so. In that present case, what was doing the Master before being called to the bridge 
 something like half an hour before a non return point, when it takes approximately 10 to 15 minutes just to adjust your eye sight to the darkness.

The authority ambiance on a navigation bridge is totally different whether it is the Master or the Chief Officer (Staff Captain) who has the conn. The reason is that the Master has already been promoted ! On a cargo en route, is the OOW calls the Captain or the Chief Mate in times of delicate passage situation. Delegation in those matters has its limit. Furthermore, challenging senior members is not a widespread culture, on the contrary. I ounce challenged myself a captain in the past, but I had to pay the price for it 
 BMR principles has to be implemented by the Master, emphasized by the head office and duly assess and appraise confidentially by the juniors officers. No escape.

Finally Solas ! The Titanic could withstand 4 watertight compartments before sinking. What I understand, is that the Concordia could survive to only 2 or 3 flooded compartments. It is quite an improvement over a 100 years. In the same course of progress, we could update that the “Master is second only to the Head Office, then to God” 


[QUOTE=GB.Murph;62121]The first priority of the Master is always the safety of his vessel and the souls on it. His second priority is the safety of all other seafarers within range (a requirement of SOLAS V, regardless of the cost to his employer). His third priority is to achieve the desired objectives of his employer. These are also the priorities of every officer on the vessel (both navigational and engineering).

I don’t think we need a fundamental change to the established on board chain of command, to be perfectly honest, just to ensure that we have the best individuals for the jobs. Having a second PR-focussed captain would likely lead to conflict at times. The correct person for that role is the existing entertainment/cruise/hotel/passenger director, who should report to the captain while at sea. The changes needed here are to ensure that both the captain, XO & mates, and every person who will be OOW are both competent and take their traditional maritime responsibilities seriously. Additionally, the proper BRM needs to be constantly evaluated, refined, refreshed, and emphasised. With the correct bridge team and BRM, there should be no major problem for the Master to spend some time with his passengers, but he needs to always put that after his main priorities and responsibilities.

The BRM also needs to include a culture where members of the bridge team are not afraid to speak up and challenge senior members of the team if they see a mistake being made. If there were not at least a couple of other qualified people on the bridge who could see the incident approaching, and the dangerous failure to correctly respond to it, that’s a fundamental problem. I suspect that there had to be others involved who failed in their responsibilities for some reason.

Some of the failures within the CC bridge team:

  1. They did have a passage plan for the close approach to Giglio, but it was either dangerously flawed, or they failed to follow it, or responded incorrectly to the failure to follow the plan.

  2. Other members of the team should have been monitoring Schettino’s manual helming and the position of the vessel at all times. They should have been sufficiently competent to spot the rapidly approaching point of no return

  3. The bridge team as a whole should not have allowed the dangerous delay in declaring a MAYDAY and sounding the general alarm. Every single member of the bridge team should have been fully aware that lost minutes in an emergency translate directly to lost souls.

These failures by other members of the bridge team do not absolve Schettino of any responsibility at all, he will forever be fully responsible for the incident and lost souls, but the other members of the team do need to shoulder their own portion of that burden. Every bridge team out there need to look at themselves and plan how they should respond if their captain shows signs of dangerously failing to meet his responsibilities (the Master may be second only to God at sea, but he will always remain human and fallible).

As for double hulls, Thomas Andrews was a fan of them to the day he died
[/QUOTE]

[QUOTE=cmakin;62219]That wouldn’t be the OCEAN PHOENIX?[/QUOTE]

Ha! No it was one of the WWII Knotship conversions. Luckily now scrapped!

The OP isn’t much better and she is INSPECTED!

Here is Starbuck’s summary of Concordia’s journey, from the time she made contact with an underwater part of Isola del Giglio to the time she settled on a rocky shelf a bit further up the coast:

[QUOTE=Starbuck1;62185]So our stability/list/capsize scenario at the moment is: Due to a badly done turn on a close pass-by, the port side is ripped open for 150’, opening 5 WT compartments to the sea. As the ship coasts to a stop, over the next 30 minutes, at first there is a port list due to loss of buoyancy on the port side, but it gradually returns to an even keel as the flooding spreads across the full beam of the ship in 5-20 minutes. (Is there any other information on timing of changes in list?). The ship is steered in a slowing gradual turn to the right, past the eye of the wind when it finally stops, we guess on a roughly even keel.

The 12kt NNE wind pivots the ship around the flooded and deeper drafted stern until the wind is on the port quarter and, while the ship is gradually flooding, it drifts back toward Porto Giglio. The wind pressure of the NNE wind on 100,000 square feet of the port side heels the ship slightly to starboard. (Is 40-60 tons of wind pressure 50’ high really sufficient to do this?) (Has the flooding in the ship reached a point where it will loll significantly with modest pressure?) This causes the flooding in the ship to move to starboard and gradually amplify the overtopping of the remaining watertight compartments onto the starboard side. Now the progressive flooding is dumping the water into the starboard side of each compartment as it overtops. As the ship runs around, aft first, the now lower starboard side touches ground at 0.5 knots (but if aft hit first wouldn’t it kill the speed while the ship pivots on the stern to its semi-final alignment?). The captain drops the anchors to hold it in place and finally calls Mayday and begins to abandon ship. Momentum is zero.

So it is aground with a 20Âș? starboard list, lights on, about 1 deck of hull showing below the boat deck, launching the lifeboats. The list is gradually steepening as the hull fills. Within a half hour, the water is up to the boat deck, the list is up to about 30Âș but most/all of the starboard boats are away now and a few are nosed into the ship to pick up more passengers. The port side boat launching has problems due to the list, but eventually all but 3 are launched.

So far the arguments have all been based on no damage to the starboard side adding to the list, and no asymmetric loading of internal tankage or transfers of ballast/counterflooding by the ER crew since we have no data on this, although all three are possible.

(see below for last paragraph)[/QUOTE]

I don’t know if anyone else has come across this website?

http://www.qps.nl/display/qastor/2012/01/17/20120117_stranding

My internet is rather slow at the moment, so I have only looked at the last video, a 3-D animation of a little model “Costa Concordia” doing here thing with additional info such as depth of water, course heading and so on. If this animation is at all accurate, and for arguments sake lets say it is, well I think it bears out Starbuck’s description rather nicely.

[QUOTE=Starbuck1;62185]
(Starbuck’s last paragraph:)

Here’s where it gets messy. Even though the list is modest, 20-30Âș, and the starboard bilge is aground (?), the ship continues to roll to starboard until by 2400 or 0100, it is on its side with 300 or so survivors walking off along ropes or ladders on the side of the ship. The main wound is fully exposed now. (Would it really be so top-heavy that only a 20-30Âș list would be past the point of no return? Why didn’t it settle back to port, pivoting on the starboard bilge rather than going all the way to starboard?). A rock under the hull? Asymmetric flooding/buoyancy? Flooding from the boat deck level (many openings open) on the starboard side of middle decks rather than flooding all the way to the bilges increasing the height and starboard side bias of the CG ? hmm.[/QUOTE]

What is interesting to me is that after, I guess, the ship has grounded on the rocky plateau, right at the end of the video, the ship’s bow continues to fall away to stbd. while the stern remains stationary. From this I deduce that yes, she has indeed got her stern stuck on the rock and the forward two thirds/three quarters of her is free floating – but also, she is free to pivot on her stern, a bit as though she is balanced on a rock outcrop. Even if she is on a fairly blunt rocky outcrop, or even on flat sloping rock, I think because she is able to pivot freely left and right, the point of contact could be fairly well aft – just where the lines of the ship narrow quite rapidly to form the underwater pinched shape so as to have a nice flow of water pass her propeller when she is steaming along under normal conditions. But the pinching in of the underwater shape of the hull also means that the flat area of the ship’s bottom, the further aft you go the narrower it gets, and any point of contact would be nearer the C/L. (Remember she trimmed by the stern by several meters). Therefore this could mean that she is also free to list, lean, loll or roll left or right (not just pivot in the horizontal plane), to any external forces with out much resistance – and with the assistance of free surface water flooding in as well. The light breeze on her vast superstructure may have been just enough to cause her to flop to stbd., a few degrees at first but increasing in time with continuous and steady flooding until she was all the way over. The stbd. bilge didn’t prevent the capsize because it was never properly in contact with the sea bottom (???).

[QUOTE=Sweat-n-Grease;62208]If repaired and placed back in service what name will grace the vessel, [I]La Costa Phoenix[/I], perhaps [I]Costa Concordia Due[/I] ?[/QUOTE]

Costa Lotta Moolah To-a Fix-a?

Useful (close to the centerline) point.

Additional factor. The ship is down by the stern at least 3 decks. The night photos, lit up, boats not launched, with Griglio in the foreground, show the first passenger deck below water aft with a list of about 20Âș. The next, boats launched, shows the aft end of the boat deck at water level, and lower two passenger levels below water aft. At this point the stern mooring deck at the first passenger level is open and 20’ underwater, opening into the long starboard passageway. This would produce rapid flooding into the starboard side cabins only, and at a high elevation relative to the normal CG. The angle also allows the flooding cabins to vent. The port side is high and dry, and the angle traps air from lower flooding on the bottom side of the decks, and the imbalance/ instability grows toward capsize.

I still question when the starboard list started. I’ve proposed wind after the point of 180Âș turn, but I’m not certain. The only news report I’ve found on the subject put it as sudden and at about 2150, only 20 minutes after hitting the island. Lolling, not just wind?

Re Heiwa’s comments:
[“Let’s not exaggerate. Let’s say hull damage was 35 meters long and three WT compartments at around 1/4L from AP were symetrically flooded. Damaged ship just trimmed on stern 
 and floated. The VDR bilge alarms data will clarify. The ship thus survived the initial contact incident enabling succesful evacuation of 99% of all persons aboard. Not bad actually!”]

You can measure the gash by looking at the lifeboat bays above it as I describe in an earlier post, and correlate it to the compartments on the longitudinal cross section of the ship. It matches the engineer’s testimony of all 5 engineering compartments quickly flooded. You could probably scale it off the aerial photos too. Open WT doors probably contributed to the speed of flooding. Sadly, no VDR as noted earlier.

The grace of the survival long enough to evacuate 4000 people is testimony to the vast volume of space in the hull to be flooded and the many small compartments slowly flooding, plus maybe the grounding preventing the stern from sinking quickly and upending the ship at it might have in deep water. Very lucky if you ask me.

I wouldn’t call a 20-30Âș list a minor matter or near upright. Your point re the aft mooring deck is significant as described above.

Re question of wing tanks. I don’t include them because I have no evidence, although I think it probable that there are some. I just don’t know where or in what condition or if full or empty. The hole in the side by the ER doesn’t seem to show any structure or space for them. Pretty surprising really.

{"It is recommended to do an underwater survey of ship and sea floor below and to establish contact points ship/sea floor, describe local ship damages starboard (down) side and to chart the bottom below/around the wreck. I wonder why it hasn’t been done 
 or why it hasn’t been reported in the media!]
[“Last edited by Heiwa; Today at 09:21 AM”].
Agreed.

[QUOTE=Observer;62234]Costa Lotta Moolah To-a Fix-a?[/QUOTE]

No Schetting
:smiley:

I do hope my Pals of Italian background do not read this!
:smiley:

[QUOTE=Starbuck1;62236]The grace of the survival long enough to evacuate 4000 people is testimony to the vast volume of space in the hull to be flooded and the many small compartments slowly flooding, plus maybe the grounding preventing the stern from sinking quickly and upending the ship at it might have in deep water. Very lucky if you ask me. [/QUOTE]

Yes indeed, all the survivors are VERY lucky that the ship didn’t roll on her side while still in deep water. If you watch the nightvision video taken after the hull was on her side you realize what the loss of life could have been given the wind from another direction!

That’s further confusion, since conventional wisdom would say, drop the anchor ASAP. But in this case Shettino’s indecision actually let it ground first! Or should I say it is better in shallow water or those people seen scampering down the port side would have had a totally different experience! Go figure!

Wikipedia seems to have a pretty good narrative and timeline together now. A few notes in brackets.
Start of starboard list is at the 180Âș turn at 22:10, although no info in Wiki on the how of the capsize. There are a bunch of youtube videos by pax below deck during the event too. Seems they were trying to use the elevators as water is cascading down the stairwells with crew trying to direct them. Watching them makes me think it is a miracle only 33 died.

21:42: Collision at Le Scole reef
[About 5 minutes later CE reports to captain, engine & generator rooms flooded & nothing can be done.]
22:06: Harbour Master phoned by passenger’s daughter, saying life jackets were ordered
22:10: Ship turns around; listing begins
22:14: Harbour Master radios ship; is told only that an electrical blackout started 20 minutes ago and will be repaired
22:26: Harbour Master contacts Captain who says that the ship is taking on water through a port side opening and listing; no dead or injured; requests a tugboat
22:34: Harbour Master is told that ship is in distress
22:39: Patrol boat reports the ship is listing heavily
22:44: Coast Guard reports the ship is grounded [about the time of the first lit-up ship photos with the lifeboats in place]
22:45: Captain denies grounding, says ship still floating and will be brought around
22:50: Evacuation begins [So most got off in about 45-60 minutes]
22:58: Captain reports that he ordered evacuation
23:23: Ship reports large starboard hull breach
23:37: Captain reports 300 people on board
00:12: Coast Guard patrol boat reports that port side lifeboats can’t be launched
00:34: Captain says he is in a lifeboat and sees 3 people in water
00:36: Coast Guard patrol reports 70-80 people on board including children and elderly
00:42: Captain and his officers are in lifeboat; Harbour Master orders them to return
01:04: Helicopter lowers Air Force officer aboard, who reports 100 people remain
02:29: 3 people hanging from ship’s prow
03:05: Evacuation ferry returns to Porto Santo Stefano with 5 injured and 3 dead
03:17: Police identify Captain on quay
03:44: Air Force reports 40-50 remain to evacuate
04:22: 30 reported remaining to be evacuated
04:46: Evacuation concluded

A friend on flicker:

has recently augmented a set of photos taken of CARNIVAL SPLENDOR during the January 2011 dry docking at SF Pier 70 to replace the engine damaged by fire. His engine room photos may be of interest to those trying to get a feel for the spaces to the extent that CARNIVAL SPLENDOR and COSTA CONCORDIA share design. He is not a mariner so his terminology may lack precision, but his photos speak for themselves.
New photos (time dependent):

Complete set:
Carnival Splendor in for major Repairs 1-2011

and

Also the Blog of “Carnival’s Senior Cruise Director” for 2/14/2011


“And now exclusively here on the blog thingy we can go inside the engine room of the Carnival Splendor and see how the new engine was placed inside.”
There are some engine room images as well as the access hole in the side of the ship:


[http://johnhealdsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/DSC00557.jpg?84cd58

An excellent post Topsail, and one that could read over to aviation as well!

I agree with you !

I forgot to say that no passenger vessel should have a clearance outward or allowed take the sea on a new cruise, prior a duly and compulsory emergency & abandoned ship drill for all the passengers and crew on board. Never.