[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;186581]But isn’t the customer always right? D’oh!!![/QUOTE]
Let’s not forget that Chouest’s best people did not even understand the basics of towing. The took the chain surge gear out. They towed far too short. They repeatedly tautlined the tow wire for hours without taking any remedial action. The arrogant ass of a captain dismissed warnings from a crewman onboard with local knowledge of the area. Instead of staying in deep water with a little more sea room, where they could put all the tow wire out they cut a corner on a short wire over a place called Albatross Bank.
If if they had left the chain surge gear in place, towed 10 miles to the east in deep water with all the tow wire out, and backed off on the throttle a little, they would have gotten the job down without incident. All the problems with fuel vents and injectors happened after they had lost the tow and where trying to recover it. They did not know anything about towing. That’s why it happened.
Chouest management now says they did nothing wrong on the Kulluk tow. Further proof that Chouest is unqualified to take over tanker escorts from Crowley.
Yes, they totally blew it in virtually every way, shape and form that they could.
Yes, ECO has a history of arrogant swagger, bluster, and substituting fancy technology for knowledge, experience, common sense and humility.
Being humble when moving your operations into areas and activities where you have no knowledge and significant prior experience can go a long way towards avoiding trouble. They went with their “usual” game plan and it blew up in their face. Shell takes the hit for failing to properly vet, choose and supervise their sub-contractor.
Having said all that, many companies, maybe even all of them to one degree or another, are prone to the exact same shortcomings. There is widespread ignorance among management-types about the different specific conditions and challenges, seasonal and otherwise, in the different geographic areas of North America and, for that matter, the whole planet. They tend not to think much of it. Tote Maritime, anyone? How about Crowley? Were they on the ball when the Sentry got caught out, lost the La Princesa in Hurricane Ida, and it wound up on VA Beach? Does that sound like a careful corporate culture or a schedule-driven one? If Crowley can’t tow competently then who the hell can?
But guess what? Way too many of my peers have the same “cowboy” mindset: “Sure, I can do it!” Setting off without a clue, relying on previous experience that often has little or no direct relevance to the voyage at hand, certain that they’ve got it all under control. Right up until the moment they don’t.
There is a lack of knowledge and respect for the elements, for the intricacies of tide and current, for the nature of how they interact with the bathymetry, and how it will effect the tow and the navigation of it. Over-engineering (which I’m not against in principle) is usually used to mitigate for it, but that will only take you so far.
The reckless and idiotic presumption that a buoy’s a buoy, a channel’s a channel, a harbor’s a harbor. Worse still, there is often a lack of basic curiosity about all of these things. No sense that there is always more to learn, that continuously learning is very important, that the knowledge gained needs to be widely shared, and that we all have knowledge and awareness gaps that can get us if we run out of our taken-for-granted luck.
Of course, most of us will always say “There’s always more to learn” (if for no other reason than because it sounds really bad not to) but actual behavior would indicate that too many of us don’t really believe in or practice it. Too much bloody ego.
I’ve seen, again and again, instances where even simply reading and heeding the right sections in a U.S. Coast Pilot would have provided enough information to avoid most or all of the trouble that befell someone, but it wasn’t done. Why?
This is a top-to-bottom problem, and it is widespread. The tone gets set by management, and the troops will generally take their cues accordingly. None of this is news, either.
Shell created and sent out a bad plan. Little time was given to evalate the plan. Tugsailor thinks a well run boat could have pulled it off, maybe so, seems like a dicey tow to me. Either way the plan had little margin for error, even well run boats have bad luck. The Aiviq however was not well run or well supported by the company. For example the failure to understand or correct the problem of water entering the fuel tanks.
If Crowley can’t tow competently then who the hell can?
Any Dutchies on here that would like to answer that one??
Otherwise I totally agree with the sentiments and opinions by Tugsailor and CaptJackSparrow here.
You can have the best of equipment, but if you don’t know how to use it, or how to respect the elements, nothing works.
Experience and good sense it the most important items when planning and executing a towing operation.
Some rely upon luck and good fortune, while others think that their experience from other type of operations and other parts of the world will be sufficient.
I am an American, commenting on two loss-of-tow incidents involving American operators in the Jones Act trade. By definition that excludes non-U.S. operators.
My statement regarding Crowley was meant only to point out that even companies with long and proud (maybe a bit too proud) histories of ocean towing can and do commit big blunders, at both the management and operational levels (planning & execution).
The Sentry was a very capable Invader-class tug that lost the tow of La Princesa (RO/RO) because they parted both 2-1/4" wires in the remnants of Hurricane Ida. They got into sustained conditions beyond the capabilities of their gear. Enormous barge, immense sail area, weather they weren’t “expecting”, etc. Crowley knows how to do this stuff competently, they just didn’t. And if an operator with their depth of institutional company experience can make these mistakes then it can happen to anyone, anywhere.
In no way am I implying that other operators from around the world, be they Dutch or any other nationality, lack the expertise to conduct competent towing operations. I know for a fact that they exist. But having the capabilities is one thing. Consistently applying them, along with sound judgment and a conservative mindset regarding safety, is another. Crowley, in that particular instance, showed that they had the former, but not the latter.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;186628]^That’s a good post Capt Jack S.
Shell created and sent out a bad plan. Little time was given to evalate the plan. Tugsailor thinks a well run boat could have pulled it off, maybe so, seems like a dicey tow to me. Either way the plan had little margin for error, even well run boats have bad luck. The Aiviq however was not well run or well supported by the company. For example the failure to understand or correct the problem of water entering the fuel tanks.[/QUOTE]
First and foremost, I think it was the wrong tow — at the wrong time of year. If the tow had to made, they should have waited for a weather window instead of setting off into a forecast storm.
It was definitely the wrong route. The correct route for this tow from Dutch Harbor to Seattle would have been to go south toward Honolulu for about 300 miles, and then turn east toward Seattle. This well established route would have taken them south of the low pressure systems tracking across the Aleutians and into the Gulf of Alaska. On this route following seas and a favorable current are expected.
Admittedly, the Shell experts forced the supposedly “safer” (within helicopter range) near shore Gulf of Alaska route on Chouest. Chouest could not push back on the route choice because they had no idea what they were doing or what route to take. No one else tows SE of Kodiak over Albatross Bank, not even in the summer. What they encountered on this route is what anyone knowledgeable would expect, NE winds north of the lows tracking across the Gulf, right on the nose, with strong currents and steep seas on Albatross Bank. Chouest is probably the only company that has ever attempted a winter eastbound tow SE of Kodiak.
In spite of all this, If they had stayed a few miles outside the edge of the shelf in deep water, used all the chain surge gear on Kulluk, used all of their tow wire, and had slowed down enough to keep the strain on the tow gear within an acceptable range, they would not have parted the tow wire and lost the tow. If they hadn’t lost the tow, they would not have been rolling on beam ends while trying to recover the tow and taking water down the fuel vents. Aiviq would not have ended up dead in the water and Kulluk would not have ended up on the rocks, and Arctic offshore oil drilling would not have been killed for decades.
If Chouest had had the knowledge and skill required of a competent Prince William Sound tanker escort contractor (that includes the ability to rescue disabled tankers in the Gulf of Alaska), they would have done everything differently and they would not have put Kulluk on the rocks.
I cannot imagine how any company could more completely disqualify itself to be the PWS tanker escort contractor, than Chouest already has.
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;186634]I am an American, commenting on two loss-of-tow incidents involving American operators in the Jones Act trade. By definition that excludes non-U.S. operators.
My statement regarding Crowley was meant only to point out that even companies with long and proud (maybe a bit too proud) histories of ocean towing can and do commit big blunders, at both the management and operational levels (planning & execution).
The Sentry was a very capable Invader-class tug that lost the tow of La Princesa (RO/RO) because they parted both 2-1/4" wires in the remnants of Hurricane Ida. They got into sustained conditions beyond the capabilities of their gear. Enormous barge, immense sail area, weather they weren’t “expecting”, etc. Crowley knows how to do this stuff competently, they just didn’t. And if an operator with their depth of institutional company experience can make these mistakes then it can happen to anyone, anywhere.
In no way am I implying that other operators from around the world, be they Dutch or any other nationality, lack the expertise to conduct competent towing operations. I know for a fact that they exist. But having the capabilities is one thing. Consistently applying them, along with sound judgment and a conservative mindset regarding safety, is another. Crowley, in that particular instance, showed that they had the former, but not the latter.[/QUOTE]
World wide towing is something that the Dutch know more about than anybody. That is an undisputed fact.
I have worked with Crowley since the mid-1970’s when they were the second to perform so-called “dry tows” and know about their capabilities, but it takes nothing away from the Dutch.
In 1975 & 76 we loaded the Bethlehem rigs “Teledyne 16 & 17” on a “Red Stack” barge, towed by a “Red Stack” tug from Singapore to GoM.
(The first such tow was done in 1974 by a Dutch operated, Norwegian owned company then known as Tschudi & Eitzen Towage.
The lack of foresight and handling skills in the case discussed here does not exactly impress. From what I have read on this case, there were more than Crowley that lacked the important skills needed to perform a successful tow in difficult circumstances. Shell and whoever approved this tow is also to blame.
Don’t you people have anything better to talk about? That minor incident is old news why don’t you move on? I know the people I made donations to have moved on and even helped me land new work in Alaska. Everyone told me I would never get a foot in the door up here. I have found Alaskan businessman and the politicians to be quite reasonable when money can be made.
Shell contracted ECO (Chouest) for the tow of the Kulluk. Crowley had nothing to do with it. ECO had no clue what they were doing.
I cited Crowley’s loss of the La Princesa as an example of a company that had a history of ocean towing but still screwed it up anyway.
So, while Crowley may have a lot of experience with tanker escorts in PWS, that doesn’t necessarily mean they are beyond all reproach.
In fact, ironically, Crowley’s Pathfinder itself went aground on the very same reef that was hit by the Exxon Valdez and brought about their required presence via OPA '90.
No one is beyond screwing up, especially when they start believing their own bullshit that they’re “the best.” Not us, the Dutch, the Norwegians, or anyone else. Human hubris and fallibility is the common thread that connects us all, regardless of where we hail from.
[QUOTE=tugsailor;186635]First and foremost, I think it was the wrong tow — at the wrong time of year. If the tow had to made, they should have waited for a weather window instead of setting off into a forecast storm.
It was definitely the wrong route. The correct route for this tow from Dutch Harbor to Seattle would have been to go south toward Honolulu for about 300 miles, and then turn east toward Seattle. This well established route would have taken them south of the low pressure systems tracking across the Aleutians and into the Gulf of Alaska. On this route following seas and a favorable current are expected.
Admittedly, the Shell experts forced the supposedly “safer” (within helicopter range) near shore Gulf of Alaska route on Chouest. Chouest could not push back on the route choice because they had no idea what they were doing or what route to take. No one else tows SE of Kodiak over Albatross Bank, not even in the summer. What they encountered on this route is what anyone knowledgeable would expect, NE winds north of the lows tracking across the Gulf, right on the nose, with strong currents and steep seas on Albatross Bank. Chouest is probably the only company that has ever attempted a winter eastbound tow SE of Kodiak.
In spite of all this, If they had stayed a few miles outside the edge of the shelf in deep water, used all the chain surge gear on Kulluk, used all of their tow wire, and had slowed down enough to keep the strain on the tow gear within an acceptable range, they would not have parted the tow wire and lost the tow. If they hadn’t lost the tow, they would not have been rolling on beam ends while trying to recover the tow and taking water down the fuel vents. Aiviq would not have ended up dead in the water and Kulluk would not have ended up on the rocks, and Arctic offshore oil drilling would not have been killed for decades.
If Chouest had had the knowledge and skill required of a competent Prince William Sound tanker escort contractor (that includes the ability to rescue disabled tankers in the Gulf of Alaska), they would have done everything differently and they would not have put Kulluk on the rocks.
I cannot imagine how any company could more completely disqualify itself to be the PWS tanker escort contractor, than Chouest already has.[/QUOTE]
I see what your saying and it sounds right. When I used “Tugsailor” I meant that the forum member with expertise towing in Alaska thought it was technically doable. I’d give you the final word on matters pertaining to towing in general.
EDIT: And welcome back, haven’t seen you post for a while.
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;186665]I think you’re confusing the two incidents.
Shell contracted ECO (Chouest) for the tow of the Kulluk. Crowley had nothing to do with it. ECO had no clue what they were doing.
I cited Crowley’s loss of the La Princesa as an example of a company that had a history of ocean towing but still screwed it up anyway.
So, while Crowley may have a lot of experience with tanker escorts in PWS, that doesn’t necessarily mean they are beyond all reproach.
In fact, ironically, Crowley’s Pathfinder itself went aground on the very same reef that was hit by the Exxon Valdez and brought about their required presence via OPA '90.
No one is beyond screwing up, especially when they start believing their own bullshit that they’re “the best.” Not us, the Dutch, the Norwegians, or anyone else. Human hubris and fallibility is the common thread that connects us all, regardless of where we hail from.[/QUOTE]
I hear that several are being hired with Alaska towing experience for that contract.
150 t. BP escort tugs must be the most powerful in the world, so far.[/QUOTE]
Here is specifications for new tugs to serve at Melkoya in Northern Norway: http://www.tugtechnologyandbusiness…tugs_44807.htm
Same purpose and somewhat same climate as in the Cook Inlet, Alaska.
The new Escort tug for Melkoya LNG Terminal near Hammerfest in Northern Norway has been delivered and is in operation. It was designed by Robert Allan Ltd. Vancouver and built in Spain for Ostensjo Rederi AS.
Here is the specs: http://ral.ca/2017/05/26/rastar-4000-df-delivered-ostensjo/
