What navigation and ship handling skills (without instruments) should junior officer have?

Professional Mariner Forum
41

I see a lot of young mates that are slaves to the electronics.

All they can do is follow the green line and use AIS and ARPA.

Lots of small vessels with no AIS, and large fishing and government vessels with it turned off.

ARPA is not reliable when targets are constantly changing course and/or speed, or for small vessels that disappear in the sea clutter.

A lot of guys have poor ideas of what to do, when the electronics cannot make the decisions for them.

There is a lot to be said for looking out the window and using a practiced eye (and perhaps binoculars ) to evaluate the situation.

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42

‘Effectively’ use =! Display enough basic competence and familiarity to not get fired.

If they were effectively using their equipment they wouldn’t have had a collision/grounding/smashed that buoy because they were looking for it while maneuvering in traffic instead of tracking it on radar.

43

@Kennebec_Captain see?

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44

Learning visual navigation is more effective when combined with electronics. A new guy getting instant and extremely accurate feedback on the distances, speeds, and rate of change of what he’s seeing is going to develop faster than someone being taught ‘the old way’ which seems to be more about people’s egos than navigation.

45

One of the first things they taught in my ARPA course at the Marine Simulation Institute (now known as USMRC) in Newport, Rhode Island was that ARPA was not useful on targets that are constantly changing course to stay in a meandering channel coming down a river or bay. Same concept for fishing vessels that are constantly turning. ARPA calculations rely upon a constant course and speed for some period of time. A collision case was discussed in which a ship alleged to be at fault for not using ARPA in the Delaware River, but was exonerated after the expert testimony of an ARPA instructor from MITAGS that ARPA would not have been useful under those circumstances. The Marine Simulation Institute (USMRC) is by far the best nautical school out of the many where I have taken courses.

Blindly assuming that electronics solve all problems is a mistake.

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46

I’m sure I’ll get a lot of crap for saying this, but one of the best ways to develop an eye for visual navigation and develop a weather eye is to for a kid to take a yacht club sailing program and race small sailboats.

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47

That’s interesting, because I took BRM there a few years ago and it was by far the worst course I have taken.

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48

Take with a grain of salt.

I believe what is missing is a shipboard discussion or conversation with junior officers regarding over reliance on any one information source in a decision-making process.

Since 1947, maritime incident records detail the misuse of electronics in supporting shipboard operations. The core element in electronic aided collisions and grounds investigations have focused on the human interface with the equipment. The incident reports mainly center on emphasizing the human component or error in not considering the equipment limitations and use when determining proper incident avoidance.

Furthermore, electronic assisted collisions and groundings reveal a complacency and situational blindness in some bridge deck officers by allowing the electronics to take primary focus over other resources available e.g., visual identification.

Realizing that it is an electronic manufacturer’s purpose to design affordable navigation support equipment with the claim of high accuracy and easy use. What is being missed and needs to be emphasized is that each manufacture type has its own design features, variations, and limitations.

When it comes to equipment used in classroom training, instructors portray the electronics as a new and improved system with greater accuracy and having a better solution to marine hazards than previous antiquated systems. These accolades present a dilemma for the mariner which can prevent them from using and trusting their own resources to prevent an incident.

Complicating the issue more is during classroom training, each electronic system is identified by generic words e.g., GPS, Auto Pilot, RADAR, ARPA, ECDIS, Sonar, Chart Plotter, AIS etc. The generic wording slides over a necessary discussion regarding a manufacture’s specific equipment and its design features, variations, and limitations utilize aboard the ship.

Remember the manufacture marketing campaign and instructional process translates to a possible overblown fixation on electronics giving the equipment an image of a no-fault navigation suite. The fallacy of a no-fault system can create a temporary lapse of a mariner’s judgement, common sense, and clear thinking. Eventually producing a potential slow reaction response to the actual events and conditions. Critical time maybe wasted by focusing on trying to prove the electronic equipment right; rather than identifying what is happening and what may eventually happen. The delaying taking control of the situation based on what their eyes see or have not seen is more than problematic.

Overall, what seems to escape the young mariner is that shipboard electronics are nothing more than a navigational aid and is to be used as part of a decision support system enhancing the watch officer maneuvering capabilities. The electronic systems of today are to be used with a human interface. They are not onboard to make decisions and determine ship’s actions independently.

As the industry works towards and eventually achieves a fully fourth degree autonomous ship, all deck officers should remain keenly aware of the limitations, inaccuracies, and failures in electronic equipment.

In my opinion, as a bridge watch officer, my duty during a developing situation is first to focus on the safety of the ship and secondarily on try to resolve electronic system malfunctions. Reference: NTSB Grounding Royal Majesty.

49

That’s exactly what he said.

The entire thread is about what they should be capable of doing not advocating that they should ever do it in reality.

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50

For such a situation, relative trails on your radar may give you a more accurate and quicker depiction of how small or maneuvering contacts will pass.

51

The goal is to have a more skilled, confident and experienced officer that is no longer100% reliant on electronics. This will reduce both workload and risk.

Visual and ARPA have different strengths and limitations that can complement each other. For example the direction of true vectors on APRA can be compared visually to the aspect angle of another ship.

Over time, with practice, confidence in visual skills can be improved and the watch officer will be able to make better and more efficient use of visual information.

This comparison, the cross-check between each method is crucial so continued use of APRA (and ECDIS) will be required to improve and expand an officer’s skills.

Some benchmark skills for guidance from a credible source as to what visual skills can be easily acquired and are useful would be helpful. In practice the optimum mix of methods in any given situation is going to vary but none of this is to suggest that ARPA or ECDIS should be shut off or not used.

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52

Why would you get crap? I spend a lot of time at the local club getting the kids out sailing. They have a lot of fun and learn a lot too. There is no more complex maneuvering than a crowded starting line. The Naval Academy must agree, the mids are out sailing small (compared to a destroyer) boats and their flight students don’t start out in a 737 either.

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53

I found ARPA on sailboats next to or actually useless in any kind of weather and ARPA used on them not any better, in either case the rapid course changes prevented any solution or the solution was way the hell off.

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54

Korean Air Lines neglected the aviation version of this training and when given a visual approach in nice weather to a well marked runway, they famously hit the seawall and wrecked their airplane.

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55

Young guys, and this is probably true of every generation, make up for experience and confidence with their skills in new technology. I’m sure I’ve been guilty of it before, I’m sure you all have too at some point. This kind of behaviour is especially true of the ace new mate type. The one who seems like he has it locked down and knows all the tech really well, and they’re OVERconfidant. The old experienced salty officer who’s totally complacent and wants nothing to do with new tech or procedures is the opposite, but same kind of problem.

56

That would be an incompetent engineer. Just like someone that can’t drive a ship by looking out the window is also incompetent. Just like a pilot that can’t hand fly an airplane is incompetent. Just like a surgeon that can’t remove an appendix without MRI is incompetent.

All the modern tools should be used to improve outcome, but sometimes all the tools aren’t available.

Also, here’s another thought that many don’t consider. It’s MUCH EASIER to teach electronics/screens/automation on the simulators that students use in schools than it is to hone the skills of looking out the window. I’d imagine young mates that grew up on the water running boats have fewer issues looking out the window.

Said another way, many mates over the last 20 years had their introduction to ship handling on screens. It’s much easier to gather skill using screens when learning on a screen than it is to learn the art of judgment required to make decisions from information visual information gained from looking out the window.

Wouldn’t it be ridiculous if somebody said “I can’t drive my car because my screen/GPS broke”? Why isn’t it the same with ships?

I guess the bar/harbor pilots will eventually be the only ones with this skill? Oh, and those lowly tug guys that big ship people look down upon.

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57

Radars and ARPA are not new technology. Neither is the practice of displaying ship motion as vectors. Becoming proficient with the technical aspect of ARPA on watch is just matter of developing procedural memory.

A better way to grade skill levels is to observe how watch officers are able to cope with areas of heavy traffic, like Korea Strait at night.

Why are companies and unions now requiring simulator training as was mentioned on this thread? What explains the rapid improvement in ability and the reduced stress levels of a properly trained watch officer?

The answer lies in how the human brain processes information. According to cognitive load theory (CLT) processing abstract, numeric and symbolic information can quickly overload short-term memory. By contrast processing visual-spatial information is far more efficient. Our brains evolved for that task.

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58

I can’t fix a lot of modern high speed diesels without computer programs I keep on my travel laptop that are designed to hack the ECM/electronics. Otherwise I’d have to call a tech, which is what most people do.

59

I would argue there is significantly more to it than that. There are a lot of people technically competent with equipment that lack skill in both using it and applying it to their information flow.

It’s all technically visual information. The fact remains that people misinterpret what their eyes are seeing more often than the computer does, and the vast majority of the time those failures are the result of a lack of skill with the equipment.

Humans are intrinsically good at spatial relations, true. But they’re also humans, and the parts of our brain that make us good at that are also capable of assigning those images in our short term memory to places where they ‘fit’ instead of where they are. I think you’ve seen this before or perhaps experienced it.

60

I think a major reason to become proficient at both is the quick, internal, constant check on if the electronics and the window are saying the same thing.

As an example, I once changed course to miss the World Trade Center

Inbound on the Barnegat- Ambrose TSS I had a contact on a steady bearing at about 10 miles, I couldn’t see it out the window, I checked the bearing through the alidade and still nothing. But it appeared in all other respects like a real target. Radar and the window did not add up. After going around and around a bit trying to figure this out, a bit embarrassed I called the Captain. Was pretty sure there was nothing there and this was some type of false echo - but not sure enough to ignore it. Was happy to have a freash pair of eyes to have a look. Long story short - we changes course a bit and " missed " this target we never saw.

After watch I hung around the bridge a bit and tried to figure this out. Turns out we were getting a return on the World Trade Center like 60 or so miles away that the radar was turning into a much shorter distance.

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