Tim thank you for your understanding my point and filled me in on the information (lessen) sharing practice among navy ships. appreciated. Probably I worry needlessly only hoping such communication had sufficient details.
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The most recent editorial about the report. I pretty much agree with. Its about PR rather than learning what can be changed.
I have also said I thought well of the response from the damage control. I still do. Particularly reading about the enlisted men who responded.
I donāt agree with āBlameā it doesnāt help change things for the better. Even if I donāt agree with the decisions. I do understand criticism and reasons for removal of commanding officer and the executive officer. I would understand the removal of all the Bridge Officers.
I do not understand why the Master Chief would have been removed. I have never heard of a situation where an Enlisted Man would be held accountable or blamed for the actions or failures of an Officer.
We havenāt seen the report of what led up to the collision. I suspect that since the Command Master Chief was fired, there was something the investigators found relating to inappropriate relationship(s) between enlisted and officers which related to the collision. Because yes, it is unusual for the CMC to be sacked for an operational failure.
But just a guess on my part.
Took a screen shot of the area when I came through last time. The collison position is marked with a waypoint. The data is from my shipās AIS.
The blue triangle is āown shipā, O Shima is on my shipās port bow. The traffic NW of O Shima is from/to Tokyo Bay.
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And itās rare for an admiral to get sacked for an operational failure as well, but I guess there are enough in high levels that are sick and tired of the status quo to do that as well.
Perhaps we can get it clarified when further reports, if any, come to light. To me itās an indication that the investigation may have turned up a piss poor attitude towards watch-keeping and competency on a shipwide basis. Thatās not an operational failure, itās a leadership failure on multiple levels.
From an outside I would say that the Chiefs, those high level enlisted members, are what allow teenagers and those in their early twenties to conduct many complex evolutions day in and day out with a good safety record (the present seamanship fiasco being a notable exception). They should be held in high regard for those accomplishments.
Itās just time to apply many good principles in use by the military (and civilian sailors) to the subject of seamanship and proper watchkeeping. And if they donāt or canāt, to be held accountable as well.
If the Fitz only had an iPad running inavx with a serial to wifi converter from the pilot plugā¦
Hell, it even works on my phone.
Somehow they couldnāt avoid a 30,000 ton ship with all the sensors and people on watch (including multiple lookouts) they already had. Iām not sure another another display would have made any difference.
It was no secret back in 1970 among a select few that the Evans was at fault, so I agree with this video and what Captain Stevenson says.
According to reports the Fitz was leaving Sagami Wan which is the bay just west of Tokyo Bay, The course at the time of collision was 230.
In that case the Fitz would have had to cross the line of coasters entering/leaving Tokyo Bay. This would require the full attention of the bridge team as it is continuous crossing traffic and is almost always heavy.
The Fitz was doing exercises in Sagami Wan then leaving the bay they would have been in heavy traffic. Once they got clear of that heavy traffic they watch may have relaxed a bit including the captain going below.
The Crystal was on a course of 080 at the time of collision and had just made a course change. Before the Crystal changed course the Fitz may have believed they were going to pass astern of the Crystal. The Fitz may have missed the course change made by the Crystal.
The Crystal may have been relying too much on AIS.
Thereās no question that the Fitz has the equipment needed to detect and avoid cargo ships. There is a question as to how well that equipment fits into the bridge work flow. It may be time to talk about integrating information from a variety of sensors into a display that presents the needed information to the OOD, without drowning them in less-relevant data.
I agree, how the data is displayed is very important.
If the watch officer is weaving through coasters and/or fishing vessels close in they sometimes miss the big fast ones further out. I like having my binoculars and my own display of AIS off in the corner of the bridge out of the way of the watch officer when in heavy traffic.
LCS and Zumwalt operate their bridge teams efficiently with minimal watch standers. Increased schooling and training time for OODs taught by unlimited masters makes a big difference. Believe they go through four months of simulator and basic seamanship training.
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I pretty much agree with what Cap David Marquest said in his presentation about Santafe.
Thatās why you should avoid going through a pack of fishing vessels.
A good OOW should always keep one radar on short range 6M and the second on 12M ( periodic scan to 24M).
Attend to the contacts with the least TCPA first.
ECDIS is the answer
In general the watch officer would not require the assistance of the master for traffic if there is sea room to avoid heavy concentrations of fishing vessels. The same is true if the ship was in COLREGs situations with only one vessel at time.
The Korean Straits, Straits of Taiwan, Gulf of Thailand, Straits of Malacca, the China coast are examples of areas where heavy concentrations of F/Vs sometimes can not be avoided and encounters with more then one vessel at a time can be expected.
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This will not work in heavy traffic, generally the COLREGs situation with a fast 20+ kts deep-draft vessel has to be resolved before starting to dodge and weave through fishing vessels.
If there is another fast, deep-draft vessel about itās better that all maneuvers for small, slow vessels be made in a manner that keeps the deep-draft on the red side till itās past and clear.
Colregs does not mention anywhere that you have to attend to the deep-drafted vessels first. You have to deal with all vessels the same. The least TCPA first.
If s deep-drafted vessel is fast, her TCPA would be short.
In the East China Sea, which is the worst in terms of traffic density, one should be ready to reduce speed in order to avoid any collision. Reduction in speed can usually resolve a complicated situation much better than manouevering.
Malacca Straits and the Japanese coast are not so bad except in the termination of the TSS and in the approaches to the anchorages south of Singapore.
You didnāt read what he wrote very well, did you? Go back and try again.
Have you sailed in the East China Sea lately?
I ask this question in a very straight matter-of-fact way, because you have to sail these waters to understand the situation. The traffic density is very high, the boats mix with fishing nets (with AIS transponders installed) and cargo vessels try to navigate through the maze. The line of fishing vessels departing or returning from ports can be thick. Despite all that, one has to follow the COLREGs to the hilt and not develop oneās own preferred solutions.