USS Fitzgerald collides with ACX Crystal off coast of Japan

Maritime News
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Even worse. Fitz should have seen her running lights, but apparently didn’t.

I would be quite surprised if no one on the Fitz saw her running lights. Possible but unlikely.

My guess, speculation. which could be crap.

Typically a Navy vessel has quite a few people on the bridge. I think I saw posts earlier. referring to OOD JOOD CON so up to three officers, My Guess a QM or whatever the navy call the dude steering, and at least a couple of ratings as look out.

According to AIS info.
The ACX was initially on a heading of just under 090 say 088 or 087.
She altered to 070.
According to ACX approx. 10 min prior to Collison. ACX had the Fitz about 40 deg to Port X about 3 miles.

It is quite probable the look out Saw and reported the ACX long before the alteration from around 090 to 070.
I would be wondering if it would occur to a relatively junior lookout to report again when the ACX altered from around 090 to 070. Quite possibly not.

According to the ACX. Around 10 minutes prior to the Collison. The Fitz made a sudden change in course and or speed. Resulting in a collision course.
The ships would be quite close at this time and closing quickly.
Would it occur to a relatively junior rating on look out to report the ACX was on a steady bearing. Or is it quite possible The look out might have thought, I’ve ready reported the container ship, Its not a new sighting to be reported, Its getting kind of close, But the officers know its there.
So If I was to ask the look out, Did you see the container ship? I would not be surprised if he or she said yes.
If I asked the look out did you see it getting closer, I would not be surprised if he or she said yes.
If I asked the look out did you report it was getting closer, I would not be surprised if the answerer was. No. Why not? I thought the Officers knew it was there and knew what they were doing.

Did you see the flashing light, I would not be surprised if the look out said yes I reported the flashing light.

Unfortunately the flashing light and alteration to Starboard by the ACX appear to have been only about 3 or 4 minutes before impact.
The Collision is virtually imminent both ships are realising what’s happening but its already to late.

The above is pure guesswork.
I don’t know anything about how a Navy bridge works.

I have seen reports where commercial bridge teams have been asked those kind of questions .
he answer from the look out or QM. Did you see it? Yes. Did it look right? No. Did you say any thing? No. Why Not? I thought he knew what he was doing? Why did you think he knew what he was doing? Because he’s the Captain or Because he’s the Officer.

Next Question. have you ever had BRM training? Surprising how often the answer is. Yes. We just did that.

More speculation.
The ACX altered from around 090 to 070 because of the line on the chart or ECDIS as per passage plan.
This alteration significantly reduced the CPA with the Fitz but did not result in a collision co.
The OOW on the ACX may or may not have taken the FITZ into account. Quite probably not.

Shortly after the ACX alters from around 090 to 070.
The Officer navigating and or conning the Fitz. Has a reason to alter Co. Why? who knows? Traffic? passage Plan? orders?
Around this time The Officer navigating, conning the Fitz is distracted by something, What who knows? Possibly the reason for his alteration?
Unfortunately he misses the alteration by the ACX.
The Officer navigating, conning the Fitz, Alters to starboard without realising the ACX has just altered almost 20 deg to port.
Unfortunately this now is a collision co.
This maneuver is not challenged.
Why?
Nobody else on the bridge notices the problem? Possible.
Or Nobody else on the bridge realises the officer conning the Fitz does not know the ACX has altered Course.
Other members of the bridge team assume the officer conning the Fitz is aware of the ACX. It looks odd but an assumption is made he knows what he is doing.
The action continues to go unchallenged. Quite possibly until the report of the flashing light. If it is ever reported.
By the time the light flashes collision is almost imminent.

According to the ACX about 10 min before the collision the Fitz was about 3 miles 40 deg to port.
The closing speed to have a Collison in about 10 minutes, would be about 18 knots, Closing by about 1 mile in about 3 minutes.
A civilian IMO approved ARPA, can take up to 3 minutes after an alteration to give accurate information.
The ACX altered, The Fitz apparently altered, at least once. during the last 10 minutes before the collision.
Possibly contributing to the Officer navigating/conning the Fitz not realising they were on a Collison Co until possibly only the last few minutes prior to impact.
By the time the situation is assessed and acted upon its to late.

Last minute desperate actions by both ships may have even changed a very near miss into a hit.

Might be complete Bollocks and totally wrong

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I thought this is a likely scenario and summery.

I am not surprised the Navy will stand by its right to not allow its people to be questioned by an outside agency.
If for no other reason to avoid setting a precedent.

On the other hand. I would expect them to supply relevant transcript to the other agencies. And if they have specific questions ask them and provide the answers.

The Japanese investigators may find it a bit frustrating, particularly not asking questions directly they miss all the non verbal communication. I expect they will not be surprised this wont be the first incident.

It does not mean the navy is not co operating. It will. Or mean the navy is covering anything up.
The appearance of a cover up would be much more damaging than saying our guys f!@#$% up.
Full disclosure of all findings and recommended changes? Depends a bit what they are and is it something that has security value or not.

If they released the audio of the 2012 collision. There not covering much up.

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It was a Freedom of Information Act order indtigated by the Navy Times that forced it into the open.

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Where do you KNOW that from??

If the two ships were originally on more or less same heading and the Crystal was actually overtaking the destroyer, (which is entirely possible, based on some statement here that their NORMAL steaming speed when in transit COULD have been below 15 kts.) then the only light seen from the Crystal would have been the Fizt’s single white stern light.

It is easy to miss that if the rest of the warship was near blacked out and with a lot of other white lights from ships, fishing boats and the nearby shoreline to mask it,
Combine that with this type of destroyers being designed to present a small radar signature, not sending AIS data and not making attempts at alerting the Crystal of their existence, (or has anybody seen any indication that they did??) it is entirely possible that both the OOW and lookout on the Crystal was blissfully unaware of the danger until shortly before the collision.

If the Fitz made a turn before any other lanterns became visible, and presented her broadside to the Crystal,or when the Crystal got nearly abeam of the Fitz, that may well have been the first indication the Crystal had of her existence.

Will we ever know for sure which? Yes, when the Japanese issue their report we will know what the Crystal experienced, but if we will ever know the other side of the story appears to be doubtful.

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Sad to say, but that is often the norm of government agencies, from the Feds right down to your county or local town / village. They fear discovery of their sins or incompetence so much that they cover it up at all costs. Even when nothing is being specifically and deliberately hidden, the obvious and deliberate lack of transparency only makes people more suspicious of it all. It sets up a nasty negative feedback loop that can become essentially permanent.

Trusting any service branch, or any other arm of government, to police itself honestly, is a sucker’s bet. Every now and then some honest & honorable soul will try to do the right thing in these circumstances but the “system” (that is to say, other people within government or the agency in question) usually will punish, not reward them for it.

In a bizarre twist of morality, it’s considered disloyal to want your own government and/or agency to fly more-or-less straight and not do shitty things.

What a surprise!

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Hi Ombugge,

I agree with you there. The “Blind Spot” for the Destroyer and the blend in with the background lights and radar targets for the Crystal.

I’m retired Navy radar type form CIC and understand what a navy Bridge at night goes through during shipping maneuvers. I also have sailed as a Master now for over a decade . Both Navy and Merchant time in and out of Tokyo Wan too many times to count.

Went in once without radar at night. Old school pucker factor will learn you something new and keep one on their toes.

All ships have a blind spot. I was taught by a sound Navy Captain to always step out on the bridge wings and look aft prior to any turn. Good lesson which I still use and hopefully manage to pass on.

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Good luck with getting the young generation to lift their heads above whatever screen they are posted in front of at the time.

I go back to when there were no air conditioned wheelhouse and ears and eyes were main tools of navigation.
In 1974 I was even Master on an old ex Dutch Interisland vessels that had never had a radar installed. We were sailing in East Indonesia, where the accuracy of the charts were not great and lighthouses and buoys were rare. The few that existed usually did not work because the gas had been stolen before even reaching the intended location. (The logic being applied was; “why waste time on replacing gas cylinders when the locals will steal them within days? Better to sell to highest bidder right here at the base”)

PS> A Seismic vessel on transit through the Moluccas, with the latest and best of navigation equipment for the time (early 1970’s) run aground on a reef surrounding an island in broad daylight. Why?? Because the instruments told the 2nd Mate that he would clear with good margin. (The entire island was charted 1.5 n.m. wrong)

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Relying on the AIS track data for the ACX Crystal posted online at “Vessel of Interest”, and using the Law of Cosines (v1^2 + v2^2 - 2 v1 v2 = Delta_v^2), I calculate that by far the largest change of momentum (change of speed and direction) occurred between the 1:30am - 1:33am data-points. Of course, that is visually obvious on the track also – there is more speed change & more heading change between the 1:30am - 1:33am data-points than between any others.

Therefore, that tells me, that the collision happened after 1:30am and before 1:33am. The “delta_v” from 1:27am - 1:30am of 5.7 knots is consistent with Captain Advincula’s claim of his hard turn to starboard immediately prior to the collision. The “delta_v” from 1:30am - 1:33am of 12.7 knots is consistent with a combination of further maneuvering commands from the Captain (steering hard to starboard with engines in full reverse) compounding the collision with the warship (and large momentum transfer to it).

From 1:33am onwards, the Crystal was obviously recovering its course, implying the collision had already occurred. For 15 minutes after the collision, the Crystal accelerated unevenly, and returned to its original heading unevenly, perhaps suggesting manual control of the helm, and/or after-effects of the impact ?

At any rate, let us briefly accept that the collision happened around 1:31am (say), just after the 1:30am AIS ping and before the next one at 1:33am. Then, given that, at 1:30am, the merchant vessel’s course was tracking 88 degrees, and its heading over to its starboard at 112 degrees…

And assuming that the collision happened soon but after that…

Then the collision would have occurred with the Crystal heading perhaps 120-130 degrees SE…

Which implies that the warship was coming into the collision on a heading of 150-170 degrees SSE…

assuming a grazing contact at a relative angle of 30-40 degrees difference in headings…

If this is qualitatively accurate, and if Captain Advincula’s testimony that the warship had been paralleling his ship eastward for a protracted period prior to the collision, then it would appear as if the warship was travelling due east along the shipping lane nearer the coast of Japan…

but instead of turning NNE up towards Yokosuka, it instead turned SSE, towards the Nii-Jima / Shikine-Jima resort islands…

Given the consensus that the warship was returning to base, perhaps it got a middle-of-the-night clearance for some R&R at the hot-springs & baths on those islands? Perhaps everyone aboard was in a jubilant & relaxed mood?? Perhaps they were aware of the Crystal but their onboard ships’ track extrapolation algorithms somehow miscalculated the position of the merchant vessel – their instruments were telling everyone they would cut across the Crystal’s track ahead of it, but to everyone’s sudden shocked surprise, some miscalibration or miscalculation got the warship skewered on its bulbous bow instead???

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I’m not either.

If for no other reason to avoid setting a precedent.

That’s a weak justification. This isn’t the US federal courts where a precedent can effectively have the force of law. The USN can easily decide in the future either way.

It does not mean the navy is not co operating.

It does. “Full cooperation” was promised by the man in charge, and now the host country is getting the statutory minimum. I think the USN made an initial statement containing the words they knew everyone wanted to hear, and now they’re crawfishing back. Most people’s definition of “full cooperation” is different from what the USN is doing here.

Or mean the navy is covering anything up. The appearance of a cover up would be much more damaging than saying our guys f!@#$% up.

Maybe.

Depends a bit what they are and is it something that has security value or not.

The Japanese are our trusted allies, there shouldn’t be a lot of harm that crew interviews could do to that. I feel sure that the Japanese authorities could find a reasonable compromise if the USN was willing.

If they released the audio of the 2012 collision.

A precedent! I can’t wait for them to follow it.

There not covering much up.

It remains to be seen, but it’s not a good look for the USN so far.

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You misunderstood. I was saying Fitz should have seen Crystal’s lights. A ship like Crystal is always trying to be seen. The impact was not consistent with ships abreast, and until we know Fitz’s course and speed we can only guess what she was doing earlier; it’s mighty dark out there. When Crystal had Fitz 3 miles out and 40 deg to port, we do not know whether that sighting was broadside or 45 deg oblique at even greater speed, so course may not have been abreast. If they had been running approx. abreast earlier, it would have been no cause for alarm at that time, as you suggested. Only when Fitz turned starboard should anyone have been concerned on either ship, if your idea of Fitz’s course is correct, and the Crystal’s captain has already submitted an initial report of which excerpts have been made available online. He gave his speed as 12 kts and he reported only flashing blinkers at Fitz, not mentioning any transmissions over VHF, which isn’t entirely unthinkable in the dark with Crystal’s bridge crew having no clear idea who or what Fitz was. How do you hail an unknown shape that doesn’t show up on AIS? Any way you can think of in the time you have, which appears to have been under 6 minutes. I like the thought process behind your speculation (that’s almost all anyone outside the investigation really has right now, including me). When looking at an accident like this, I’ve learned the “Ahso F*** Up” answer is usually nearest the right tack. If you haven’t heard that old NTSB yarn, google Capt. Kohei Asoh JAL Flt 2, 22 Nov 1968. It also unfolded with a lot of mistaken reports and speculation, as this incident has, so it’s actually an instructive case in point.

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You misunderstood. I was saying Fitz should have seen Crystal’s lights. Crystal is always trying to be seen. The impact was not consistent with ships abreast, and until we know Fitz’s course and speed we can only guess what she was doing earlier. Even if they had been running abreast earlier, it would have been no cause for alarm at that time, as you suggested. Only when Fitz turned starboard should anyone have been concerned on either ship, if your idea of Fitz’s course is correct, and the Crystal’s captain has already submitted an initial report, of which excerpts have been made available online. He gave his speed as 12 kts and he reported only flashing blinkers at Fitz, not mentioning any transmissions over VHF, which isn’t entirely unthinkable in the dark with Crystal’s bridge crew having no clear idea who or what Fitz was. How do you hail an unknown shape that doesn’t show up on AIS? Any way you can think of in the time you have. I like the thought process behind your speculation (that’s almost all anyone outside the investigation really has right now). When looking at an accident like this, I’ve learned the “Ahso F*** Up” answer is usually the right tack (if you know that old NTSB joke). If you haven’t heard it, google Capt. Kohei Asoh JAL Flt 2, 22 Nov 1968. It also unfolded with a lot of mistaken reports and speculation, as this incident has, so it’s actually an instructive case in point.

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I remember several very knowledgeable posters in this thread explaining why it would have been impossible for Crystal to change speed significantly on short notice, and IMPOSSIBLE to simply go to full astern. Perhaps you should read those posts before creating your detailed supposition of minute-by-minute events.

I will patently wait for the results of the investigation, and only wish the USN to be as forthcoming as they should be in this case.

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Yes so definitely, the Fitz MUST have seen the Crystal visually, on radar and whatever else they had available. I don’t think that is disputable.
The speed OG of the Crystal in the 10-15 minutes or so before the course change and near immediate collision was recorded as 18.5 kts., which MAY indicate that she was overtaking the Fitz, but may not have been aware of the existence of the warship much before that.

If all they saw was a weak blip on their radar and there were other weak blips indication fishing vessels w/o AIS, it is not too far fetched that they just ASSUMED that the Fitz was just another fishing vessel, but not an immediate danger.
They would be unlikely to make an ARPA plot of such a target when there were several other vessels in the vicinity that may be more of an immediate interest, thus not realizing that this one was moving at 12-15 kts. as some Navy guy indicated was normal transit speed for this type of warships.

Anyone who have stood on the bridge at night dodging fishing vessels and other commercial vessels, with a background of lights from shore, would recognize that scenario and what they would prioritize as targets.

PS> The “10 minutes” mentioned in the report about the statement of the Crystal’s Master may not be “intended to be taken literally”. (Popular subject these days) It could be wrongly reported or misunderstood by the Japanese Reporter, or something went missing in translation etc.
It is also possible that the Master was asleep until just before the collision and were referring to statement made by the OOW

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Maybe Fitz was chasing an N.Korea sub going to attack Washington, DC, and to wipe out Donald Trump, so Fitz had to turn starboard to save the world (and Donald T) but Crystal was not informed and … collision. Everything happens at sea all the time.

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Agreed. “The terrible ifs accumulate.” -Winston Churchill.

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I love ARPA, and there are a number of other useful tools that can be brought to bear.

But I teach my mates to always fall back on a virtually fail-safe basic radar method: a simple line and a ring (even on an unstabilized radar) will seldom let you down. Put an EBL and a VRM ring on a target and watch. If the target moves (exactly or more-or-less, doesn’t matter which) down that line you WILL collide or come very close to doing so unless somebody (either or both) does something to remedy the CBDR situation.

No guessing, no algorithms, no bullshit. And no way to really screw it up accidentally unless you’re just one of those people that can find their way into an accident no matter what. Putting the radar into unstabilized mode eliminates the possibility of a drifting gyro inducing an error. If visibility permits you can and should use your :eyes: to double-check what the radar is telling you, or vice-versa. CBDR is CBDR, no matter how you cut it. You’ve got to do something to resolve it.

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The timing of the collision is pretty hard to say using the AIS track.
Around 1630 UTC give or take a minute, Or as you say between 1630 UTC and 1633.
I think other people have concluded, Based on Impact damage and the AIS track the Fitz approximate heading at time of impact was around SE. 135. This appears to be consistent.

Here is the speed and heading info from the ACX AIS track starting approximately 10 minutes prior to the collision.
1619 UTC 18.1 Kn Co 069
1621 UTC 18.4 Kn co 070
1624 UTC 18.4 Kn Co 070
1627 UTC 18.5 Kn Co 070
1630 UTC 17.3 Kn Co 088
1633 UTC 11.2 Kn Co 135

The speed and heading at 1633 the ACX is approximately 90 degrees from her heading of 070. her speed reduced to 11.2 knots.

My guesstimation of the Manoeuvering characteristics of a Container ship of the ACX Crystals size with a single screw direct reversible slow revving diesel.
At 18.5 knots, Rudder Hard to starboard, No engine Movement, approximately 4 minutes later. Heading Changed by about 90 Degrees, Advance approximately 0.5 miles. Speed reduced to 10 or 11 knots. Give or take a Knot, Minute or a Cable.

My guess the ACX version of events so far. Is roughly consistent with the AIS track. Working back from 1633, My guess the Hard to starboard was applied around 1628 UTC or 1629 UTC. Pure speculation of course.

I don’t see any apparent indication from the AIS of telegraph or throttle movement until some time after 1633 UTC

The ACX Applied Hard to starboard, After signaling with the flashing light (probably at least 1 set of 5 short flashes) waiting for a reaction and seeing none.

The ACX Decided to signal the vessel approaching on her port bow. After having become concerned the Vessel she perceived as give way was not taking appropriate action.

The ACX has a vessel approaching on her port bow. Less than 3 miles away, The ACX perceives it is a crossing situation and she is the stand on vessel.

The ACX reports the Fitz as a Crossing Vessel. (Masthead and sidelights visible) approx. 40 deg x 3 miles to Port 10 minutes prior to the collision. Its unlikely this timing is accurate its based on the OOW recollection. Its Unlikely it was logged.
The VDR data from the ACX will show the Radar Picture. If tracked by the ARPA the Data will show the relative and true motion of the Fitz and the timing of any alterations of course and or speed. It will be possible to calculate from raw target data even if the Fitz was not tracked as an acquired target.

The ACX report having used a light to flash at the Fitz. When probably prior to ordering hard to starboard, How long before?
Using an ALDIS light to Flash 5 Short and rapids. I have done this.
Radio, Who was he going to Call, “Ship My Port Bow” He didn’t its an omission. Would It have done any good? Not the point. Wasn’t done.

The ACX identifies the Fitz as a crossing vessel. Presumably The ACX could see Masthead and side lights. There is no mention of stern light by the ACX. This does not mean it was always a crossing situation. Or not just the ACX considered it a crossing situation.

So the ACX stood on maintaining her course and speed. With a vessel approaching quickly from a distance of less than 3 miles away on her port side.

A container ship this size stopping distance? crash stop ball park 1.5 miles give or take a bit.
Turning circle 0.5 miles give or take a bit.

This is all happening pretty close to acceptable minimums.

The ACX reports 3 people on bridge in hand steering, Was this Capt., OOW and QM or OOW, QM and Lookout.

The ACX makes a routine course alteration which may have contributed to a close quarter situation developing.

After this alteration.

They see the ship to Port, They see it change course and speed, It takes them a while to figure out its now on a collision course, They wait around for it to react, It takes them a while to get concerned, Then their reaction going hard to starboard is very late and the approaching ship is very close.

To little to late.

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Jeez you must be old. Unstabilised? Tow boater?

Even older than me, Heads up , Unstabilised, A mechanical cursor and a range ring, WTF it works, doesn’t it.

I must be just a bit younger than yourself. I like. N up, relative, stabilised, (No targets getting spread by yaw)
Many years using a china pencil a mechanical curser and a range ring.

I don’t like these new fangled true motion gizmos. Young guys nowadays.

True motion does have its advantages, But I am to old to really like or trust it.

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  1. Seven years enlisted in the USN. Commissioned as Ensign. On my first ship. JOOW on the bridge. Learned to do initial contact CPA on the SPA-25 radar display, using a china pencil and tongue depressor as straightedge. Hard during the day with the big hood on. If within certain parameters, transferred the work to a MoBoard. CIC also plotting and sending solution up to the bridge, so comparison made as check.

Want to know the all important bearing drift. Get out on the bridge wing and start checking with an Alidade on the gyro repeater. And remember, just because you have good bearing drift on his deckhouse doesn’t mean you’re going to clear the other end… :slight_smile:

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At this point there is so little information, Anything I say is little more than a wild guess. Somebody told me a long time ago. "Never said the guy who knows what happened to investigate an accident"
Sometimes its hard to keep an open mind, But you have to.
Usually if think I know. It often turns out to be something quite different. Sometimes completely new.
I don’t know anything about how the Navy operates just speculated based on how some BRM stuff from the commercial world. On the assumption people are just people. regardless of organisation.

There is no way of knowing if it was ever an overtaking situation or always a crossing situation.
The ACX did make an alteration, of almost 20 degrees, large enough to be significant perhaps not quite large enough to be readily apparent. I was just contemplating the possibility this change may not have been “seen”.
I will google Jal Flt 2,
I watch a lot of “Mayday” TV Shows.