As is common in Maritime Law both sides are likely partly to be blamed when there is a collision between ships. But in this case (??):
Given the circumstances of this case, Navy ship cutting through the traffic lanes at high-speed at night with no AIS, itâs no surprise that the Crystal failed to take proper action.
However from a legal point of view after an incident none of that matters, what matters is COLREGs. It wouldnât be realistic for example for the watch officer in a emergency to think of the danger signal, heâs probably never used it before. But itâs spelled out clearly in the COLREGS, which is what the legal system goes by.
Same thing with the having the AIS off, bad idea at sea, in court, itâs failure to keep a proper lookout on the Crystal.
Speaking of colregs- this is interesting.
Hereâs another one:
Strange case! From Wikipedia:
âIn a report released on 1 November the US Navy describes USS Fitzgerald 's course in the half-hour prior to the collision as running 190T (nearly due south), with a speed of 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph). At about 01:17 USS Fitzgerald 's OOD (Officer of the Deck, responsible for the shipâs course and maneuvering) misjudged the course of ACX Crystal . At 01:25 the OOD, Lieutenant Sarah Coppock,[8] noticed ACX Crystal getting closer, and ordered a turn to 240T (that is, to turn to the right and pass behind ACX Crystal ), but then rescinded the order. Instead she âordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port)â (to pass ahead of ACX Crystal ), but âthese orders were not carried out.â At 01:29 the âBosun Mate of the Watch [BMOW], a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders.â[9] The Navy has not said what those orders were, nor what transpired on the bridge following the collision at 01:30. Among other failings the Navy says âphysical look out dutiesâ were not performed on the starboard (right) side, where ACX Crystal and two other ships were approaching.â
It seems ACX Crystal kept speed/course 90T as per COLREG, while Ms. Sarah Coppock, junior officer on USS Fitzgerald course 190T, required to avoid ACX Crystal as per COLREG, changed her shipâs course and speed several times, first trying passing behind, then trying passing far ahead to finish just in front - CRASH. I wonder what the Master of Fitzgerald was doing. Sleeping in his cabin? Anyway, the Owners of ACX Crystal appears to be stupid paying anything to the USN.
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Looks like the Navy Crimes has been working on an expose. As usual, their writing is garbage, but theyâve at least done some sort of public service - sunlight is the best disinfectant. Iâd rather they just release the unredacted report theyâve seemingly managed to get a hold of, but that doesnât sell any fishwrap.
Hardly a glowing performance by supposedly âqualifiedâ officers on the RoR exam. I would be embarassed to use the excuse of post-collision duties to justify poor test performance. The CO and his watch officers are (in theory) professionals and for him to glibly brush away the outcome is a rather pointed indictment of the standards and training of the US Navyâs surface fleet. SadâŚ
Iâve always wondered about the âdanger signalâ. Given the size of vessels, given the âbridge bubbleâ that we work in, and in this case, given the speed of the Grey-hull at 20kts, realistically what effect does the danger signal have??? The A/B if heâs outside canât hear it due to the sound of exhaust blowers at a range a ship could maneuver, so if you do hear it, itâs too late to do anything about it. . . and the MOW is inside, insulated from the noise.
And in the case of the DDG, - - - Pee bottles, kettlebells in CIC??? I am beyond speechless. Certainly not the destroyers I was on in '71 & 72. I guess the admirals and other powerbroker are more interested in a âkinder/gentlerâ NAVY, and the reduction of âtoxic masculinityâ, instead of SEAMANSHIP/LEADERSHIP/WARFIGHTING!
I read with great displeasure that the Operation Specialists, formerly known as RADARMEN of which I was one on destroyers in 1971-75, could not tune the radar, or adjust it for proper display. And that the condition was tolerated by the CPOâs and both the Division Officer (a commissioned officer) & a Department Head (also an officer). On GURKE (DD-783), the radarmen also knew the rules of the road.
From another forum, an author opined:
âThe big buzzword for the Armed Forces in the last 10 years has been diversity and inclusion. Every dollar spent in that arena and every hour of training for D&I has been at the expense of developing the proper competency of Ship operators.â âD & I doesnât work, because you end up with the wrong person in the wrong place for the wrong reasonsâ, wrote another writer.
Without a doubt, the priorities have changed, and changed for the worse. When the commander of a submarine is relieved of command for hiring 10 local girls in the Philippines for a night on the town, (he was âturned inâ by one sailor from his sub - no doubt a malcontent snowflake who was jealous that he couldnât afford 10 - who, by the way was also hiring two local girls and just not prosecuted by NCIS), then the Navy has the wrong priorities. When I was in, that kind of liberty activity although not necessarily condoned, was not a criminal or career ending event.
IT IS TIME FOR A RESET!!
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