It could happen. It has happened. That’s why there are items now such as BNWAS that should reduce the probability all on watch are asleep or alert somebody else who’s sleeping in their cabin that there is sleeping on the bridge.
Does a destroyer ever lean like a sailboat? Is it possible that the first
point of contact was the keel of the destroyer hitting the bulbous bow of
the container ship beneath the surface?
They ‘lean’, but usually for different reasons, apart from general motion caused by the sea and swell. Most of the ‘leaning’ on a destroyer would normally be from turns, while a sailboat is normally leaning due to the effect the wind force has on the sails, and the monohull sailboats keel counteracts it to some degree.
It’s been nearly fourty years since I sailed on actual sailboats as opposed to power driven vessels (ships), so I’m a bit rusty on the specific terms used for vessels under sail.
As for first point of contact, hard for me to tell at this point.
[quote=“lww, post:303, topic:45129, full:true”]. I have
read that in order for a container ship to stop it is not a simple process
hence the status of “Restricted in Ability to Maneuver”.
[/quote]
Just wanted to interject that you’re entirely mischaracterizing the term “Restricted in ability to maneuver.” The Definition as per rule 3 is:
(g) The term “vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver” means a vessel which from the nature of her work is restricted in her ability to maneuver as required by these Rules and is therefore unable to keep out of the way of another vessel.
The term “vessels restricted in their ability to maneuver” shall include but not be limited to:
(i) a vessel engaged in laying, servicing, or picking up a navigation mark, submaine cable or pipeline;
(ii) a vessel engaged in dredging, surveying or underwater operations;
(iii) a vessel engaged in replenishment or transferring persons, provisions, r cargo while underway;
(iv) a vessel engaged in the launching or recovery of aircraft;
(v) a vessel engaged in mineclearance operations;
(vi) a vessel engaged in a towing operation such as severely restricts the towing vessel and her tow in their ability to deviate from their course.
If it was a narrow channel or an area with shallows, a vessel such as the container ship might be considered constrained by her draft. A vessel that is Restricted in ability to maneuver has to be because of the, “nature of her work,” though. The biggest thing with this case is whether it was an overtaking situation or a crossing situation between two normal PDVs. Some people here are trying to use the damage pictures to judge the angle of impact and whether the Merchant ship was 2 points abaft the beam (overtaking) or forward of that (crossing). I don’t think we can use the pictures to make assumptions. For all we know the merchant ship put the rudder hard over to starboard, like she was supposed to, when she saw collision was imminent. I don’t think no one was on the bridge or they were asleep at the wheel. The way I see it, she resumed her course and only came about 30 minutes later, because she didn’t want to create a new collision situation, everyone had to be awoken, and the bilges had to be sounded, captain brought to the bridge, etc. once everything was deemed safe, and engine room manned for manuvering, then she came about to return to the Fitz. We’ll all have to wait for new info to come out though because I don’t think we have enough to speculate with any degree of certainty.
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Exactly. I consider 30 minutes a perfectly reasonable time frame for this evolution.
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Also, look at the live AIS track video showing other vessels. The track makes sense considering the traffic overtaking and crossing after the collision.
Someone put out that "The FITZ was in a holding area making slow circles while waiting to be sequenced into the flow into the harbor. " on the USNI news comment section. I do recount another collision happening with a between a naval vessel and merchant under the same circumstances. I will try to think of the case. Continuous circles is often used by naval vessels to calibrate equipment. True or not, it is a possibility.
Thank you for the clarification on Restricted in Ability to Maneuver. I am
currently studying for my “6-pack” license. This incredibly sad collision
has brought a new sense of purpose to my endeavors to understand the
nuances of the rules.
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It never ends.
If you ever think that you have reached an enlightened state of complete and full understanding and mastery of all of the navigation rules in every possible situation then you will have become especially dangerous to yourself and everyone around you.
Seriously, I’ve been at this for over 35 years, and my knowledge gaps periodically surface to remind me not to get relaxed or self-satisfied. It’s the kiss of death.
You want to be committed to the idea that it’s “continuous education” for life.
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When we were steaming independently, my experience as a USNR LT(jg) OOD, 1957 to 1959, on a Gearing class DDE, was the captain’s night orders called upon me to call him when merchant shipping point of closest approach was plotted to come within a specified distance. I don’t remember what that distance was. It probably changed dependent upon ship’s speed. When steaming at night, the captain invariably slept in his “sea cabin” aft of the bridge on the bridge deck. From the pictures of the starboard side damage, the captain was in his regular cabin a few decks below the bridge? Does the Fitzgerald have a sea cabin? Why wasn’t he on the bridge in this area of heavy traffic? Was the Fitzgerald participating in VTS? Do USN ships report in to VTS abroad? What is the Navy’s policy about participating in a foreign VTS? Was a pilot on board?
They were not in a VTS area.
The waters this happened in would not normally warrant a captain being in the bridge, commercial or military.
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Here’s some food for thought from pages 264-266 in Farwell’s Rules Of The Nautical Road (8th Edition):
Rule 17. Action by Stand-on Vessel
(a)(i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.
For any single action regime to be effective, it is important that both vessels comply with their duties. Rule 17(a)(i) provides clear direction to the stand-on vessel to keep her course and speed. The stand-on vessel’s obligation is understood to begin when the vessels are in sight and the relevant steering and sailing rule for the situation first applies to the stand-on vessel. In crossing situations, the rule begins to apply at the point when the approach involves risk of collision. Before that point is reached, the privileged vessel, which is not yet a stand-on vessel, is free to change her course and speed.
Earlier versions of this rule referred only to the privileged vessel’s duty to keep her course. Applying that rule, an early U.S. Supreme Court decision held that the word “course” signified “a running or moving forward,” and that a vessel that came to a stop was no longer keeping her course. The present rule now refers to both course and speed, thus extending its effect to any significant speed change, whether up or down. Under the cases decided before the 1972 COLREGS introduced Rule 17(a)(ii), the stand-on vessel’s obligation to hold her course and speed was said to be strict. A stand-on vessel that failed to hold her course and speed once the approach involved risk of collision violated the rule. Even under those cases, however, the obligation was tempered with reason. In construing the rule, courts concluded that a stand-on vessel did not violate it by course and speed changes carried out in the course of ordinary navigation, such as to embark or debark a pilot. The key criterion for evaluating any such changes was the extent to which the change was reasonably foreseeable by the give-way vessel. In an oft-cited passage by the English Admiralty Court, Chief Justice Alverstone wrote:
_emphasized text_In my judgment, “course and speed”…mean course and speed in following the nautical manoeuvre in which, to the knowledge of the other vessel, the vessel is at the time engaged…The “course” certainly does not mean the actual compass direction of the heading at the time the other is sighted…A vessel bound to keep her course and speed may be obliged to reduce her speed to avoid some danger of navigation, and the question must be in each case “Is the manoeuvre in the course of navigation which will require an alteration of course and speed; ought the other vessel to be aware of the manoeuvre which is being attempted to be carried out?”
And, as to the requirement to keep speed, Justice Kennedy in that same case added:
emphasized text"Keeping her speed" ought, I think, to admit the interpretation of keeping that speed which, according to the criterion of good seamanship, is the right speed to be kept in the performance of the nautical manoeuvre in which the vessel is at the time engaged…A steamer approaching her landing place for goods or passengers, or drawing up to an anchorage, must often reduce her speed or abandon her object."
Moreover, the stand-on vessel cannot ignore other dangers that may arise or follow a course and speed that will lead to collision. Courts have held that a “stand-on vessel maintains her course and speed within the meaning of Rule 17 of the COLREGS, not only when her course and speed are steady, but also when she continues to engage in a steady, predictable maneuver.” Thus, a U.S. Navy destroyer turning a continuous circle around a calibration buoy for a period of six hours was held to be complying with her duty as the stand-on vessel to maintain her course and speed.
Seldom is anything as simple as it first seems.
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Hi, gCaptain, I am a sailing boat sailor in Yokohama and very famiiar with the area. I am wondering if anyone on this forum is capable to retrieve as many AIS track records of other ships passed the same area just before the collision and plot on a single chart such as for every 10 minutes, Since it is very congested passage, you may find any vacant spot or passage which might indicate the track of the destroyer or at least strange movement of other vessels. Large Fight flag on a destroyer returning to Yokosuka on Thu.
Takeshi T from Yokohama
“Navy Captains use relative bearings based off the centerline of his own ship and the Navy measures everything in yards”
.
This explains alot.
Both vessels following the TSS? Now there’s a thing.
Japan does not have any internationally recognised TSS. Sure, they have few, including in the area north and west of O Shima, where the collision happened, but they are not followed by Japanese vessels and not policed by the Japanese authorities. The irony of it is, the Japanese maritime authorities push the agents to distribute a booklet showing the coastal TSS routes to all foreign vessels, and it is only foreign vessels using the TSS.
This particular area where the collision happened is away from the TSS and is actually a fairly quiet route for vessels wanting to pass south of O Shima. At 0130 (or 0230) it is not very busy, a few hours later, then there is a traffic build up, the morning rush hour into Tokyo Bay.
What about the collision? My first reaction was it was Fitzgerald’s fault as her starboard side came in contact with the port bow of ACX Crystal.We don’t know yet the reason for this 180 degree course alteration, was it before or after the collision? Obviously, this is crucial. I have no reason to change my view on who was at fault at the moment.
Since then I have seen so much nonsense talked about the ACX Crystal, in automatic steering,wheel house unmanned, crew asleep etc. etc. etc.I suppose this comment is because it was Johnny Foreigner, a poorly trained Filipino crew, rather than the highly trained crew on the Fitzgerald who stood and watched as ACX Crystal ploughed into them. Where were the watchkeeping officers there? Were they sleeping? Was the ship in automatic steering?
It takes 2 (or more) to have a collision, ACX Crystal will have to shoulder some responsibility for not taking action to avoid a close quarters situation, but the bulk of the blame falls on USS Fitzgerald, and there is no escaping that fact.
From a Master, more than 25 years in Command and 45 years at sea
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[quote=“jeffobytne, post:231, topic:45129, full:true”]. . Bill Halsey found this out in1945. He sailed the most powerful fleet in history into a typhoon without taking rudimentary seamanship precautions. Lost 700 men and 3 ships. . . .
[/quote]
Small point of historical order. Typhoon “Cobra”, where the ships were lost, was not in 1945, but December 1944. Whether Halsey “found out” something from this might be doubted, as he did it again in June, 1945, losing no ships but killing a number of sailors. Boards of inquiries were convened in both cases, but no sanctions were issued.
It’s a good reference for the issue of the U.S. Navy and seamanship.
Yes I agree STCW is the minimum standard require by ALL national maritime education institutions in IMO member countries, or at least those who have signed up to the STCW Convention, incl. the Manila Amendment in STCW’10
I did qualify my statement that some countries, incl. Norway had reduced their education time to meet those standards by saying:
[quote=“ombugge, post:275, topic:45129”]
But then again, the level of basic education of seafarers have generally improved, thus less time is needed to teach mathematics, physics, languages and writing skills etc.[/quote]
I stand by that statement. In my time of studying at a Maritime School most of us had only 7-year basic schooling, before going to sea at 15. and with min. 3 years of seatime on entering school. Some being in their 30’s on entry and rather rusty on their childhood learning.
The schooling was compulsory, which took 3 x 1 year to sit for a Master examination. Most took the education in steps as they gained seatime as Officers. To obtain the Master Unlimited Licence required at least one year as Chief Officer.
Today’s reality is that all Norwegians have at least 10 years of schooling, but may not have been to sea at all when stating their min.2 years Maritime education per STCW requirement, regardless of whether they are aiming for a career on VLCC, Cruise ships, Offshore drilling rigs, on Deep sea Fishing vessels, or even car ferries running across a fjord somewhere in Norway. They have to get seatime as Apprentices or Cadets before they can obtain any certification.
The only exception is license to command pleasure crafts over 15 m. but below 24 m. LOA in greater coastal trade, or small commercial vessels in local trade. (Deck Officer Class 5 - Pleasure Craft): https://www.sjofartsdir.no/en/recreational-craft/certificates/certificate-for-deck-officer-class-5-pleasure-craft/
PS> Pleasure boats below 15 m. require a Boating Licence, regardless of power.
Well it does unless the investigation indicates otherwise…
There are many factors to consider before the legal blame can be assigned by an enquiry in Japan, USA, or even the Philippines.
Most likely there will be a proportional blame, based on who SHOULD have done what and who actually did what, which cannot be determined before both parties present their facts and raise their defence.
Of course it’s going to be proportional blame. My comment was based on “bulk” of the blame…