Here’s what gCaptain said is “certainly the most true” statement about the sea:
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I agree with gCaptain’s bottom line, that both captains will be held liable, and that’s the gouge. However, I’m just a simple soldier and my take is a bit less sophisticated than that expressed by gCaptain: small and maneuverable always yields to big and clumsy. (You need to move. No, you need to move. No, you need to move. No, I’m a lighthouse.)
gCaptain’s detailed descriptions of the two captains’ differing roles and resources appear to argue that a Naval officer and Merchant captain have radically different bridge experience and responsibilities, but then he undermines his own position by stating that Merchant “Ship captains spend most of their time in the office doing paperwork or managing people all around the ship. The actual navigation of the vessel is done on the bridge by a junior officer called the Officer In Charge Of The Navigational Watch (OICNW).” Which is also his complaint against the Fitzgerald’s captain.
The apparently conflicting statements come together to form a credible picture of Merchant and Navy captains that is more similar than dissimilar as regards what they do all day. Even the Fitzgerald’s captain being in his cabin at the time of the collision is mirrored in the Exxon Valdez example gCaptain correctly offered. As to the unexplained U-turns, well, we have yet to hear from the container captain, but it hardly seems sinister; wouldn’t anyone come about after an experience like that, if only to offer assistance? The plot and timing of these maneuver data points only suggest that both captains were likely off their bridges at the time of the collision - hence the “hit and run” appearance of the merchant ship’s maneuvers before the U-turn (adult leadership now on the bridge).
I’ve come in to Tokyo Bay from the west many times, typically I would not be on the bridge in that section.
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If you look at the link posted by @ombugge this morning showing the AIS tracks of other vessels in the area at the time it makes the Crystal’s course track look quite reasonable considering the other traffic.
I don’t think it requires an “adult” to avoid a huge ship, and if the Porter incident is any indication, that doesn’t always help.
I was talking long term experience. My point was that before a civilian becomes captain they spend their entire career on ships and most of that time is on the bridge… but, before getting command, Naval officers get moved around between shoreside and non-bridgestanding sailing billets.
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Good video. It makes my point very well. Bill Halsey found this out in1945. He sailed the most powerful fleet in history into a typhoon without taking rudimentary seamanship precautions. Lost 700 men and 3 ships. We only visit the ocean. I have never been to sea that at some time, despite the size of the ship, that my primary thought was “Oh lord thy sea is so big and my boat so small!"
ELTON C. "JEFF” OBYRNE
9802-12 Baymeadows Rd
PMB#179
Jacksonville, Florida
32256-7987
910-545-5768
obyrnejeff@mac.com
The sea was not dangerous Capt. Davidson was.
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Agreed, but in that parenthetic statement I was referring to the container ship - which doesn’t appear to have reacted decisively following the collision: not reporting the collision for nearly an hour as well as coming about a bit later than you’d expect, had the captain been on the bridge at the time of the collision.
Thanks, I was wondering if that stretch of water would be part of the captain’s shut-eye time - just wasn’t sure.
That’s an interesting comment. Trying to get west of potential hurricane and east of the Bahamas never sounded like a good idea, but do you think that it was Captain Davidson’s alone? Have never operated in commercial environment but have experienced desk bound deciders who pushed in an inappropriate direction or schedule.
Even so, just as in the commercial, bad decisions are heavily punished by the sea, which meets the definition of “dangerous”.
ELTON C. "JEFF” OBYRNE
9802-12 Baymeadows Rd
PMB#179
Jacksonville, Florida
32256-7987
910-545-5768
obyrnejeff@mac.com
That post makes me feel queasy … please find somewhere else to post your silly fantasy messages. Maybe that diver kid will send you a message and you guys can become the bestest friends and exchange messages about the dangerous seas.
That is probably the only accurate statement you have made so far. Go away.
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Where did you get the information that the Crystal didn’t report anything? My understanding was that the Crystal reported to the JCG almost immediately (approximately 1:30 am local time) and the Fitzgerald reported via satphone an hour later, for understandable reasons.
correction: The Crystal reported the collision to the JCG at 2:25 am local time. The report was later amended by Nippon Yusen to specify the correct time.
As far as the Crystal’s turn watch this and you’ll see that the Crystal also had to avoid the Maersk Evora, the Bai Chay Bridge, Wan Hai 266, Kiso, Nissho Maru, and potentially several other things that may have been moored out there. Is it reasonable to expect the Crystal to take faster action in those circumstances? Seems to me like right after a collision would be a bad time to make hasty decisions.
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Yes, he was.
But he was aided, abetted and probably bullied in one form or another by shoreside management.
He gets the basket but they get the assist.
Yes, he was the Master and I agree with Steamer “Please Go Away”
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This is only one of more than a dozen articles that reported the container ship took an hour to report the collision. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/container-ship-waited-hour-reporting-navy-collision-article-1.3258885
I’ve seen nothing that amends the report time to anything close to 1:30 am local, if you have I’d love to see it.
As to evasive actions for other shipping, well, the Crystal already appears to have been turning as hard to starboard as a container ship can under-weigh to avoid Fitzgerald (they get points for effort, but that elephant can’t turn on a dime), then, they correct course and make a rather extended, almost straight run at Tokyo - apparently avoiding, well, nothing - until the first U-turn, which did require evasive care. I watched the you-tube video you referred to and it shows the same thing - nothing to avoid until well after they corrected course following the collision to resume their original heading toward Tokyo. Then the U-turn after passing other shipping, and more maneuvering after they returned to the scene of the accident. Again, I’m not suggesting anything untoward in this - just think the captain wasn’t there until after the collision, then asked if anyone had reported the collision yet and brought her about. I guess I’m uncertain why that assessment of the evidence would be unacceptable.
From what I’ve seen, they at least have a commercial VHF on the bridge with DSC. They also have EPIRBs, and NAVTEX. Could have easily called out a destress from the bridge… yet they push all the blame to the Chrystal.
NY Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/asia/ship-navy-collision-uss-fitzgerald-japan.html
Look again. The first turn to port after the collision avoids the Evora, who is running along side also headed in the direction of Tokyo. I suppose they could have continued to turn around at that point, but they didn’t, maybe they didn’t want to run over the Fitzgerald a second time, I don’t know. Next they turn slightly to starboard to go around the Bai Chay Bridge. They wait for Kiso to clear their path and then turn 180 around the Bai Chay Bridge and return to the area of the collision. The apex of the 180 happens 35 min after the initial collision.
Estimate the times of each turn with this image posted by @capangel earlier in the thread, or look it up on one of the many instances of this data posted elsewhere.
https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/business6/uploads/gcaptain_maritime_forum/optimized/1X/ecae8cefc2bfe436ac19de493cf8d5a8e7fd32a3_1_690x443.png
One reason, I suspect, that the Navy uses yards as distances is that they train to sail in tight formations, in which the distances between ships are measured in hundreds of yards - and not multiples of nautical miles. And, in any case, yards to nautical miles is a pretty simple conversion when they need it.
This is simply wrong most of the time.
Bad decisions get made all the time, every day, everywhere, by mariners (and aviators, and everyone else) experienced and not. Relative to the amount of activity, quite rarely does it result in fatalities at all, let alone an event that makes it into the news with staying power.
And therein lies the potentially deadly trap: excessive risk-taking often, maybe even usually, goes unpunished. Often completely and for shockingly long periods of time. Whole careers, even. That fact easily leads to making excessive risk-taking the norm. Eventually no one even realizes that what they’re doing is risky at all. It’s known as the normalization of deviation: “That’s the way we’ve always done it!” and blah, blah, blah.
So I believe it’s counterproductive to warn / teach people that the sea will swiftly punish them for their risk-taking sins. The likelihood is that their own experience has or will teach them otherwise and your credibility is thereby reduced. Better to tell them the truth and concentrate on developing and practicing good judgment, and the discipline to use it consistently.
I’ve been plying the waters in one form or another since I was a young child. I’m in my 50’s now. I’ve made bad decisions and yet still avoided anything catastrophic. Luck, deserved or not, has been with me. But it can desert me at any time. I know very well not to ever count on it to compensate for a bad decision I might make.
If bad decisions were always heavily punished by the sea there’d be none of us left to argue about it. Punishment, as doled out by the sea or its proxies, is arbitrary and capricious, and inconsistent in application, scope and severity. It tends not to discriminate. Having said that, luck tends to favor the prepared more often than not, but your mileage may vary.
Murphy’s Law = fake news.
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There’s plenty of blame to go around, but the Crystal bridge crew are only responsible for themselves; what they did and failed to do. I don’t much care for what the pundits say or the finger pointing. I just want to see what happened. As more facts become available, we may eventually learn what went wrong on the Fitzgerald as well.