[QUOTE=LI_Domer;184672]Yea I have to agree, really the voice is the only useful piece of data that can be gained. I just hope the data is intact and of decent enough quality.[/QUOTE]
Some VDRs are set up to record engineering alarms. Those can be very useful especially in a case like this with a loss of propulsion. From the gist of the conversation here, it doesn’t look hopeful that we’ll get that data.
[QUOTE=c.captain;184695]Still, I refuse to believe that once he did speak with the DPA that the reason for the loss of propulsion was never disclosed and it is the refusal of TOTE to come clean with that is what smacks of coverup. I guess there is a port engineer scheduled in this round of hearings so maybe the cause of that casualty will become known at that time? Why do I have so many doubts though?
.[/QUOTE]
My hope was that they would “Recall” The DPA to see if he “suddenly” remembered more of his conversation with the Captain. I refuse to believe that he did not ask WTH was going on. Plus, why in hell did they not setup a time frame for call backs. Something along of the line of you call every 15-30 minutes and if I do not hear from you I WILL PUSH ALL OF THE BUTTONS!
As for me, I really hope that those involved in this (Cover Up) never get a good night sleep again!
[QUOTE=Steamer;184795]According to the machinery specifications published by the USCG the design pressure for those boilers is 1075 psig.
That means they are “900 pound boilers” which is, or was, the standard for American commercial steamships up to this time. The pressure in the economizer will be above drum pressure only enough to provide the volume of feed required for the boiler load.
That figure of 150% applies to fire tube boilers and new boilers. For boilers “in service” the CFRs call for 125% but ABS rules still call for 150% so there seems to be a conflict there. Maybe the hearings will address the differences. Why the ABS surveyor figured she could test at 800 psig is a mystery to me, and sounds ridiculous since it is below normal working pressure but is 25% below design pressure.
Hardly, the purpose of using water in a hydro test (see the connection in the term? hydro=water)is to ensure that there is little if any stored energy in the system under test. There is a check valve between the economizer and the drum so that the only part of the system pressurized is the economizer itself and its volume is very small compared to the boiler. An economizer tube failure during a hydro test would cause the loss of a few ounces of water, not an explosion.[/QUOTE]
Steamer is exactly correct. Hydroing a system simply means putting water in and pressurizing the water with either more water or air to make sure nothing leaks. Superheat is easy to understand. It is water heated past it’s normal evaporation point. Example, your tea kettle boils and you capture that steam out of the spout and heat it up some more. There have been thousands of steam powered ships on the oceans for 100 years voyaging safely around typhoon and hurricane. It is not rocket science. If the El Faro properly maintained the boilers and associated machinery there should have been no problem with propulsion.
[QUOTE=tengineer1;184928]There have been thousands of steam powered ships on the oceans for 100 years voyaging safely around typhoon and hurricane. It is not rocket science. [/QUOTE]
And lots of casualties as well.
Having been through huge typhoon on a steamboat while hove to and rolling on the beam ends and pitching so badly the screw was out of the water half the time I can say with no reservations that luck, pure shithouse luck, is why more ships were not lost.
Watching the throttle cycle between closed and wide open in less than a minute every couple of minutes is a very scary way to spend the day. Steam plants don’t like to change conditions rapidly and there is too much “inertia” in the system to do it gracefully. Steam plants are like old engineers, they do things extremely well with considerable elegance but prefer not to rush. Almost any little problem with the automation or a dodgy sensor in those conditions can trip the plant and if that happens it takes either tremendous skill or amazing luck to avoid losing more than just the plant.
We were lucky, the boat was a fully loaded tanker, deep in the water and we had a very well maintained plant.
[QUOTE=Steamer;184937]And lots of casualties as well.
Having been through huge typhoon on a steamboat while hove to and rolling on the beam ends and pitching so badly the screw was out of the water half the time I can say with no reservations that luck, pure shithouse luck, is why more ships were not lost.
Watching the throttle cycle between closed and wide open in less than a minute every couple of minutes is a very scary way to spend the day. Steam plants don’t like to change conditions rapidly and there is too much “inertia” in the system to do it gracefully. Steam plants are like old engineers, they do things extremely well with considerable elegance but prefer not to rush. Almost any little problem with the automation or a dodgy sensor in those conditions can trip the plant and if that happens it takes either tremendous skill or amazing luck to avoid losing more than just the plant.
We were lucky, the boat was a fully loaded tanker, deep in the water and we had a very well maintained plant.[/QUOTE]
Yup. . . kinda why the Bridge Throttle Control wasn’t a very good idea on a steamship. I know in heavy weather I certainly was more relaxed on the tugs. My biggest problem was keeping clean fuel to the engines. Those Invader tugs had no centrifuge and bad weather would stir up all kinds of crap in the tanks. . . on, and of course water coming in through the vents, too. Keep those tanks drained. . . .
[QUOTE=tengineer1;184928]…There have been thousands of steam powered ships on the oceans for 100 years voyaging safely around typhoon and hurricane. It is not rocket science…[/QUOTE]
Circumvent a hurricane is all about input, i.e. about the future path of the hurricane.
Predicting the path of a hurricane is still not applied science at all.
Even with all the present satellite data and the enormous computer power, the path of ‘Joachim’ did clearly not follow the predictions. Maybe onboard there was some irrational hope involved: The hurricane will very soon return to the original predictions…
Without all the modern gadgets, during WWII and more than once, the entire Pacific Fleet run into hurricanes who did not follow the predictions. Less seaworthy vessels would simply have disappeared for unknown reasons.
[QUOTE=Steamer;184937]Watching the throttle cycle between closed and wide open in less than a minute every couple of minutes is a very scary way to spend the day. Steam plants don’t like to change conditions rapidly and there is too much “inertia” in the system to do it gracefully. Steam plants are like old engineers, they do things extremely well with considerable elegance but prefer not to rush. Almost any little problem with the automation or a dodgy sensor in those conditions can trip the plant and if that happens it takes either tremendous skill or amazing luck to avoid losing more than just the plant. [/QUOTE]
so let’s discuss what MIGHT have occurred aboard the EL FARO that morning? I don’t want to go back to the original thread on the ship’s loss but recall (purely anecdotally) there being a turbine lube oil pressure loss which tripped off the automation to shut down steam to propulsion. I think we can assume the ship was running with wind and seas on the quarter so her stern rising high and exposing the screw very frequently like when you were on that tanker. Could it be simply that a pressure sensor failed or at least the oil sump level changing over an extreme range with the motions so that suction was lost? Where are the single point failure points were the automation would have shut down steam to the turbine and why not able to be overridden by the engineers quick enough to get the ship under command again?
Of course, if the plant was still running in automated mode, was that not its own point of failure? Should the automation been overridden and the plant been running in manual control to avoid a potential shutdown?
I believe that the final hour was like this. The ship running before the seas as it neared the center of circulation with increasingly more violent motions. It was shipping seas onto its first vehicle deck which allowed the downflooding to occur. Ultimately, the ship made a particularly huge pitch/roll (possibly while trying to come head to seas) to cause that automation to shutdown the steam to the turbine. Immediately after that, the ship went into the tough and began the huge deep rolls at which point the second phone call to that call center was made as the engineers tried to restore propulsion. It was likely continuing to downflood during this period reducing the righting arm with massive freesurface down in the lower holds. Ultimately, a rogue wave rolled the ship onto her beams end and she layed over for an extended period. At this point the lashings on only one piece of rolling stock failed and that began a cascading loss of more and more lashings. Rapidly, this cargo all went down to the low side of the hold pinning the ship on her side as the flooding became fatal. The only question is how much time all of this took after the first lashings failed? Could be less than a minute before the ship foundered. I hope for all hands that end came so quickly.
[QUOTE=cmakin;184942]Yup. . . kinda why the Bridge Throttle Control wasn’t a very good idea on a steamship. [/QUOTE]
The issue wasn’t bridge throttle control, it was the governor trying to keep up.
Bridge control certainly carries a lot of risks when a mate is clueless about what is on the other end of the lever. More than once while maneuvering I have had to call the bridge and tell them that they are on the ragged edge of losing the plant. Kind of like on a motorboat where they think there is an electric starter motor or something. A lot of them seemed to think the throttle was like the gas pedal on their car.
After having a wise old chief watch me head for the throttle to try and save the plant once, I never tried that again. He told me that unless it was to save our own lives all I would do is give the mate someone else to blame for his own stupidity if the plant went down.
[QUOTE=c.captain;184947]so let’s discuss what MIGHT have occurred aboard the EL FARO that morning?
Should the automation been overridden and the plant been running in manual control to avoid a potential shutdown?
[/QUOTE]
We are talking about a couple of separate but linked controls. The turbine has an overspeed trip that slams the throttle shut to prevent the engine from grenading if the prop ventilates at high power. Loss of lube oil also closes the throttle.
A sudden closing of the throttle at high loads does weird things to the boiler and feed. Pressure rises rapidly, drum level drops due to “shrink” the feed pump speeds up in response. Fuel and air flow drops. When the prop goes deep again a moment later, all those things reverse … there is no way a human can keep up, at least a single human or pair of them. It took a gang of engineers, firemen, watertenders, junior engineers and wipers to keep up in the old days …
Restoring the plant when there is only one or two watchstanders is a coin toss … with a lot of luck and quick identification of the problem it might happen within a few minutes but otherwise it is pretty much a start from scratch process and when the ship has turned beam to things would get ugly in a hurry.
Loss of lube oil seems unlikely if any electrical power was available. Their are two lube oil pumps, one in service and the other in automatic standby. The pump fills a gravity header tank that holds a few minutes of lube oil supply. That tank is overflowed by the lube oil pump and the overflow is visible through a “bullseye” as it returns to the sump. In rough weather it sometimes seems like the overflow stops for a looong time when rolling heavily but an alarm should sound if lube oil pressure drops. If lube oil was lost and the shaft could not be stopped then the engine could be wrecked very quickly.
The truth is there are so many reasons the plant could be lost that without any clue whatsoever it simply is not possible to even speculate as to the cause or even what part of the propulsion system from fuel tanks to prop that failed.
[QUOTE=Steamer;184950]We are talking about a couple of separate but linked controls. The turbine has an overspeed trip that slams the throttle shut to prevent the engine from grenading if the prop ventilates at high power. Loss of lube oil also closes the throttle.
A sudden closing of the throttle at high loads does weird things to the boiler and feed. Pressure rises rapidly, drum level drops due to “shrink” the feed pump speeds up in response. Fuel and air flow drops. When the prop goes deep again a moment later, all those things reverse … there is no way a human can keep up, at least a single human or pair of them. It took a gang of engineers, firemen, watertenders, junior engineers and wipers to keep up in the old days …
Restoring the plant when there is only one or two watchstanders is a coin toss … with a lot of luck and quick identification of the problem it might happen within a few minutes but otherwise it is pretty much a start from scratch process and when the ship has turned beam to things would get ugly in a hurry.
Loss of lube oil seems unlikely if any electrical power was available. Their are two lube oil pumps, one in service and the other in automatic standby. The pump fills a gravity header tank that holds a few minutes of lube oil supply. That tank is overflowed by the lube oil pump and the overflow is visible through a “bullseye” as it returns to the sump. In rough weather it sometimes seems like the overflow stops for a looong time when rolling heavily and an alarm should sound if lube oil pressure drops. If lube oil was lost and the shaft could not be stopped then the engine could be wrecked very quickly.
The truth is there are so many reasons the plant could be lost that without any clue whatsoever it simply is not possible to even speculate as to the cause or even what part of the propulsion system from fuel tanks to prop that failed.[/QUOTE]
Let’s be thorough–lots of experience here, esp you, Steamer–what are the auto-shutdowns for main prop besides the below (let’s not discount loss of fuel, complete loss of steam—but for this maybe just focus on turbines and automation related). What is the relative level of difficulty to reset (time, skill, materials required) when conducted in heavy weather, deadship conditions of this plant? Grade the level of difficulty in terms of High-Med-Low with specific regard to time to restore (length of time in deadship mode being likely related to sinking given list and reported compromise of watertight integrity). I think we can assume a high-level difficulty to reset/restore was in place. You make a great point about also the likely backups in place to prevent such trips like the LO, maybe a third column on likelihood to occur in heavy weather?
ABS rules for auto-shutdowns for Turbine Vessels. Is this an accurate list for year built and do they have reset/bypass/override capability? Any additions/deletions?
-Overspeed
-Loss of Lube oil
-Excessive steam pressure drop to throttle
-High condensate level in main condenser (anyone know the sensor locations in relation to seas)
-excessive axial displacement of rotors
-low vacuum in main condenser
[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;184952]
ABS rules for auto-shutdowns for Turbine Vessels. Is this an accurate list for year built and do they have reset/bypass/override capability? Any additions/deletions?
[/QUOTE]
There are a lot more ways to lose the plant than auto shutdown items. The items listed are the last ditch safety devices that back up a litany of items that can kill the plant.
An attentive engineer will watch hotwell levels and manipulate it manually, he will watch vacuum, drum levels, DC heater levels, auxiliary exhaust pressure … there are so many items that can lead to loss of power that it would take a book to itemize them much less prioritize them. What seems like the least significant parameter can go astray and cause a large problem half an hour later. Catastrophic events aside, nothing happens instantly on a steam plant. If a diesel is a paperback detective novel, a steam plant is Shakespearean.
There are so many characters and plot twists that without a single clue it really is foolish to speculate on what initially stopped the ship.
Maybe I missed it but was the ship as far as we know on one or two boilers at the time of the incident? I suppose it must have been on two boilers as it would be rather foolish to try to outrun or shoot under an unpreditical thing like a nasty hurricane on only one boiler. But then you never know…
[QUOTE=Dutchie;184972]But then you never know…[/QUOTE]
Especially when the people you would expect to have been told [I]something[/I] have said [I]nothing[/I].
I am afraid I am getting your drift…
Back in the old days I sailed on the Dutch crewed, Liberian flagged, Newport News built ‘W. Alton Jones’. Quite often the Bailey boards went beserk. The ship’s electrician was not able to repair the boards as it was full of vacuum tubes and those things were not his cup of tea. I was then called in to try to find the problem and soon found on the first occasion that the cause was a couple of faulty gas filled thyratron tubes of which I still remember the type number, 2D21. These tubes switched relays on and off. Always a big problem were the many false alarms. The sound was sometimes so loud that it could disorientate you. Some less important alarms were silenced by simply cutting a wire! Others were smothered in cotton waste and such…
It didnot happen often but once in a while a boiler tripped or what. We used to literally say that for instance boiler one ‘had fallen off the board’. All hell broke loose then and as I remember it the first thing they did was closing the main steam valve because the greedy turbine would suck the boiler dry in seconds or less. Luckily in those days we had enough oilers, assistant engineers and what not to help out the watch engineer in the sequence of manually shutting down the boiler, softly softly, and switching to the other boiler.
That’s me at a tender age on the top deck of the ‘W. Alton Jones’
Yes, those were the days…
While watching todays Hearing, I was very surprised to hear the NTSB Rep say what he did.
Here is a link to an Article about this statement.
[QUOTE=Tugs;185019]While watching todays Hearing, I was very surprised to hear the NTSB Rep say what he did. [/QUOTE]
Thanks for that link. That is an astonishing statement to make for someone holding that position (senior EVP) and in that position (in front of a marine board). Really? Just an accident? I’m paraphrasing here but to say “we are waiting for this board and the NTSB to tell us what happened” that is astonishing.
I dont know this guy so I don’t know if this was a brain fart under pressure or if it accurately reflects a complete lack of soul searching, analysis and reflection on the part of upper management at Tote. That was a pretty poor all around never mind relatives were present.
ISM demands minimum levels of training for us poor wretches at sea maybe it is time to put aside the notion that all shipowners staff are knowledgeable about ship management. Apparently it wouldn’t hurt them to sit in on some of these resource management courses and LMS courses.
here’s the text of that
NTSB: Few dispute El Faro sinking was “colossal failure” in management
TOTE exec calls the loss an accident
Thursday, May 26, 2016
By Stephanie Brown
Jacksonville, FL —
A “colossal failure” in management.It’s how the NTSB’s Investigator-In-Charge of the El Faro sinking investigation classified the incident while questioning a top official within TOTE Incorporated Thursday. Despite that, the TOTE rep says what happened was truly an accident.
TOTE Inc. Executive Vice President Peter Keller spent much of his testimony to the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation speaking about the customer-centric, safety-oriented focus he has tried to build within the company. Part of that, in his own definition, included holding management and leadership responsible for any breakdown in operations.
“Now sir, many would argue and few would dispute the loss of the ship El Faro and its cargo, and most importantly the loss of 33 souls aboard the El Faro represents a colossal failure in the management of the companies responsible for the safe operation of the El Faro. As you stated, the proof is in the pudding. And sir, you have no doubt thought long and hard about the nature of the management failures that led to the loss of the El Faro and its crew. Could you please share with this Board your thoughts about the nature of the management failures that led to the loss of the El Faro,” asked NTSB Investigator-In-Charge Tom Roth-Roffy.
“I think this tragic loss is all about an accident, and I look to this Board, as well as the NTSB, to try to define what those elements may or may not have been. I, for one, with 51 years of experience in transportation, cannot come up with a rational answer. I do not see anything that has come out of this hearing or anything else that I’ve ever seen that would talk about a cause. Certainly, as management, we look for that, we look for what the NTSB and this Board may come up with because we think it will be important. At this point in time, I, for one, cannot identify any failure that would have led to that tragic event,” Keller responded.
AUDIO:Hear the exchange between Roth-Roffy and Keller
The dozen or so El Faro crew family members sitting just off to the side behind Keller could be seen bowing their heads and covering their eyes by the time he was done with his response.
Derek Davis, the son of crew member Larry Davis, left during a recess and returned with pudding cups to hand out at the end of the hearing day. He tells WOKV they’re “proof in the pudding” cups to “celebrate” TOTE standing by their record.
Prior to that exchange, Keller spoke at length about the corporate reorganization among TOTE Inc and its sister companies- including the El Faro’s owner TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico and operator TOTE Services. He says the result was more streamlined staff and operations and consolidated knowledge. When the Board questioned whether there were still enough shore side resources devoted to operations at sea, Keller says that is their priority.
“Everything we do, we do with safety in mind. It makes no sense to have good customer relations, it makes no sense to have an efficient terminal, it makes no sense to handle a lot of cargo if you can’t do it safely,” he says.
Keller was chiefly involved with the launching of the new TOTE ships- Isla Bella and Perla Del Caribe- and gave new insight in to the El Faro’s roll in the larger LNG project. While we’ve heard previous testimony that El Faro was preparing to transfer to Alaskan trade, Keller says that was going to be done to relieve a different vessel that needed a dry dock period. The El Faro could only leave for that, however, when the Isla Bella joined the Puerto Rico trade route, because the company still had to handle the same amount of cargo on that route.
The delivery of Isla Bella was delayed several weeks after a problem found during sea trials, ultimately launching just a week or two ahead of the El Faro sinking. The Board did not ask what the Isla Bella’s original delivery date was supposed to be, and whether without the additional dry dock period the El Faro would have still been in service on the trade.
She was heavily loaded when she went down in Hurricane Joaquin. Keller says the ships normally carried a large load and TOTE temporarily had barges brought over to supplement the cargo boost they got when a competitor closed up shop. The new ships are designed with a larger capacity.
The CGMBI continues through this week and there will be another session called for the future after the NTSB mission to recover the El Faro’s Voyage Data Recorder, which was found on the ocean floor but requires special salvage equipment. Following the third hearing session, the CGMBI will issue findings, as they work to prevent something like this from happening again.
[QUOTE=c.captain;185029]here’s the text of that[/QUOTE]
Of course it has to be an accident. You think TOTE is hoping for a finding of negligence or unseaworthiness? You think TOTE is looking to pin it on someone in the office? Hell, no. First, they want to collect the payment from the insurance company, second they HAVE to tell the customer it wasn’t their fault. No matter what the finding, TOTE is going to spin it so the crew or the weather service or the guy that made the wing nuts is to blame. Up here in the office, we’ve got all the bases covered and when something goes wrong, it’s not our fault.
Please remember that guys like Keller, before appearing in a hearing like this one or in court, are video trained and grilled by professionals to react exactly as required to all kind of questions in such a way as to always keep a clean sheet. I even was video trained in a much and much smaller damage case once. Nothing is left to chance, they even brought in actors to make it look very real. After such a ‘court’ session the video was shown to you and all your stupid mistakes were discussed and later trained on with another video take etc.
I remember that if somebody attacked you rather strongly you were required not to answer the guy but turn to the judge to appeal to him that witnesses should be treated with more respect and that worked! Judges don’t like to be accused of the fact that they cannot keep order in their court… When the training started they told me: “We will Teflon-coat you mate, no worries.”
The only thing that could bring them off balance are perhaps hard facts like the following.
This came up during the hearing of 19 February. It was said that the starboard boiler was inspected a month before the loss of the El Faro. It was not not deemed necessary to inspect the port boiler as the situation could be expected to be similar.
TOTE had commissioned an independent firm to survey the starboard boiler in order to determine the scope of work required during her next drydock period, scheduled for November 6. The port boiler was not inspected, Mr. Fisker-Andersen said, and the condition of the starboard unit was intended to serve as an indicator of maintenance requirements for both. The USCG has not made the full text of the document available to the public, but in the section quoted, the surveyors found that the boiler’s “burner throats have deteriorated severely, especially between number one and number three burners. Cracking and loss of material, plus heavy buildup of fuel, is present in all three throats.”
Mr. Fisker-Andersen told the panel that the survey was standard practice in advance of a drydock period, and that the damages found had been discussed with boiler specialists and were not “show stoppers.” The wear on the components did not constitute a reason to cancel or delay a voyage, he said.
Well this could be true, I am certainly not an boiler burner expert, but to me it sounds rather threatening. Any thoughts?
[QUOTE=Dutchie;185038]Please remember that guys like Keller, before appearing in a hearing like this one or in court, are video trained and grilled by professionals to react exactly as required to all kind of questions in such a way as to always keep a clean sheet. I even was video trained in a much and much smaller damage case once. Nothing is left to chance, they even brought in actors to make it look very real. After such a ‘court’ session the video was shown to you and all your stupid mistakes were discussed and later trained on with another video take etc.
I remember that if somebody attacked you rather strongly you were required not to answer the guy but turn to the judge to appeal to him that witnesses should be treated with more respect and that worked! Judges don’t like to be accused of the fact that they cannot keep order in their court… When the training started they told me: “We will Teflon-coat you mate, no worries.”
The only thing that could bring them off balance are perhaps hard facts like the following.
This came up during the hearing of 19 November. It was said that the starboard boiler was inspected a month before the loss of the El Faro. It was not not deemed necessary to inspect the port boiler as the situation could be expected to be similar.[/QUOTE]
the ‘hard fact’ that a company was preparing for a drydock repair period by preparing for it? Yeah, that’ll trip him up.
I think NTSB was trying to rile the witness, but if it was sincere, it’s a sign of poor tactics on the part of NTSB to have basically stated they have reached a conclusion of colossal management failure while evidence gathering. And by stating at ‘few would argue’, well, that’s rhetoric, not fact. Relying on the one fact that a vessel and 33 souls were lost to ‘prove’ it is suggesting that management failures are inherent, absolute and unpardonable, (we’ll figure out how in the report). If a meteorite struck and sank a vessel, it sounds like NTSB would have found a cause of management failure for failing to properly execute the meteorite avoidance plan. “You don’t have a meteorite avoidance plan? Don’t you know meteroites exist and are capable of destructive power? Management failure!” If I was the TOTE rep, I would have asked for more specific info from the NTSB to help him identify those failures immediately. TOTE have several ships out there with lots of people working them, if there is a colossal management failure ongoing and un-corrected,“few would argue” the NTSB wouldn’t be criminally negligent to fail to point them out RIGHT NOW if they knew them, so help the company DPA out, Tom. Otherwise, save the theatrics.
