[QUOTE=Tugs;179777]That’s what I heard also but have wondered the same thing. It sure sounded as if it was Water in 3 Hold but it could have been Flooding in 3 holds. Once again, only the DPA knows what was said and he is not going to volunteer any information. To bad they Stopped water boarding.[/QUOTE]
It was 3 hold. I think that is the non-sailor types who think it is 3 holds.
[QUOTE=z-drive;179741]Yes, the towing/salvage/firefighting thing is in place. How well it works, well in my experience it actually works pretty well as the QI’s have everything in place. No question as who the emergency oil boom vendor is in Marcus Hook at 0300.
In my experience the QI and DPA have regular jobs within the company, but serve as QI/DPA additionally. Theoretically the QI could have been the alt-QI who is the regular DPA; semantics, yes i know. Typically you have alternates too (likely required by ISM anyways?), so you aren’t responsible for the call every day of the year. Once again, in my experience, you’d holler at your dispatcher or equivalent that you have an emergency and either TELL them to get you the QI, or that you’re calling them. Depending on what time of day it is, I’m calling the QI as the master calls the GM, VP, or port captain etc. Honestly If i’m ever in such a situation with that many lives at stake in that fucked up of a situation, the heirarchy can go fuck itself as i’m calling whoever i see fit at the time.
While i despise being spied on, maybe the solution is just a real-time feed. Maybe just send it to an independent storage vendor rather than watch it livetime to preserve some autonomy, but have it available for review whenever needed. Basics would only be needed: Bridge audio, course, speed, position. They’d hate the data pricetag, but in this case why wouldn’t the owners want to know whats up with their boats at any time? Doesn’t BP advertise something like this in their TV ads where they monitor drilling activity?[/QUOTE]
Not sure how it works now, but when OPA 90 was first put into place, I was a QI. ABS decided to get into the QI business. Some of them were office slackers in Houston, but a few of us field surveyors were “volunteered” to be QIs, including myself. Most times we had an incident in my area, one of the office slacker QIs quickly took over. I was also not always available as I was often offshore and NOT in a position to respond quickly or efficiently (a point I made early on, but as usual, I digress). Not sure if the roll of a QI has expanded. I do know that ABS got out of the QI business some time ago. . . not sure if they are any more responsive now. . .
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[QUOTE=Fraqrat;179755]I don’t know if that would’ve changed anything. CG didn’t sound like they were that eager to go out. The DPA at one point says you have a better map than me when they are talking about anchoring. Didn’t the CG know how deep it was in that area? Does anyone have 1,000 shots of chain onboard? How would they go to Turks and Cacaos if the were DIW? The DPA even chuckles during the call. If it was a national security cutter out there stranded they would have moved heaven and earth and launched all available assets. Just like if that was a CG body found in the water he would have been retrieved and we all know it. Those assholes would’ve flown for hours with one of theirs in a body bag in the chopper. They couldn’t even be troubled to grab a hair sample and bring back for some closure for a family. This whole thing horribly fucked up. I hope they ask some of those questions this week when the SAR is examined.[/QUOTE]
I thought that the attitude of both parties in that call were grossly casual and almost routine. Of course I am not sure that either one of them were truly aware of the gravity of the situation at the time of the call. . . and whose fault is that?
[QUOTE=Dutchie;179771]An important question is why the cargo shifted in the first place and was this also the cause of the boilers shutting down? There exist certain circumstances at sea which could maybe explain this. I am referring to the phenomena of following and/or quartering seas. From Mat’s weather history picture it shows that the wind direction was dominantly west which together with the anticipated ship’s course spells out quartering waves.
Another factor to consider in this respect is the ship’s speed. The ship was trying to escape the hurricane and therefore probably went full throttle, anyway as fast as the circumstances would permit it to go. To avoid to be caught in this dangerous situation one would normally do the opposite and slack off speed.
The danger zone in terms of wavelengths are between 0.6 and 2.3 of the ship’s length in meters, thus between about 145 and 555 meters. The situation becomes critical with wave heights greater than 3.5 meters and increases proportionally with the wave heights. Too high a speed can also lead in some cases to a broach. Riding on a wavecrest reduces the stability of a ship dramatically and can easily lead to capsizing. An indication of this seems to be the fact that the ship can no longer be steered properly. That could be due to the fact that the trough of the wave is at the stern of the ship and the rudder is then partly out of the water. IMO has come out with a Circular 1228 on the subject which is interesting to read.
If this happened you can be sure that with the resulting violent accelerations lashings will break and that a domino effect will develop which will increase the list even more. Such a sudden list with accompanying accelerations could possibly also lead to boiler failure as well. It is just another theory, my tuppence worth after all that already has been said on the subject.
It is frustrating and not very professional that captain Davidson did not give any details of what had really happened, only sketchy general information about a heavy list but no details how much list and what caused the list. Boiler shutdown, what was the probable cause? Water in three holds, how could that happen? So much questions and hardly any answers so far.[/QUOTE]
That sounds like a possiblity that deserves looking into. Have to take a close look at the wx charts at the time including wave peroid.
When the captain called he said, IIRC, he’d had a “navigational incident” which struck me as unusual phrasing and he said the crew was safe which implies the incident he was referring to was over.
The ship may have been doing around 20 kts at the time according to the AIS, The ship was sailing with a low GM (I saw somewhere 0.5 feet which is much lower then I have ever experienced.) so the GM (dynamic GM) at the time may have gone negitive.
According to the phone call something along the lines of the scuttle blew off? and #3 hold flooded. That would be consistent with a high-speed broaching roll. How much roll would it take to put the scuttle under? A very heavy roll may also explain loosing propulsion.
The 15 degree list is not fully explained. Was that after the water was pumped out of #3 hold? If it was after de-watering then it may have been shifted cargo.
This seemms like a plausible explanation worth looking into.
I really hope WHOI finds the VDR, with intact data. The talk on the bridge will answer so many questions about what actually happened.
With regards to the CG/DPA phone call, I don’t think too much should be read into that. Neither one had the full picture and everyone believed the Joaquin was going to hit the East Coast so all the coverage was USEC so it wasn’t really front and center.
Also if you “call the Coast Guard” you don’t speak to the Commandant you talk to some lowly schmuck reading off a cheat sheet. When your I-shit breaks you don’t call the CEO of Apple, you talk to tech support. With the CG 99.99 percent of the calls are small pleasure craft hence the suggestion to call Sea Tow.
Actually the coastie didn’t do that bad, he told the DPA to look into gettiing a tow and he was going to try to call the ship for more info. As far as the laughter, it seems weird to me but at the time they were just trying to establish a little rapport with someone he was going ot be working with.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;179774]I thought he said it was water in the 3 hold, not water in 3 holds.[/QUOTE]
It took it from this sound clip. Listen from 2’43". I think I heard him saying: “We have water down in three holds.” I thought I was hearing the plural of hold but I must admit it sounded a bit unclear to me. So I think, after listening to the clip again, that you are right that it was number 3 hold after all.
[QUOTE=Dutchie;179787]It took it from this sound clip. Listen from 2’43". I think I heard him saying: “We have water down in three holds.” I am hearing the plural of hold but I must admit is sounds a bit weak. What do you make of it?[/QUOTE]
I’d say #3 hold is most likely, I think the captain said singular, “a scutle”.
After listening again I think it’s singular “…we have water down in 3 hold…” I think if it was plural he would’ve said “…we have water down in 3 of the holds…”
[QUOTE=cmakin;179781]I thought that the attitude of both parties in that call were grossly casual and almost routine. Of course I am not sure that either one of them were truly aware of the gravity of the situation at the time of the call. . . and whose fault is that?[/QUOTE]
I really have to believe that the DPA never spoke to the master before that call to the USCG was placed.
Here is some weather data from the hurricane hunter flight that made a pass through the storm and dropped dropsondes at midday UTC (8am EDT) on the 1st Oct. The positions of their records mean that El Faro must have been right on the western edge of the eyewall at the time communications were lost. The eyewall was 36nm across. It is possible that they got to within 20 nm of the centre of Joaquin.
Max surface winds were at 117 kts at 08:00 EDT.
http://aircraft.myfoxhurricane.com/recon/archive/storm.cgi?year=2015&storm=Joaquin&product=URNT12
[QUOTE=Mat;179770]Local time - which would have been EDT I think.[/QUOTE]
Bahamas time is UTC - 5: http://www.timetemperature.com/caribbean/bahamas_time_zone.shtml
some might recall in the days after the EL FARO disappeared my speculating if the propulsion was possibly lost while the master might have been bringing the ship about in order to heave to. To do that would mean swinging the ship to wind and seas abeam from on the quarter which could possibly caused a very severe roll. If the vessel had a list to begin with it is possible that the turn and rolling might have been the cause of the loss of the propulsion. I have asked about this privately with steam engineers and they say that it is unlikely but I still wonder?
I do know in my situation where I had 60’ seas on my stern when I took the GALAXY into that winter GoA storm needlessly, we were suffering terrible 40degree rolls as we ran before it. I thought about heaving to but dared not to try to bring her head to wind because I knew the vessel had more than once gotten in irons when trying to turn in strong winds and while she had adequate righting arm to survive very deep rolls, being pinned in the tough could very well have resulted in synchronous rolling where she couldn’t come back. We did have huge bags of bulk cement in the holds which could have shifted although any shift would not have been catastrophic because they were stowed in pretty tightly. In the end, I came to the conclusion that I was stuck to stay the course and keep running like we were even though the night was miserable and most aboard was seasick and very scared. I was very uncomfortable and got no sleep that night but did not have fear in my mind however I did not even take the possibility of losing one of the mains into consideration. Had that happened we never could have held any heading because one engine did not have enough HP and the ship had only a single rudder. Had one engine shut down and not have been able to be restarted, we would likely have been lost and no one could have saved a single soul.
I made a needless error of judgement to take the vessel into a situation which could have been a fatal one. After it was over and we were fine, the reality of what I did hit me like a freight train. I vowed to never to do that again and have taken pains since to get as far from severe weather as possible and never to ever risk my ship whether for an owner’s wishes or not. I always considered a successful career as a master is to never lose a man or a ship and so far I am going to make it till my career’s end with such a record however I will never, ever be complacent again nor ever think we’ll be just fine. A true professional master thinks just the opposite…that his ship will NOT be fine. Not were any danger or risk is concerned.
I also have to state that I nave since been asked to be the master of a ship (EPIC DIVER) which was manifestly unseaworthy (mostly with regards to structural fire protection and watertight integrity) and have accepted the responsibility even as I implored for safety upgrades which never came. Sometimes one assumes the risk and has to know where the weaknesses in his ship lie then do the best with what he is given knowing that there might be an emergency someday when he can’t save the ship or the people on her. There never is a day when aboard when you don’t have a fear deep down that day could be the one where it all comes down around one’s head. One reason I loathe Joe Boss so much is when he says he cannot afford to make even the simplest of changes to a vessel which could save everybody someday. Putting profits ahead of people is CRIMINAL!
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[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;179783]That sounds like a possiblity that deserves looking into. Have to take a close look at the wx charts at the time including wave peroid.
When the captain called he said, IIRC, he’d had a “navigational incident” which struck me as unusual phrasing and he said the crew was safe which implies the incident he was referring to was over.
The ship may have been doing around 20 kts at the time according to the AIS, The ship was sailing with a low GM (I saw somewhere 0.5 feet which is much lower then I have ever experienced.) so the GM (dynamic GM) at the time may have gone negitive.
According to the phone call something along the lines of the scuttle blew off? and #3 hold flooded. That would be consistent with a high-speed broaching roll. How much roll would it take to put the scuttle under? A very heavy roll may also explain loosing propulsion.
The 15 degree list is not fully explained. Was that after the water was pumped out of #3 hold? If it was after de-watering then it may have been shifted cargo.
This seemms like a plausible explanation worth looking into.[/QUOTE]
A GM of 0.5 feet (15,24 cm) is cutting it very close. The absolute minimum requirement is 15 cm. It is indeed not too difficult to go negative then. Due to the inherent slow roll and small freeboard, the FWA was used, one can get a lot of water over the ship especially under those extreme circumstances. Any flooding will eat away the GM and the freeboard rather rapidly. As far as I know there is no information about the damage stability of this ship. I suppose that the information of the actual GM and GZ curve is available from the LoadMax ashore. I hope that they will bring it out in due course.
[QUOTE=ombugge;179792]Bahamas time is UTC - 5: http://www.timetemperature.com/caribbean/bahamas_time_zone.shtml[/QUOTE]
But in October it would be UTC -4 for daylight saving time or EDT.
I believe it was the GM Margin that was 0.5 feet. The coasties were harping on that with the El Yunque captain.
[QUOTE=RespectMyAuthority;179798]I believe it was the GM Margin that was 0.5 feet. The coasties were harping on that with the El Yunque captain.[/QUOTE]
OK, that is something different then! Anybody familiar with the actual GM?
[QUOTE=RespectMyAuthority;179798]I believe it was the GM Margin that was 0.5 feet. The coasties were harping on that with the El Yunque captain.[/QUOTE]
That makes a lot more sense, my guesstimate on the GM would be about 3.5 to 4 feet. Rollling peroid of what? 10-12 seconds?
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;179800]That makes a lot more sense, my guesstimate on the GM would be about 3.5 to 4 feet. Rollling peroid of what? 10-12 seconds?[/QUOTE]
Yes, that is about what it would have been.
Moulded depth is listedas 12.8 meters, draft leaving JAX was IIRC about 7.5 meters, freeboard would be about 5.3 meters or about 17.4 feet.
[QUOTE=RespectMyAuthority;179801]Yes, that is about what it would have been.[/QUOTE]
If I apply the formula T(s)=0,75*B(m)/GM^2, use a GM of 4 feet (1.2 m) and a breadth of 28.6 m the rolling period is about 15 secs, the characteristic of a ‘tender’ ship.