for the LOVE OF OUR MOST HOLY LORD…why did the master not heave to before midnight?
there is so much potential that Joaquin was going to block them so why proceed? WHAT COMPELLED THE MAN TO KEEP GOING? I say he must have been pressured and was only hoping that the storm would stop its march south and they’d be ok? I can see that up until just before midnight but after that it was extremely foolhardy to not stop and wait for the system to pass.
[QUOTE=c.captain;179431]is there one member of the crew who was not aboard on the fated voyage who was aboard on the voyage when the ship went down the Old Bahamas Channel to avoid Erika who can testify as to the veracity of this? Someone must know how TOTE felt about that voyage and Davidson’s decision that time?[/QUOTE]
The second mate will be testifying tomorrow. He knows about the Erika voyage. Maybe he might have some insight.
I just heard that someone may have walked out on the Hearing. Can anyone confirm if this did happen?
The Live Streaming really sucked today. I was able to watch about a Third of it as it was freezing up so much.
[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;179428]You wouldn’t think with a vessel steaming into a heavy weather impact possibility that there wouldn’t be interest and checking to make sure schedules were holding firm? I would think regardless there would be heightened concern to verify schedule instead of assuming no problems until advised. Any such communications for ‘concerns’ to ensure schedule should vary little from Erika to Joaquin.[/QUOTE]
It could be that the emails were not turned over or it’s possible that fewer emails were generated. Without more information it’s hard to say.
In general my experience is that if I am asked am I going to make the ETA and my answer is yes I wouldn’t expect any more questions. On the other hand if I am not going to make the cargo start I’d expect a lot of emails. Not necessary just about the weather, some of course by mostly various sundry items related to a change in schedule.
I honestly can’t imagine standing down into a storm like that on any vessel regardless of commercial pressure. And while I haven’t felt pressure as master of a large vessel like that I have felt it in my trade. I have said No fucking way to stupid Things, fire me if you must, they haven’t yet. Probably someday they will.
I find it hard to believe the master would have risked a good chance of possible suicide for commercial pressure. Other reasons at play here for certain. I wanted to not criticize the master but the more I’ve digested the issue I’m having second thoughts.
[QUOTE=z-drive;179479]I honestly can’t imagine standing down into a storm like that on any vessel regardless of commercial pressure. And while I haven’t felt pressure as master of a large vessel like that I have felt it in my trade. I have said No fucking way to stupid Things, fire me if you must, they haven’t yet. Probably someday they will.
I find it hard to believe the master would have risked a good chance of possible suicide for commercial pressure. Other reasons at play here for certain. I wanted to not criticize the master but the more I’ve digested the issue I’m having second thoughts.[/QUOTE]
It’s not possible to imagine, it was likely more then just a couple simple things.
With regards to commercial pressure, likely it’s not a matter of the company directly asking the captain to do something that’s unwise and the captain having to either do it or refuse. If the captain told the company he wasn’t going miss the ETA based on the current forecast he would feel some pressure to make sure it happened even after the forecast had changed.
Another element is the fact that when people make decisions under pressure their judgement suffers, they sometimes tend to accept more risk.
Another factor was the forecast and the way Joaquin unfolded. There was a lot of bad luck involved, the loss of power, the flooding whatever caused that. The El Yunque passed close as well, not as close but I’ve not see anyone criticizing the risk assessment in that case.
[QUOTE=z-drive;179479]I honestly can’t imagine standing down into a storm like that on any vessel regardless of commercial pressure. And while I haven’t felt pressure as master of a large vessel like that I have felt it in my trade. I have said No fucking way to stupid Things, fire me if you must, they haven’t yet. Probably someday they will.
I find it hard to believe the master would have risked a good chance of possible suicide for commercial pressure. Other reasons at play here for certain. I wanted to not criticize the master but the more I’ve digested the issue I’m having second thoughts.[/QUOTE]
so maybe TOTE didn’t order Davidson to go through the storm center but I honestly must wonder if there was something said to him about the caution he took regarding Erika that might just have made him want to not face the wrath of TOTE a second time. Especially if he felt he was already in the doghouse with them and not sure what future lie in store for him with the company? That is why I would like to know if he was somehow made to feel some pressure to perform?
Regardless, if Davidson had the data which we believe he did regarding the predicted storm path (even with ambiguity in its path) then there is a terrible disconnect in how he arrived at the decision to proceed? To us who have been master we know there is a point where we must stop moving ahead regardless of what a company wants. A true professional knows what he must do damned the owners and he faces them later with a ship which survived hopefully without any significant damage. I don’t consider any course which would take a vessel within 50miles of the eyewall of a strong tropical cyclone as being prudent seamanship. If there is even a chance of that happening then it is best to stop if for no other reason but to prevent damage to ship and cargo.
There is also the matter of past experience. Maybe Davidson never had a close call in his career regarding weather decisions. I had one early in my career which I was lucky nothing bad happened, however I did learn from that experience that in the future to not take unnecessary chances with severe weather and I never repeated that mistake. In fact, from that having suffered so much that night that I have since taken great pains to avoid severe weather and have gone many hundred of extra miles to stay well away from the worst of the winds and seas. Fortunately, the owners of the vessels I was commanding understood and gave me no censure for having played it so safe.
[QUOTE=c.captain;179484] I don’t consider any course which would take a vessel within 50miles of the eyewall of a strong tropical cyclone as being prudent seamanship. If there is even a chance of that happening then it is best to stop if for no other reason but to prevent damage to ship and cargo.
There is also the matter of past experience. Maybe Davidson never had a close call in his career regarding weather decisions. [/QUOTE]
I have a hard time seeing how someone who has sailed for that length of time hasn’t had a close call with weather. Whether being master or even a junior officer, you are still involved and should be storing it in the old hard drive for future reference.
So is it maybe in one realm a bounty situation where he Had over confidence after multiple close calls? I’m scared shitless of some of mine, but not everyone’s the same. I see it everyday though, guys who just keep getting lucky.
[QUOTE=z-drive;179488]So is it maybe in one realm a bounty situation where he Had over confidence after multiple close calls? I’m scared shitless of some of mine, but not everyone’s the same. I see it everyday though, guys who just keep getting lucky.[/QUOTE]
The fact the the El Yunque was “crossing the T” ahead of the system and was down to 9 kts in heavy seas, that’s a big ship with lots of power, tells us the company had gotten in the habit of cutting it close.
Sad situation a lot a lot of good people lost. In some ways the story reminds me of the Edmund Fitzgerald or the Derbyshire.
Pity its not the NTSB leading this investigation. Trying to find someone to blame isn’t going to help prevent a future occurrence.
We really don’t know much. Ships lost, Crew Lost, No VDR a few emails and position reports beyond this its guessing.
What the company says is absolutely true. Masters is responsible and has the authority. Just is the way it is. Was there pressure? There is always pleasure. Just is the way it is. Did the pressure make a difference. You will need a physic to find out. The voice recordings on the VDR may give some clue. If they are retrieved. Unlikely there will be any clear statement about pressure. There may be a recording of the bridge team discussing there options.
The thing about the pressure is. Its way to subtle to be recorded. Often its just imagined. A schedule is pressure just because it exists. The cost of delays is pressure. Decisions have to be justified and explained. More pressure. Ocean routing and weather services say go this way more pressure. Easy for them to say they ain’t on the boat. Often they are no help just more pressure. In any case they have no responsibility. Only the Master has responsibility. In the end its up to him or her, just the way it is.
Sometimes the greatest pressure is peer pressure. Sometimes even greater the pressure he puts on himself or just imagines exists.
How does this affect the Master? Depends on the Master, the Manager ashore. all of it intangible.
When you get it right everyone is happy.
The ship gets bust up, The cargo gets bust up, The crew or passengers get bust up. The Dock gets bust up. Nobody thanks you for trying when you get it wrong.
Why did he go the way he went? If the VDR gets recovered there might be some clue.
He probably was confident enough in his ship and crew to believe it would all be OK. He may have had it work out OK before.
Over estimated the ship and underestimated the weather? The loss of power. When did that happen? It probably changed everything.
Dead ship, no power, worsening weather, How bad was the problem? How hard to fix? Pretty dam hard in a ship beam on or bow down in the Unnavigable circle.
Why is it called the Unnavigable circle?
Cause if you try to run before the wind or heave to or loose power the wind blows you in towards the its center.
The eye is just plain bad.
Within 50 is just plain bad, Worse when the Squalls hit.
50 to 75 Not a good place to be, Worse when the Squalls hit. Nasty but a well found ship should be able to handle.
75 to 100 Just another bad day at sea.
100 plus Bu#$%r all to a big ship.
Some big ship RADARS have a 48 mile range some 72 or even 96. for the most part the horizon is so much less these ranges are about as much use as tits on a bull. If you are near a TRS you can often pick up the squall lines and even the eye may be track able.
His plan may not have been so bad if the ship hadn’t lost power. We might never have heard of him or his ship. As plans go it wasn’t a good one. Real easy to say with hindsight from the comfort of an armchair.
There but for the Grace of God go I. I’ve made some good plans and some not so good and a couple of downright bad ones. They all worked out OK in the End.
This guy paid with his life and his crews. Unfortunately he will be vilified. Just the way it is.
[QUOTE=c.captain;179484]so maybe TOTE didn’t order Davidson to go through the storm center but I honestly must wonder if there was something said to him about the caution he took regarding Erika that might just have made him want to not face the wrath of TOTE a second time. Especially if he felt he was already in the doghouse with them and not sure what future lie in store for him with the company? That is why I would like to know if he was somehow made to feel some pressure to perform?
Regardless, if Davidson had the data which we believe he did regarding the predicted storm path (even with ambiguity in its path) then there is a terrible disconnect in how he arrived at the decision to proceed? To us who have been master we know there is a point where we must stop moving ahead regardless of what a company wants. A true professional knows what he must do damned the owners and he faces them later with a ship which survived hopefully without any significant damage. I don’t consider any course which would take a vessel within 50miles of the eyewall of a strong tropical cyclone as being prudent seamanship. If there is even a chance of that happening then it is best to stop if for no other reason but to prevent damage to ship and cargo.
There is also the matter of past experience. Maybe Davidson never had a close call in his career regarding weather decisions. I had one early in my career which I was lucky nothing bad happened, however I did learn from that experience that in the future to not take unnecessary chances with severe weather and I never repeated that mistake. In fact, from that having suffered so much that night that I have since taken great pains to avoid severe weather and have gone many hundred of extra miles to stay well away from the worst of the winds and seas. Fortunately, the owners of the vessels I was commanding understood and gave me no censure for having played it so safe.[/QUOTE]
This sums up the competing factors that drive the decision making process very well.
While the master may be 100% responsible, he/she may not be 100% to blame.
[QUOTE=tugsailor;179507]This sums up the competing factors that drive the decision making process very well.[/QUOTE]
CC is describing so-called “emotional tags” or somatic markers. You don’t necessarily need to have the experience yourself. You could read “Halsey’s Typhoon”, Conrad’s “Typhoon”, the description of a hurricane in Bowditch or listen to the right sea story.
Bottom line is a person’s own decision making process can not always be trusted. A methodical rule-based process must be used to guide high-stakes decisions.
It’s possible to get too rattled as well.
I just wasted 90 minutes of my life watching the dog and pony show that they call a “hearing”. With the quality of questions asked of the El Yunque master by the last guy, I don’t have much hope that they will come up with any real answers.
In the old, old days, like before WWII, these admiralty board type casualty hearings were presided over by people who knew ships, knew how they operated, what type of people and personalities made up good crews, and had a general understanding of acceptable risk in a maritime undertaking. Granted they saw many times more hearings, so even those without any background as a mariner had plenty of understanding. Now, those who do this sort of thing have probably never stepped foot on a gangway.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;179516]In the old, old days, like before WWII, these admiralty board type casualty hearings were presided over by people who knew ships, knew how they operated, what type of people and personalities made up good crews, and had a general understanding of acceptable risk in a maritime undertaking. Granted they saw many times more hearings, so even those without any background as a mariner had plenty of understanding. Now, those who do this sort of thing have probably never stepped foot on a gangway.[/QUOTE]
I don’t know, the line ofquestions right now seem on target - how often did the Captain check the ship, how long was C/M aboard.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;179516]In the old, old days, like before WWII, these admiralty board type casualty hearings were presided over by people who knew ships, knew how they operated, what type of people and personalities made up good crews, and had a general understanding of acceptable risk in a maritime undertaking. Granted they saw many times more hearings, so even those without any background as a mariner had plenty of understanding. Now, those who do this sort of thing have probably never stepped foot on a gangway.[/QUOTE]
indeed, it was known as the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation but during WWII all its functions were transferred to the USCG. The Steamship Inspection Service was run by civilian merchant mariners and not by those who have never served on merchant ships.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;179517]I don’t know, the line ofquestions right now seem on target - how often did the Captain check the ship, how long was C/M aboard.[/QUOTE]
Did you listen to the last guy before the break?
[QUOTE=RespectMyAuthority;179519]Did you listen to the last guy before the break?[/QUOTE]
No, just started listening, interesting about the captain having to forward the weather to the bridge.
