Further to Jughead’s post. Evans was not in her correct and assigned station when the watch was handed over, she was in Blackpool’s sector. The watch should not have been handed over until she was in her proper assigned station.
All OOW should be familiar with the two volumes of manoeuvring code ( I can’t remember the exact title) but the communications are always manned by a specialist signalman (nickname bunting tosser) who explains to the OOW the exact execution of any signal received.
The sub had two anchor lights, one on the conning tower and one on the rudder. The rest of it was pitch black, it REALLY looked like two boats with a dinghy running back and forth between them. I have no doubt the RIB defends the sub from threats of all kinds including getting rammed by someone going home from a night on the town,.
The two ships were not facing the same threat environment, just as the threat environment differed for USS Cole’s in Aden relative to the other ships in the same place.
Keeping the AIS off does in fact, to some degree, increase the risk of collision but presumably lowers the security risk.
I knew one of the investigators of the Cole incident. Interesting trivia is the bombers attempted some months earlier but they overloaded their boat with explosives and it sank. They made corrections and succeeded the next time. Perseverance is one of their traits. Made a couple of attempts on the World Trade Center also before being successful.
In 1970, I reported aboard USS LARSON [DD-830] as a 3c Radarman. There were several RD’s aboard who were veterans of the incident. #1 Lesson when maneuvering IVO carriers: TURN AWAY FROM CARRIER!.
The other interesting & unreported fact: CIC [combat information center] of LARSON communicated directly with CIC of EVANS during the last few moments. The radio transmission was something like this: “EVANS this is LARSON. HOLD YOU ON COLLISION COURSE WITH MELBOURNE, over”. “THIS IS EVANS; ROGER OUT!”. There were two radio calls as I remember-same transmission & same response.
Now, one would expect this transmission should have been monitored in the wheelhouse of EVANS; it was on LARSON.
The other interesting fact about the event, according to those veterans, is there was NO PANIC in the voices on the radio. . .
To this day, I still “feel the emotion” of those veterans & the event-even though I didn’t live through it. [but is sure as hell had an effect on my years as a Radarman on other ships, and in my commercial career.
Remember there was a decoding error, and because of the exercise, NAV lights were extinguished or dimmed, until the station change. Furthermore, EVANS’s OOW & JOW did not follow Captains’ Standing Orders. [By the way, USS LARSON had a “close encounter” just the night before.
Eh? They were both maneuvering through an anchorage. The “threat environment” was a self imposed reaction response mentality on the part of the Navy guys and was as wildly irrelevant to the collision as the upcoming planetary alignment.
If the Navy thought the bulker was a threat why didn’t they respond appropriately? Did they not see it? Were they not looking and plotting all the other traffic? Did they see the bulker as just another peasant that was expected to move aside and lower its gaze so as to not offend?
That was a very serious mistake, a 100 degree error in the flagship’s course.
Decoding such things should always have been double checked by a second person. I’m not sure of USN bridge procedures but in my experience tactical communication was invariably by dedicated tactical operators who wrote down everything spoken on the tactical circuits decoded and interpreted it for the OOD.
The You Tube video seems to suggest that the OOD operates the tactical circuit (as one of his many other critical duties) and doesn’t write the signals down for later decoding. The ship’s CIC should have also monitored the tactical circuit and separately decoded.
I guess my point was that a stuff up by a junior officer on one ship has unforseeable detrimental consequences for even senior officers elsewhere and even long-lasting lack of confidence between strongly committed allies. This collision was drummed into me as a junior officer and I’ve never forgotten the lessons of the necessity of total situational awareness.
I might add that night manoeuvring in company of numerous ships, all darkened, zig-zagging and conducting flying operations was routine but sphincter-tightening. Add in total radar and radio silence (not in this case) and you have the pinnacle of an OOD’s skill demands.
Constipation was an occupational hazard. Nothing like having the stern lookout and lifebuoy sentry ring the bridge and report he can see something. Looking out in the gloom I could just make out the bow of one of the replenishment ships closing our stern.
Lifebuoy sentry? Is that like the WW II thing where you tow something like that behind you for other ships to see before you get rear-ended?
It was an actual person. Ratings forming the watch were rotated through lookouts on each bridge wing, the quarterdeck and the wheelhouse during the watch. The lifebuoy sentry was in theory there to push alarm button, once for someone going overboard on the starboard side, twice for someone on the port side. This was the only occasion when I found he was useful for anything.
I have no idea whether this is still the case.
My memory is a little fuzzy but somethings are “concrete”.
On LARSON, in CIC we would log the signal, and decode. The interpretation and solution was passed to the bridge. But the conning officers held CIC in “low esteem”, and as a result, our recommendations were not welcomed. As such, the bridge did the tactical comms. If EVANS had the same dynamic, it explains the accident. After one cruise on that ship I volunteered for transfer to another can, USS GURKE.
On that ship, the CO said “take CIC’s recommendation for station change & signal decoding, or call him and explain why not”! WOW! That made us ABSOFUCKINGLUTELY SURE OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONSl Our reputations were on the line. [Anecdotal story: We were operating on Yankee Station, and were ordered to plane-guard station from a screening station, with a formation course change. CIC’s solution was to call for all-stop, and resume speed after carrier changed course. OMG, the bridge came unglued with arguments why we should alter course and ring up flank speed. . . CIC called the CO, We got the BZ - and “conn” was passed to CIC for the evolution.]
I can’t say what the relationship between CIC and bridge is now. But in either MCCAIN or FITZGERALD collisions, CIC/Bridge relationship was shit!
I had one somewhat similar experience. Whilst keeping OOW watches 4 on - 4 off in our replenishment tanker handed over to my relief at midnight zig zagging, darkened, radar silence and rain squalls in a large formation and when I returned to relieve him again at 0400, he wasn’t there and had been relieved by the navigator (who doesn’t normally keep watches).
I asked where he was and the response was that he was being posted out of the ship by jackstay during my morning watch. That was the fastest sacking I’d seen.
He zigged instead of zagged and was suddenly presented with the USS White Plains (the flagship) turning on every possible light crossing at right angles very close ahead. We missed thankfully but his time in the navy was cut very short.
And the sphincter tightened even more …
The radar plot ratings in our navy were selected on entry to the navy for training. Those with hearing like a bat became sonar men and muscle men became weapon men. There always was one RP onboard who had done a course at the hydrographic department in chart correction, care of chronometers etc., known as the navigator’s yeoman. The last one I had was the ship’s bookmaker, he could calculate odds on a horse quicker than anything I knew. RP’s were the crème of the crème.
Thank you !!! I love this. I’m so very glad to see people on this forum still have a great sense of humor.
What are the odds you would find that name on that boat! 
I disagree.
Yes, their operational ability may be deemed “more complicated” when they are using the equipment they have during the militarily designed functions they were built and intended for. Everyone would likely not argue that point.
But in a routine transit between two points, simply navigating through a crowded anchorage or an area of heavy traffic (as I mentioned in my earlier post), there is NOTHING more complicated on the bridge of a Naval ship compared to your typical civilian ship. If there is something vastly more complicated on a bridge with upwards of 20+ people compared to a cargo ship with 4 or 5 at best, thats a worthwhile discussion by itself. Notwithstanding their tendency to get on the VHF radio and demand that everyone stay well clear of THEM … navy ships of all flags do not have the presumption of “right of way” unless their specific operation deems they legally can expect others to give way.
The obvious exception to this (be patient, gang) is a submarine. Let’s push that aside for now. Secondly, to be fair, I would also say that an aircraft carrier is also much different, but not ‘complicated’. The rules do not grant them anything special during routine transits.
All that said, the OOD of the carrier is still dealing with the same issues as the bulker that he is approaching. A close quarters situation that might quickly turn into a collision. Ironically, while everyone is taking the carrier’s OOD to task, (myself included), nobody has questioned the skill set of the Mate on watch on the bulk cargo ship or her Captain. The Mate on the civilian ship could have been a young new guy himself, with little experience with that situation. Let us also NOT assume the Captain was on the bridge … even though most mariners would have the expectation that he should be there. But later in the report, we hope to understand that the Master was on the bridge where they were operating.
This would be a good time to remind everyone of Joe Hazelwood’s decision making process.
My comment is based on my personal observations and experience including Naval Reservist for 6 years, being an observer Pilot onboard numerous US Navy ships at Pearl Harbor Hawaii, and Piloting 31 years, which would include numerous foreign navy ships and USCG ships.
I deleted my post.
Question is; why do Navy ships have such complicated crew structure?
My answer was because they operate in complex environments.
I should have made my meaning more clear, Navy ships are not always encountering a complex environment.
In a battle situation the ship would be at general quarters, while entering port the ship uses Sea and Anchor detail.
I might add that a US warship, especially a carrier, manoeuvring in close quarters with numerous international ships and (in my experience) multitudinous smaller support craft of all sorts buzzing around, is a delicious target for a small craft attack eg USS Cole by terrorists.
So there’s not just collision avoidance happening on the bridge/CIC. There’s difficult threat assessment of every small craft approaching and possible countermeasures eg searchlights, noise deterrents, small arms, mounted machine guns ready all around the ship to warn off or fire warning shots in the path of small craft straying threateningly close.
I simply include that as a complicating addition to normal navigation. Again I stress both ships in this situation should have been well aware of each other and acted accordingly.
In that scenario, does it matter if they show their position by AIS or not?
They don’t have to identify themselves by name or number, nor destination and ETA.
(Simply “War ship”, or “Gov. ship” will do)
On close quarters a carrier group will be spotted regardless.
PS> It MAY help other vessels in the same congested waters to avoid collision though.
Watched part of Sal’s video, What’s apparently known is the Truman was following the destroyer escort USS Jason Dunham. It’s also known from the AIS the bulker MV Besiktas -M turned to port, apparently astern of Dunham and ahead of Truman.
From USNI News:
“The damage to Truman and images from Besiktas support a collision between the two ships with the bulker’s starboard bow coming into contact with Truman ‘s starboard quarter,” he said.
If in fact the bulker turned to port in front of Truman the damage might indicate the Truman also swung to port to avoid. Perhaps still swinging to port when Truman’s stern struck the bulker’s bow.