Recent Ex TOTE mate, with 8 years as Master for Maersk here. My experience with TOTE corporate, mirror’s CaptainRon1. Furthermore, the command structure of the vessel I sailed on encouraged input from the mates. Is that the case on all TOTE vessels? How difficult is it to “check-the-box” and say “training was provided”?
All AMO deck officers I know, have taken the BRM course at Dania. Trust me, we have been BRM’d to death. The problem is in the execution of BRM. What is the course of action if the Master isn’t listening? If the El Faro Master was being obstinate, then it’s incumbent upon the rest of the mates to speak up. It appears this didn’t happen.
What I find astonishing from following the El Faro case, is the finger pointing to corporate. TOTE Corporate certainly could have spent more money on maintenance, and the level of maintenance may have made a bad situation worse, but Davidson had an obligation to keep the vessel safe. He didn’t.
It wasn’t JAX’s fault that Davidson steered for the hurricane; he’s the guy who didn’t go up to the bridge at 2300 when the 3/M called. Had he gone up when the 3/M called, and again when the 2/M called, perhaps this would not of happened.
I know I’m old and cranky, but I can’t help but think what I would do if I knew the Master was steering a ship into a hurricane. Y’know, if the old man isn’t going to come up to the bridge when I call him for imminent danger, I’ll call the Chief Mate. And if he fails to come up, I’d take matters into my own hand, and make the turn away from the hurricane. By the time he wakes up, the ship is out of danger. Yes, I’ll be packing my sea bag when the ship hits port, but at least the ship would hit port.
However, I also realize that my sea experience is deep, and sometimes the mates on watch are not as experienced. But in the VDR recording, wasn’t there a mention they were heading towards an intercept with the hurricane? There is no way I’ll permit that to happen. For you 3rd and 2nd’s out there, LEARN about HURRICANES, and always have a contingency plan if the Master fails to show up.
Since I’ve retired after 23 years of sailing, it is clear to me that over-regulation and stupid regulations (alternative compliance vs USCG inspection) have made this occupation very difficult. I long for the days when a successful voyage was measured by five metrics: Not touching bottom, not touching another vessel, no cargo in the water, and no injuries. Now it’s ALL ABOUT micro-managing.
We have to get back to basics. Ship drivers need to be seamen first, then corporate pawns. Become “master ship handlers”, not just an observer of ECDIS, AIS, and all the other electronic distractions.