“This fire could have been prevented with adequate oversight into the ship’s material condition and the crew’s readiness to combat a fire.”
@Salvatore_Mercoglian has a good update on this:
Yikes! That is an appropriately passionate synopsis from Sal. His opinion that it could happen again today is particularly poignant, and he’s likely not wrong.
Yeah I’m not sure how to link to them but @Salvatore_Mercoglian has a series of great videos about the incident.
And he helped a lot with these articles too:
I guess what concerns me is not the fact that it could easily happen again, but a lack of confidence that the capacity exists to effect the change required to prevent that reoccurrence. Since you spent time on drillships at the same company I did @john, I know you are likely intimately familiar with quick-shares and incident reports, both internal and from industry. They often seem topical and relevant at the time, but lost thereafter. We had a system in place to bring them to surface again at set future dates, but the farther from the actual event date, the lesser the lesson impact. And that was a company with 20-30 ships. So honestly, how can one expect an organization the size of the US Navy to truly learn from this event and create the change necessary to prevent a reoccurrence? Particularly with the USN’s style of shifting officers through commands like a revolving door. How do you retain that training over time, in the locations where it’s relavent? (Not questions I necessarily expect answers to)
Maybe I just don’t have the experience to conceptualize successful large organization leadership. I suppose there are plenty of successful, large, low incindent-rate private shipping companies, but they don’t have the un-told layers of hierarchal bullshit of the US military. It blows my mind that an Admiral has to call another Admiral to try to get a Captain to save his ship because he is part of a different command. That is an organizational failure to rival the rest of the failures of that day.