When contemplating technology in the maritime context, the mind often gravitates towards sophisticated electronic tools like GPS, AIS, and ECDIS. However, it is essential to broaden our perspective. Technology, defined as “the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes,” encompasses not only the technical skills associated with electronic tools but also the soft (or human) skills crucial for human interaction and decision-making.
A bit bitter reading about this but is this a case of “corporate and the almighty dollar is more important than the lives of the crew”. Reminiscent of the lose of the Bounty. It feels like a captain with an ego thought he could take an old wooden ship into a hurricane and be “safer” than tied to a dock.
My perspective, colored a bit by the reporting on Pan Viva:
I doubt more meteorology training is going to improve anything.
What may be needed is a change in mindset about seeking ports to avoid storms.
That is the strategy of captains who operate vessels in places like the Aleutians where severe storms are frequent. Using the mental chart of where these refuges are located, and more importantly, having the mindset to make use of them before it’s too late.
We have a schedule to keep. But anchoring to allow the worst of a big storm to blow over you is how things are done. You might still go out in 30 foot seas, but only after the front has passed and you’re traveling with the seas, not against them.
I may be corrected but I don’t think this is the rule on all oceangoing ships. I’ll got out on a limb and say that on a lot of deep-sea vessels routinely anchoring to avoid a big storm may be considered an unusual.
So, IMO that’s where the training and corporate mindset needs to be focused. On the route that El Faro took there were likely several anchorages that could have been used for protection . What was lacking was a systemic mindset to make use of them.
How much of that is mentioned in a vessel’s SMS, or taught in academies, not in passing but in depth?
No need for the EL FARO to anchor…all Davidson needed to do was reduce speed at 1800 the night before encountering Joaquin…that extra distance between the ship and the eyewall would have meant the ship and all aboard arriving in San Juan safe albeit late.
I’m pretty sure more meteorology training wouldn’t hurt. Surely some catastrophes happened because of ignorance of meteorology. Perhaps all weather related catastrophes were because of ignorance of the subjects because the masters of the doomed ships underestimated the effects weather would have? At the very least more meteorology training would have the same affect that all the extra SASH training has had on the workforce. Concerning the additional SASH training, sure, the dirtbags & creepos will still be dirtbags & creepos but it sets the environment where SASH isn’t tolerated. Maybe more meteorology training would change the culture a little where ignorance of or ignoring horrible weather won’t be condoned as much?
The route from Florida to Puerto Rico doesn’t contain very many ports I would try to put into in a hurricane in my sailboat, let alone a full size freighter. For that part of the world the best strategy BY FAR is to be someplace else when the eye comes by.
Also note local authorities would likely be saying “HELL NO GET OUT OF HERE” if you tried it.
It wasn’t like there was no way around the storm, the skipper just didn’t want to take the time. The Bounty was sort of the same, they were under extreme time pressure to be somewhere by a certain date IIRC plus the captain was a nut who thought hurricanes were fun. They are - until they aren’t and then it is too late to change your mind.
Thinking about storm avoidance in terms of processing information, the way things were being done on the El Faro the ship could only process weather information during the day when the captain was up and working.
The lesson learned ought to be that’s not the way to do things as that process has a single failure point, the captain.
That’s where BRM and assertive communication training come in.
If memory serves family members of crew realized what was going to happen before the captain did.