How about the caption above this video “Jap container Ship attacked and clashed to Busan new port”. Well, then the pirates jumped off and captured it. Sorry Mr Journalist, crew was too busy ducking and a race for the bathroom.
Ok, so in the “Jap containter ship” video it looks like the engine is ahead. The rudder can be seen moving as they steer.
Also in that video a small ship can be seen, that must be where the crewmember took the video. In the crewmember taken video “Milano Bridge containership cleans up…” it looks to me the engine is astern the whole time.
When the engine is put astern we should see the prop slow down, stop and then reverse, but we don’t see that.
So I’m thinking the change to astern happened between the two videos. When the view of the first video was blocked by the small ship.
I’m thinking that social distancing and mask wearing caused communication errors and operational mistakes…
On MAN engines, (no idea if this is an MAN engine or not) this is prevented by the control system. You’ll see it in the display as ‘scav air limit active’ or something similar. However, going to all back emergency, perhaps this limit is overridden. If that’s what happened, I wonder why they weren’t already in all back emergency as their speed was so excessive for so long prior to the smoke plume.
Whenever I had to hammer reverse, which was not often, Black smoke was everywhere for a bit. I took it slow and easy around the docks when I could. My engineers appreciated that, I had good ones for the most part that knew how to take care of our stuff, and gave me what I needed IF I needed it. Our engines were in generally good repair and maintainence. We all were well aware to take it easy whenever possible. Saved my butt a few times . Whatever video you look at, those guys were hauling ass for a docking manuever for whatever reason you select.
@SeaEagle, I think you mentioned you are retired so I was wondering how long ago this black smoke experience you shared is from. Today’s slow speed diesels(ME-C engines in particular) having to meet at least Tier II have electronic limiters to prevent these huge black smoke plumes so common in previous years. As I said, perhaps all back emergency overrides these limiters and pours on fuel to answer the ordered RPM without regard to making smoke.
When the red button under the clear plastic guard on the bridge by the engine control is pushed all kinds of mayhem happens as I witnessed but never personally used. When everything settles down one thing can be countered on: There is a very thirsty chief engineer requiring a large bottle of something to calm him down.
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Retired 2003 at age 48. Mostly EMD 16’s and 20’s. My chief’s at the time did not trust the electronic limiters at the time. They preferred mechanical. Their gig and choice, not mine. I rarely broke down,and trusted them. I’m sure stuff is way more up to snuff today, but hard astern is gonna make the engines and my chief unhappy while making 6+ knots… Don’t put yourself in that position to start with. No matter what engines you have. As you can see, black smoke was apparent on this modern ship engine well before"Landing" at the berth in 2020.
That’s pretty sweet right there. Kudos.
Hogsnort, I get you loud and clear. Did due diligence. Really made an effort to stay on the good side of my engine guys. It wasn’t that hard, thanks to them.
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Maybe they had just watched Captain Ron and figured that’s how you do it!
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Now that’s funny! Good thing that smoke didn’t get in his good eye.
Tue Apr 14 18:44:40 CEST 2020 Timsen
Uncontrollable high speed was the main reason for the allision of the ‘Milano Bridge’ in Busan with a whole strip of container cranes on the dock on April 6. Apart from the speed, less reaction time after turning, less power from tugs due to high speed forward and no effect of bow thrusters was stated by the investigators of ONE as the possible causes. The crew had not taken into account that the ship was empty and sailed with a partially submerged rudder, nor had they taken sufficient account of the local weather conditions and had not understood the pilot’s intentions whoo panicked as the ship approached the dock. Only one of the six gantry cranes remained functional after the accident.
There’s another article but behind a paywall that has this info:
The Milano Bridge’s propeller, deck plating and fittings were damaged after hitting Pusan Newport berth
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There appears to be company report/notice on a Chinese website:
Pretty lo-res but readable, page one, couple other pages at the link:
1437 Commenced STBD turn, STBD 20 Helm, Dead Slow Ahead, Speed 9.3 kts
1439 Stopped engine. Speed 7.6 kts
1442 Pilot appeared panicked, Speed 7.6 kts, Dead slow ahead STBD 20 helm
1442 Pilot realizes heavy drift to port, panicked, full ahead engine, hard Stbd helm, concerned to avoid three moored vessels, Aft Tug continuously pulling
1444 Cleared 1 moored vessel, drifting towards 2nd moored vessel, Navigation full head, STBD 20 helm, drifting towards berth. FWD tug’s action not known as pilot speaking local language. Master used BT
1447 Cleared 2nd moored vessel, random orders on ME and rudder, stern drifting towards port side. Speed 6 kts.
1447 Cleared lesser beamed 3rd moored vessel
1449 Made hard contact with gantry no 85, fully collapsed on stern of ONE vessel, ME Nav full ahead, speed 5.2
1450 Emergency full stern to prevent contact with moored vessel ahead.
1452 Hard contact with Gantry craned no #1 by bridge wing which was working on the moored container vessel ahead followed by slight contact with the moored vessel…(?)
The list of damage is pretty long, more then I expected. It is still beyond me how you can storm into a harbor with a speed of 10 knots, already close to the berth, and then think you can get away with it and that with a lightly ballasted ship and wind.
About what most of us old farts concluded. Ain’t we smart? Reason being we have been in tight situations and learned from our mistakes. This one was quite obvious and easy to solve. Wasn’t aware the pilot shit his pants.
Many previous comments have addressed whether the engine was operating in astern at earlier times during the approach, but this makes it clear that they were in ahead operation, with significant starboard rudder, apparently attempting to “drive” out of this situation.
I believe the 1450 emergency full astern better correlates with the heavy black smoke, as noted by a few posts above. You can also see the significant change in prop wash on the video.
I’ve read comments elsewhere that Busan Pilots have a reputation for being “fast”, though I appreciate that description is subjective.
“There is strength in length” is what I’ve learned. Maximizing the tugs ability to pull you from a long line is correct. Once you start to approach dock and do maneuvers alongside, that’s a different set up altogether and yes, response time is longer. So … pilots and tug Captains that are accustomed to routinely working together, know when it’s time to “shorten up for a working line on/off the dock”. Or I will tell them when I want them to shorten up, when I’m ready at a specific point in the job.
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You must have seen the same report I did.
As a Pilot, I’m utterly dumbfounded how this stunning example of a fantastic “error chain” of events continued without anyone (as revealed in the report) stepping in and saying something. It is clearly a case of way too much speed, regardless of her size or load or type of ship. Looking at the basic dimensions of the harbor basin, her transit at 9 knots before a turn to starboard and immediately making an approach to berth, going alongside port side to pier … anyone who handles ships routinely can see, 5-6 knots on final approach to a dock is just too fast.
The description of “panic” on the bridge is not surprising … at all. The question is, why? Were they all surprised at the ship’s speed? Was there no speed log? The engine worked, so did the steering. It was broad daylight. There was a wind on the starboard beam that some people have characterized as “breezy” for this place. I suppose to some that 14 knots is windy to them (?). But in my opinion, this shouldn’t have been a worrying issue for the local Pilot. What else was “surprising” to them?
Then to realize a big astern bell was going to pull your stern even faster TOWARDS the berth should not have been a surprise, either.
Was the Pilot a brand new guy? Recently cut loose on this size ship as a solo pilot? Did the Master say anything like, “Hey, I think we’re going way too fast and we should slow down.”?
The aft tug, if it had been on a centerline lead aft on transom, could have been a tremendous aid in helping slow the ship’s speed in transit and approach. But videos show him backing in a direct pull at nearly a 90 degree angle off the starboard quarter, though much of his horsepower was obviously being used to simply move sideways to keep up with ship and actually NOT PULLING SHIP’S STERN OFF BERTH. So I wonder if the “tethered on the stern centerline” is a method Busan Pilots and Tug Master’s are even aware of or use routinely, if at all? Further, that the tug was “pulling direct” at 5-6 knots (or more) in the entire video(s) makes me wonder if they even tried to use an “indirect pull” at all to be more effective at that higher speed??
I genuinely believe this accident will be used for years now, in future BRM classes, for both Pilots and Deck Officers. The bridge team has to have the same mental model of what the job will be like, specifically where are “we” going, how fast will “we” transit, and how will “we” approach the dock and berthing will evolve. A long list of errors for all those standing on the bridge. But at the crux of it all, the Pilot was simply going too fast. Way too fast for the area, he was operating in. A great example of horrific ship handling. Almost as if he had no idea of what he was doing at all.
But I wasn’t there, so maybe I’m wrong.
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