Propellor immersion?
Looked pretty much, mostly immersed to me.
Fairly certain lack of immersion was not much of a factor in this,
This is just speculation on our part. Donât know the facts at this point.
I was recalling my experience with being âshipyard lightâ as opposed to the usual âin ballastâ
In that range between a full load and in ballast, the handling doesnât really change all that much. We have propeller and bow thruster submersion minimum drafts guidelines we follow. But for the shipyard, and the ship is significantly under those minimums, itâs a whole other ball game.
I learned this one windy day trying to anchor. When I slowed down and then goosed it a bit to turn up wind, the same way Iâve done many times, she wouldnât go. Ended up blowing downwind like a kite. I had lots of sea room and time to figure it out so it wanât a problem. Just had to use some big bells and more sea room.
So the speculation here is if the ship was shipyard light and the pilot was handling the ship in a way he was in the habit of doing, likely has done it many times, he might have been caught by surprise.
Busan weather on April 6 was clear and sunny.
Windspeed at:
0000 S 8 km/h Beaufort 2
0600 S 9 km/h Beaufort 2
1200 N 25 km/h Beaufort 4
1800 N 11 km/h Beaufort 2
At what time did the accident occur?
This was Busan âNew Portâ. Were you there or at just plain âBusanâ now aka as âold Busanâ?
At the end of the day, we are for the most part armchair QBâs, sharing our own experiences. A combination of shipyard departure extremely light condition, (Frothy propeller) not a lot of wind but still having some setting effect with the windage this vessel will incur. Coming out of the turn may well have called on engines to steady up. A bit too much speed, and whatever engine response/or lack of contributed. Didnât see but one tug on the stern, (Doesnât mean there wasnât one forward) but was there a second forward, or just relying on bow thruster? Thruster near useless at that approach speed.They approached too close and too fast when school of hard knocks dealt itâs hand. Sure the pilot and captain were seasoned.makes this debacle even harder to fathom for them.
Your guess is likely better then mine. The percentage thatâs itâs just an ordinary ship handling error is certainly higher then my theory.
As far as the room, not saying not enough room to make the maneuver, saying not enough room the way it was done. Otherwise the crane would still be standing.
Never just one cause Kennebec_Captain you know that. Domino effect just buryâs you when shit turns sour. Agree, way it was done was dicey.
There was both a bow and stern tug made up, by what I could see. Both were out on a 90, in position to work. Approach was way too damn fast and we just donât know why.
General forecasts or measured wind speeds at a station in the region will not tell much about the true wind in the port.
Look at the black smoke leaving the âMilano Bridgeâ; it says something about the true pressure on the shipâŚ
True, seems like when you get in a pickle everything turns out to be working against you.
I do see the AIS for the ship is showing draft of 7.1 meters. Thatâd be on the light side for me, my max summer draft is 10 meters or so.
URS, good observation on the smoke ! That shows a bit more than the forecast or present wind âSomewhereâ. Went back and looked at the videos, Saw a small bit of the bow tugs wheel wash. ??? Shit went bad in a hurry.
According to Marine Traffic the draft at the time if the incident was about 7 meters, maximum draft 15.52 meters. The ship was therefore loaded for almost 45%, not what you can call an empty or lightly loaded ship.

The ship moved to an anchorage, see the red graph.
The top of the propeller gets set by the waterline. Typical is that the propeller should always be fully submerged. So the top of the propeller gets set by the lightest draft waterline. I donât think, seen the limited frothing, that the propellerâs tip is very high out of the water. Note that such a ship has a propeller with a diameter of about 10 meter or a little bit more so there is ample pressure developed.
What would be the draft of a lightly loaded ship? Zero meters?
My max summer draft is just a hair over 10 meters. Iâd consider under 7 meters aft to be too light really. When discharging cargo once we hit about 7.4 flat we let the bow come out and hold the aft draft at more then 7.2 if we can.
Hereâs the min drafts for transit through the Panama Canal for a 200 meter ship.
Over 625Ⲡ(190.50 m) â 24Ⲡ(7.32 m) forward, 26Ⲡ(7.93 m) aft, TSW
When I looked at the length of Quayside in the video I thought things had changed since my visit so you are correct my visits were to what is now referred to as old port. If my memory, a bit wobbly as I advance in years is correct at the old port you came through a quite narrow entrance turned to starboard taking the way off and you were almost at the bridge marker.
Just watched the video and I wonder if the Prop was damaged. From the video, it sure looks like the would have contacted something with how far the stern overhung the dock. If the did damage the Prop, that could explain the black smoke and loss of control after hitting the cranes. What happened before that is anyoneâs guess.
Never been there , been to similar ports though.Canât come into a port like that half or more balls to the wall, no matter what vessel. Nor draft. A very short stop awaits you. Lawyers will fight it out, but most of us have a âfairlyâ educated guess what happened here. Majority of you guys know your stuff.
Tugs, respect your opinion often. They were in trouble with the approach way before that, if prop damage actually happened, that is perhaps after the fact. Black smoke direction does have a telltale sign the wind was a bit brisker than they anticipated. Those boys were backing like hell once they came on line. Also a black smoke producer, dumping lots of fuel. And yes, engines and engineers will not send you a Christmas card when you strike a prop.
Are you positive there is no LBLE Syndrome at Work? (Long Beach Locomotive Engineer Syndrome) I thought I saw the reflection off a tin foil hat up there. Just kidding brothers.
Telepathy with simple tools is alive and well. Good one KP Chief
Speculation from a bunch of X spurts.
We know very little.
My non X spurt observation, or deductions from observation. Of video and posted AIS track.
Ultra large unloaded box boat,
Approaching berth between to other box boats.
From almost perpendicular angle at relatively hot approach speed.
Almost 90 degree turn to approach berth,
Speed reduction possibly due to turn. Still relatively hot. For an approach to berth.
Speed increased after steady. Why?
Vessel track indicates course made good, towards dock, combination of heading, set, drift, advance or transfer?
the approach was pretty dang hot. For a ultra large box boat, Why? Lots of guessing.
Environmental Conditions, appear to have been well within normal parameters.
Not a white cap in sight.
Smoke went inshore, conclusion, wind on shore.
Two tugs. Routine positioning.
Aft tug is pulling astern, a bit, why not harder?
My observation, when first sighted engine and prop ahead. Could be wrong might have been stopped. Not a lot of wash.
Slight starboard rudder.
Did not observe prop tip.
Near end and black smoke, engine and prop astern propulsion,
Black smoke my guess engine start or significant increase in astern.
Conventional right hand prop, Response to astern propulsion.
Bow to starboard stern to Port.
Light ship displacement, may have played a small part, donât know enough to eliminate.
Appears to have been a completely buggered up approach resulting in a buggered up landing.
Could it have been worse, if it hit other ship?
Why?
Lots of questions, no answers, just more questions.
To Masters Orders and Pilots Advice? Probably.
Language difference? probably.
Ship, Just out of dry dock? Could something have gone wrong? Very Possibly
Who had the conduct? Probably the Pilot.
What was the Master doing?
What was the Mate doing?
Were the pilots intentions understood by the ships bridge team?
Were the Pilots actions being effectively monitored by the bridge team?
Was the pilot communicating with the tugs?
What if anything were the tugs asked to do?
Were the tugs made aware of the problem?
When things started to go pear shaped, what was the communication like.
Did the Pilot insure his advice (orders) was understood correctly?
Did the OOW insure the Pilots advice was understood correctly?
When it started to look strange what did the bridge team do?
Iâve talked to many bridge teams after a buggered up landing.
I almost always expect to ask the following.
What would you expect to see during a routine approach ?
What if anything did you notice was different with this approach?
When you noticed this approach was differently did you ask why?
why not?
The answer I expect to hear. a variation of.
I thought they knew what they were doing.
Unfortunately by the time someone figured out it had all gone pear shaped, it was either to late, and or instead of aborting the buggered up approach, they tried to fix it, without properly assessing the situation.
Buggering it up some more.
Pure speculation of course