spowiednick,
This would be my commentary on the podcast……
“ 96. The DALI’s step-down transformers were set in “manual” mode when the ship departed Seagirt Marine Terminal.”
Dali was delivered in 2015, so the suggestion that Hyundai could be responsible for a loose wire ten years later is, on its face, laughable. Though admittedly in an US court of law one should expect every possible argument.
The vibration, if a design flaw, if not brought up during the sea trials and warranty period, that seems unlikely to factor for the builder. The Operator obviously knew there was a problem, they welded a turnbuckle to the transformer. But was that problem communicated to the Owner? That would be critical information.
Now the owner vs operator (Grace Ocean vs Synergy) liability for the crew allowing loose wiring through lack of maintenance, or setting automation systems to manual rather than automatic, that seems like a legitimate point of liability argument. But there too, did the Operator have a procedure that wasn’t followed? Was it not followed because the system was unreliable? Was that unreliability communicated to the Owner?
The one thing mentioned that is for sure accurate, is that these questions will take years for the courts to determine.
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The idea was voiced by interviewed US lawyer attending the meeting in Berlin , hence I asked the question.
Besidtes during the 8 years of vessel ops, there were some class visits/inspections, audits, PSCs, charterer’s vetting not to mention yearly or half yearly depending on SMS visits of technical superintendents . Were all of them blind not to notice some weird contraptions ? Looks weird to me.
If this ship was only under Maersk charter serving the same line and the thing was faulty ALL of the time , then it seems a bit strange such malfunction manifested itself only one time in US with such catastrophic results. She docked at the terminal on arrival w/o a problem as far as I remember. Quite a coincidence one must admit.
Exactly.
I saw that item too. But i also saw other items where normative reference was provided like CFR item or Solas item. Here there is nothing. I am not sure -may be I am wrong but are all manual settings wrong??? I do not know.
Give You an example. Surely U used at some time faximile receiver for weather charts. U set it in automode then in most cases U will not get a required chart . In manual mode , that requires user attention at the time of transmission/reception and user listening/judging the quality of incoming signal in most cases one can get a chart even if conditions are bad.
In some cases setting the radar to maual tuning , manual setting of anticlutter rain & anticlutter sea generates much better results in detection of weak echoes of small objects in the vicinity.
Hence I am not sure that all that is manual is forbidden or not allowed. I do not know the regs regarding machinery neither do I have experience to say and argue the automode is the best from all choices under all circumstances.
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I’m my experience, I can’t immediately think of a regulation which would require an equipment setting. Certainly regs or class rules might dictate a certain level of designed available redundancy, but on a granular level the setting of that redundant automation is going to be provided for in a company or vessel operating manual, not a regulation.
In the case of the transformers, I would be extremely surprised if the design philosophy and operational guidance wasn’t intended to have the offline transformer set to automatic transfer mode.
Considering your radar example, as you say, in some circumstances manual adjustment can lead to better results, but isn’t the default intended to be automatic?
I don’t find it strange that it only once lead to catastrophic results. But I doubt that was the only occurrence. The catastrophic ones are the only ones which get reported. You make a good point about Class inspections though, that welded turnbuckle isn’t exactly subtle.
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She had been supplied LV via TR2 seamlessly for seven months prior to and including the arrival at Baltimore. The changeover to TR1 occurred when alongside Baltimore with no major resonant/harmonic vibrations in play although TR1 had been subjected to significant vibrations prior.
She departed on TR1 feed in manual changeover mode thus bypassing the PMS.
Now if I was a technical manager, being mindful that a loss of LV feed had the potential to both preferentially shut down both the main engine and steering, I would be issuing very clear and specific written instructions under Safety Operating Guidelines requiring the switching to automatic transformer changeover whilst in confined and Pilotage waters and whilst under UMS operation. Not negotiable.
One would also expect that there was routine and logged testing of the automatic changeover when in open waters.
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Everything You write is perfect and I see absolutely no reason to object .
However:
Looks like a key word to me being mindful of my own experiences mentioned many times before, while working all professional life in environments classified by Guard P&I and others as " cover up " and " pathological " cultures .
So the perfect world You are painting above is a foreign/allien world to me and I am justified I think to call it " UTOPIA" .
But I still insist that item 96 should have a reference provided if not to regulations and/or mandatory rules then at least to user manual , SMS ( if there was anything there on that issue) or to applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations, Classification Societies and maritime industry organizations. But I may be wrong of course.
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This is not the perfect world……it is the new and evolving world. We now work and exist within a highly litigious maritime environment.
Allow me to use the “Costa Concordia” incident by way of example. Many individuals instantly laid the blame for the grounding on the singular actions of the Master Capt. Francesco Schettino yet the more analytical observers asked why was he not prevented from the sail past via company written instructions? Billions of dollars in lost capital and salvage, 4200 people exposed to danger and 32 souls lost their lives whilst one person languishes in a jail cell for 16 years.
Another example if I may. During my Pilotage career I was occasionally presented with written company instructions via the Master during the MPX. These instructions specifically detailed maximum allowable closing speeds and aspects whilst berthing. It would have been foolhardy to exceed these limits and so with the use of RTK PPU I was able to both meet and display these requirements to the Master who was ultimately responsible.
Evolution.
The relevant requirements would be in the ISM code regarding critical equipment. The code includes a requirement that the SMS include “specific measures” regarding stand-by systems.
Clause 10.3 of the ISM Code states, “The Company should establish procedures in its SMS to identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use”.
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That specific example makes no sense. There probably was not a specific rule stating not to use the Costa Concordia to tow water-skiers through a congested harbor or a rule stating not to hit icebergs to see what happens next either. Some things are just so stupid one would probably think if you need a specific rule telling the captain not to do it, you really need a new captain.
I am about 99.99% sure the Captain would have done the exact same thing anyway even there was a rule, it was so obviously stupid and dangerous I doubt a piece of paper would have stopped him.
Should there have been an actual rule stating not to use a turnbuckle welded to the transformer to keep it from coming off its mounts? Some things are so obviously bad that if someone is willing to do them, they are beyond the printed rules already.
What is really puzzling is apparently everyone charged with inspecting and maintaining this ship apparently let these shenanigans slide for years and especially in Baltimore when the ship lost power sitting at the dock.
(The FAA has a catch-all rule called “careless and reckless” to avoid having to think of every possible stupid pilot trick)
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Just my thoughts
I think the loose wire claim by Hyundai ‘expert’ engineers is ‘flashing the shiny toy’ to take the focus away from rest of the events
I do think the loose wire is an issue. But think about this. The UV coil is very low wattage and thus very low current requirement. Even if 1 strand of the stranded cable is making contact the UV should not drop out
I think the UV dropping out has something to do with the fuel pressure (or lack thereof) – happened in port as well. Severe swings in voltage/frequency. Engine slows downs – frequency drops – AVR tries to compensate for voltage, etc, etc. Bottom line, a momentary drop in voltage is not surprising
I do not think having the stby xformer on manual is in conflict with the rules – especially when they are manned. But yes, the crew should have switched on the stby transformer faster than the 10 secs set for the automation.
I still believe that had they steering functionality they would have missed the bridge. So far no update on any of the reports on the steering – emergency low speed powered from the ESB.
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Maybe somewhat equivalent to the US legal of ‘gross negligence’ and ‘wilful misconduct’ - kind of unique to US. I think the rest of the world including in English law it is referred to as ‘negligence’ only.
Almost all of the US law is bases on English Common Law, but obviously differences creep in. Running a stop sign in negligent, running a stop sign because you are wearing a blindfold is willful misconduct 
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Talking about stop signs and stop lights, on the lighter side years ago I saw a bumper sticker on a sports car.
Red mean Stop
Green mean go
Yellow mean go real fast
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Good day.
Any idea about the underwater damages in the bulbous bow , bow thrusters area. Pictures , video clips ??? Thought it would be revealed once she docked in Baltimore.
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No idea. And I do not think she was docked (drydocked). Safe to say the WT integrity was maintained to allow the ocean passage. Maybe there is damage with plating upsets, etc. Not sure.
Cant wait for the authorities to subpoena all the crew to office emails…any deleted and its obstruction.
Methods for producing written instructions are well established.
In the case of the Dali it’d be 'follow engineering best practices, no modifications without obtaining permission of the port engineer" or some such.
There’s plenty boilerplate already been created. My instructions for example included “use the shortest safe route” between scheduled ports. That would disallow both sail-bys and water skiing.
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KC,
Thank you for bringing us back to reality.
The “Dali”, as akin to the “Costa Concordia” was an organisational incident. I really tire of individuals who automatically sheet all the blame and responsibility on to the ship’s crew……crews change and therefore the associated SMS needs to be definitive and overarching.
I hope that the NTSB final report treats this as an organisational incident and looks at the entire picture. The SMS should be analysed and reconciled with the actions and setups undertaken by the engineering crew on departure.
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Every ship is an order of magnitude different for the engineers as opposed or compared to the deck officers. (Totally unlike the airline industry). Both disciplines are basically ‘operators’ and not expected to stay current with all the rules and regulations.
I am also guessing these vessels do not have a permanent Chief/Capt - definitely no permanent 1stAsst/Chief mate. So in 2 or 3 months (not sure if crew are contract or staff of Synergy), it is fair to say no one can understand the entire engineering plant.
Point I am making is while there is no definitely/absolutely/unquestionably/etc, no ill ill, no GN, no WM, not even negligence or misconduct on part of the crew. Period.
Next - who decides ‘competence’? They are all licensed – certificate of competency basically. None of us can question this.
BUT – if they had the experience on this vessel or class of vessel, the stby transformer/LV SWBD could have been live within 10 secs and main engine within a minute.
Assuming they had other ‘issues’ that prevented them from the above, my friggin’ grouse is the SG. I just cannot subscribe to the view that a rudder cannot affect a course change at 8 kts or so without the prop.