Granted, but at least the idiots would be responsible for their own idiocy when it burned up or sank, right?
Crews can get good at routine tasks, the trap is when there are out of their league don’t realize it. Shaking down a new-build is not routine work, operations in an unfamiliar region is not routine. What is required is a crew that can identity problems and communicate the problems to the office. On he office end technical has to respond in an appropriate manner. BTW did anyone notice all the emails the C/E sent to the company?
I’m glad that someone took note of that. Did you see where he was reporting issues with the FRC? That denotes a rather thorough mindset, wouldn’t you say?
In fact, a goodly portion of this report has been gleaned from his MMR e-mails.
The captain has a role in this well. There more to running a boat then handling the sticks.
I’ll leave any comments on the captain(s), to other captains.
I’m glad that someone took note of that. Did you see where he was reporting issues with the FRC? That denotes a rather thorough mindset, wouldn’t you say?
In fact, a goodly portion of this report has been gleaned from his MMR e-mails.
.[/QUOTE]
Actually the USCG took note of company / shore issues in their cover letters, which are rather scathing.
I think we all agree that the fuel venting, storage, transfer and monitoring arrangement on the AIVIQ was poorly designed for the environment what the vessel was built to work in and that fact was recognized by many involved at the vessel level here which leads to two questions needed to be asked in this regard:
why the the chief engineer and master both allow these potential points of failure in the fuel system to not be rectified by ECO management before setting out on the tow in December?
what possible measures could have been taken by the chief engineer (and approved by the master) to eliminate or at least minimize the potential for these failures from occurring during that tow?
So with those questions asked, I will not scream names and use all caps here this morning but points need to be made with regards to responsibilities and the fuel taken:
I will not even begin to enter into a debate here that everything with the fuel system was just fine and the AIVIQ fully and completely sound to make its crossing of the GoA during the winter and that only the “mystery additive” brought about these results. Perhaps there was an incompatibility between the contents of the fuel and the injectors on all the engines which might have negatively effected their long term condition but even that shows that person or persons were not knowledgeable that the fuel loaded aboard the vessel needed to be pure of incompatible additives. Competent marine engineering management and operations staff should have known that the fuel needed to not contain any identified additives which could compromise the system and had meetings with the fuel supplier and Shell to say “we want to know what is in this fuel before we take it” and “we ain’t taking any fuel that we do not know what it contains” ECO and its engineers had a year to learn all this critical information and know what was ok for those engines and what wasn’t.
Another point to mention is that the fuel taken while dispensed by Delta Western in Dutch Harbor I believe was provided to the vendor from Shell’s chartered tanker AFFINITY. I believe that AIVIQ was been taking that same fuel from the AFFINITY all through the season but suffered no machinery casualties of this nature during the season leading up to this event. There is a record of changing injectors during the previous season but it is not stated why those injectors required changing. Bad additives in the fuel certainly should have become apparent during the course of those months. If there was any mystery additive in that fuel it still does not explain why this massive machinery casualty occurred when it did and why it was so suddenly and so catastrophic? As stated by me previously, a machinery casualty due to incompatible additives would not cause such a sudden loss of all four main engines as occurred late on the 27th and early on the 28th over basically a 4 hour period. Also that it is only logically assumed that there would have been no fuel aboard the AIVIQ that was free of any non compatible additives unless there was some single tank with fuel taken from a completely separate source such as in Puget Sound and carried all through the season without being touched for more than six months? If this is the case then it would be a first for me to encounter in 30+ years at sea. I do not believe the vessel had some magical mystery fuel somehow squirreled away even though the chief states he banked a separate tank of good fuel for emergencies. If he did where did the vessel get that fuel and how was it carried completely segregated throughout the months the AIVIQ operated in Alaska?
I am with the USCG in that this casualty was seawater induced and believe the silencing of the high level alarm on the overflow tank prevented the engineers from knowing that their system became suddenly and massively full of water after the tow was lost while the AIVIQ was attempting to recover the emergency tow line.
According to what I saw up there almost all the vessels in Shell’s operation were fueled from the tanker Affinity. Why was the Aiviq the only one with problems??
A labor dispute is brewing between a regional fuel distributor and its staff in Unalaska. Employees of Delta Western say the company doesn’t want them to unionize.
Delta Western has about 16 employees in Unalaska to fill up commercial vessels and sell home heating fuel.
Early Sunday morning, about half of those workers walked off the job and onto a picket line with members of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union.
“Delta Western unfair, Delta Western unfair,” protesters chanted.
Leo Dacio is a dock driver for Delta Western. He’s been with them for about five years.
He and his co-workers want to join the union. But Dacio alleges that the company has been trying to discourage them.
“Yeah, we have a 401k [retirement savings plan] but they say that the 401k company that they have won’t be dealing with us if we’re union,” Dacio said. “So they’re threatening to stop that.”
Dacio also alleged that for months, they’ve been harassed by their supervisor. During a recent snowstorm.
“He had me shovel down at the dock where I could use an equipment,” Dacio said. “But he told me to use manual labor.”
The International Longshore and Warehouse Union sent an organizer to Unalaska last week.
Jon Brier helped put together the walkout. And he says the union also filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board on the workers’ behalf.
“It’s called an unfair labor practice,” Brier said. “It’s discrimination against these folks for exercising their rights to be union.”
In the complaint, the union alleges that Delta Western threatened at least two pro-union workers with disciplinary action and had their work assignments changed.
Brier says that all seven employees who walked out on Sunday morning were to back to work by the end of the day.
On Monday, the workers delivered a letter to Delta Western asking the company to recognize them as union members.
Brier says the company has not yet responded to that letter.
Delta Western’s site manager in Unalaska declined to comment. Representatives from Delta Western’s parent company, North Star Petroleum, weren’t available on Tuesday.
This isn’t the first time Delta Western’s employees in Unalaska have tried to unionize. In 2007, they considered joining the Teamsters and then the International Longshore and Warehouse Union.
The movement to join the ILWU went to a vote. But according to National Labor Relations Board records, the measure failed to get support from a majority of workers.
Don’t know if Delta’s management/labor troubles would extend over to Dutch, but having been involved in a few organizing drives in my career, I know that peculiar things happen when your supervisors and your labor force end up in an openly adversarial relationship.
“Hey,dat’s a mighty FINE looking ship youse guys got fueling dere! It would be a SHAME if sum’t’in happened to it because of the fuel you mugs are selling to dem!”.
[QUOTE=Bilgeman;135165]Delta Western is having labor troubles.[/QUOTE]
If you have anything relevant to the Aiviq fiasco to contribute you are entitled to do so regardless of how absurd you come across. Please keep irrelevant labor relations events out of this. Your trolling has become annoying.
The Kulluk’s OIM testified that Kulluk’s diesels also had fuel and injector problems.
I can’t find the transcripts of the public testimony, or I’d supply the cite, so I’m relying on having access to One Who Was There.
And then there’s this from pages 2 and 3 of the Appendix:
(b) Prior to the main engine failures, there were problems with fuel quality.
i.Log entries for clogged fuel oil flowmeters indicate problems with the fuel
oil quality (e.g., contamination). Reference (g) shows Main Engines and
Ship Service Diesel Generators have supply and return Kral screw type
flowmeters installed to monitor fuel consumption. Log entries show
recurring problems with supply and return Kral flowmeters becoming
clogged. The Kral supply flowmeters are upstream of the engine filters.
Kral return flowmeters are downstream of the primary Racor filters and
engine secondary filters.
The following problems with Main Engine and
Ship Service Diesel Generator fuel oil Kral flowmeters were logged:
05/07/2012: Cleaned FO Strainer to No. 1 Main Engine due to FO
meter not working.
05/08/2012: Troubleshoot Main Engine No. 1 Supply Kral Meter.
06/29/2012: Disassemble Main Engine No. 4 Supply Kral Meter (full
of plastic).
07/14/2012: Pulled Kral Meter from Main Engine No. 1.
07/31/2012: Disassembled Fuel Meter from Main Engine No. 3,
removed debris.
08/04/2012: Cleaned TFO Boiler supply and return flowmeters.
08/05/2012: Bypass Main Engine No. 3 Kral meter for
service/cleaning.
08/14/2012: Removed and cleaned Main Engine No. 3 Kral meter.
08/17/2012: Remove and clean Main Engine No. 1 Kral flow meter.
08/31/2012: Main Engine No. 3 Supply Kral meter fouled.
09/13/2012: Pulled and cleaned Main Engine No. 1 Return Kral
meter.
09/25/2012: Replaced return Kral meter bearings on SSDG No. 3.
11/03/2012: Kral meter plugged on Main Engine No. 2
12/21/2012: Main Engine No. 3 Return Kral meter failed, bypassed
and cleaned.
12/23/2012: Troubleshoot Main Engine No. 2 Kral supply meter.
Now I ask you…would water in and of itself clog a flow meter?
Updated - - -
Feel free to ignore my posts if any of the facts are inconvenient to you.
I will do the same for your contributions, but I will not ask YOU to stop posting your opinions.
[QUOTE=c.captain;135156] Another point to mention is that the fuel taken while dispensed by Delta Western in Dutch Harbor I believe was provided to the vendor from Shell’s chartered tanker AFFINITY. I believe that AIVIQ was been taking that same fuel from the AFFINITY all through the season but suffered no machinery casualties of this nature during the season leading up to this event. There is a record of changing injectors during the previous season but it is not stated why those injectors required changing. Bad additives in the fuel certainly should have become apparent during the course of those months. If there was any mystery additive in that fuel it still does not explain why this massive machinery casualty occurred when it did and why it was so suddenly and so massive? As stated by me previously, a machinery casualty due to incompatible additives would not cause massive and sudden loss of four main engines as occurred late on the 27th and early on the 28th over basically a 6 hour period. Also that it is only logically assumed that there would have been no fuel aboard the AIVIQ that was free of any non compatible additives unless there was some single tank with fuel taken from a completely separate source such as in Puget Sound and carried all through the season without being touched for more than six months? If this is the case then it would be a first for me to encounter in 30+ years at sea. I do not believe the vessel had some magical mystery fuel somehow squirreled away even though the chief states he banked a separate tank of good fuel for emergencies. If he did where did the vessel get that fuel and how was it carried completely segregated throughout the months the AIVIQ operated in Alaska? I am with the USCG in that this casualty was seawater induced and believe the silencing of the high level alarm on the overflow tank prevented the engineers from knowing that their system became suddenly and massively full of water after the tow was lost while the AIVIQ was attempting to recover the emergency tow line. .[/QUOTE] According to the report the Aiviq had, at one point, 1832 gals of water in the overflow tank. There is not an appreciable difference between having that much sea water in your FO system and having that much seawater AND a mysterious additive The additive issue is a red herring even if it is true, the sea water alone was a show-stopper.
I believe he meant don’t bring up a labor dispute that has happened over a year later as evidence of wrong doing by the fuel supplier.
Did the Aiviq ever figure out where the plastic and other debris was coming from that was clogging their fuel meters??? Did anyone actually verify the tanks were cleaned properly before accepting the ship??? Shipyard guys leave shit everywhere, maybe someone pencil whipped the tank inspections.
[QUOTE=c.captain;135156]I am with the USCG in that this casualty was seawater induced and believe the silencing of the high level alarm on the overflow tank prevented the engineers from knowing that their system became suddenly and massively full of water after the tow was lost while the AIVIQ was attempting to recover the emergency tow line.[/QUOTE]
I agree completely.
The level alarm told a story but no one wanted to listen because they were incapable of understanding what it was telling them. They probably thought that if the alarm was silenced the problem would go away. What did they think was filling the overflow tank? Why did they not drain the tank to see what was in it? Or if nothing else, to silence or test the high level alarm?
There is no evidence whatsoever to support a claim of some mystery additive that only affected Aiviq. The mystery slime is no mystery to anyone who has ever experienced biological contamination in fuel oil. That kind of contaminant does not happen overnight. It went unknown until the incident because there was no way to drain the water bottoms and no one knew how much water was on the tank bottoms or how long it was there. No one knew enough to take measures to correct what should have been a glaringly obvious minefield of amateur and totally ineffective plumbing.
No one on Aiviq or at ECO or the CG or ABS knew about or cared that there was glaring visual proof that there was no way to check the fuel tanks for water or bio contamination. I don’t believe that the shipyard, no matter how Bayou ignorant they are, is responsible for the kludge of plumbing to that valve actuator, that is a home made work around for a job that should not have been permitted to leave the dock. The ridiculous excuse for a tank drain doesn’t even make for a good sampling port. That tells me it was probably never used in the first place.
The fact that the centrifuges were operating at less than half output should have told its own story to anyone capable of listening. Did no one wonder where all the water was coming from and why there was more water than fuel coming out of those units?
The photographs show a new boat that has already suffered from backwater wrenching. It has been assaulted by shade tree mechanics who don’t understand what sight glasses and drains are for and don’t care enough to get them installed. ECO and the CG had to have known how that boat was equipped and how it had been mistreated since delivery. They share as much blame as the incompetent and ignorant excuse for an engineer that was given responsibility to maintain and operate it. The story makes it obvious and the photos fill in the huge spaces between the lines.
It is this type of story that gives ammunition to those who want to use foreign flag boats built by yards that know what they are doing and are manned by trained and concientious crews. There is enough shame in this incident to spread far and wide across the owners and the agencies who were charged with regulating them.
And what of the MARPOL required bunkering fuel samples, taken continuously from the fuel flow while bunkering, by the crew, thence retained aboard in uniquely numbered sealed bottles or cans, with a sample offered to supplier ?
And what of the similar commercial samples drawn from barge / tank / tanker in presence of crew prior, to bunkering ?
Did these samples mysteriously disappear or are these just not part of “what is done”?
Come on, we sample the piss out of fuel deliveries exactly because we do not want fuel system troubles, we file Protest Notes, ensure details are recorded and samples are retained correctly, etc. And the crew knows that is expected of them, as in do it properly. And you know what, it gets done nicely thank you.
And of course there is grinding dust muck in the FO tanks of every new build unless the tanks are specifically cleaned and wiped down by hand and inspected by both Supt AND Chief (our process), as absolutely the last persons out of the tank before closing, in physical presence of same.
[QUOTE=Steamer;135173]
What did they think was filling the overflow tank? .[/QUOTE]
According to the report the C/E thought that when the vessel was in rough seas the fuel in the FO tanks was sloshing around into the overflow system. The report said that the overflow system piping led from the fuel tanks though a gooseneck above the main deck and then to the overflow tank…
The other possibility is that seawater entered the overflow tank vents when the vents were submerged.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;135171]According to the report the Aiviq had, at one point, 1832 gals of water in the overflow tank. There is not an appreciable difference between having that much sea water in your FO system and having that much seawater AND a mysterious additive The additive issue is a red herring even if it is true, the sea water alone was a show-stopper.[/QUOTE]
That’s it in a nutshell. The overflow tank flooded with seawater during heavy weather. That was the single point failure that promptly let water into the day tanks and caused the failure of all the injectors in all the propulsion engines. It is not a coincidence that the engines just happened to fail right after having this massive slug of water pump through them.
All ultra low sulphur diesel fuel does have an additive for “lubricity”. When ULSD was first introduced it caused a lot of injector failures because it lacked adequate lubricity. The problem was most severe with GM 71 series injectors. There is no mystery about the lubricity additive. The suppliers who add it have records and samples. Is it possible that a vendor might not put in enough additive and that vessels burning that fuel might experience premature failure, sure, but not the simultaneous failure of every injector. It is possible that a vendor might add too much lubricity, sure. Who knows what problems that might cause if any.
Hundreds of other boats burning the same fuel from Dutch Harbor had no problems at all with it. To me that rules out fuel quality and fuel additives as potential cause of the Aiviq’s loss of propulsion.
Vessel owners sometimes supply fuel additives for the crew to add to the fuel. I have worked on boats that used these additives that supposedly improved power, reduced fuel consumption, and prolonged engine life. I do not know if these additives achieved any of those goals, but the owners who were paying $1000 per drum for the stuff sure thought it worked. So I wonder, was ECO using any fuel additive?
Aiviq lost propulsion due to massive slug of water in the fuel that entered the fuel system through the vent overflow tank. That is a design defect. I certainly do not blame the chief for that design defect. If the chief had said that at the USCG hearing, I would have no problem with his testimony. Instead of telling like it was, water from a defectively designed overflow vent tank, the chief chose to tell a fairytale and try to shift to the blame. He needs to be held accountable for that.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;135177]According to the report the C/E thought that when the vessel was in rough seas the fuel in the FO tanks was sloshing around into the overflow system. The report said that the overflow system led from the fuel tanks though a gooseneck above the main deck and then to the overflow tank…
The other possibility is that seawater entered the overflow tank vents which when the vents were submerged.[/QUOTE]
"What did they think was filling the overflow tank? " was a rhetorical question. But, it was one that could have, and should have been asked and answered by a competent engineer through the simple expedient of draining the tank bottom to have a look at what came out.
That and multiple other large red flags would have provided a rapid answer to anyone on that boat who could read a drawing and trace a pipe. The evidence indicates that no such person was present.
I’m chief engineer on a newer DE boat for ECO. I can’t talk for the chief on the Aiviq or how their OF tank operates. On the vessel that I am assigned to, the OF tank fills from the centrifuge. As the centrifuge ramps up or winds down, the feed pump continues to run until the centrifuge is at a complete stop. This fuel is dumped into the OF tank. Also, blocking the high level alarm only blocks the audible alarm, the level and visual alarm still operate. Now, we also have a GMR playback, GMR is graphic maneuver recorder. everything that happens with the PMS (power management system), automation systems alarms, tank levels and pretty much everything else is recorded and can be played back. There is no more lying because it is recorded along with the time of incident. I use it all the time to check alarms and sequence of events. Again, I can’t speak for the Aiviq or the crew, I don’t know if they have a GMR playback to follow the sequence of events and if they did, I’m sure it was analyzed. .
Perhaps it was a good decision to scrap the Kulluk after the bad publicity, but in the end there are no drilling units left with such capability to operate in ice. Unless someone orders such rig, it’s unlikely that we’ll see drilling in the high Arctic anytime soon…
Maybe no lives were lost or oil spilled but to have such avoidable human errors result in the loss of such a unique and valuable rig makes this incident a downright hideous maritime crime of the greatest proportions! What will be the cost now to build a new KULLUK and what delays will this cause Shell?
Maybe no lives were lost or oil spilled but to have such avooidable errors result in the loss of a valable rig makes this incident a downright heinous maritime crime![/QUOTE]
To be sure the Kulluk was the best Rig to drill in the environment. Should be noted she had successfully drilled in the Canadian arctic for years. Her hull design was well set up for this type of operation. And was the prime reason she was selected. It is certainly sad that she has ended her service life. From a purely practical sense there are many drilling rigs still being used that need to be addressed for future use. Please don’t read anything into that comment but globally there are many rigs being used that quite honestly are well past their service life. The Kulluk prior to this incident, most likely, had another 10 years of valuable service.
I don’t know the chief or the master for that matter, however I do believe the master worked many years in Antarctica. He was not towing of course, but he wasn’t ignorant to sever weather conditions. What really pisses me off when some people like to post things like “Bayou Ignorant”. You are classing an entire group of mariners. Ignorance is ignorance in Alaska or New York or China. Remember when the ferry crashed into the pier killing several people near NY. How did that mariner pass his CG physical? Don’t race to assume the Unions up there are not in bed with the CG. Besides, without this bayou ignorant industry down here, no one would even be talking about offshore exploration in Alaska.
[QUOTE=Bilgeman;135149]In the Oil Patch? The comment would be:
“That needs to be painted.”
A fresh coat of Paintenance would make it right as rain…and yes, I’m serious.
It’s not the Black Gang’s job to BUILD the ship, guy. It’s their job to operate it. You want to point a finger, point it at the shipyard.
Sadly, pretty much every shipyard I’ve ever been to, the yardbirds have had only two things on their mind…they knock off at 1700 and this heap has to float away on X date.
Again, every yard I’ve ever been to, they’re looking at their wristwatch and the calendar, and the company has been looking at the calendar and the hole in the bookkeeping where the day-rate for this boat should be,(as well as how much of a bonus they’ll get for shoving it out to sea before it turns into a pumpkin).
If you know of a company that gives the vessel’s chief engineer and its captain absolute veto power on the shipyard delivery date…the ironclad ability to make the yardbirds do it over again, and do it RIGHT this time, let me know, will ya?
I’d REALLY like to work for 'em.[/QUOTE]
I believe you hit a valid point here. We, and I use We as i have sailed years as Chief Engineer on various vessels - The ship design is something that the Engineer has to understand. both it’s capabilities and it’s limitations. the operation does not occur in a vacuum. And the ocean is a dynamic environment. If there is limitations in the engineering design that limits the operation in any way it falls to the Chief to communicate that to the Master-continually. After reading the report, I noted the alarms on the tow winch. I could very easily see that if that had occurred on my vessel I’d have most likely been called to address, and validate the set points and that the system was working correctly. But I did not read much addressing if the Engineers checked that. The overflow tank issues not withstanding. There is in most Engineering electronic systems /Automation. A TFO total fuel on board.
if your TFO is increasing then it’s not fuel. As fuel is consumed. and not generated. anything added is not fuel. I can think of many instances when this occurred where trouble shooting of the system discovered a crack in the tank, a rupture in a pipe that allowed a fluid other than fuel to enter the tank.
