[QUOTE=c.captain;134590]I wonder if our fine fellow is the unnamed “third mate” upon who’s watch the towline was allowed to tension out of control until the main tow shackle failed?
[/QUOTE]
More likely a troll and no friend of the captain.
Ok I was under the impression this was a forum for professional Mariners, but after READING Captains post I see other wise. I have made no indications as to my knowledge of towing and or the plans that proceeded the tow. What I will say is that I did work with the captain and for the time he was on the vessel he treated us crew members with respect and dignity. I may not be a officer, but respect from the crew is a reason for post about him. For someone to make personal attacks against a person based solely on actions in a situation is not a very professional direction on the part of some.
[QUOTE=Bmoore;134601]For someone to make personal attacks against a person based solely on actions in a situation is not a very professional direction on the part of some.[/QUOTE]
Well SIR!..there is a 152 page USCG report that I am at page 58 in reading that says otherwise…
best keep your yap shut now…
Then you clearly have little to no understanding of what you post.
[QUOTE=Bmoore;134603]Then you clearly have little to no understanding of what you post.[/QUOTE]
oh such a brave little man you are…
goodbye now!
Enjoy your miserable existence!
[QUOTE=Bmoore;134607]Enjoy your miserable existence![/QUOTE]
HAHA! I love making little men like you detonate. It gives my life real meaning and purpose!
[QUOTE=c.captain;134564]Besides, I know the chief engineer and can say my professional opinion of him as that he is all hat and no cattle. A big loudmouth who professes being so damned good at his job but never really did a damned thing to improve a situation aboard yet constantly bitching.[/QUOTE]
Y’know, I read a lot of your postings on these boards, and you always seem to have a lot to say.
So you know Carl, huh?
And you offer your “professional opinion”?
Then why not do so under your professional name?
A “big loudmouth who professes to being so damned good at his job…”
Who got the Aiviq’s engines started?
Was it Jesus? No…it was Carl and his crew.
And who towed Kulluk off the rocks? You? No. It was the Aiviq.
Getting the engines started again from the “slime”…you DID read where the USCG confirmed that there WAS “slime”, right?( just as Carl had claimed), was THE essential element that kept this accident from becoming a tragedy.
Frankly, sport, you’re the one who sounds like “all hat and no cattle”.
Assuaging your past butthurt by taking pot-shots at some fellow’s back from the anonymity of an internet BBS account.
^ You should reread the report - the problem with the engines wasn’t slime it was seawater.
Several main engine fuel injectors were examined following the casualty. These fuel injectors are a critical engine component that feeds fuel oil into the cylinder of a marine diesel engine at precise pressure and combustion patterns. An injector examined by the Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) on behalf of Edison Chouest Offshore indicated that there was extensive internal corrosion which resulted in the injector check valve (pintle) becoming seized
in the injector tip nozzle assembly. The “frozen” pintle rendered the injector inoperative. Four injectors examined by Caterpillar , the engine manufacturer, showed similar corrosion to internal components. Metallurgical analysis using Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy confirmed high content of iron and oxygen (i.e. rust) and high levels of sodium, chlorine, calcium, and potassium on all internal parts. These elements are major components of seawater
.
The seawater entered the vents from flooding on deck in heavy weather.
Evidence strongly suggests that the fuel overflow tank was full prior to the AIVIQ’s engineering casualty that occurred on December 27. The circuit breaker for the fuel oil overflow tank alarm had been secured for unexplained reasons sometime after midnight on December 26. The fuel overflow tank was not pumped down until after the casualty. The failure to immediately pump this tank down may have resulted in the tank/ overflow header becoming full of contaminated fuel, filling the vent/ overflow header and offering an opportunity to contaminate other fuel tanks, including the day and settling tanks. It also strongly suggests that the AIVIQ Chief Engineer did not realize the potential for water intrusion through the vents,despite the fact that he had recommended in his maintenance report that the following log appears in his maintenance report to Edison Chouest on December 25 the“Tank Vents in both Port and STBD safe deck passages will need to be removed and inspected for damaged caused by storm, some vent screens and vent check balls will be required.
He might be a good C/E but the fuel his engines were getting had rust and sea water. Plus fuel management not in accordance to procedures. Not to mention several other serious engineering issues.
[QUOTE=Bilgeman;134616]Getting the engines started again from the “slime”…you DID read where the USCG confirmed that there WAS “slime”, right?( just as Carl had claimed), was THE essential element that kept this accident from becoming a tragedy.[/QUOTE]
some form of slime in the DGE Racors is all I read in (108.), otherwise destroyed injectors due to massive water contamination. All through the report is water in the fuel service tanks and the failure to prevent the ship from going DIW was all human caused by allowing the water to get into the service tanks in the first place (Coon Assed ship design) and not recognizing it was in there before the injectors were destroyed (engineering fuel management). Even the master is telling the CO of the ALEX HALEY they have water in the fuel which was recorded but later it is all attempted to be buried by bullshit of some mystery additive which never was found.
Carl was lying his ass off under oath in front of the USCG and you are full of it yourself for trying to cover his sorry behind. And getting the ship running again was not simply Carl but an entire team…he did not do that by himself but he and his first allowed the water to destroy all those injectors!
btw, nice username you picked…sounds fitting for you!
Didn’t they have to airlift in new injectors and a CAT specialist or two to help get the engines going???
Slime is slime…what it was from, who knows? But Carl’s claim of slime was confirmed.
And right now, that puts HIS credibility head and shoulder over YOURS, anonymous poster who has made his enmity for the man abundantly plain.
Carl was lying his ass off under oath in front of the USCG and you are full of it yourself for trying to cover his sorry behind.
Lying under oath is perjury, a felony.
And stating without equivocation that someone committed a felony without a shred of proof is libel and slander, fella.
Oh yes, “C-Captain”…your professionalism is shining right through here!
And getting the ship running again was not simply Carl but an entire team…he did not do that by himself but he and his first allowed the water to destroy all those injectors!
Yeah? You may have missed it in your carpet-chewing rant, but I SAID:
“…it was Carl and his crew…”
I know this because I’ve worked for Carl since 2001, and hope to do so again.
He’s the kind of 1st and now Chief that earns a guy’s loyalty.
So does the Captain who was on Aiviq, as HIS guy has come out to his defense.
It appears that the concept of crew members defending and protecting their current and former superiors is an utterly alien concept to you, but then not ALL ships are commanded by the type of men who are anonymous back shooting cowards.
btw, nice username you picked…sounds fitting for you!
Ooooooh! You REALLY took the gloves off for THAT one.
That STUNG!
(Did you think that one up by yourself?)
I posted before how I was curious to the sequence of engine failure. The C280 Cats turbo inlet temps will skyrocket with the loss of 1 or 2 injectors. Did the Triplex Racor primaries have water sensors?
The story I heard was the techs didn’t hit the deck in thick of it. The chopper wouldn’t lower them down but sent the injectors. I believe the crew got things going from there. If I heard correctly it was only a couple of engines at first. Also hear the tech flew up in Gary’s private jet. They had to make several stops because the injectors could not all be obtained in one place.
This is from the report:
Racor RVFS1 fuel filters are provided on the fuel supply line for each main engine.Sight glasses or water monitoring probes can be installed to indicate water contamination, but neither were installed.
115
This would require routine draining of the filter to check for the presence of water, a practice which cannot be verified occurred within the routine watch system of the engine room. The manufacturer of the filter stated that if water was not drained from the filter bowl then water could pass through the filter element and into the engines fuel system. Additionally, the Chief Engineer testified that all engines maintained good fuel pressure and normal filter differential pressures prior to the casualty. It appears the Chief Engineer incorrectly assumed that water in the fuel would cause high differential pressure in the fuel filters.
The filter manufacturer identified that if the RVFS 1 primary filter accumulated water there would be no significant increase in pressure before the water would be passed through the filters to the engines.”
[QUOTE=c.captain;134592]I believe poor wretch’s name John Skoglund…a pie eyed disciple of Mr. Gary to be sure! How else would one get the job? Not like they went looking for a man with the right experience outside ECO’s ranks of sycophant kool-aid drinkers.
btw, I agree with you about “blind devotion” in the GoM. saw it all first hand at OCLLC. How else could a blithering illiterate idiot make chief engineer unless he had a senior captain smoothing the waters for him? Oh, how I could tell sorted stories but I will defer.[/QUOTE]
Just a comment. The Report blocked out the names of ALL. Does it give any validity to call them out? According to the report many may face further action against their tickets. Just my own thoughts on the subject.
Pray tell, how much “experience” and how many certificates does one need in order to understand what the eventual result of repeatedly putting that much tension on the gear will be — “quality” wire or not ?
The energy absorbed in a heavy tow stopping a big tug dead in the water and the gear coming taut is pretty [I]“jump out of bed from a dead to the world sleep and adjust friggin gear / speed / course RIGHT NOW”[/I] self-evident. Perhaps understanding what WILL happen unless you deal with it should be a qualification for working on a tug, such as knowing, “do not stand in the bight.” At least it was where I worked.
Exactly “why” the gear repeatedly coming taut wasn’t dealt with effectively did not appear to be addressed in the Report, but the real reasons (not just sordid stories) would be interesting to know. There are reasons that led to the actions of what most people would think were well intentioned people.
Understanding those reasons would help prevent similar accidents.
.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;134619]^ You should reread the report - the problem with the engines wasn’t slime it was seawater.
The seawater entered the vents from flooding on deck in heavy weather.
He might be a good C/E but the fuel his engines were getting had rust and sea water. Plus fuel management not in accordance to procedures. Not to mention several other serious engineering issues.[/QUOTE]
There’s two problems I see with that, K Cap:
1st, the USCG’s own timeline doesn’t support its own assertion that the C/E was unaware of possible seawater intrusion.
On Christmas Day he sends ECO his Morning Report about tank vent repairs/ possible damage. On the 26th the FO Overflow tank alarm is silenced, and the Aiviq goes DIW on the 27th.
They seem to try to attach some great significance to the fact that the o-flow tank wasn’t pumped out until after the incifent ,(gee…maybe they were busy getting power back and trying not to get broached or pooped?), but this then beggars the question if they took samples from the o-flow tank? And if not, why not?
2nd, since samples are usually taken from tank drains and drains are habitually located at the bottom of the tank as opposed to the top, its not at all surprising that there would be water, rust,corruption and maybe a half-eaten burrito in the sample, right?
Now if the tank vents were poorly designed or improperly installed, that’s a totally different issue, and if they are not the proper type of vents to go toodling off into the winter GofA with, that’s something else again.
But if either the above is the case, that hardly constitutes negligence on the C/He’s part, does it?
If GM sells you a car with faulty steering and bad brakes, I think it would be mighty unsporting to claim that your car wreck was due to “Driver Error”, yes?
[QUOTE=mainecheng;134636]Just a comment. The Report blocked out the names of ALL. Does it give any validity to call them out? According to the report many may face further action against their tickets. Just my own thoughts on the subject.[/QUOTE]
The Anchorage Daily News attended the USCG hearings in Anchorage and published the names of all the AIVIQ officers who testified, including Skoglund. Many other publications picked up the story and published the names as well. Their names have been out in the public domain for around a year. It probably won’t be long before enterprising reporters match the names from the original testimony to the redacted report that was just released.
The KULLUK incident has set back Arctic Drilling for years, maybe forever. John Skoglund has done tremendous damage to the Alaska economy. Perhaps, even more damage than Joe Hazelwood. Only time will tell.
[QUOTE=+A465B;134639]Pray tell, how much “experience” and how many certificates does one need in order to understand what the eventual result of repeatedly putting that much tension on the gear will be — “quality” wire or not ?
The energy absorbed in a heavy tow stopping a big tug dead in the water and the gear coming taut is pretty [I]“jump out of bed from a dead to the world sleep and adjust friggin gear / speed / course RIGHT NOW”[/I] self-evident. Perhaps understanding what WILL happen unless you deal with it should be a qualification for working on a tug, such as knowing, “do not stand in the bight.” At least it was where I worked.
Exactly “why” the gear repeatedly coming taut wasn’t dealt with effectively did not appear to be addressed in the Report, but the real reasons (not just sordid stories) would be interesting to know. There are reasons that led to the actions of what most people would think were well intentioned people.
Understanding those reasons would help prevent similar accidents.
.[/QUOTE]
Perhaps someone could repost that video clip of the AIVIQ’s tow wire coming taut and jumping up off the deck. That clearly told us why the tow gear failed, and that the captain didn’t know any better.